The articulation of hegemonic power through television : Islamic Republic's discourses regarding Iranian everyday life by Khoei, Seyed Mohammad Mahdi
Khoei, Seyed Mohammad Mahdi (2016) The articulation of hegemonic power through television : 
Islamic Republic's discourses regarding Iranian everyday life. SOAS, University of London.
http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/id/eprint/23578 
Copyright © and Moral Rights for this PhD Thesis are retained by the author and/or 
other copyright owners. 
A copy can be downloaded for personal non‐commercial research or study, without prior 
permission or charge. 
This PhD Thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first 
obtaining permission in writing from the copyright holder/s. 
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or 
medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders. 
When referring to this PhD Thesis, full bibliographic details including the author, title, 
awarding institution and date of the PhD Thesis must be given e.g. AUTHOR (year of 
submission) "Full PhD Thesis title", name of the School or Department, PhD PhD Thesis, 
pagination.
 1 
The Articulation of Hegemonic Power 
through Television:  
Islamic Republic’s Discourses Regarding Iranian Everyday Life 
 
 
 
Seyed Mohammad Mahdi Khoei 
 
 
Thesis submitted for the degree of PhD 
2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
School of Arts, Centre for Media Studies 
SOAS, University of London 
   
 2 
Declaration for SOAS PhD thesis 
 
I have read and understood regulation 17.9 of the Regulations for students of the 
SOAS, University of London concerning plagiarism. I undertake that all the material 
presented for examination is my own work and has not been written for me, in whole 
or in part, by any other person. I also undertake that any quotation or paraphrase from 
the published or unpublished work of another person has been duly acknowledged in 
the work which I present for examination. 
 
 
Signed: ________________________________________ Date: _________________ 
  
 3 
ABSTRACT 
 
The Islamic Republic of Iran’s discourse has been articulated differently throughout 
various periods of its history. After the presidential election of 2009, this discourse was 
confronted by a crisis brought its hegemony into question. The claim of electoral fraud 
by the predominantly middle class residents of Tehran produced the “Green 
Movement”—with unprecedented protests and subsequent repression. Despite the 
repression, the Islamic Republic’s discourse also needed to form a kind of subjectivity 
among the middle class in order to remain hegemonic. The middle class in Tehran has 
always played a significant role in major social and political changes in contemporary 
Iranian history. Therefore, forming the subjectivity of the middle class secures the 
Islamic Republic’s discourse from losing its hegemony. Since 1979, Iranian state 
television has always represented the preferred meanings and ideal subject positions 
of the Islamic Republic’s discourse. Therefore, studying the representations of this 
apparatus reveals the articulation of the Islamic Republic’s discourse regarding 
different aspects of everyday life. Using the method of discourse analysis offered by 
Laclau and Mouffe, this research sets out to explore if the Islamic Republic’s discourse 
is the hegemonic discourse in forming the subjectivity of the Tehranian middle class 
after confronting a dislocation in 2009. The preferred meanings and ideal subject 
positions of this discourse were explored by studying three of the most popular 
television series in the four years following the events of 2009. The hegemonic 
appropriation of these meanings has been examined through conducting interviews 
with middle class residents of Tehran. Brining these two elements together, the 
research demonstrates that the Islamic Republic’s discourse has constructed a 
depoliticised subjectivity among this class that not only prevents the discourse from 
being dis-articulated, but also can advance its desired articulation within various 
realms of the middle class’s everyday life.   
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION1 
THE CONTEXT OF THE STUDY 
The Iranian revolution of 1979 caused the collapse of the Pahlavi dynasty. On 1 April 
1979, a referendum of 98% of Iranians resulted in the formation of an Islamic Republic 
as the political system for the country. This political system was one based on 
ideological Islamic values, specifically, on a Shiite reading based on Ayatollah 
Khomeini’s interpretations of Islam. Ayatollah Khomeini, who is known as the leader of 
Iran’s Islamic revolution, was seeking to build a system led by Shiite clergy and the 
protection of Islamic Jurists (velayat-e faghih)2. As the head of state, the Supreme 
Leader (Vali-ye faghih) 3  determines the main policies of the regime in the 
establishment of an ideal Islamic Republic. The changes of the 1979 revolution resulted 
in the new Iranian administration seeking the promotion of its desired ideas for 
different aspects of society and making changes among the previous regime’s social 
order, according to ideas that were first, against the previous regime’s ideas of 
governance, and second, in accord with Khomeini’s theory of Islamic government.  
For instance, in the realm of politics, the emergence of the Islamic Republic and the 
approval of constitutional law according to this political system caused Islamists, and 
especially the clergy, to become significant and decisive in ruling the country. As a 
consequence, secular political groups and non-religious individuals, including leftists 
and liberals, were eliminated from the political administration of the country. In the 
realm of the economy, new forms of economic policies emerged during the early years 
of the revolution, which were based on criticising consumerism and dependency on 
the West. These policies led to the imposition of sanctions from the West during the 
war between Iraq and Iran (September 1980 to August 1988) and the early years of the 
revolution, and this led to a homogenous type of consumption in Iranian society. Since 
the diversity in commodities was reduced due to the cessation of imports from                                                         
1 In the whole of this research, I refer to the term “Islamic Republic’s discourse” as “IRdisc”. 2 Ayatollah Khomeini developed this concept in his book “Islamic Government” (Hokumat-e Eslami), 
which was first published in 1970. Referring to this concept, Khomeini, in his book, argues that the 
country should be run according to Shiite Islamic laws, and a Shiite clergy (faghih) should supervise all 
aspects of government for this to happen. 3 Ayatollah Khomeini himself was the first Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, and after he died in 
June, 1989, Ayatollah Khamenei became the Supreme Leader and has ruled until today. 
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Western countries, both in terms of commodities and of essential products for 
factories, people had to consume the same commodities, which were mostly the 
products of internal workshops, without having many or various options (Karsh, 2002, 
p57).  In the realm of culture also the importance of Islamic values (based on the 
Islamic Republic’s readings of these values) led to the kind of cultural policies that, for 
instance, led to compulsory Islamic dress codes and headscarves (hijab) for women 
and the Islamisation of universities. 
According to the changes that the Islamic Republic of Iran was pursuing in the different 
realms of social life, a new lifestyle emerged for citizens that were based on the ideas 
of the Islamic Republic. This new lifestyle was sometimes promoted by using 
government force, but the ideal of the Islamic Republic was to cause satisfaction 
among the citizens in order to accept the Islamic lifestyle that was based on the 
principles of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The desired and preferred meanings of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran regarding different aspects of social life that were constructing 
the lifestyle and everyday life of citizens, must therefore be accepted by citizens and 
must become the preferred meanings in their identities. This means that, on the basis 
of the benchmark values of the Islamic Republic, which were promoted by Islamist 
revolutionaries and were formed according to the Ayatollah Khomeini’s interpellations 
of political Islam in order to build an Islamic state, a discourse was formed that has 
sought to prefer its desired meanings in relation to the everyday life of Iranians. Since 
it is impossible to reach this discourse and to grasp it as a coherent entity, which has 
been formed and presented by the state in order to transform everyday life (because, 
as I will discuss in the theoretical chapter, discourses are not matters that are 
recognisable out of contexts), then, in order to grasp this discourse and its preferred 
meanings, everyday life should be considered as the realm of the emergence of 
discursively-preferred meanings. Meanings that construct everyday life and articulate 
the discourse of the Islamic Republic of Iran are recognisable in the efforts of this 
discourse to have a preference for them in everyday life and its different aspects.  
This discourse, by using apparatuses like the mass media and the educational system, 
which were seized after the revolution, has sought to institute a preference for its 
desired meanings among citizens. Understanding the achievements of this discourse in 
creating preference for its desired meanings seems impossible, unless by examining 
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the lifestyle and scrutinising the everyday life of the citizens that this discourse is 
attempting to persuade. Hence, in order to grasp this discourse and the meanings that 
have formed it, on the one hand, and, on the other, to understand the success of this 
discourse in relation to its preferred meanings among citizens, it seems necessary, 
first, to study the apparatuses that this discourse is using to spread its preferred and 
desired meanings, and, second, to study the achievements of this discourse in 
achieving the preferred discursive meanings in the realm of everyday life and among 
the citizens of the Islamic Republic.  
THE AIM OF THE RESEARCH 
One of the most important apparatuses that discourses benefit from in order to 
develop satisfaction among citizens through accepting their preferred meanings is the 
media. Media, on the basis of their nature, are mostly consumed in leisure time. The 
media have made it possible to cause effects on audiences through representation 
strategies that result in the acceptance of discursively preferred meanings that are 
behind media productions for the audience, although audiences have the possibility to 
be active and effective in reading media texts. Television is known to be the most 
important and most consumed media worldwide and this is also the case in Iran. 
According to the results of a census, 98.4% of Iranians have a TV set at home, while 
57% have radio, 45.9% have a PC or laptop, and only 37.8% have access to the Internet 
(Statistical Centre of Iran, Census of 2013). According to the Constitution of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran (Article 175), the production of television and radio content in Iran is 
the exclusive right of the state. This right was given to the Islamic Republic of Iran 
Broadcasting (IRIB) organisation, which is a state organisation under the direct 
supervision of the supreme leader. According to Iran’s constitution, IRIB programming 
(or as it is called in the official literature of the IRdisc: The National Media: Resane-ye 
Melli) is the only legal television use in Iran. Although this monopoly has shifted due to 
widespread illegal use of satellite TV, still the only legal form of TV consumption in Iran 
is through consuming IRIB productions and programs (the evolution of Iranian state 
television will be discussed in the chapter three). On the basis of this exclusivity, media 
apparatuses are among the most effective tools for the state to promote its desired 
discursive meanings among its citizens. The study of the media apparatuses of the 
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Islamic Republic brings us the possibility to understand and determine the preferred 
meanings of the IRdisc. According to the nature of television and its close connection 
to everyday life, studying state television also makes it possible to achieve the 
meanings that this discourse is trying to prefer in relation to different aspects of 
everyday life.  
The formation and transformation of the IRdisc has been the subject of study in much 
research. The social and economic context of the Revolution (Abrahamian 1982, 
Keddie 2003, Kurzman 2005, Tavakoli-Targhi 2001), the effect of the discourse 
promoted by the state in cultural changes (Sreberny and Torfeh 2013, Varzi 2006, 
Gheissari 2009, Dabashi 2007) and the social and economic transformations of Iranian 
society under the IRdisc (Behdad & Nomani 2006, Bayat 1997, Adelkhah 1999) have all 
been studied and discussed by various thinkers. Many scholars have studied the 
operation of the Islamic Republic in different eras and periods. The important point 
here is that, in considering the nature of discourses, discursively preferred meanings 
are being articulated differently in different eras as a consequence of contextual 
objectivity (as I will discuss in the theoretical chapter, discourses are historic matters 
that are related to the objectivity of the context). In the case of the IRdisc, different 
articulations are also determinable in different periods according to the contextual 
circumstances. Namely, this discourse, in different periods since the 1979 revolution, 
has sought to prefer different meanings in relation to the everyday life of citizens. 
Consequently, the utilisation of this discourse by the media apparatuses has been 
transformed in different eras. By emphasising the exclusivity of TV productions in Iran, 
the study of these productions in the different periods since the revolution will 
demonstrate the desired articulation of the IRdisc in relation to its preferred meanings 
in each period. For instance, the study of state television productions during the Iran-
Iraq war demonstrates the preferred meanings that the IRdisc articulated regarding 
that period4. The study of state television productions in the years after the war shows 
the preferred meanings of this discourse in relation to aspects of everyday life during                                                         4 Varzi, in her book “Warring Souls” (2006), did an outstanding job of analysing a TV program called 
“Revayat-e Fath” (Chronicles of Victory) which was broadcast by state television during wartime. She 
considered the preferred meanings of the concepts “War” and “Victory” in the Islamic Republic’s 
discourse in the mentioned TV program, and the effects of these meanings on the construction of 
Iranian everyday life, both during and after the war.  
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the reconstruction era after the war. Although, according to the discursive redlines of 
the IRdisc, during all periods and eras following the revolution, the same policy is 
recognisable in broadcasting, but the emphasis of this discourse in each periods, 
according to the contextual circumstances, was definitely on the preference for 
different meanings in regard to different aspects of Iranian everyday life (this will be 
discussed in the chapter three of the dissertation in some detail). As will be discussed 
in the theoretical chapter, preferring certain discursive meanings among people, 
means making them satisfied about acting according to the meanings that are the 
desired meanings of the discourse studied. These meanings and the acts of individuals 
in relation to them (either through acceptance or ignorance) form everyday life. 
Whenever a discourse is successful in gaining preference for its desired meanings, 
consequently that discourse becomes more powerful and hegemonic in forming 
everyday life. The main question of the current study is forming here: to what extent is 
the IRdisc the hegemonic discourse in forming the everyday life and identity of the 
citizens of Iran according to the preferred meanings that have been represented in the 
productions of state television? Nonetheless, this question still seems a raw and vague 
question, since, according to what has been discussed before, this discourse in 
different periods, has sought to prefer different meanings according to the contextual 
circumstances. It therefore seems crucial to argue in which era (and why this era is 
significant), and according to what meanings (and why these meanings are significant) 
were represented on state television, and among which group of Iranian citizens (and 
why this group is significant) I am looking for the answer to this question: Can the 
IRdisc be considered the hegemonic discourse in Iran? 
Background to the Research 
Television and, as mentioned by Althusser (1971), “ideological state apparatuses” in 
general, are playing a significant role in forming the meanings in people’s everyday life. 
Various research has been carried out by a number of scholars about the close 
connection of the meanings that construct everyday life and TV texts (Williams 1975, 
Morley 1986, 1992, 2000, Silverstone 1994, Fisk 1987, 1990, Hall, Hobson, Lowe & 
Wills, 1980). Discourses that are behind television productions through the application 
of different strategies of representation in media texts are seeking to achieve certain 
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aims, such as the fixing of discursively preferred meanings in the identities of 
audiences, the naturalisation of these meanings, and the concealment of the fact that 
these meanings and identities that discourses are attempting to form are constructed. 
Discourses behind TV productions (like other discourses) are the articulations of 
different elements and meanings that have been formed around a specific nodal point. 
TV productions, according to the usage of different representational strategies, are 
attempting to represent discursively preferred meanings as the common sense and 
inherent and natural meanings of signs. Among various forms of TV productions, TV 
series, both in the number of their audiences and also their closeness to everyday life, 
are significant in promoting meanings that relate to different aspects of everyday life.  
Much research has been carried out to study Iranian media by considering different 
fields of media production. Although the number of research projects on Iranian 
television are fewer than those on other subjects, like Iranian cyberspace or Iranian 
cinema, but there are a few outstanding research publications in this field. Sreberny-
Mohammadi & Mohammadi (1994) have discussed the rise of television in Iran and the 
effects that this rise has caused for the Iranian revolution of 1979 and they have also 
discussed the early policies of the Islamic Republic in regard to the regulation of state 
television. Khiyabani (2010) has also studied the politics of broadcasting in Iran by 
considering the policies of TV broadcasting in Iran in three periods. In addition, a 
number of unpublished PhD theses have considered Iranian television policies in 
different areas. For instance, Guivian (2006), in his thesis about religion, television and 
culture in post-revolutionary Iran, has studied the representation of religious-
revolutionary ideas on IRIB and has considered the emergence of Islamic television 
after the 1979. Emami (1981), by presenting a historical narration of emergence and 
the evolution of the mass media in Iran, has studied the development of television as 
the most important form of mass media in Iran.  There has been little research on 
audiences and how they process state TV discourses, such as that which was 
undertaken by Ghaem (1996) on the audience’s use of video in the Islamic Republic of 
Iran, or the research of Abutaleb Juola (2007) about Iranian audiences’ perception of 
two satellite Persian language channels. This research, especially in the chapter on the 
subject of the study, has taken many of the benefits of this previous research in order 
to reach a historical narration of TV discourse’s evolution in Iran under the influence of 
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the state. Although the mentioned research is significant in studying Iranian television, 
and they are helpful in understanding state policies that relate to the production of TV 
texts, it can be said that the current study is significant and unique in the field of 
Iranian television study in two ways: First, in this research, the connection between 
state TV products and the preferred meanings of the IRdisc has been studied in order 
to elaborate the close connection between these products and the preferred meanings 
that the discourse of the Islamic Republic has desired to promote in different periods. 
By referring to TV products, I have tried to reach the preferred meanings of the IRdisc 
and, as I will discuss in the continuation of this section, the emphasis of this research is 
on popular TV series that have been broadcast by the state TV in a specific period. 
None of the mentioned research projects have studied Iranian TV products in this 
detail in order to grasp the preferred meanings of the IRdisc. Second, in this research 
the relation between the preferred meanings of the IRdisc and the subjectification of 
the Tehranian middle class (as I will discuss during the third chapter in this study) as a 
group that potentially has more possibilities to deconstruct these meanings, has been 
discussed. These attempts make this research unique. 
CONTEXTUALISING THE STUDY  
The subject of the current study is the analysis of the confrontation between two kinds 
of formations. First, the formation of the IRdisc in a specific era relating to specific 
aspects of everyday life, and, second, the subjectivity formation of the Tehranian 
middle class, which is potentially more able to deconstruct the preferred meanings of 
the IRdisc in relation to those aspects.  
A grasp of the first formation and the determination of which signifiers the IRdisc is 
trying to favour in its desired meanings, and what these preferred meanings are, 
became possible through studying popular TV series during the selected period of this 
research. Furthermore, understanding the second formation in relation to the 
favoured meanings of the IRdisc, which are represented in TV series, became possible 
by referring to the members of the middle class that the IRdisc has tried to encourage 
to take on its desired meanings. Conducting interviews with individuals who belong to 
that class, and to explore their preferred meanings, made the position of the 
interviewees clear in regard to the signifiers that the preferred meanings of the IRdisc 
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have represented in the TV series.  
The considered period in this research is between 2009 and 2013. Namely, this is the 
period in which the IRdisc experienced its most major crisis since the revolution. This 
was due to the country’s highest number of protests in the aftermath of Iran’s 2009 
presidential election. These protests, which are called the “Green Movement” 
(Jonbesh-e Sabz) by the protesters, has occurred more among the middle class, 
especially in the Tehranian middle class. So, on 15 June 2009, as the Mayor of Tehran 
said, almost 3 million citizens of Tehran (the capital) participated in an unprecedented 
demonstration in protest against the authorities (Etemad-e Melli Newspaper, 18 June 
2009). The Green Movement that emerged from the claims of fraud by the authorities 
in publicising the results of the presidential election of 2009, according to lots of 
scholars like Fadaee (2012, p70), Rieffer-Flanagan (2013, p222), Sadeghi, in Nabavi 
(ed.) (2012, p129), Khosrokhavar in Jahanbegloo (2012, p50), was a middle class 
movement. For instance, Sadeghi, in Nabavi (2012), sees the Green Movement as 
being a middle class phenomenon, especially in regard to its organisation and social 
networks. She believes that the participation of the lower classes in this movement 
was restricted to the less costly actions, like casting votes, rather than in taking part in 
mass demonstrations. Rieffer-Flanagan (2013) believes that the inability of the Green 
Movement, as a middle class movement with the demands for democracy and 
freedom to mobilise the lower class, is one of the reasons that this movement was not 
successful in causing political changes and reforms.  The Green Movement began in 
Tehran and was centred there and did not expand much to other cities, except for a 
few street protests in big cities like Isfahan and Shiraz, which have a high number of 
middle class residents.  
Research Question  
Now it seems possible to complete the main question of the current research: the 
IRdisc was facing its major legitimacy crisis in the almost 30 years since the 1979 
revolution, which was formed, and occurred, mostly through the mediation of the 
Tehranian middle class after the 2009 presidential election. During the four years after 
the election (meanwhile, this discourse was experiencing the crisis and the state was 
facing protests in streets of Tehran), the IRdisc, despite using its repressive forces, has 
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tried to articulate its preferred meanings that relate to some aspect of the middle 
class’s everyday life. Considering that Iranian state television has always represented 
the preferred meanings of the IRdisc in different contextual circumstances (this claim 
will be elaborated in a later chapter), the main question of this research will be: what 
discursive preferred meanings in regard to which signifiers (aspects of the everyday 
life) have been represented in the most popular TV series between the summer of 
2009 and the winter of 2013? Are these meanings significant and effective in 
constructing the desired form of identity (or, as will be discussed: the subjectivity) in 
the IRdisc among the middle class in order to remain the hegemonic discourse after 
experiencing its legitimacy crisis?  
The Necessity and Significance of the Research 
Finding answers to the above question is important and also necessary from two 
aspects: First, it is obvious that the Islamic Republic, during protests and 
demonstrations, which started from June 2009, has used its repressive forces in order 
to suppress the protests. Nonetheless, for how long can the state use its repressive 
forces? As I will discuss in the theoretical chapter, as Gramsci has argued, the 
hegemony of a discourse means its superiority in making people act and think 
according to constructed and articulated discursively preferred meanings. The 
hegemony of a discourse is a combination of elements of satisfaction and repression. 
Both of these elements can be obtained by the mediation of state apparatuses that are 
related to them. The Islamic Republic, by its mediation of repressive state apparatuses 
like the police, the courts, the anti-riot forces and the military forces, has repressed 
the protests. Nevertheless, this discourse needed to develop the satisfaction among 
the middle class in order that they will act according to its preferred meanings in order 
that it will remain as the hegemonic discourse in the construction of the subjectivity of 
this class. By considering Althusser’s (1971) definition of ideological state apparatuses, 
Iranian state television can be considered to be one of the ideological state 
apparatuses of the Islamic Republic to develop satisfaction among citizens, causing 
them to act according to its preferred discursive meanings. Studying the 
representations of Iranian state TV during the years after the emergence of the Green 
Movement therefore brings us the possibility to firstly determine the more significant 
 16 
signifiers in the IRdisc, which were the subject of representation during the legitimacy 
crisis, and, secondly, it leads to an understanding of the discursively preferred 
meanings of the IRdisc in relation to those signifiers. The common thought among 
people when they remember the Green Movement, is that the Islamic Republic, just by 
applying its repressive forces could suppress the protests and had therefore passed 
through that crisis. Nonetheless, this research is an attempt to argue that although the 
state used its repressive forces during the protests, this discourse was also seeking to 
encourage satisfaction among citizens through the IRdisc (or, as I will discuss in the 
theoretical chapter, it was seeking to form the subjectivity of citizens and to make 
them the subjects of its power) by articulating and representing its preferred meanings 
in relation to aspects of the everyday life of this urban middle class through the TV 
series shown on state television. Understanding these discursive meanings and 
determining the signifiers that these meanings have formed in regard to them, leads to 
an understanding of the articulation of the IRdisc. This understanding, if it is obtained, 
is significant and important, since it demonstrates the problematic of this discourse 
and it reveals the characteristics of the desired form of the subjectivity that this 
discourse is seeking to form. The recognition of these characteristics through the 
attempts of this discourse, in order to highlight them, is important, not only for 
understanding how the IRdisc has survived the legitimacy crisis, but also it helps us to 
comprehend the general attitude of this discourse in being, or remaining, the 
hegemonic discourse in constructing the subjectivity of the middle class. Since the first 
step to each beneficial criticism is also the understanding of the subject of the critique, 
the mentioned understanding can bring us the possibility of an advantageous and 
fundamental critique of the IRdisc according to its problematic and the characteristics 
of its desired form of subjectivity.  
Second, a comparative study between the articulation of the preferred meanings of 
the IRdisc and the subjectivity formation of the Tehranian middle class, by examining 
the hegemonic level of this discourse among this class, it brings us the possibility to 
understand what meanings are forming the everyday life of this urban middle class. In 
a chapter in this study and in a sub-chapter on the Tehranian middle class, I will argue 
why the subjectivity of Tehranian middle class is significant for the Islamic Republic, 
and why forming this subjectivity according to the desired characteristics of this 
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discourse could secure the IRdisc from being deconstructed. Many Iranian analysts 
who have studied the lifestyle of the urban middle class in Tehran believe that this 
lifestyle could be considered as a kind of resistance against the state and the ruling 
class, since it is inconsistent with the ideological values of the IRdisc in constructing the 
religious lifestyle (Kazemi 2009, Moghadam 2003, Moghissi 1999, Sreberny 2013, Varzi 
2006, Mahdavi 2008 & 2007, Sadeghi in Nabavi (ed.) 2012). Although this claim seems 
to be true when studying some aspects of the Iranian middle class’s everyday life, 
which has mostly been formed in contradiction with the ideological values of the state, 
such as their appearance in public (the hijab and fashion), or in their cultural 
consumption, but the question about the possibility of deconstructing the preferred 
meanings of the IRdisc by this middle class, throughout its everyday life and lifestyle, 
still remains. It means that just giving consideration to the objective lifestyle of this 
middle class, results in this lifestyle, and everyday life, being in contradiction with the 
ideological values of the IRdisc, is an incomplete consideration of everyday life. We 
need to seek answers to the question of the possibilities of this everyday life 
deconstructing the preferred meanings of the IRdisc. Finding answer to this question is 
impossible, unless through studying the meanings that construct the everyday life of 
this urban middle class. Analysing the everyday life of the Tehranian middle class and 
examining it according to the meanings that the IRdisc is trying to favour in regard to 
different aspects of this everyday life, leads to an understanding of the extent to which 
these middle class members can be considered to be the subjects of the IRdisc.  
This analysis also leads to an exploration of whether the middle class’s everyday life is 
a construction of the preferred meanings of the IRdisc in regard to meanings, which 
can sometimes be formed through indirect relation with its ideological values. 
Although the authority of the Islamic Republican state has always emphasised its 
ideological values, has the subjectification process of this discourse always been 
carried out according to its ideological values? Or is this discourse, with its articulation 
of meanings that do not seem to be ideological in the first place, trying to form a 
subjectivity that contains characteristics, which stops this discourse from being 
deconstructed? Surely the formation of this subjectivity brings benefits for the IRdisc, 
rather than just surviving the legitimacy crisis. These benefits may be grasped in 
relation to the political economy of the IRdisc, which has been formed based on the 
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lifestyle of this class that, if it is not Islamic, is also not a threat to the hegemony of the 
IRdisc since, as I will argue based on the findings of this research, these characteristics 
make the politics and the ideology move beyond the concerns of the Tehranian middle 
class and thus they smooth out the articulation of the IRdisc according to its desired 
meanings, which are related to the signifiers of politics and ideology. This research is 
therefore an attempt to grasp characteristics that construct the everyday life of the 
Tehranian middle class and to examine whether these characteristics, that form the 
subjectivity of this class, have been formed in relation to the preferred meanings of the 
IRdisc, or not? The findings of this research, in addition to exploring the desired form 
of the subjectivity of the IRdisc, reveals the extent of the hegemony of this discourse in 
forming the everyday life and the subjectivity of the Tehranian middle class. 
During the first section of the next chapter, which constitutes the theoretical 
framework of this research, I will discuss why studying everyday life, as the realm of 
the manifestation of meanings that construct the subjectivity of the actors in this 
realm (people) is significant, and may be beneficial in bringing the extraordinary out of 
the ordinary of everyday life, and transforming the power relations within this realm. 
Before addressing what the theoretical principles of this study are in the next chapter, 
the ensuing part briefly shows what is discussed in the chapters of this research 
dissertation. 
MAP OF THE RESEARCH 
The next chapter of this research demonstrates what the theoretical approach of this 
research is in studying the meanings that construct everyday life. In this section, I will 
start from the notion of everyday life and I will argue why the consideration of 
everyday life is both significant and beneficial. The approach of this research in 
considering the significance of everyday life for the study has mostly been formed 
under the influence of Lefebvre’s works. Then Foucault’s thoughts about the notion of 
power will be discussed in order to reach a proper understanding of power relations 
within everyday life, rather than what Lefebvre has suggested. Consequently, the 
importance of the concept of discourse, as the matter that constructs the power 
relation within everyday life, will be deliberated upon. The approach of this research, 
in considering the notion of discourse and applying the discourse analysis method, has 
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been formed under the influence of Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory. The 
concept of hegemony by Gramsci, as a key concept in forming Laclau and Mouffe’s 
theories on discourse analysis, will therefore be discussed as well.  In this chapter, I will 
also discuss the role of the media as an ideological state apparatus, as Althusser has 
suggested, in constructing meanings by discourses.  
In Chapter Three: Evolution of the Iranian State Television Discourse in Post-
Revolutionary Iran, I am going to argue that why and how the state television in Iran 
totally supports the ideas of the IRdisc through presenting a historical analysis of the 
evolution of the discourse of Iranian television, emphasising this evolution after the 
1979 revolution.  
In Chapter Four: Thinking about Middle Class in Oil-Rent Iran, the significance of the 
Tehranian middle class’s forms of subjectivities for the IRdisc will be discussed after 
determining what I mean by the Tehranian middle class and discussing how this class 
has been formed and transformed during contemporary Iranian history.  
Chapter Five will discuss the methodological principles of the research in considering 
the representation of the preferred meanings and the desired subject positions of the 
discourses that are demonstrated in television. In addition, the method of gathering 
and analysing data that has been applied is justified in this chapter.  
In Chapter Six: The Body of the Research, Findings 1: Analysis of the TV Series, after 
presenting a synopsis of each TV series, argues which are the preferred meanings of 
the IRdisc, represented in the three most popular TV series from 2009 to 2013 and 
relates them to the aspects of the everyday life of the Tehranian middle class and 
which of these meanings have been preferred by them. Consequently, in Chapter 
Seven: The Body of the Research, Findings 2: An Analysis of Middle class Attitudes, 
through analysing data gathered from conducted interviews, I will examine the 
hegemonic level of the Islamic Republic’s discursively preferred meanings in 
constructing the subjectivity of the Tehranian middle class. 
Finally, in Chapter Eight: Conclusion, I will share my responses to the main questions of 
this research and I will discuss how the characteristics of the constructed subjectivity 
influence the Tehranian middle class’s everyday life in favour of the IRdisc in order that 
it will remain the hegemonic discourse.  
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CHAPTER TWO: THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
EVERYDAY LIFE 
The rapid expansion of cultural studies in the last several decades, which has targeted 
the construction of meanings in societies as the main subject of consideration, has 
elevated “everyday life” as the realm of the manifestation of the constructed cultural 
meanings. Nonetheless, it seems necessary to argue what I mean by everyday life, and 
what the importance of this concept is that is considered to be the main realm that the 
meaning making processes are seeking to shape. When we are thinking about the 
concept of everyday life, and when we want to determine it objectively, we can find 
that this everyday life exists since we are living it, but we cannot indicate what exactly 
everyday life is, since it is so familiar and obvious to us. Consequently, the question 
arises:  if anything becomes familiar to us, does it mean that we understood it in the 
first place? We can acknowledge the importance of Hegel’s dictum: “the familiar, just 
because it is familiar, is not well known” (cited in Elden, 2004, p111).  
Henri Lefebvre, the premier theorist of the everyday, asks whether, if we accept the 
fact that this current everyday life, under the domination and influence of profit 
seeking systems, has become banal and trivial, then is the study of the banal and 
ordinary inevitably trivial in itself?  
 
Why should the study of the banal itself be banal? Are not the surreal, the 
extraordinary, the surprising, even the magical, also part of the real? Why 
wouldn't the concept of everydayness reveal the extraordinary in the ordinary? 
(Lefebvre, 1987, p9) 
 
The importance of studying everyday life becomes clear here. It may reveal the 
extraordinary in the ordinary. This means that Lefebvre sees potentials that are hidden 
in the heart of everyday life and, in his words, profit seeking systems are trying to keep 
these potential hidden, because the current situation of everyday life is beneficial for 
them in order that they can be powerful and dominant. The potentials of everyday life, 
if they are to be explored, could change the power relations and resist the existing 
form of power in societies.  
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Lefebvre (1987) argued that before the existence of the modern era, and before the 
emergence of the revolutions, which have formed the modern era and are known as 
the transformation point when we moved from the pre-modern to the modern era, 
the pattern of life has contained variety and significant difference at every level. This 
diversity and difference has never been completely and properly understood after the 
pre-modern era. Today, after the elapsed epoch of diversity, modern life is proceeding 
on its way to more similarity and uniformity. Different rationales, and even irrational 
doctrines, are demanding domination, not diversity (Lefebvre, 1987, p8). 
Meanwhile, a collection of systems or subsystems has been created that are trying to 
provide a collection of durable objects in order to achieve their profits. For example, in 
architecture or cars or the food industry we can see that what these systems are 
inclined to do is to develop subsystems, which are independent and distinct from each 
other. Diversity exists, but it is so obvious that this diversity and its variations are 
organised and predetermined by a predominant force, which must be explored. These 
predominant forces can be any form of force, such as the capitalist system, or market 
conditions, or an ideology, or a composite of them that aims at everyday life as the 
sphere from which to gain profits. Whenever these predominant forces are explored 
and understood, it will be understood that these diversities are fake and pre-ordered 
(Lefebvre, 1971). All these systems consider the everyday as a collection of functions, 
which provide relationships between all those systems that may seem different and 
diverse. Everyday life is thus the product of those systems.  
 
The everyday is therefore the most universal and the most unique condition, the 
most social and the most individuated, the most obvious and the best hidden. A 
condition stipulated for the legibility of forms, ordained by means of functions, 
inscribed within structures, the everyday constitutes the platform upon which 
the bureaucratic society of controlled consumerism is erected. (Lefebvre, 1987, 
p9) 
 
The first step in bringing out the potentials, which lie in everyday life, is to 
demonstrate the power relations in everyday life, which try to favour and expand their 
desired meanings. Consequently, it seems crucial to indicate that meanings, which 
have been represented as being immediate and natural, are constructed meanings, not 
inherent meanings. The construction of these meanings by power/s and favouring 
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them in relation to the different aspect of everyday life, inevitably will lead to the 
emergence of potential meanings, which have been marginalised, since particular 
meanings have been preferred in order to construct the realm of everyday life. In 
studying everyday life it therefore seems crucial to firstly understand what meanings 
construct everyday life and, secondly, in favour of what power/s, have these meanings 
been constructed? 
Lefebvre, in studying everyday life and all the meanings, which create everyday life, 
recognises power relations as being the most important elements that form everyday 
life and also that make it a problematic notion. Lefebvre analyses these power 
relations in everyday life by systematic sight. He believes that the produced and 
reproduced structures of the capitalist system have totally seized everyday life. These 
structures are dominant and, at the end of the day, they benefit the capitalist system 
by this domination (Lefebvre, 1971). 
Facing the realm of everyday life as the product of the systems that Lefebvre has 
mentioned (or, as I will discuss, as a product of forms of subjectivity that the 
discourses are trying to expand), we can choose two totally different strategies. 
Heidegger, the German philosopher, supports one of these strategies. He discussed 
this notion of the everyday as being a trivial fact that has no value to consider. He 
believed that the problem of the everyday must be solved from the transcendental 
point of view. We are not supposed to engage with the everyday in order to solve the 
problems of the everyday (Roberts, 2006, p17). Although what Heidegger referred to 
as the everyday could definitely be differently defined from the way in which Lefebvre 
sees this notion, but Lefebvre criticizes Heidegger’s notion of the everyday, and he 
believed that he undervalued it. For Lefebvre, everyday life has a contradiction within 
it, as it embraces both the trivial and the extraordinary. Lefebvre is critical of 
Heidegger's attribution of permittivity, triviality and anonymity to this notion, and 
thinks that Heidegger’s notion of everyday life is underestimated (Elden, 2006, p66 & 
76). Lefebvre brings up everyday life as a site of struggle. He believes that the Marxian 
concept of alienation is now flowing into everyday life, and the actors in this realm are 
alienated (Lefebvre, 1971). This means that everyday life is problematic.  
The realm of everyday life is the realm of the production and reproduction of powers 
according to their values and interests, but critical analysis of current everyday life 
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would provide possibilities to explore how power has been articulated in this realm 
and which meanings construct the current condition of everyday life. Lefebvre (1971) 
believes the everyday and everyday life, in its current form, it seems to be the sole 
reasonable source, with the grasp of its mediation as the common denominator and 
the basis of all existing power activities, and we can explore and perceive the 
functional relations and the diversity of power relations in everyday life. This will be 
the first step in rebuilding everyday life that is based on potential meanings, which 
have been hidden and marginalised. These potential meanings have potentials for 
constructing everyday life more justly and desirably as the realm of the equal 
appearance of all groups, classes, genders, races and religions. This research attempts 
to grasp some aspects of the everyday life of the Tehranian middle class in order to 
find what meanings, in favour of which form of power, construct the current 
conditions of everyday life. The study of everyday life is beneficial in order to reveal 
hidden potentials, which have been marginalised in this realm. This revelation is 
impossible unless we understand what meanings now construct this everyday 
according to the study’s context. 
If we divide Lefebvre’s project in studying the everyday life into three particular parts, 
in the first, Lefebvre speaks about the importance of the study of everyday life. In the 
second, he addresses the various relationships in everyday life and the question of 
what, and how, different forms of power affect everyday life, becomes important for 
him. In the third and last part, he particularises the ultimate purpose of his study of 
everyday life. 
Accordingly, the main question of this research will relate to the second part of 
Lefebvre’s project of studying everyday life: what meanings construct the Tehranian 
middle class’s everyday life, and how do these meanings become the preferred 
meanings in this realm?  
To grasp meanings, which create everyday life and address relations that flow into the 
heart of everyday life, having a consistent theoretical framework for this analysis 
seems to be necessary. This research tries to analyse power relations within everyday 
life by an approach instead of systematic analysis of power relations, as Lefebvre has 
applied in his analysis. This means that by dividing Lefebvre’s thoughts to consider 
everyday life in three parts, the second part, which is related to the analysis of power 
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relations, would be investigated by a broader theoretical analysis of power than that 
which Lefebvre has suggested. During the ensuing part of this chapter, I am going to 
present the approach of this research in studying power relations within everyday life, 
which is the Foucauldian approach. 
In this research, I am going to utilise the Foucauldian approach to the notion of power 
and I will elaborate on this approach, and why I have chosen it, in order to grasp power 
relations. Applying this approach inevitably leads to consideration of the notion of 
discourse, as the meaning making matter, which I will discuss consequently.  
I can express two significant reasons for theoretically distancing myself from Lefebvre’s 
systematic analysis of power relations. Firstly, Lefebvre’s systematic method of 
analysing power relations is particular to societies, which their cultural, economic and 
political systems have developed through the effect of the capitalist system. Mostly, 
the intention of Lefebvre in addressing the dominant power is in the capitalist systems, 
and he believes that what colonised everyday life is capitalism. Considering my study’s 
case, which is Iranian society, and considering the absence of the western form of 
capitalist system in Iran, compared with those in western countries, it seems crucial to 
have a theoretical formation that is more appropriate to investigating the conditions of 
the context.  
The second reason for avoiding the systematic way of analysing power relations is 
related to the general approach and the aim of this research. This research, which 
considers the articulation of hegemonic power within Iranian everyday life and 
through media, is going to be carried out under the influence of the Cultural Studies 
approach. The Cultural Studies tradition relating to the issue of power relations does 
not apply the systematic method of analysis as Lefebvre has suggested. In this chapter 
I am going to elaborate on the Foucauldian approach of this research to the issue of 
power, which is consistent with the general Cultural Studies approach. 
FOUCAULDIAN APPROACH TO THE NOTION OF POWER  
Foucault’s approach to power is not to theorise on this issue. What he proposed in 
relation to power was not a theory, but is an analysis of power. In his point of view, 
this analysis stands against a general theory of power (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982, 
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p.184). He believes that, instead of constructing a theory about power, we must create 
an analytical system with which to perceive the relations of power. 
 
If one tries to erect a theory of power one will always be obliged to view it as 
emerging at a given place and time and hence to deduce it, to reconstruct its 
genesis. But if power is in reality an open, more or less coordinated (in the 
event, no doubt, ill-coordinated) cluster of relations, then the only problem is to 
provide oneself with a grid of analysis which makes possible an analytic of 
relations of power. (Foucault, 1980, p199) 
 
Foucault (1982) believes that, in relation to the issue of power, instead of having an 
integrated look at the application of power in everyday life from the top to the 
bottom, or a restricted look at the political institutions, and even governmental power; 
we should consider micro-practices and analyse these behaviours in the sphere of the 
everyday. This leads to a better perception of power relations within society. 
The power is not just limited to political institutions, and power is not just applied from 
these institutions, but power works both from the bottom to the top and vice versa. 
Power is the general frame for all mandatory relationships formed at a specific time 
and in a particular society. Foucault believes that if we do not deliberate on power 
relations in the least possible form, and we do not study the unequal power relations 
in its corporeal and actual forms, then we are involved incorrectly in this assumption 
that every applied power in society is definitely operated from the top to the bottom 
by political macro institutions. The domination of actual social classes, or of totalitarian 
governments, is thus not the main matter of power. Indeed, it is true that in every 
society both dominant and marginalised classes exist, and the marginalised classes are 
subject to the operation of evident power more than the other classes are, but 
Foucault believes that power is applied both on the dominant and the dominated 
classes. The dominant class was exposed to the power before the dominated class. The 
values of power should firstly have been fixed in this class, which is supposed to be a 
dominant class, and then those values flowed and were dictated to the rest of society 
though the meanings of the created dominant class (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982).  
In Foucault’s argument (1980), power relations are intentional and non-subjective, 
Intentional allusions that there is no power that operates without any pre-existing 
collection of aims and goals, and the non-subjective signifies that the power has been 
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applied previously on the person who now seems to be the applying subject of that 
power. The power is not an institution or construction, but power is the name that we 
give to the complex strategic relations in a particular society. As he argues: “People 
know what they do; they frequently know why they do what they do; but what they 
don’t know is what, what the do does.” (Foucault, quoted in Dreyfus and Rabinow, 
1982, p187) 
Foucault believes that the power, for us, is not just a theoretical issue, but has evolved 
tightly with our everyday experiences. The power, in this sense, could be grasped as 
being the systems that Lefebvre sees as the mediators of domination. However, he 
sees the application of power within societies from the top to the bottom by 
considering the systems that colonise everyday life. Nonetheless, the power, in its 
Foucauldian sense, constructs everyday life by the application of processes of 
subjectification. Later in this chapter I will argue that what could be the hidden 
potentials in everyday life that Lefebvre mentioned are used when we analyse power 
relations within everyday life using the Foucauldian insight.   
What Foucault suggests for the analysis of power relations, is to start by analysing 
micro-practices and to demonstrate the role of power in forming these practices. He 
argues that other ways to analyse the concept of power mostly understand the power 
that is related to institutional forms of power application. Nonetheless if we want to 
distance ourselves from these points of view and to have an alternative approach to 
analysing power relations, we need a mediator that makes us able to undertake this 
analysis. Foucault suggests that this mediator could be considered as the forms of 
social micro-practices within everyday life.  
To understand power relations, we may study and perceive attempts, which aim to 
construct and reconstruct the existing order of micro-practices within society. In my 
opinion this is the exact point that Foucault’s perception of power associates with the 
notion of everyday life. Micro-practices are being formed and become meaningful in 
the sphere of everyday life; micro-practices form everyday life that is allied to power 
relations. If power, -not in macro forms, but in micro forms- is the issue for 
consideration, then everyday life, as the manifestation realm of micro-practices should 
be considered. Everyday life is full of detail and the micro-practices that are related to 
these details. This approach to power, and also to everyday life, as Lefebvre argued, 
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will lead to an exploration of the hidden potentials of everyday life in forming micro-
practices, and meanwhile these practices are being formed according to constructed 
meanings that are the results of a specific form of power articulation. Revealing the 
current form of power relations will lead to an exploration of potentials, which have 
been ignored in forming the current order of relations. This will also lead to the 
revelation of processes that form individual and collective identities (Dreyfus and 
Rabinow, 1982).  
The power, which is applied on people’s immediate everyday life, influences the 
processes of gaining an identity. People know themselves through the process of 
gaining identity from society. This process is dramatically under the effect of power, so 
people’s identity, and the way they are defining and recognising themselves, is 
continuing under the effect of power. This process is the one that Foucault called 
“subjectification” (Deleuze, 2006, p101). Foucault believes that revealing power 
relations in micro-practices within everyday life that are affected by the processes of 
subjectification, could lead to resistance to the process of subjectification by a 
particular form of power (Foucault, 1982).  
 
This form of power applies itself to immediate everyday life which categorises 
the individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own 
identity, imposes a law of truth on him which he must recognise in him. It is a 
form of power, which makes individuals subject. There are two meanings of the 
word subject: subject to someone else by control and dependence, and tied to 
his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge. Both meanings suggest a 
form of power which subjugates and makes subject. (Foucault, cited in Dreyfus 
and Rabinow, 1982, p 212) 
 
In Foucault’s opinion, the political forms of power which governments represent are 
different in particular societies. Different kinds of political power systems affect 
everyday life differently. Nevertheless, Foucault believes that what is common to 
different political forms of power, is their attempts to dominate a class or a group 
among all of their citizens (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982). This domination becomes 
possible when the identities of other people are formed in acceptance of the desired 
and preferred meanings of the dominant class. This power is that same power that 
dominates individuals’ identity and makes people the subjects of power. 
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Forms of subjectification may thus arise alongside governmental activities, and 
consequently forms of resistance against this kind of power become identifiable by 
revealing forms of subjectification. The aim of resistance, in this sense, is to 
demonstrate the hidden and ignored potentials that can be effective in forming 
individuals’ identities, by revealing the dominant form of subjectification. The ultimate 
goal of resistance is thus not to liberate individuals only from the domination of 
governments, political institutions and systems, as Lefebvre has suggested, but to 
liberate us from a way of subjectification that arises alongside governmental 
domination (Featherstone, 1991). 
 
The political, ethical, social, philosophical problems of our days are not to try to 
liberate the individual from the state, and from the state’s institutions, but to 
liberate us both from the state and from the type of individualisation which is 
linked to the state. We have to promote new forms of subjectivity through the 
refusal of this kind of individuality which has been imposed on us for several 
centuries. (Foucault, cited in Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982, p216) 
 
It is vital to mention that forms of power, which do not give individuals the right of 
choice, are not considered as power in Foucault’s reading of power. The right and 
power of choice is a matter of subjectification. This choice is considered to be the fact 
that forms and creates different forms of subjectivity. The right to choice provides the 
possibility of the non-conformity of subjectivities, and may form resistance against a 
particular form of subjectification. Forms of resistance are becoming meaningful and 
determinable by revealing dominant forms of subjectification and this can lead to the 
transformation of power articulations within everyday life. Resistance in the everyday, 
in this sense, means revealing the hidden potential of the everyday, which present 
alternative forms of subjectification.  
Considering that Foucault distinguishes a nature of subjectification for power, it seems 
crucial to answer this question: how does power make its subjects? Or, how do 
individuals become the subjects of power and obtain meanings, through which their 
acts, behaviours, and even their minds, are formed? In other words, how do 
individuals receive particular meanings and, accordingly, how do they form their 
lifestyle? By what process, and how, do particular meanings become preferred by 
individuals, and how do those meanings form their identities? 
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Due to this concern, Foucault has formed a notion that, by understanding this concept, 
it would be possible to grasp power relations in a particular context. This notion would 
help us to answer this question: How does power flow in societies, and how does 
power make individuals its subjects? This notion is called “discourse”. 
DISCOURSE THROUGH THE FOUCAULDIAN APPROACH 
In recent decades, the concept of discourse has been evaluated and has become 
important, especially among western scholars. Analysing this concept in each context 
and relating the abstract description of the concept to the concrete circumstances of 
its appearances has become the major aim of lots of the research that has been done, 
in recent decades. Although this concept was used by earlier thinkers, like Jean-
Jacques Rousseau and Thomas Hobbes, and as Torfing (1999, p84) has mentioned, it is 
possible to find the basis of discussion about this concept in Immanuel Kant’s 
philosophy and in Husserl’s phenomenology, but the recent application of this concept 
is totally different. Foucault was one of the most prominent thinkers who has evolved 
and developed the concept of discourse. He has expanded this concept so that lots of 
different intellectual attitudes, like poststructuralism are now using the concept of 
discourse in its Foucauldian sense.  
In this section, my aim, after a brief description of Foucault’s concept of discourse, is to 
presents an interpretation of this concept. This interpretation, firstly, does not have 
any contradiction with the Foucauldian sense of discourse, and, secondly, it gives me a 
framework, through which, accordingly, the method of my research, using discourse 
analysis, becomes clarified. This insight into the concept of discourse will be 
elaborated in the continuation of this chapter through the theory of discourse analysis 
suggested by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. Before elaborating Laclau and 
Mouffe’s discourse theory, I will briefly describe the notion of discourse in its 
Foucauldian sense.  
Foucault believes that discourses are acts that systematically form subjects. Discourses 
are not talking about subjects, and they do not determine the identities of subjects, 
but they create subjects. In the process of this creation, each discourse tries to hide its 
interference and lets subjects talk on its behalf (1972, p37).  
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Here, the meaning of subject is similar to what Foucault meant in the analysis of power 
relations. He argued that the aim of power is to create subjects, which the power is 
applied through their subjectivities and by them. These subjects, which have been 
created by power, become mediations for its application. So it is obvious that, in 
Foucault’s thoughts, different kinds of power construct their subjects by creating and 
developing different discourses. Subjects are constructed in and by discourses. In 
Foucault’s point of view, each discourse in each historical era has a collection of 
negative and positive rules, regulations and laws. These collections determine which 
issues are tolerable to speak about in each era and context, and which issues are not 
(Foucault, 1980, 1972). In other words, issues that it is possible or it is not possible to 
open a discussion about are determined by discourses. These unwritten collections of 
rules and regulations dominate behaviours, speech, and writing, and they form 
discourses in different historical eras, and even in geographical places. As Torfing 
explains, 
 
Our cognitions and speech-acts only become meaningful within a certain pre-
established discourse. However, there are two important differences between 
classical transcendentalism and contemporary theories of discourse. First, while 
classical transcendentalism conceives the conditions of possibility as ahistorical 
and invariable, the theories of discourse insist on the historicity and variability 
of discourse. (Torfing, 1999, p84) 
 
Different and dissimilar discourses present different ways of understanding the world, 
or even one aspect of it. Different understandings of the world among various people 
are based on the different discourses from which individuals gain their life’s meaning. 
Being the subjects of different discourses means having different understandings of 
the world, so different discourses construct different identities for different individuals 
(Laclau, 1993a, p435). 
Challenges and the differences between dissimilar kinds of knowledge in the 
investigation and analysis of a particular issue can be understood according to the 
differences among discourses. Each discourse presents its preferred knowledge to 
investigate a specific issue, such as a social phenomenon (Foucault, 1977, p27). 
The world has a discursive order and objects, ideas, behaviours, manners, etc., become 
meaningful according to discourses. So the world may gain a different meaning and 
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can be grasped differently through different discursive perspectives (Dyrberg, 1997, 
p90). In other words, although, ontologically, the world has unity, epistemologically we 
are facing different worlds and living in multiple worlds. When we speak about 
different discourses, it seems necessary to determine the domains and boundaries of 
each discourse according to its basic assumptions. Otherwise, assuming the existence 
of different and dissimilar discourses would be nonsense. Although, when we can 
successfully describe a complicated and developed system among various numbers of 
statements, theorems and propositions, and can determine its limits and domains, 
then we can say that we are facing a discursive formation (Smart, 2002, p40). This 
determination and description will be possible when we can discover some kind of 
regularity that relates to different features, like order, dependency, reciprocal 
relations, circumstances, functions, transitions and displacement, among matters, 
things, statements, theorems, concepts, contents, and propositions (Macdonell, 1986, 
p40). 
According to the dominant rules and regulations of each discourse, intentions are 
defined, subjects are constructed and issues are formed. It is worth noting that 
Foucault doesn’t stand just at the level of describing the dominant regulation of each 
discourse, but he relates the discursive nature of thinking to the social nature of 
discourses. As discourses cannot exist only in the abstract world and inexplicitly, so 
they must be something that embodies discourses in the concrete world (Dreyfus & 
Rabinow, 1982) 
In reality, and in the concrete world, social, economic and cultural behaviours and 
institutions support different discourses and embody them. So, discourses are not 
abstract notions but the methods of existence of discourses are basically materialistic 
and there has to be some concrete social mechanism for discourse to represent them 
in social realms (Macdonell, 1986). 
Foucault (1980, 1972) believes that each discourse has been formed according to 
limited numbers of statements. These statements need specific conditions, according 
to their functions, to emerge in the social world. So discourses, in this meaning, are not 
ideal and eternal, but they are temporal and historical. In Foucault’s thoughts, truth is 
the product of discourses and is discursively constructed. Different regimes of 
knowledge are determining, in different historical eras, that what is right (true) and 
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what is wrong (false). Hence, searching for pure truth outside discourses would be a 
vain attempt (1980, p118).  
The ultimate aim of Foucault, in considering discourses, is to search for different 
regimes of knowledge, which determine what is true and what is false, what is 
expressible and what is not expressible (Smart, 2002). From Foucault’s point of view, 
what has to be studied and analysed is discursive process, and discourses are formed 
through them. These formed discourses draw the impression that, with empathy and 
acceptance of their discursive statements, the true image of reality has been provided 
for us. As Jorgensen and Philips (2002) therefore argue:  
 
Foucault claims that it is not possible to gain access to universal truth since it is 
impossible to talk from a position outside dis- course; there is no escape from 
representation. ‘Truth effects’ are created within discourses. In Foucault’s 
archaeological phase, ‘truth’ is understood as a system of procedures for the 
production, regulation and diffusion of statements. In his genealogical phase, 
he makes a link between truth and power, arguing that ‘truth’ is embedded in, 
and produced by, systems of power. Because truth is unattainable, it is fruitless 
to ask whether some- thing is true or false. Instead, the focus should be on how 
effects of truth are created in discourses. What is to be analysed are the 
discursive processes through which discourses are constructed in ways that give 
the impression that they represent true or false pictures of reality. (Jorgensen & 
Phillips, 2002, p14). 
 
Here, it is worth mentioning that in his archaeological phase, Foucault wants to explain 
the discursive formation rules, which construct a particular discourse. Archaeology 
emphasises the break between different historical eras and wants to recognise these 
as independent and distinct eras. This can lead to the discovery of homogenous 
features and the dominant rules of a historical regime of knowledge (Smart, 2002, 
p62). Foucault’s approach, in his more latter works is genealogy. Relations between 
power, knowledge and truth became Foucault’s main concern in the genealogical 
phase. In fact Foucault’s genealogy is tied to the centrality of power in the formation of 
discourses, identities and institutions. This approach attempts to emphasise the 
power-centric nature of discourses (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982, p392) and, obviously, 
this research has taken benefits from Foucault’s thoughts in his genealogical phase.  
The processes of discourse’s formation are really important for consideration, in 
Foucault’s point of view. He believes that, during these processes, some discourses 
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become forbidden, some become suppressed and some become acceptable. 
Discourses, in these processes, are divided in categories like reasonable and 
unreasonable, rational and irrational, true and false (Foucault, 1972, p190). During a 
process, which was named by Foucault as “the will to truth”, reasonable, rational and 
true discourses become preferred. Foucault wants to discover rules and regulations, 
which are involved in determining true and false, reasonable and unreasonable, 
rational and irrational (Torfing, 1999, p91).  
The aim of this research in addressing the concept of discourse is therefore to obtain 
an explanation of discourse, which provides possibilities to deliberate on the main 
question of this research. Namely, the aim of this research in relation to the question 
of power and the notion of discourse is to discover and understand power-centred 
processes, which aim to make subjects for the IRdisc. 
 So, instead of expanding the concept of discourse by Foucault, in the next section I will 
refer to different accounts of the notion of discourse and then I will emphasise a 
theory that helps me in doing contextual discourse analysis both in theory and the 
derived method accordingly. 
Different Accounts of the Notion of Discourse 
Arguably the recent application of the concept of discourse in various studies in 
different fields of social science, which intend to carry out a kind of discourse analysis, 
have been influenced by Foucault’s considerations on this notion, even though 
different forms of discourse analysis have emerged and theorised regarding different 
definitions of the notion of discourse (Fairclough, 2003, p2). The main reason that has 
caused the formation of different discourse theories and application of different forms 
of discourse analysis is the debate over determining the extent of discourse in 
constructing the social and making meaning in regard to social phenomena (Mills, 
2004, p9).  
Considering the nature of discourse in Foucault’s thoughts, which emphasises the 
construction of social, political and cultural identities—or in Foucault’s term, 
subjectivities—by the mediation of discourses (Foucault, 1972, p49), the question of 
dividing non-discursive from discursive in this construction is the centre of 
consideration by different forms of discourse analysis or discourse theories. Responses 
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to the question of is it possible to determine discursive from non-discursive, have 
formed different definition of the concept of discourse depending on the position of 
researchers regarding debates between poststructuralists and structuralists over the 
essence of structures. 
Apart from the struggles between poststructuralist and structuralist scholars, arguably, 
poststructuralism is not a school of thought in opposition to structuralism. Rather 
poststructuralism has been formed in continuation of structuralism, since the jumping-
off place of both schools is language (Williams, 2005, p61). Both schools consider 
language as the starting point of meaning making processes within societies. The main 
difference between these two schools is in their approach to language as structure. For 
instance, Saussurian linguistic thoughts, which are based on structuralist thoughts, 
distinguish two different functions and scopes of language. Saussure elaborates one of 
them as langue (the system of language or the general section of language) and the 
other one as parole (language in its use and functions). In the structuralist point of 
view, parole is changeable, namely the function and use of language could be different 
in different contextual circumstances and could lead to production of different 
meanings, but language as the structure of expression is fixed and constant (Saussure, 
1974). Expanding the main argument of structuralism, which insists on existence of 
consistent determining structures, these structures could be any transcendental notion 
which structurally determines conditions of being social, like economy or ideology. 
Nonetheless poststructuralists reject the idea of essential structures and emphasise 
discursive nature of power relations in even forming structures which may seem 
constant and unchangeable (Williams, 2005, p8).  
Based on this understanding of structure, various forms of discourse analysis have 
been formed regarding their understanding of structures and the extent they consider 
for discursive practices in constructing the social (van Dijk, 1997).  
Although, Foucault in his archaeological phase, inspired by classical Marxism thoughts, 
believed that rules of different discursive formations have been conditioned by non-
discursive relations (Foucault 1972, 1981), in his genealogical phase, after elaborating 
analysis of power relations, Foucault is less concerned about dividing discursive from 
non-discursive and insists on constitutive relation between power and discourse and 
impossibility of having one without the other (Torfing, 2005, p7). For instance, 
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Foucault, contrary to Habermas who sees the ideal type of communication and 
rationality as relations which have eliminated power (Habermas, 1985), believes that 
both rationality and communication are been constituted through discursive power 
struggles (Foucault, 1980).  
It is worth mentioning that although it is possible to consider some feature of 
structuralist thoughts in Foucault’s archaeological phase, but as mentioned before, he, 
after expanding his analysis of power relations and after elaborating the centrality of 
power relations in forming, embedding and producing the truth in his genealogical 
phase (Foucault, 1986); has become the most prominent figure that has influenced 
poststructuralist thoughts in rejecting the idea of attainability of truth or perpetual 
structures. Foucault by rejecting essential structures and also by declining the 
centrality of human subjects as the source of application of power, has emphasised the 
discursive feature of power relations within societies.  
Considering the importance of the notion of discourse by Foucault, and debates over 
determining the extent of discursive practices in constructing the social; various 
methods of discourse analysis based on their definition of notion of discourse and 
determining the scope of discourse have been formed. In this regard Torfing (2005) 
has distinguished three generation of discourse theories. The first one considers 
discourses as linguistic practices and focuses on semantic aspects of written or spoken 
texts by applying methods like content analysis, conversation analysis or 
ethnomethodology (van Dijk, 1997, p3). In this kind of discourse analysis, discourse is 
defined as linguistic sense of textual unit that is more extensive than a sentence. The 
conditions of emergence of discourses and rules that may govern discourses are 
neglected in these kinds of analysis and conditions of discursive practices, not related 
to power relations (Torfing, 2005).  
The second generation which is more considerate about discursive practices, which 
lead to the construction of social, political and cultural identities and is more analytical 
regarding dynamics of power relations and discursive practices; is more influenced by 
Foucault in his archaeological phase. Analyses of this generation, firstly, are intending 
to analyse practices which construct subjects and identities and secondly, are 
considering division between discursive and non-discursive. The school of Critical 
Discourse Analysis (CDA) that is mostly inspired by Fairclough’s contributions to the 
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notion of discourse both in theory and application of methods (Fairclough, 1992 1995), 
is the most important form of discourse analysis of the second generation. In CDA the 
quasi-transcendental conception of discourse is rejected. In this approach discourse 
has been considered as a subset of social practices and is defined as empirical 
collection of practices that contain semiotic elements. However, the conditions of 
formation of discourses are tightly related to power relations in its Foucauldian sense 
(Torfing, 2005). Nonetheless in CDA some extra-discursive essentials like ideology are 
considered as influential factors in naturalising contingently constructed meanings 
within discourses. In CDA it seems that discourse is considered as a mechanism that is 
embedded in the independently existing structure of society (Wodak, 2001, p65). I 
believe the main controversial difficulty in adopting CDA as the theory of discourse 
analysis is determining the relation between discursive and its non-discursive context. 
However, CDA benefits from consistent and influential methods in analysing actual 
forms and contents of linguistic statements and semiotic practices and relating these 
to more widespread power relations.  
The third generation of discourse analysis which this research benefits from is 
consistent with poststructuralist thoughts and insists on contingent discursive meaning 
of all social phenomenons since they get their meaning from de-centred system of 
meaning construction. Centre here means any concept or structure that may seem 
consistent or perpetual like economy, ideology or social classes. Derrida (1978), as one 
the most prominent figures that supports this idea, believes that there is no 
determinative centre or essential structure regarding making meaning for social 
phenomena that its conditions of being essentially remain perpetual and 
unchangeable. Therefore, in each discursive formation, formation of meaning could 
continue infinitely and all structures and centres are provisional and may change or be 
displaced. In this generation, discourses are matters that make meaning for all social 
phenomena, but these meanings are partially fixed in and through discourses, which 
even construct meaning for objects (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985).  
Laclau and Mouffe, based on poststructuralist assumptions regarding impossibility of 
having perpetual structures, and inspired by Foucault’s analysis of power relations and 
discourse, have fashioned a coherent framework of discourse theory. The main 
concern in this framework is contribution to the change of discursive formations in 
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order to bring out the possibility of change from the heart of the social through 
understanding rules that govern the production of the social within discursive 
practices. Similar to Foucault, in his genealogical phase, Laclau and Mouffe in their 
discourse theory are not concerned with the truth or actual meaning of practices; 
rather they seek the conditions and rules of possibility of these meanings in order to 
change them.  
I should point out that Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory (DT) is a development of 
and departure from the second generation of discourse analysis as poststructuralism is 
a development of structuralism.  As Sjolander and Ryne (2011) argue, there are many 
similarities and also a few differences between CDA and DT. Overlaps are both being 
influenced by: Foucauldian perspective of discourse, Gramscian hegemony theory and 
Althusser’s thoughts of interpellation. Also, both see connections between power and 
discourse within processes of subjectification and believe our understandings of the 
world are socially constructed or discursively formed. In addition, both will contribute 
to social changes and believe in eventual changes of society (pp32-37). Torfing (2005) 
also believes differences between Fairclough and Laclau/Mouffe are small and there is 
not much to say, since in methods, both are concerned to analyse every text in its 
context by application of interpretative theories and methods in order to link micro 
and macro practices or agency and structures. However, in theory, the main difference 
is that in DT Laclau and Mouffe do not distinguish between discursive and non-
discursive; since, they believe the meaning of everything is discursively constructed 
and reject the idea of existence of any determining extra-discursive power at the level 
of economy or ideology (Laclau and Mouffe’s perception of the concept of ideology 
will be discussed within the coming sections of this chapter). Nevertheless, in CDA, 
Fairclough distinguishes between discursive and non-discursive and believes that 
discourses are somehow determined by extra discursive powers. Regarding the 
methods, CDA established the rich and detailed conceptual framework for analysing 
rhetoric of texts, however in DT, articulatory practices within texts are the subject of 
consideration. The methodology of CDA is blamed for its mechanical use of methods 
and balkanisation and reification of methodology, which leads to method-driven 
researches rather than problem-driven considerations (Howarth, 2005, pp317-18). This 
research has been done under the influence of DT, in both theory and methods and in 
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the next sections I will elaborate the framework of Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse 
theory in detail.   
LACLAU AND MOUFFE’S PERCEPTION OF THE NOTION OF DISCOURSE 
The concept of discourse in Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse analysis has been 
elaborated in Foucault’s discourse theories. Discourse, in their point of view, is a 
system of meaning that is even bigger than language (Smith, 1998, p85). Each 
discourse has become dominant in a different realm of society. Discourses form 
collective and individual behaviours by taking over their subject’s minds. Laclau and 
Mouffe have also used the Foucauldian notion of power in their discourse theory 
(Laclau 1993a). Foucault knows power is the driving force of society. He believed that 
this driving force became visible and emerged in societies in discursive forms. Laclau 
and Mouffe also believed that power, by emerging in its discursive form, is the driving 
force of societies. Laclau and Mouffe emphasise the power role in the development of 
different social formations. They believe that power is the driving force for all of the 
mechanisms and processes that make meaning in social life (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, 
p21). According to the Foucauldian notion of power in his genealogy theory, Laclau 
believes that the elimination of power causes the dispersion and disintegration of 
society. So it would be impossible to imagine a society without power relations (Laclau, 
1990, p32). 
Notable differences between the Laclau/Mouffe approach and Foucault’s approach to 
the concept of discourse can be summarised in two points. Firstly in explanation of 
discourse’s structures, Laclau and Mouffe use the Saussurian concept “sign”5, instead 
of “statement”, which was used by Foucault. Secondly, in Laclau and Mouffe’s 
approach there is no difference between the discursive and the non-discursive, they 
see all phenomena as discursive matters (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002, p19). 
The concept of discursive formation, in Foucault, is also analogous to the concept of 
articulation in Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse analysis. Since articulation, in their 
theory, is acknowledged as the process in which signs are binding together through its 
use and thus creates a particular meaning system. It can be said that using signs                                                         5 Sign is constructed through the relationship between the signifier (or expression) and the signified (or 
content). 
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instead of statements, as in Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse analysis, is a minor 
displacement that has caused there to be more flexibility in their theory.  
Laclau and Mouffe, with reference to the Saussurean linguistics, argue that discourses 
make the social world within the meanings. This creation is done by language, and 
language has an unstable essence. Language is not only playing a role in the 
representation of the reality, but also has a fundamental efficacy in creating reality. 
The access to reality is possible just through language, and there is no a priori 
predetermined reality. Changes in discourses will cause changes in a whole social 
system. Hence, disputes between discourses may cause either changes in a system of 
meanings, or the reproduction of the social reality (1985, pp105-14). 
It seems that the relationship between discourse and reality is a constructive 
relationship in Laclau and Mouffe’s thoughts. From their point of view, historical, social 
and cultural requirements and desires are constructed by the dominant discourses in 
each epoch. While these desires can claim a specific discursive formation (articulation) 
and make it dominant in the other epoch. Discourses reconstruct their meaning 
systems according to social and political requirements and demands. The shortcomings 
of the dominant discourse in solving existent social problems will cause other rivals 
discourses to provide their own solutions to overcome social difficulties (Smith, 1998, 
p50). It must be said that these problems are considered to be problems in the 
meaning system of the dominant discursive articulation, because they affect the 
practical functions of the dominant discourse in some social aspects. Consequently, it 
can be concluded that discourses are not immutable, closed matters. Discourses 
redefine their system of meaning and articulation according to the type of relationship 
that they have with other discourses. When a discourse can establish its system of 
meaning among its subjects (in other words, can make subjects according to its 
meaning system) and partly achieves a consistency and closure, then it has become the 
hegemonic discourse (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, p166). The articulation of a discourse 
is a sort of active and relational articulation. When the meaning system of a discourse 
loses its adaptation to the concrete world and current circumstances challenge its 
articulation, then we can say that discourse has started to decline. This decline will be 
the result of the incompatibility of the meaning system of the discourse with the 
concrete world. Inversely, when a discourse can adapt its meaning system to the on-
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going circumstances of the social world, then its level of acceptability will increase 
among its subjects and agents (Laclau, 1990, p66). Overcoming the difficulties, which 
are affecting the existing articulation of a discourse, will cause satisfaction in the 
current meaning system by the social agents. In other words, it will increase the 
number of subjects for discourses, both qualitatively and slightly. A discourse thus 
makes itself the hegemonic discourse. The consequence of becoming hegemonic, for a 
discourse, is the highlighting of its system of meaning and of marginalising other rivals’ 
discourses. In the coming parts of this section, I will elaborate on exactly what 
hegemony means. Considering the idea of the impossibility of closure in the meaning 
system of discourses, Jorgensen and Philips believe:  
 
The overall idea of discourse theory is that social phenomena are never finished 
or total. Meaning can never be ultimately fixed and this opens up the way for 
constant social struggles about definitions of society and identity, with resulting 
social effects. The discourse analyst’s task is to plot the course of these 
struggles to fix meaning at all levels of the social. (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002, 
p24). 
 
A Conceptual Framework for Discourse Analysis  
If we want to take advantages of the theoretical potentials of Laclau and Mouffe’s 
discourse analysis for analysing social, cultural and political phenomena (Iranian 
everyday life and state TV, in my research case), we have to be familiar with some 
terms and concepts, which they have used in order to establish their theory. The 
concept of articulation is one of the most important concepts that they have used. 
In addition to the significance of this concept in the development of Laclau and 
Mouffe’s theory of discourse analysis, articulation as both theory and method, has 
influenced the cultural studies tradition. Grossberg (1993) believes that utilising the 
theory of articulation has transformed cultural studies from a model of communication 
to a theory of contexts. Daryl Slack believes articulation, as a method, suggests a 
methodological framework for cultural analysis and also provides strategies for 
contextualising the object of study in cultural analysis (Slack, in Morley and Chen ed., 
1996). Hall believes articulation is:  
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the form of the connection that can make a unity of two different elements, 
under certain conditions. It is a linkage which is not necessary, determined, 
absolute and essential for all time. You have to ask, under what circumstances 
can a connection be forged or made? The so-called ‘unity’ of a discourse is really 
the articulation of different, distinct elements which can be rearticulated in 
different ways because they have no necessary ‘belongingness.’ The ‘unity’ 
which matters is a linkage between the articulated discourse and the social 
forces with which it can, under certain historical conditions, but need not 
necessarily, be connected. (Hall, 1986b, p53) 
 
Hall thus believes that the theory of articulation brings us the possibility of 
understanding under which circumstances different elements cohere together within a 
discourse. This attitude to the notion of articulation, an emphasis on social processes 
that link different elements in order to make sense of life for subjects who 
acknowledge this linkage in their subjectivities. Considering those linkages between 
different elements in an articulation are therefore not essential, as Hall suggested, we 
need to think about the conditions that caused this, not the necessary connections 
(Grossberg, 1996). Considering these conditions, means contextually determine forces 
are attempting to constitute particular linkages between different elements. As Slack 
has argued: “To understand the role of articulation in cultural studies is thus to map 
that play of forces, in other words, to track its development genealogically” (Slack in 
Morley and Chen ed., 1996, p 115). 
Articulation is an act that forms such a relationship between different ingredients like 
concepts, signs, behaviours, etc. In the process of articulation the former identity of 
those ingredients is transformed, and they are going to be gained from the new one. 
The identity of a discourse is therefore formed according to the relationship it 
establishes between different ingredients by the act of articulation. In fact, discourses 
are systematic orders, which are acquired in the result of the articulation of connected 
concepts and ingredients. These systematic orders include various numbers of signs, 
which are meaningfully connected to each other in a wider network. In the other 
words, the articulation is a process that constructs a coherent collection of individuals, 
concepts and terminologies to make sense of life. Laclau and Mouffe define 
articulation as:  
 
We will call articulation any practice establishing a relation among elements 
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such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice .The 
structured totality resulting from the articulatory practice, we will call 
discourse. The differential positions, insofar as they appear articulated within a 
discourse, we will call moments. By contrast, we will call element any difference 
that is not discursively articulated. (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, p105) 
 
Actually, here, the method of discourse analysis becomes meaningful. Jorgensen and 
Phillips (2002) believe discourse analysis is an attempt to understand processes, which 
fix preferred meanings according to different signs in a particular discourse: 
 
It is precisely those constant attempts that never completely succeed which are 
the entry point for discourse analysis. The aim of discourse analysis is to map 
out the processes in which we struggle about the way in which the meaning of 
signs is to be fixed, and the processes by which some fixations of meaning 
become so conventionalised that we think of them as natural. (Jorgensen & 
Phillips, 2002, p25-26) 
 
In a discourse, Laclau and Mouffe believe that all signs gain their meaning in 
relationship to other signs. All signs in a particular discourse gather around a central 
signifier.  Laclau and Mouffe named that central signifier the “nodal point” (Laclau and 
Mouffe, 1985, p112). The meanings of all signs are understandable in relation to the 
nodal point. Discourse is an attempt to fix the meaning of all its signs in the process of 
articulation. Namely, this attempt wants to eradicate all possible meanings that a sign 
can have, and to highlight a particular preferred meaning. When a sign doesn’t have a 
fixed meaning in a particular discourse, and it is possible to relate it to a numbers of 
meanings, Laclau and Mouffe call that sign an “element”. While they call a sign with a 
specific preferred meaning which is obtained in the process of articulation by a 
discourse around the nodal point a “moment”. The articulation of a discourse is an 
attempt to transform all “elements” to “moments” (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, p111). 
This attempt is implemented during the procedure that is called “exclusion” by Laclau 
and Mouffe. Exclusion is the procedure, which excludes all possible meanings for an 
element, and prefers and selects a particular meaning among all imaginable meanings. 
A collection of all the imaginable meanings for an element is called a “field of 
discursivity“ by Laclau and Mouffe (1985, p111). The articulation of a discourse 
becomes possible by selecting and preferring a meaning for a sign among those in a 
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field of discursivity. In fact, the field of discursivity is the product of the articulation of 
a discourse. This field is a collection of the removed meanings for the signs in a 
discourse, which has been shaped in the process of the articulation. The articulation 
prefers a particular meaning that is related to a sign, while, rationally, it is possible that 
this particular sign had a different meaning beforehand, or that it currently has a 
different meaning in other discourses with different articulations.  
These meanings may possibly be totally different, or even in opposition to each other. 
Laclau and Mouffe believe that the meanings of signs form a meaningful discourse in 
their relation to each other. Signs or moments in a discourse have to be meaningful 
when we see them as a whole; they have to make sense in relationship to each other. 
Otherwise, the articulation of a discourse is not a successful one and the discourse 
cannot be a hegemonic one (ibid). We can therefore conclude that the ultimate goal of 
a discourse is to fix its preferred meanings for all signs, and to transform all elements 
into moments. When a discourse can fix all its preferred meanings and demolish the 
polysemic essence of signs, then that discourse establishes a “closure” (Jorgensen and 
Philips, 2002, p28). A discourse can establish a closure when it conquers the possibility 
of gaining other meanings from its moments. Nonetheless, the important argument in 
Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory is that the closure of a discourse cannot be 
permanent. Although a discourse has the possibility to reach temporary closure, but 
this closure and the process of transforming elements to moments cannot be 
perpetual. 
Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory is similar to Saussurian linguistics, in the sense of 
the connection between the signifier and the signified6. Similar to Saussure, Laclau and 
Mouffe see this link between the signifier and the signified as being conventional and 
arbitrary. Furthermore, in their point of view, this link being established within 
articulatory practices of discourses, since on the one hand they don’t recognise non-
discursive meanings and on the other hand they see discourses more than the 
language. To consider arbitrary linkages between the signified and the signifier is the 
ontological anti essentialist principle of Laclau and Mouffe‘s discourse analysis. When 
Laclau and Mouffe argue that links between the signifier and the signified are arbitrary                                                         6 The signified is the concept (or content) that is expressed by a certain signifier, and the signifier is the 
sound-image (or expression) that signifies a certain signified (Torfing, 1999, p305). 
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and temporary, it means that they suppose all connotations are discursively 
constructed (Howarth, 2000, p114). 
Laclau and Mouffe take the possibility of the ambiguity of meanings in discourses by an 
adaption of Derrida’s poststructuralist approach in the connection between the 
signifier and the signified (Smith, 1998, p85). The existence of different meanings for a 
particular sign in everyday life, and the possibility of different understandings and 
applications for a similar word in everyday life show the instability of the signifier and 
the signified connection. For instance, it is possible to find different understandings of 
signifiers like freedom, justice, rationality, Islam, etc., among different people in 
different historical epochs or geographical places. Laclau and Mouffe believe that 
there is no essence of the meanings of these signifiers. Although different discourses 
offer different meanings for similar signifiers, but none of them has inherent 
superiority over the other one. A particular signifier can have a different signified, 
since discourses cannot establish perpetual closure. In the continuation of this section, 
I will explain the ways in which discourses want to present their preferred meanings 
for signifiers as the essential meanings. 
The principle of the impossibility of closure in Laclau and Mouffe’s theory leads to the 
importance another concept. This concept has been called the “floating signifier”. The 
floating signifier is a signifier with a non-fixed signified. This means that a floating 
signifier is a signifier that has different signifieds (Laclau, 1990, p28). Diverse 
discourses try to append their preferred signified to a floating signifier in order to 
construct and fix their desired meaning. This could be feasible in each discourse by 
trying to marginalise rival discourses’ signifieds.  
Discourses set floating signifiers in the social sphere alongside each other, like puzzle 
pieces during the articulation process. They do this in order to present an 
understandable, acceptable, and rational image of their socio-political system. In fact, 
a floating signifier is an element, which could be perched in different articulations of 
dissimilar discourses and so gain different meanings (Laclau, 1993, p287). In short, a 
floating signifier is a signifier, which has not yet been confiscated by a particular 
articulation. This means that floating signifiers either don’t have fixed meanings in an 
articulation process, or that they have lost their previously fixed meanings. It is 
possible that a current floating signifier was previously a moment in a discourse. 
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Nonetheless, since permanent closure is impossible, it has become a floating signifier, 
even though it was a moment in a particular discourse. So, other different discourses 
try to own this floating signifier by placing it in their articulations (Laclau and Mouffe, 
1985, p113). If we want to return to the Lefebvre analysis of hidden potentials in the 
heart of everyday life, we can now relate the possibility of the existence of those 
potentials to the concept of the floating signifier. The floating signifier, which can gain 
different and dissimilar meanings in different discourses, is the same as potentials, 
which are hidden in everyday life. This means that the possible meanings of a floating 
signifier can be considered as potentials in everyday life. The impossibility of closure 
also means that fixed meanings have the potential to be reconsidered in the sense of 
their meanings. A floating signifier is a potential in itself, which can gain different 
meanings that are favoured by different discourses’ articulations. The adjustment of 
Lefebvre’s analysis of systems, which are dominant in everyday life through Laclau, and 
Mouffe’s discourse analysis would result: some discourses are dominant in everyday 
life. Considering their objective circumstances and the facilities that they have, those 
discourses try to fix their preferred meanings for all of the signs in everyday life. This 
can be done during the process of articulation by marginalising other possible 
meanings (potentials), and confiscating all floating signifiers.  
The principle of Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse analysis, which emphasises the 
impossibility of permanent closure in a sign’s meaning, will lead to another concept, 
which is called “deconstruction”. The concept of deconstruction highlights the 
possibility of changing the fixed meanings for moments. It emphasises that, although 
we take some meanings for some moments for granted, those meanings are 
essentially unstable and have the chance to change (Laclau, 1993b, p281). 
Deconstruction can happen on the micro levels, such as the meaning of a particular 
sign, and also on the macro levels, e.g., in the dominant discourses in the world which 
leads to the “dislocation” of dominant social orders and structures (Laclau, 1990, pp41-
45). The concept of dislocation, in Laclau and Mouffe’s theory, refers to crisis and 
tensions, which challenge the hegemony of a discourse. On one hand, dislocation, by 
weakening the hegemony of the dominant discourse, is providing the possibility for the 
emergence of rivals’ subjects and new articulations. On the other hand, it encourages 
the hegemonic dominant discourse to reconstruct itself and to avoid the 
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deconstruction of its signifieds and meanings (Barrett, 1991, p61). The social world is 
the construction of dislocations. Social systems are meaningful between the constant 
and dislocation. Forasmuch as the concept of deconstruction, in Laclau and Mouffe’s 
discourse analysis, refers to redefining moments in a discursive articulation and 
interrelating new meanings to them (Laclau and Zak, 1994), they define the political 
versus politics, which refers to attempts of the hegemonic discourse in order to avoid 
the dislocation within existing social orders and structures; as intentions and struggles 
over separating signifiers from their preferred meanings in the hegemonic articulation, 
and relating other signifieds to signifiers through imagining alternative meanings 
(Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). 
Probably, here I should note that considering Lefebvre’s view of everyday life and 
connecting this viewpoint to the discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe, I can conclude 
three important points. First, the potentials that Lefebvre has mentioned, that are 
hidden in everyday life, can be considered as the possibility to offer different meanings 
to floating signifiers, which could be different to the meanings that the hegemonic 
discourse is offering for them. Second, systems, which Lefebvre saw as dominant 
systems that are colonised everyday life, could be considered to be hegemonic 
discourses and their capabilities. Third, the possibility of subversion that Lefebvre has 
mentioned in his critique of everyday life can be considered as the possibility of losing 
a hegemonic discourse it’s hegemony when it faces the dislocation because of the 
deconstruction of its preferred meanings, since the closure is impossible. 
Contextualising the Conceptual Framework of Laclau and Mouffe’s 
Discourse Analysis 
According to the conceptual framework of Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse analysis, it 
seems possible that this theory can be utilised as a method in order to contextualise 
the subject of the study. Considering the different circumstances that the IRdisc has 
faced since the revolution of 1979, this discourse has been articulated differently. In 
the transformations of the IRdisc’s articulation, some signifiers have always had the 
same signified. Namely, some moments are recognisable in all of the different forms of 
the articulation of this discourse in different contextual conditions. These moments are 
constructing meanings that are closer to the nodal point of the IRdisc. For instance, the 
signifier of “Shiite Islam”, as the nodal point of the IRdisc has always been linked to the 
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signified of the supreme leadership and the protectorate of the Islamic Jurists (Velayat-
e faghih). All of the forces that have tried to present their desired form of articulation 
under the tent of the IRdisc, as an assumption that the acceptance of the signifier of 
Shiite Islam and its signified is therefore needed as a moment in their articulation, 
otherwise these forces were considered as others, and were excluded from the field of 
discursivity of the IRdisc. By considering the same nodal point in different articulations 
of the IRdisc, in different historical conditions, the discourse of the Islamic Republic has 
been articulated differently by different forces. Izadi & Rezaeipanah (2014) argue that 
since the revolution of 1979, considering objective circumstances, four major, different 
articulations of the IRdisc are recognisable. In all of them the nodal point is the same, 
but the articulation is different. The first articulation, which they called the “Islamic 
leftist”, was the dominant articulation following the establishment of the Islamic 
Republic’s state up to the end of the war between Iraq and Iran (1981-1989). This 
articulation, by highlighting signifiers like social justice, the state’s economy, Islamic 
internationalism and anti-capitalism in the field of political economy; war, martyrdom 
(Shahadat), social mobilisation (Basij-e Mardomi), anti-consumerism, anti-western 
sentiment and anti-aristocratic values in the field of social policies; family, Islamic law 
(Sharia), Shiite Islamic ideology and religious traditions in the field of cultural policies; 
was attempting to offer an anti-western (specially anti-American) and anti-capitalism 
position for the IRdisc by emphasising the Islamic nature of this position (Izadi & 
Rezaeipanah, 2014). This articulation was carried out under certain historical 
conditions of the war between Iran and Iraq, and also the early years of the 
establishment of the Islamic Republican state. The notable point is that, although in 
the field of discursivity of the IRdisc various forces were struggling to offer different 
articulations, the charismatic supreme leadership of the state, as the signified for the 
nodal point of the IRdisc, namely Ayatollah Khomeini, by approving the articulation of 
the so called Islamic leftists in various struggles, caused the hegemony of the 
mentioned articulation in relation to the IRdisc (Aras, 2001). The government of the 
day, with the Prime Ministry of Mir-Hussein Mousavi, was playing the most significant 
role in making this articulation the hegemonic one.  
After end of the war and the death of the Ayatollah Khomeini, the other form of 
articulation became hegemonic in relation to the IRdisc. This articulation also, by 
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approving the centrality of the moment of the supreme leadership as the nodal point, 
has caused a major transformation in the articulation of the IRdisc. Izadi & 
Rezaeipanah (2014) call this articulation “Economic Development” under the influence 
of the “Free Market Economy” approach (1989-1997). This articulation, which 
emerged under the social and historical conditions of the new supreme leadership 
(Ayatollah Khamenei), the end of the war, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the 
end of the Cold War, emphasised economic development in order to reconstruct 
following war damage (Adelkhah, 1999, p13). The preferred meanings of this 
articulation came from the field of discursivity that emerged through the exclusion of 
the meanings in the previous articulation of the IRdisc. This articulation, by maintaining 
the ideological values of the IRdisc, and by highlighting signifiers, such as construction, 
development, economic growth and privatisation, in the field of political economy and, 
consequently, signifiers like tolerance, rationalism, institutionalisation, etc., in the field 
of social and cultural polices, was trying to offer a rational technocrat position for the 
IRdisc and to transform the subjectivity of its citizens from ideological patriotic citizens 
into ambitious social citizens (Amaniyan, 2005, pp161,162). Again, obviously, different 
social forces were challenging this articulation, but the supreme leader, Ayatollah 
Khamenei, during the presidency of Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani on the constructionist 
cabinet, didn’t get any serious position that was contrary to the general attitudes of 
this new articulation of the IRdisc, which was represented by Hashemi and his 
technocrat cabinet (Aras, 2001). The establishment of this articulation, by excluding 
the preferred meanings of the Islamic Leftists’ articulation, has caused a 
transformation in the Political Economy of the Islamic republican state ever since 
(Behdad & Nomani, 2002).  
The third articulation of the IRdisc, which might be called the “Reformist” articulation 
(1997-2005), has caused a serious transformation within the cultural structure of 
Iranian society. This articulation emerged under the influence of various social 
conditions, such as a growth in the ratio of the younger generation (referred as the 
third generation of the revolution) to the older, the enhancement of communications 
facilities like television, satellite and Internet, the importance of international 
communication, the improvement of the education system, an increase in the urban 
population and the development of civil society in Iran. Under the effect of the 
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unpredictable election of Seyed Mohammad Khatami as the President of Iran in 1997, 
a form of articulation of the IRdisc emerged that emphasised the political 
development, rather than the economic development in the previous articulation 
(Tazmini, 2009, p 5). Consequently, new political forces arrived on the scene of Iranian 
politics. The preferred meaning of this articulation regarding the signifier of political 
economy was the same as the previous articulation. The reformist cabinet merely tried 
to reform the economic structure of the free market economy in Iran (Nomani & 
Behdad, 2006). For instance, the tax system was improved, foreign investment became 
possible, and private banks were established (Pajouyan, et al, 2008, p186). However, 
this articulation in the social and political realms, by highlighting signifiers like 
democracy, people, civil society, individual and social freedom, civil rights, minority 
and women’s rights; has caused a serious split among effective forces within the field 
of discursivity of the IRdisc (Kamrava, 2008, p11). The reformist articulation, by 
targeting the aim of political development, has emphasised the republican face of the 
IRdisc, rather than its Islamic face. Although active forces of this articulation were, at 
least orally, recognising the signifier of the supreme leadership (Velayat-e Faghih) as 
the nodal point of the IRdisc, this articulation caused the emergence of a split between 
the two active forces of the IRdisc. The split emerged between forces that were 
emphasising the Islamic face of the IRdisc -- by highlighting the priority of the 
legitimacy and authority of the supreme leadership, and forces that were emphasising 
the republican face of this discourse, by emphasising the priority of the legitimacy of 
law (Mir-Hosseini & Tapper, 2006, pp29, 30). The gap between these two forces, which 
were known as Principlists (Osoul-garayan) 7  and Reformists (Eslah-talaban), has 
caused an extensive struggle between these two groups in relation to making their 
articulation the hegemonic one in regard to the IRdisc. This split, and the subsequent 
struggle between Reformists and Principlists, emerged because of the failure of the 
reformist articulation to link the mentioned signifiers to the nodal point of the 
supreme leadership and the protectorate of the Islamic Jurists (Velayat-e faghih), 
(Tazmini, 2009, p36).  
                                                        7 Various scholars, in their writings have cited this group as being Conservatives, but, according to the 
Persian term (osoul-garayan), I prefer to call this group Principlists. 
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The main result of this gap and this struggle was the emergence of an Islamic 
republican discourse’s articulation, which articulates its preferred meanings in direct 
relation to the demands of the current supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei. Although 
the central signifiers of this principlist articulation, such as social justice, Islamic 
ideology, Islamic government, Islamic development, Islamic economy, enemy, etc., 
have also been articulated in previous articulations, this articulation stresses making 
these elements into moments according to the principles of the Islamic revolution. In 
this articulation, the sole source that it is legitimate to determine and define through 
these principles is the supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei. The main principle of this 
principlist articulation is the determining of the principles according to the 
interpretations of Khamenei, and following his demands in different social realms such 
as politics, culture, etc. (Palizban, 2009). As a consequence of the establishment of the 
mentioned articulation, which has become the dominant articulation since the 
presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2005, the struggle between the Principlists 
and Reformists in articulating the IRdisc, has intensified. This struggle was intensified 
more than ever during the Iranian presidential campaigns of 2009, and events that 
were the aftermaths of this election contextualise the mentioned struggle.  
On one hand, all principlist forces were united around Ahmadinejad, as the symbol of 
the principlist articulation of the IRdisc, and, on the other hand, the reformist forces 
gathered around Mousavi, as the symbol of the Reformist articulation. Although in 
both articulations similar signifiers, such as justice, equality, independence, etc. are 
recognisable, as mentioned, the approach to determining the signifieds for the same 
signifiers was different among these forces, accordingly highlighting the Islamic face or 
the Republican face of the IRdisc. 
In advancing this struggle, Mousavi had a unique position. He, as the Prime Minister of 
the early years following the revolution, during the war, stood against an articulation 
of the IRdisc which was backed by Khamenei and knows itself to be the legitimate 
extender of those years, namely the Principlists articulation. Mir-Hossein Mousavi, a 
candidate for the presidential election in 2009, as the most prominent political symbol 
of the early years of the revolution, after Ayatollah Khomeini, could be a great 
representative for the principles of the IRdisc. This representative could question the 
legitimacy of the preferred meanings of the Principlists articulation by referring to the 
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meanings of signifiers in the early years following the revolution, when the charismatic 
supreme leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, was alive. A struggle to seize the meanings of 
signifiers, like Ayatollah Khomeini, marginalised groups, social solidarity, the 8 years of 
war and its martyrs, people, justice, freedom, equality, etc., was a struggle that 
Mousavi could properly advance. According to the charter of the Green Movement, 
which was written and published by Mousavi, the main aim of the Green Movement is 
to reach justice, freedom, independence and equality in all economic, political and 
social realms, under the tent of the IRdisc (Mousavi, cited in Mohammadpour, 2012). 
Mousavi has never had any oppositional position regarding the IRdisc and has never 
tried to dislocate the integrity of this discourse, rather, he, and reformists forces, was 
attempting to deconstruct the meanings of moments within the principlist articulation, 
which have other potential meanings in the field of discursivity of the IRdisc. Mousavi 
sees the way to reach the aims of the Green Movement through the empowerment of 
the civil society and the public sphere, establishing a sphere for social dialogues, 
promoting awareness via the free flow of information, and recognising the plurality 
within the society (ibid).  
Obviously, in this articulation of the IRdisc, under the historical condition of the 
emergence of the Green Movement and the intensification of the struggle between 
the Reformists and the Principlists, the supreme leadership has no centrality, rather, 
this articulation emphasises the neglected potential of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s 
constitutional law in recognising the sovereignty of the people, which was the main 
purpose of the Islamic revolution (ibid). The Principlist therefore interprets the 
Reformist articulation as the rival discourse, since the centrality of the nodal point (and 
its meaning as preferred by Principlists) has been neglected within this articulation. 
The Principlist articulation recognises a determinative role for the supreme leadership 
in all of the social aspects of establishing the ideal Islamic state (Ayatollah Mesbah-
Yazdi, cited in Palizban, 2009), while the Reformist articulation considers a 
protectorate role for the Supreme Leader in order to reach the aim of the sovereignty 
of the people.  
Regardless of the truth or unreality of the claims of fraud in the 2009 presidential 
election, the principlist articulation of the IRdisc has faced a crisis (dislocation), which 
has questioned the legitimacy of this articulation by deconstructing its central 
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moments. In the consequences of intensification, the struggle between Reformists and 
Principlists during the events in the aftermath of the election, forces that were trying 
to present their desired articulation under the tent of the IRdisc have become 
antagonistic. Since repressive forces, like the police, courts and judiciary system, 
because of their affiliation to the supreme leader, as the core of power of the 
Principlists, the Reformists were eliminated from the field of discursivity of the IRdisc 
by the mediation of these forces, and the principlist articulation of this discourse 
became dominant through the support of the supreme leader. 
Two years after the emergence of the Green Movement, Mousavi was put under 
house arrest with no legal trial, and by the direct command of Khamenei, Khatami, 
without a legal trial, was banned from all political activities and media presence, and 
many reformists went to jail because of their political positioning against the 
Principlists and under pretexts, like dependency on foreigners and western enemies. 
The Green Movement was called seditious (Fetneh) by Ayatollah Khamenei, and he 
has, since then, commanded the elimination of all seditionists (Fetneh-garan) from the 
realm of politics. I believe this elimination has initiated a new phase of the IRdisc with 
a more homogenous field of discursivity than ever before, and this made the Reformist 
articulation the rival discourse to that of the Islamic Republic.  Obviously, apart from 
the political forces that have been eliminated, the Green Movement had a powerful 
social base among the citizens who participated in advancing this movement.  
Nonetheless, the question is: is this Principlist articulation (which I call the IRdisc 
henceforth) hegemonic in constructing the subjectivity of the citizens mentioned, in 
regard to its preferred meanings?  
Laclau and Mouffe by taking advantage of Gramsci’s hegemony theory, acknowledge 
the discourse, which has fixed its preferred meanings for floating signifiers and 
transforms elements to moments, as the hegemonic discourse. In the following parts 
of this section I will address the concept of hegemony and how discourses become 
hegemonic.  
HEGEMONY, THE ULTIMATE GOAL OF DISCOURSES  
According to the flexibility of the signified and signifier relationship, and the 
impossibility of closure for a discourse, Laclau and Mouffe conclude that: a discourse 
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that has temporarily fixed its preferred meanings for floating signifiers, and has 
transformed elements to moments in its articulation, is a hegemonic discourse. 
Namely, if there is a consensus in a society around a particular meaning for a particular 
signifier, and the public opinion has temporarily accepted that meaning, then that 
signifier is hegemonic. If signifiers for a discourse become hegemonic, then that 
discourse becomes hegemonic, as a whole. The main function of the hegemony in a 
discourse is to temporarily fix meanings for signs. Reaching hegemony is the ultimate 
goal for each discourse. Hegemony for a discourse becomes possible during the 
process of articulation (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). 
The hegemony of a discourse in the social world is understandable when we discover 
which meanings are preferred in everyday life. Preferred meanings form the 
hegemony of a discourse. As Torfing argues: 
 
We can define hegemony as the expansion of a discourse, or set of discourses, 
into a dominant horizon of social orientation and action by means of 
articulating unfixed elements into partially fixed moments in a context 
crisscrossed by antagonistic forces. (1999, p 101) 
 
The Italian intellectual and activist, Antonio Gramsci, mainly developed the concept of 
hegemony. Laclau and Mouffe have therefore also used this concept to expand their 
discourse theory under the effect of Gramsci’s hegemony theory. According to 
Gramsci, hegemony refers to a situation in which a “historical block” (Gramsci used 
these words instead of ‘dominant class’ in orthodox Marxist terminology) has reached 
the intellectual-moral leadership of the whole society. It means that the “historical 
block” has a kind of social authority among the people who live in the particular 
society (Bennet, 1986). Reaching hegemony usually becomes feasible during a process, 
which contains a combination of elements of both “repression” and “satisfaction”. 
Gramsci believed that the existence of a combination of repression and satisfaction is 
the main feature that makes it hegemonic. These two elements are moderating each 
other and the hegemonic historical block always tries to indicate that the force applied 
onto the minority was based on the satisfaction of the majority (Gramsci, 1971, p80).  
Since Gramsci is emphasising the existence of the combination of the repression and 
satisfaction elements in a hegemonic system, we can conclude that hegemony always 
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requires resistance. Those who are not satisfied by hegemonic values and rules, are 
resisting the acceptance of hegemonic meanings. The force of the hegemonic system is 
therefore applied to them. Gramsci believes that the superiority and supremacy of a 
social group is always manifested in two forms. The first one is the form of the 
domination, and the second is the form of the intellectual-moral leadership (Barrett, 
1991, p59). In Gramsci’s point of view, hegemony means the construction of 
satisfaction and cultural consensus (Gramsci, 1971, p80).  
In other words, hegemony means the existence of a kind of self-constructed and 
spontaneous satisfaction among the people.  Hegemonic values and meanings, which 
are the preferred meanings of hegemonic discourse, become involved in all aspects of 
social and everyday life. This involvement will cause preferred meanings of hegemonic 
discourse finally to be considered as common sense by people. These preferred 
meanings will form the common sense, and will influence customs, habits and tastes 
(Joll, 1977, p8). People, who follow these rules and who have accepted them as 
common sense, may not notice that they are living under the domination of a 
hegemonic articulation. Hegemony refers to a coalition between some social groups in 
order to achieve authority in the society. This coalition may eventually attain their 
total social authority over other, subordinated social groups. Applying this authority is 
not possible merely by the application of force or the direct imposition of the 
preferred meanings of a discourse. Rather the hegemonic authority becomes 
achievable by gaining and forming the people’s satisfaction. This satisfaction will cause 
the naturalisation and legitimisation of hegemonic discourse’s preferred meanings 
without using widespread suppression and force application (Barret, 1991, p54).  
A hegemonic discourse is always trying to present its methods for constructing the 
social, as being objective methods, but objectivity is nothing other than dominant 
sedimentary discourse (Jorgensen & Philips, 2002, p36). Laclau (1990, p32) believes 
the identity of individuals and subjects of discourses is formed according to this 
objectivity. Nevertheless, since there are always different discourses, which exist in 
each society, and are involved in forming the subjectivity of individuals, Laclau argues 
that identity is a combinational matter just as there is a hegemonic discourse in each 
society, which is a combination of different and contradictory elements. What is 
important here to find out how these elements are perched together in the process of 
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articulation? Or, as Slack (1996, p115) argued, mapping and tracking the development 
and play of forces that are trying to construct the subjectivity of social agents. 
Identities are also formed in a kind of articulation process between the different and 
dissimilar elements and objectivities. Laclau and Mouffe therefore believe that 
identities are also not inherent, but they are constructed within articulatory practices 
(1985, p105). This construction of identities is not an arbitrary act, but depends on the 
amount and quality of being objectively accessible for different discourses. 
The hegemonic system, by promoting and expanding its rules and regulations, tries to 
reproduce the social structure, which has made this particular discourse the 
hegemonic one. This means that the hegemonic discourse tries to construct types of 
identities for its subjects by the minimum involvement of other discourses. The success 
of hegemonic discourse in doing this will cause the reproduction of the social 
structures and means the continuity of its hegemony.  
Relating a signifier to a particular signified during discursive articulation and 
temporarily fixing this relation, causes the hegemony of a discourse. As a result, the 
meaning of that signifier becomes temporarily fixed, and it is transformed into a 
moment in a hegemonic articulation. Nevertheless, rival discourses and marginalised 
articulations are trying to swoop on this stability and break down the hegemony of the 
dominant discourse via deconstructing the meanings of moments in a hegemonic 
articulation, just as the Reformist articulation aimed to do in the face of the IRdisc, 
during the Green Movement, by highlighting the face of republicanism in relation to 
the nodal point of the IRdisc, instead of the Islamic face. 
Whatever deconstruction of meanings is closer to the meaning of the nodal point in 
the hegemonic discourse, the possibility of collapsing the hegemonic discourse 
becomes greater due to facing the dislocation. The deconstruction of the main 
meanings of a discourse means aiming the essential meanings that a discourse has 
fundamentally articulated and formed according to them. The deconstruction of these 
meanings will therefore cause the collapse of the hegemony of a discourse. When this 
deconstruction is done at the levels near the nodal point, and causes the dislocation 
for the hegemonic discourse, it is possible for the hegemonic discourse to apply two 
strategies to secure itself from collapse and complete deconstruction. 
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First: start a new articulation regarding the meanings that are the subjects of 
deconstruction. This could be done in two ways. Firstly, by offering new meanings for 
deconstructed signifiers. This means that the hegemonic discourse tries to change its 
articulation somehow so as to save the nodal point and the signs near the nodal point 
from deconstruction. Or, secondly, by accepting the meanings that are raised by rival 
discourses, the hegemonic discourse affirms the logic of difference among its subjects. 
This strategy is more appropriate in regard to signifiers that are far from the nodal 
point of the discourse. When accepting differences in meanings that are far from the 
meaning of the nodal point, the hegemonic articulation accordingly encourages more 
satisfaction among its subjects. This satisfaction increases the possibility that the 
hegemonic discourse will remain hegemonic. 
Second: nevertheless, in facing the deconstruction of meanings that have been 
preferred regarding the signifiers around the nodal point, a hegemonic discourse, in 
order to remain hegemonic, uses more suppression forces against efforts, which are 
aimed at deconstructing the meanings that are near to its nodal point. The antagonism 
and forcing others will be more obvious in relation to these efforts. Meanwhile, this 
discourse tries to secure its nodal point from deconstruction by preferring and 
emphasising meanings relating to the signifiers that are more significant in the 
discursive articulation in constructing identities for subjects that possibly may become 
the subjects of rival discourses. These signifiers work like a protective belt around the 
nodal point. Preferring the desired discursive meaning relating to these signifiers 
among the subjects may secure the nodal point from being deconstructed. If subjects 
are satisfied through accepting the preferred meanings of the hegemonic discourse, 
the nodal point will consequently be secure. Whatever a discourse that is facing a 
crisis, could make more subjects regarding to signifiers that has been highlighted 
during crisis, it consequently become more successful in passing through this crisis. 
These subjects can objectively agree with the grounds of the crisis, but their identity 
has been formed according to the preferred meanings of a discourse that they may 
consciously oppose, and therefore this crisis would not lead to the collapse of the 
hegemonic discourse.  It is worth mentioning that these signifiers and the preferring 
meanings relating to them are beneficial for the hegemonic discourse alongside the act 
of repression during a crisis that is being faced.  
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The IRdisc in facing a crisis that has questioned the legitimacy of its articulation, has 
applied a second strategy that is to say, firstly, it represses the active forces that were 
attempting to deconstruct the central signifiers of the IRdisc, like supreme leadership, 
Islamism and sovereignty, and redefining signifiers, like social justice, freedom, 
independence and equality, according to the republican face of the IRdisc and the aim 
of the sovereignty of the people; as has been noted in the charter of the Green 
Movement (Mohammadpour, 2012). These forces were reformist activists and many of 
them were sentenced to prison and banned from undertaking any political activity, 
either for life or for a long time. Besides that, streets protests were suppressed and 
many ordinary people were arrested because of their participation in demonstrations, 
or for their activities in cyberspace in favour of the Green Movement.    
Besides this repression, as Gramsci argued, being hegemonic is a combination of 
utilising repressive forces and achieving satisfaction among subjects. Considering that 
a hegemonic discourse, in facing a crisis, is trying to secure its nodal point by preferring 
its desired meanings relating to signifiers that can secure the nodal point from being 
deconstructed. So, one of my concerns is to explain which signifiers were more 
significant for the IRdisc and what meanings have been preferred in relation to them, 
since this discourse has highlighted them during the facing of the dislocation. 
Understanding the mentioned relation leads to an exploration of the desired 
subjectivity and its characteristics for the IRdisc. 
In order to explore this subjectivity and its characteristics, it seems necessary to 
address the way that discourses are creating and forming their subjects. In other 
words, the mechanisms or processes from which discourses are taking benefits so as to 
construct their desired subjectivity among people. It seems impossible to explore this 
subjectivity and the discursively preferred meanings except by tracking the processes 
with which a particular discourse plans to fix its preferred meanings and, accordingly, 
reach its desired subjects. 
THE FORMATION OF SUBJECTS; BY AND THROUGH DISCOURSES  
Louis Althusser, a prominent French Marxist intellectual, is one of the theorists that 
has addressed the domination mechanism and the formation of subjects. From 
Althusser’s point of view, making subjects through the dominant power and the 
 58 
reproduction of power by the dominant class is done by the mediation of the ideology. 
Althusser believes that the ideology is the objective matter that lies at the heart of the 
actions in everyday life. Ideology is a system of ideas, concepts, myths, images, and 
common sense that forms relations within the societies accordingly (Rojek, 2003, p23). 
From Althusser’s point of view, ideology is not a static collection of the application of 
beliefs on the suppressed classes by the dominant classes, but it is a dynamic process 
which is successively reproduced in actions (Althusser, 1971). Here, ”In actions” means 
what people think, behave and understand themselves, and their relation to society 
(Fisk, 1987, 119). Althusser distinguishes between the ideological state apparatus and 
the suppressor state apparatus. Suppressor apparatuses include the police, the army, 
the courts and the prisons. These apparatuses are suppressors because their operation 
requires elements of violence, obligation and coercion. Althusser argues that the state, 
in reproducing the current situation of its domination, basically takes advantage of 
ideological state apparatuses. The main function of ideological apparatuses is to create 
satisfaction among people so as to encourage them to behave and think in ways 
accepted by the dominant class (Althusser, 1971, p150). These apparatuses may be 
religious apparatuses, like churches, educational apparatuses like schools, universities 
and family institutions, legal apparatuses, institutions related to political systems -- like 
parties, commercial unions, or mass media and cultural apparatuses. In his view, the 
main function of these apparatuses, and also the main goal of an ideological system, is 
the “interpellation” of individuals and subjects in relation to the continuity and 
reproduction of the existing social order.  
Althusser has defined Interpellation as a mechanism during which the ideology calls 
subjects and gives them individuality. Because of the interpellation mechanism, 
individuals become the subjects in the ideology (Althusser, 1971, p170). 
 
Ideology ‘acts’ or ‘functions’ in such a way that it ‘recruits’ subjects among the 
individuals (it recruits them all), or ‘transforms’ the individuals into subjects (it 
transforms them all) by that very precise operation which I have called 
interpellation or hailing, and which can be imagined along the lines of the most 
commonplace everyday police (or other) hailing: ‘Hey, you there!’ Assuming 
that the theoretical scene I have imagined takes place in the street, the hailed 
individual will turn round – [...] he becomes a subject. (Althusser, 1971, p174) 
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During the process of interpellation by ideologies, individuals are placed in specific 
positions through being called and individualised. These positions are predetermined, 
and ideologies identify subjects by placing them in different positions. Jorgensen and 
Phillips (2002, p41) believe that, in discourse analysis’s view, we can say that with 
interpellation “subjects become positions in discourses.”  
Like Althusser, Laclau and Mouffe also believe that subjects are subject to 
interpellation, not with ideologies, but, rather, by discourses. In order to understand 
the process of subjectification, we must therefore study the subject positions that 
have been represented according to the preferred meanings of the hegemonic 
discourse, or of each discourse that can interpellate subjects (Laclau, 1977, p100). The 
difference between Althusser’s and Laclau and Mouffe’s viewpoint on subjectivity and 
the conditions of interpellation is based on their different theoretical approaches to 
the notion of ideology. Laclau and Mouffe study subjectivity and ideology through a 
poststructuralist approach, meanwhile, Althusser contemplates these issues from a 
structuralist point of view. 
Marxism has addressed the notion of ideology more than other intellectual attitudes. 
This approach sees two main features of the ideology. First, it describes ideology as a 
superstructure, and that all social relations and rituals are defined according to, and 
by, it. Second, Structuralist Marxists see ideology as a false consciousness of social 
conditions and even subjectivity (Laclau, 1990, 89). In this view, the conditions and 
rules of this superstructure are defined and determined by the base of economy. 
Jorgensen and Phillips (2002) have classified the differences between the 
poststructuralist approach of Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse analysis and the approach 
of traditional structuralism/Marxism in two points. Firstly, Laclau and Mouffe deny the 
difference between the base and the superstructure. They believe that all kinds of 
social formations, even those we take for granted, like the base in traditional Marxism, 
are the results of discursive processes. Secondly, they dismiss Marxism’s conception of 
society. In traditional Marxism, society exists as an object. In their view, being 
objective means the fixation of a structure into a discursive process. Discourses try to 
present objective conditions by the articulation of their intended signs, and they 
attempt to fix their preferred meanings. Namely, they are trying to fix all their 
preferred meanings, relating to all signs and signifiers, so as to be able to present the 
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product of their discursive articulations as objective matters. Objectivity is possible 
when all meanings are fixed in a discursive articulation (Laclau, 1990, pp89-92). As I 
have mentioned before, Laclau and Mouffe believe that closure in discursive 
articulations is impossible; consequently constant objectivity is also impossible. The 
permanent meaning fixing of all signs is impossible, and all meanings are disposable to 
deconstruction and, rationally, signifiers can gain different meanings in different areas 
and places. Laclau and Mouffe thus believe that there is no predetermined reality 
according to which we can conclude on the truth or falsity of statements (Howarth, 
2000, p5). It is worth mentioning that the nonexistence of reality in Laclau and 
Mouffe’s discourse theory doesn’t mean the material lack of the existence of things 
and of the outer world, but they believe that they will get meaning by being placed in 
discursive articulations. Without the existence of discourses, things are meaningless.  
All post-structural intellectuals, like Foucault, criticise the traditional Marxist notion of 
ideology. Structuralist/Marxists believe that the ideology is based on truth and falsity. 
This means that there is a predetermined reality which ideology, by referring to this 
reality, used to evaluate statements as being true or false, or it distinguishes subjects’ 
consciousness to be true or false (Smith, 1998, p59). However, from a discursive 
perspective, the reality is constructed by discourses and consequently it is changeable. 
It is impossible to find a predetermined coherent entity by referral to which, the truth 
or falsity of statements becomes obvious, unless that reality has been constructed by a 
discourse. Hence, the other aim of discourse analysis can be the investigation of 
discursive articulations which construct different kinds of reality that are taken for 
granted by subjects. This effort by discourse analysis stands against the discovery of 
the objective reality of society in Structuralist approaches. Laclau believes that what 
has been called ideology in a discursive articulation process, is, in fact, the desire of 
that discourse to be pervasive (1990, p92). The concept of ideology, in Laclau and 
Mouffe’s standpoint, is similar to the notion of myth. 
Dominant hegemonic discourses are always facing social crises, which may threaten 
their hegemony. These crises may cause the dislocation of hegemonic meanings and 
demonstrate the hegemonic articulation to be weak and to incapacitate articulation in 
resolving social problems. A hegemonic discourse therefore needs to have its subject’s 
minds under control. In crisis circumstances, the subjects of the hegemonic discourse 
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are seeking a solution to social problems. This seeking brings with it the possibility for 
subjects to accept the meanings of alternative discourses, which offering a solution to 
crises and problems. Subsequently, the hegemonic discourse needs to offer an ideal 
image of the objective circumstances of the society if it is to seize the minds of its 
subjects. This ideal image must embody situations where all of the social problems 
have been solved, and no crisis remains in the social realm and no contradiction exists 
in the subjects’ minds. Laclau and Mouffe know this offering of an ideal image of 
society as “myth”. 
 
By myth we mean a space of representation, which bears no relation of 
continuity with the dominant ‘structural objectivity’. Myth is thus a principle of 
the reading of a given situation, whose terms are external to what is 
representable in the objective spatiality constituted by the given structure. 
(Laclau, 1990, p61) 
 
Myths are the products of the dislocations of dominant discourses. They are offered by 
discourses regarding the creation of a new social objectivity to overcome dislocations. 
Myths, according to the context and discourses that support and offer them, represent 
the desires of a particular social group or class. Nonetheless, this is not enough for 
myths and discourses to be hegemonic. Myths have to transform “social imagination” 
to become pervasive and hegemonic (Laclau, 1990, p62). Social imaginations and 
myths are communal, and they represent different parts of societies. In acts, a social 
imagination is the ideal image created by a myth, which has become comprehensively 
generalised among different groups and classes in a society (Maffesoli, 1996, p146). 
Actually, in Laclau’s point of view, ideology is a myth that occurs according to the 
demand of each discourse to be total (Laclau, 1990). Discourses construct ideologies to 
overcome the deconstruction of their signifier’s meanings. Discourses present an ideal 
imaginary image with metaphoric aspects to create a social imagination. In discourses, 
ideology and myth seek to represent society as a coherent entity, which has been 
based on preferred discursive meanings through the articulation process. When social 
agencies identify themselves according to this represented entity, then they will not 
question the hegemony of the discourse.  
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We can therefore conclude that what interpellate subjects are discourses, not 
ideologies. Discourses create and provide the subject’s positions for individuals 
(Howarth, 2000, p13). Laclau and Mouffe have used the concept of interpellation, 
suggested by Althusser, to form their theory when they speak about subject positions 
in discourses. Nevertheless, they have registered this notion as part of their 
poststructuralist approach. Obviously, in their perception of this concept, hegemonic 
discourses are more determinant of positions for subjects and controlling of patterns 
of social actions.  
Since Laclau and Mouffe argue that anything outside discourses is anonymous and 
unrecognisable, subjects are also not exceptions, and the identities of subjects are 
being determined by discourses, not by the subjects themselves. The perception of a 
subject by itself, and even by the world, is based on subject positions that have been 
determined by different discourses (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, p184). This perception 
of self is the basis of the social acts of each subject.  
By referring to Lacan, Laclau and Mouffe argue that subjects are essentially 
“fragmented” or “decentred” (Laclau and Zakc, 1994, p31). This means that subjects 
are successively attempting to perceive themselves completely through identification 
processes and to reach a comprehensive identity. From Lacan’s point of view, these 
attempts by subjects to have a complete identity and to perceive themselves to be a 
whole, would be incomplete attempts since considering the demand of a subject to 
transform into a whole, which has a total identity, the subject finds itself not to be 
coincident with its present position and identity, and it consequently tries to find the 
total identity in other subjects’ positions in other discourses (Lacan, 1977, Laclau and 
Zac, 1994). A discourse is therefore hegemonic, being able to satisfy its subjects more 
through accepting its constructed reality and truth according to its preferred meanings 
and ideal subject positions. If subjects have the assumption of the truth of a particular 
discourse, these subjects are going to identify themselves less according to subject 
positions in other discourses. 
Nevertheless, the important question in considering the forming of subjects and 
interpellation is: how do discourses interpellate subjects? Namely, what mechanisms 
are defined by discourses through which individuals can be placed in subject positions 
and identify themselves according to the constructed meanings of a discourse? How 
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do individuals find subject positions, and how do these positions become clear for 
them?  
Laclau and Mouffe believe that the “representation” of subject positions by discourses 
will cause the identification of subjects by the represented subject position (1985, p76 
and Laclau, 1993, p289). Individuals or groups in societies understand their individual 
or collective identities when subject positions are being represented. Individual or 
collective identities are formed either by accepting or denying the positions 
represented. 
Hall (1997) sees representation as part of cultural circulation, which rises alongside the 
elements of production, consumption, identity and rules. He argues that 
representation is relating meanings to the culture and common sense (Hall, 1997). 
Hall, by using a Foucauldian point of view in relation to the notion of discourse, 
elaborates that the representation contains constructive features. According to the 
principle of discourse analysis that indicates that signifiers do not have any self-
sufficient meaning, Hall argues, through the intermediation of representation systems 
of signs and concepts, and meanings are constructed for signifiers. 
Hall (1997) creates the term “systems of representation”, within which he indicates 
two levels. The first one tells us about a system that contains all kinds of issues, 
individuals and events. With the intermediation of the collection that Hall named 
‘mental representation’; individuals organise and classify different kinds and forms of 
notions, things, concepts and events. With this system of classification, people can 
distinguish different things and notions. At the second, and higher, level, people share 
notions that they could distinguish at the previous level. They share notions together, 
and common cultural meanings are constructed through this sharing in order to 
interpret the world. People need to express and exchange meanings and concepts. 
Without this common meaning, understanding other people would be impossible. 
People always share their mental representation of concepts and meanings (Hall, 
1997, p18). 
Nonetheless, to extend and develop the idea of representation, it is crucial to search 
for an idea which elaborates representation processes as sources for the production of 
social knowledge, an idea that is related to social acts and the issue of power. This 
point, for Hall, is considered to be the main point in elaborating a method of meta-
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textual analysis. This idea thus constructs subjects, and it also relates the object of 
representation to the more widespread realm of knowledge and power. Hall utilises 
the Foucauldian approach to the notion of discourse in order to reach this aim. As I 
have argued in the “Notion of Discourse” section of this chapter, Foucault believes that 
the meanings and meaningful forms of relations are constructed in discourses; thus, 
each study of representation, under the influence of Foucault’s theory of discourse, 
seeks for processes that construct meanings.  
One of Foucault’s key concepts in considering the relationship between knowledge and 
power is the concept of the “institutional apparatus”. Institutional apparatus, in 
Foucault’s thought, refers to the background relations of knowledge, discourse and 
power. Institutions and social constructions have the ability to control different 
aspects of representations. These institutions and constructions are sites for the 
emergence of representations in different forms of signs, symbols and artistic styles. 
Institutions own these styles and symbols and use them due to their interests (Hall, 
1997, p47). In considering these institutions, the most important issue is to discover 
the relationships of these institutions to ideas of a particular discourse, which is 
dominant. 
In fact, discourses represent subject positions with facilities that they own. The 
function of representation is the same as the function of interpellation. Discourses try 
to bring identity to their subjects in relation to their articulated, preferred meanings by 
representing subject positions and calling people to interpellate them according to 
these positions. It is worth mentioning that these positions could also be represented 
in order to make “the others” of discourses accept the logic of difference in a 
discourse. All of the represented subject positions are not desirable positions in 
discourses, but their representation has functions in either continuity or in reaching 
the hegemony of discourses. In the chapter on Methodology, I will discuss different 
representational strategies and their functions in subjects’ interpellation for 
discourses.  
So considering my project, it seems crucial to understand under what discourse the 
representation of subjects’ positions and the preferred meanings of Iranian TV series 
are forming, and to which signifiers these preferred meanings have been articulated. A 
grasp of this discourse helps us to reach a proper understanding about both the 
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represented subject’s positions and the positions that individuals can take up 
regarding what has been represented. Nonetheless, the main question in regard to this 
issue is: How are discourses representing subject positions, in order to interpellate 
subjects? 
Media, Interpellation and Discourse Analysis 
As previously mentioned, Althusser believed that the ideological state apparatuses are 
doing the interpellation of subjects. Althusser knows mass media and cultural 
apparatuses to be the ideological apparatuses, which aim to interpellate subjects. In 
Laclau and Mouffe’s approach to the notion of ideology, we can recognise the mass 
media to be tools for the different discourses that aim to interpellate subjects. 
Regarding the rate of possession of this tool, different discourses are attempting to 
interpellate subjects through the mediation of mass media. Discourses represent 
subject positions through the mass media. The mass media is therefore one of these 
apparatuses which represent subject positions for people in societies. Accordingly, 
through investigating the mass media we can grasp the articulation of their discourses. 
Discourses expose themselves and reveal their preferred meanings and their 
articulations when they represent subject positions. Exploring discursively preferred 
meanings becomes possible through investigating the attempts of discourses to make 
and interpellate subjects according to their preferred meanings. Hence, considering 
the presumed role of the mass media in subjects’ interpellation, by investigating 
particular media productions, we can discover the process of a particular discursive 
articulation. In this research I therefore intend to analyse the IRdisc when this 
discourse exposes its articulation in media productions.  
Television is one of the most important kinds of mass media, which broadcasts 
programs that are full of meanings with particular ideas and values and “that 
perform[s] the work of the dominant ideology” (Fisk, 1987, p1). This medium attempts 
to interpellate subjects by representing ideal subjects’ positions. As Fisk (1987) argues: 
“Television is able to construct a subject position for us … Television tries to construct 
an ideal subject position which invites us to occupy, and if we do, rewards us with the 
ideological pleasure …” (Fisk, 1987, p51) 
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Television, in relation to its discursive articulation and hegemonic conditions, tries 
either to dislocate the hegemonic meanings of dominant discourse or to naturalise its 
hegemonic discourse and preferred meanings.  
The aim of studying television in this research is to find the preferred meanings of 
Iranian State Television’s discourse. Iranian state television is the medium of the IRdisc 
and, as I will discuss in chapter three, the preferred meanings of this media and subject 
positions represented in this media are the same as the preferred meanings in the 
IRdisc. This means that television discourse, in the case of Iranian state television, 
which is operated under the direct supervision of the supreme leader, totally works in 
the interests of the IRdisc and does not even question a single preferred meaning of 
this discourse. Rather, it attempts to represent subject positions and preferred 
meanings that, accordingly, can make subjects for the IRdisc. 
Torfing (1999) believes that by considering the discourse analysis of media, we can 
choose one of three strategies. Firstly, looking at discourses about mass media. This 
viewpoint considers the functions of media in societies. The main question of this 
approach will be: what is the role of the media in the production and reproduction of 
social order? The second approach will look at the discourse of the mass media. The 
main question in this approach will be about forms and content, which are produced 
and presented by mass media. The main method of this approach will be through 
quantitative methods in content analysis. Although studying questions raised by the 
first two approaches is important, Torfing (1999) believes that the best approach in 
discourse analysing mass media is the third approach, which looks at mass media as 
discourse. This approach, which is a Cultural Studies approach, suggests when we 
consider mass media as tools for discourses to interpellate subjects, it doesn’t mean 
that we can separate media and the discourse that the media present. Rather, we have 
to consider mass media as discourse. In analysing mass media as a discourse we can 
investigate its discursive articulation and preferred meanings.  
Fairclough (1995) in a discourse analysis approach to mass media argues that media 
discourse should be analysed at three levels. The first level is the micro-level. At this 
level, mass media products are considered as texts, which try to articulate a particular 
discourse. Discourse analysis at this level aims to clarify the preferred meanings of 
media discourse and to discover the processes and the ways they are articulated. The 
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preferred meanings of discursive articulation will be found through mass media 
productions. The second level is the meso-level. At this level, the study of institutional 
forms of mass media productions is important as discursive practices. Analysis at this 
level will clarify what kind of discursive articulation flows in texts that are produced by 
the mass media. The third level is the macro-level. At this level, the mass media are 
considered in relation to their ownership forms and political regulations as social 
practices.8  
In this research I intend to offer a discourse analysis of Iranian State Television as a 
discourse through applying the conceptual framework of Laclau and Mouffe’s 
discourse analysis. The emphasis of this research will mostly be on the micro-level of 
mass media discourse analysis. After a brief contribution relating to the meso- and 
macro level (institutional and ownership analysis of Iranian State Television), in order 
to argue that Iranian state television discourse totally supports the ideas of the IRdisc; I 
will undertake discourse analysis of Iranian State Television at the micro-level (the 
texts produced). This means that I will analyse the representation of the subject 
positions in Iranian State Television in order to explore the preferred meanings and 
ideal subject positions of the IRdisc.  
It is worth mentioning here that my concern in this research is not to study 
perceptions of the Tehranian middle class from television texts, rather, after exploring 
what the ideal subject positions of the IRdisc are, I will examine if the subjectivity of 
the Tehranian middle class has been formed in a way that is consistent with these 
ideals and ideas, or not. To achieve this aim, I interviewed members of the Tehranian 
middle class in relation to the themes that were evident from what I have explored in 
the TV texts, not by the theme of the TV texts.  
The interviewees are therefore not necessarily members of the audiences of state 
television texts, but I have examined whether the preferred meanings of Iranian state 
television in particular texts, as the preferred meanings of the IRdisc, can be 
                                                        
8 Arguably, I see suggested division between micro, meso and macro levels by Fairclough, not in contrary 
with my approach in dividing text discourses, structural discourses of producing texts and ownership 
discourses of producing texts.  
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considered to be meanings that construct subjectivities of members of the Tehranian 
middle class or not. 
I decided on not doing audience analysis for two reasons: firstly, I didn’t want to limit 
my sample to just the audiences of Iranian state television since I considered the 
possibility of the construction of middle class subjectivity according to different forms 
of interpellation by the IRdisc through other ideological state apparatuses. I only 
therefore considered TV texts and Iranian television’s discourse as a sample that 
reveals this interpellation and articulation of the IRdisc. Secondly, referring to TV texts 
might cause some kind of presumptions in the interviewees that could lead them to 
consciously embrace a position against the IRdisc and the notions that it puts forward.  
Since, as argued, it is possible that a subject, stands against a discourse, politically and 
ideologically, but significant parts of his/her identity are still formed in a way that is 
consistent with the preferred meanings of that discourse, I never referred to the 
preferred meanings of the IRdisc and the TV texts in interviews, in order to avoid 
making any presumptions. Specifically, at the time when I have conducted the 
interviews, there was a kind of general pessimism about the state in the Islamic 
Republic among the Tehranian middle class, because of the repression of the Green 
Movement by this state.    
In the next chapter, through presenting a review of the development of Iranian state 
television’s discourse since the revolution of 1979, I will elaborate on why, in this 
research, I have considered Iranian state television discourse as a formation that 
demonstrates and manifests the ideal subject positions and preferred meanings of the 
IRdisc.  
 69 
CHAPTER THREE: EVOLUTION OF THE IRANIAN STATE 
TELEVISION DISCOURSE IN POST-REVOLUTIONARY IRAN 
 
Political and media discourses in Iran were fully transformed in 1979. The revolution 
not only changed the political discourse of the country and eliminated the hegemony 
of the Pahlavi monarchy, but also caused a significant transformation in all of the 
cultural patterns in Iranian society. Here, I do not want to consider the 1979 revolution 
and its effects in relation to changing the cultural patterns of Iranian society, but I will 
analyse how the television discourse was changed during and after the 1979 
revolution. The study of this transformation is important, since television discourse in 
Iran, and basically all forms of state media production, still consider themselves to be 
the extenders and propagators of the revolution, which occurred in February 1979.  
This research examines whether the subjectivities of members of the Tehranian middle 
class have been constructed to be consistent with the ideal subject positions of the 
IRdisc, which has been represented in most of the popular TV series in Iranian state 
television since the Iranian presidential election of 2009. This research supposes that in 
studying Iranian state television’s discourse, this discourse promotes the ideas of the 
IRdisc and interpellate subjects regarding preferred meanings of this discourse.  
In this research the preferred meanings of the IRdisc will therefore be explored in 
relation to the products of Iranian state television. As discussed before, I will analyse 
the three most popular TV series on Iranian state television from Summer 2009, to 
Winter 2013, in order to understand what the preferred meanings of the IRdisc were 
and according to which signifiers these meanings were preferred. Therefore, analyses 
of these TV series will be done at the micro level. Nonetheless in order to elaborate 
that the represented subject positions and preferred meanings of the Iranian state 
television discourse are consistent with ideals of the IRdisc, it is a need to consider the 
formation and evolution of the state television discourse in its institutional forms 
(meso-level) and ownership forms (macro-level). Therefore, during this chapter, I 
intend to elaborate that during different contextual circumstances passed from the 
revolution of 1979, and during domination of different articulations of the IRdisc, the 
Iranian state television discourse has always represented and projected ideas of the 
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IRdisc in order to form subjectivities that are desired by this discourse. Moreover, as it 
discussed during the theoretical chapter, regarding a split that emerged among active 
forces of the state in the consequence of emergence of the reformist articulation, 
during this chapter I will elaborate that how the Iranian television discourse stood in 
the side of the principlist articulation. This will justify my approach when currently I call 
the principlist articulation as the dominant articulation of the IRdisc and intend to 
reach preferred meanings of this articulation through representations of the state 
television.  
Grasping different articulations of the Iranian state television discourse from the 
beginning, and considering its preferred meanings at different periods, is a requisite 
for arguing that this discourse has always interpolated subjects regarding preferred 
meanings of the dominant articulation of the IRdisc. To reach this aim, in this section, I 
will study the discourse of Iranian television in four epochs and will discuss how, during 
those years, the discourse of Iranian state television was formed and established 
according to the dominant articulations of the IRdisc. 
Moreover, as Torfing (1999) suggested, I will look at the Iranian state television which 
definitely can be considered as mass media as a discursive formation, since it is 
impossible to separate media from the discourse that media presents. Therefore, the 
main argument of this chapter would be that articulation of the Iranian state television 
discourse has been done consistent and coordinated with the articulation of the IRdisc 
and it is possible to investigate preferred meanings of the IRdisc through studying 
representations of the Iranian state television discourse. It is worth mentioning that 
this contribution to the mass media does not stand against considering media as 
ideological state apparatuses, since these apparatuses also are forming and 
articulating discourses that interpellate subjects. Therefor again we cannot separate 
ideological apparatuses from the discourse that they present. Arguably ideological 
state apparatuses are discourses that have been articulated regarding meanings that 
have been preferred in regard to discursive practices in their institutional and 
ownership forms, namely macro and meso levels.  
During this chapter I will mostly present a narration of formation, establishment and 
articulation of the Iranian state television discourse in its institutional and ownership 
forms. During this chapter, I will also refer to TV texts as evidence for different 
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articulations of the television discourse consistent with different articulations of the 
IRdisc.  
In addition, as the main concern and core question of the school of Cultural Studies in 
doing media research is to demonstrate a powerful link between culture and politics, 
understanding politics of the Iranian television discourse in macro and meso level, will 
lead to a better grasp of the intention of this discourse in micro level regarding relating 
to particular signifiers to specific signified in order to interpellate subjects. Therefore, I 
believe that the political nature of discursive articulation of TV texts in their micro 
level, is tightly dependent on discursive practices in macro and meso levels.  
THE FORMATION PERIOD OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN’S 
TELEVISION DISCOURSE: FROM 1979 TO 1981  
In early February, 1979, after the return of Ayatollah Khomeini to Iran following 15 
years of exile, the representative of the NIRT’s (National Iranian Radio and Television, 
the name of the organisation before the revolution) strikers, who went on strike from 
November, 1978, asked his opinion about the role of television in society. Khomeini 
responded: “My opinion about television is that it has to be in the service of the people, 
and governments do not have any right to supervise this apparatus. Hitherto the 
Iranian government and the former Shah have behaved against international rules.” 
(Rashidi, Jam-jam Newspaper, 1st February 2009) This speech caused the strike of NIRT 
employees to continue until 11th February 1979, the day of the Iranian revolution’s 
victory. 
On 12th February 1979, Mehdi Bazargan, the Prime Minister of the provisional 
government, through a decree appointed Sadegh Ghotbzadeh as the President of the 
NIRT. After the day of revolution, the name of the National Iranian Radio and 
Television organisation (NIRT) changed to Voice and Vision of the Revolution. Voice 
and Vision of the Revolution at 8:30 on 12th February 1979, broadcast a news section 
without any censorship and with total neutrality. The designation of Ghotbzadeh as the 
President of the Voice and Vision of the Revolution organisation, which was later 
renamed as the Voice and Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran (VVIR), was the 
beginning of a different articulation of television discourse in Iran. The preferred 
meanings of the previous television discourse were deconstructed and the new 
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discourse needed to bring a new kind of articulation to its preferred meanings. This 
articulation should have been formed around a new nodal point, rather than around 
modernisation, westernisation or Americanisation, as in the Pahlavi era (Abrahamian, 
2008, p245). This new nodal point was Islamism. The discursive articulation of state 
television after the revolution thus had to be formed in a new way. This discourse had 
to create a new myth and, by making this myth into the social imagination, could 
become the hegemonic discourse. Attempts to bring a new form of articulation to 
television discourse according to the new nodal point, therefore started a day after the 
revolution. These attempts eventually led to the establishment of the Islamic television 
discourse. 
One of the proceedings of the Voice and Vision of the Revolution organisation in the 
early days after the victory of the revolution was reading the statements and 
declarations of all the political groups and parties’ (which had played a role in the 
victory of the revolution). These groups contained left-leaning parties, like 
“Mujahidin”, to the neo-liberal right-leaning parties, like “Nehzat Azadi”. Declarations 
by these groups were provided to radio and television, demonstrated their political 
positions after the victory of the revolution. These declarations were presented to 
both radio and television with the condition that there would be no censorship of the 
broadcasting. One of the first actions by Ghotbzadeh after he took on the presidency 
of the radio and television organisation was to interrupt the broadcasting of these 
declarations. In an interview, he stated: “in the early days [after the victory of 
revolution] we read the declarations of all groups. Now, we decided that from today, 
[14th February, 1979] not to read the declaration of any group, whether it is “Nehzat 
Azadi” or “Jebhe-ye Melli”, or other different groups” (Iranian History, 19th February, 
2011). 
Ghotbzadeh was describing his plans for the radio and television organisation as being 
the expression of the voices of the “barefoot people” (Paberahne ha). He believed that 
broadcasting the programs of this organisation must represent the ideological voice of 
the revolution, which was totally and wholly Islamic. He also believed that the 
demands of the society after the revolution must be determined by the leader of 
revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini, and nobody else. He also stated that the radio and 
television organisation is not a laboratory for the ideological expression of different 
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political and doctrinal groups and believers in ideologies other than Islam, can express 
their beliefs through other media like the press (the press was not yet subject to 
governmental censorship at that time). Ghotbzadeh believed that the predominant 
amounts of Iranian society are practising Muslims and the religion of Islam plays a 
major role in Iranian society. He therefore prevented the influence of other groups, 
which did not have any religious concerns but had played roles in the victory of the 
revolution. Ghotbzadeh ordered that instead of news of these groups, and generally of 
political groups and parties, the messages of the Ayatollah Khomeini and the problems 
of the provisional government should be broadcast (Interview with Kayhan 
Newspaper, 17th February, 1979).  
These statements by Ghotbzadeh and his operations in the radio and television 
organisation caused protests from some political groups against him. Additionally, 
some of the press also started to critique the operations of Ghotbzadeh in the radio 
and television organisation. The Ayandegan newspaper, in critiquing the double 
standard of behaviour by Ghotbzadeh, published an article entitled: “Censorship in 
different forms in radio and television”. This article stated: “we should see why the 
employees of radio and television went on strike and now, when their strike has 
finished, what they have achieved? The aim of the strike of radio and television 
employees, as various statements by employees’ union demonstrate, was, in the first 
place, the demand for the neutrality of radio and television and the ending of, “every 
governmental” supervision. However, in recent days it has been proven that not only 
have radio and television employees not reached their aim, rather, in fact, nothing has 
changed” (Ayandegan Newspaper, Cited in Iranian History, 19th February, 2012). 
Ghotbzadeh’s remarks, and his actions in the Voice and Vision of the Revolution 
organisation in the early days of the revolution, demonstrate well that the new 
discursive articulation in television had started to form. This articulation sought to use 
all discursive facilities to attach new meanings to floating signifiers. These floating 
signifiers were mostly moments in the previous television discourse, and some of them 
had recently entered into the field of discursivity of the new articulation. From the first 
days after the victory of the revolution, the television discourse, by adopting the nodal 
point of Islamism, signified by the supreme leadership, as Ghotbzadeh declared, 
started to articulate its preferred meanings. In this process, the television discourse 
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began to marginalise voices and discourses, which their nodal points had not 
determined to be Islamic after the revolution. 
Ayatollah Khomeini, in his first speech after returning to Iran, in referring to cultural 
institutes like cinema and television, said:  
 
We are not opposed to the cinema, to radio, or to television; what we oppose is 
vice and the use of the media to keep our young people in a state of 
backwardness and dissipating their energy. We have never opposed these 
features of modernity in themselves, but when they were brought from Europe 
to the East, particularly to Iran, unfortunately, they were used not in order to 
advance civilisation, but in order to drag us into barbarism” (Khomeini, cited in 
Algar, 1981: 258) 
 
This means that the signifiers of the previous television discourse during the Pahlavi 
monarchy were carrying the meaning of corruption with their signifieds. These 
signifiers must therefore leave the field of discursivity of the current television 
discourse and must be replaced with new signifiers. These new signifiers have to carry 
meanings that are consistent, with Islam as the nodal point.  
Khomeini emphasised that if television was not entirely Islamised; Islam would not 
have succeeded in Iran (Sahifah’i Nur, Vol. 12, p84). He believed that television is as 
important to revolutionaries as it was important to Pahlavi regime (Sahifah’i Nur, 
Vol.5, p 203), because television is the most powerful and efficient apparatus, since it 
reaches the entire country (Sahifah’i Nur, Vol.8, p201). He believed that if it (television) 
was purified, the entire country would be purified; otherwise society would be 
deflected (Sahifah’i Nur, Vol. 16, p82). Khomeini, in the first month after the victory of 
the revolution, and following objections from different political groups about the 
operation of radio and television organisations, during a visit with members of the 
provisional government said:  
 
These apparatuses –when serving Taghut (rebellion against Allah in Quranic 
terms, here it means the Shah’s era) - whether they were empowering Taghut 
or distancing people from important issues… It was very important for them to 
widely blind the eyes of people, to increase their unawareness in order to pillage 
them. Now, when –thanks to Allah- this apparatus is Islamic, it should fulfil its 
Islamic duties…Those who were formerly serving Taghut and doing all kinds of 
corruption, should be cleansed. Now, any expression of piety and belief in Islam 
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is not acceptable from those who were formerly delivering speeches, or 
exhibiting, or doing anything against the revolution. They should all be 
cleansed. Radio and Television are important in the propaganda of both the 
corrupt and the correct. The importance of television is more than any other 
media. These apparatuses are nurturing systems. All strata of the nation should 
be nurtured. Television is a public university. This must be an apparatus which … 
nurtures all [people] as fighters and thinkers; nurtures them as independent and 
tolerant, and distances them from westoxification. (Sahifah’i  Nur, Vol. 6, P 399) 
 
After this speech by Khomeini, and determining the duties of the television apparatus 
in creating an Islamic and revolutionary television discourse, Ghotbzadeh started to 
clean up (Paksazi) the radio and television organisation. He fired and eliminated lots of 
the employees of this organisation, who had been working in this organisation in the 
Pahlavi monarchy era. In his opinion, this action and widespread elimination 
determined the border between the revolutionaries and the non- revolutionaries. Lots 
of the fired employees were employees who went on strike before the revolution, and 
in the last three months of the Pahlavi monarchy they did not go to their work at the 
NIRT. Nonetheless, Ghotbzadeh, in response to objections by fired employees, said: 
“the strike does not determine the border between revolutionaries and non-
revolutionaries” (Iranian History, 1st February, 2012). 
Nevertheless, the process of the formation of the new television discourse regarding 
the Islamic preferred meanings was obviously acceptable to the leader of the 
revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini. He believed that television employees should be 
purified, and need to be responsible to, and believe in, Islam, and also in the Islamic 
republic (Sahifah’i Nur, Vol.10, p12). Actions regarding having an Islamic television 
discourse followed two major ideas. Sreberny-Mohammadi & Mohammadi (1994, 
pp170-1) believed that these two major Ideas were, firstly, presenting “pure Islam” 
(Eslam-e Rastin) and, secondly, avoiding western and eastern culture and their 
influences, under the slogan: “neither west, nor east” (na sharghi, na gharbi). The 
emphasis on these two values intensified after the referendum on 1st April, 1979. 
Through this referendum, the Islamic Republic was selected as the political system of 
Iran. For instance, one of the signs of this intensification was the mandatory hijab for 
women who worked at radio and television organisation. The mandatory hijab on the 
radio and television organisation occurred before the hijab was obligatory for women 
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in all public places. Following 1st April referendum and the election of the Islamic 
republic as the political system, the radio and television organisation was renamed as 
the Voice and Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran (VVIR).  
After this renaming and the referendum, obviously the content of VVIR programs 
became more Islamic and more religious. In referring to the two values mentioned 
above, pure Islam, and neither East nor West, we can divide the content of the 
broadcasting programs of those days into two sections. The content of the first section 
sought to articulate the preferred meanings of the dominant discourse after the 
revolution and the referendum to make sense of pure Islam. The contents of programs 
that related to the second section were trying to reject, deconstruct and dislocate the 
meanings, which were articulated in the Pahlavi era by articulating anti-imperialist 
meanings. 
Iranian State Television According to the Constitution  
Article 175 of the Iranian Constitution, which was approved on 29th December, 1980, 
refers to the rules of VVIR operation and the duties of this organisation. According to 
this law, VVIR is an independent organisation, which must be operated under the joint 
supervision of three representatives from the judicial system, government and 
parliament, and the head of the organisation is to be determined by the supreme 
leader. This paragraph of the statutes of VVIR changed on 5th May, 1991, and 
afterwards representatives from the judicial system, government and parliament only 
have a regulatory duty at VVIR and the president in charge of the operation of VVIR 
will be chosen or dismissed, merely by the direct decision of the supreme leader.  
Nonetheless, other paragraphs in this article have not changed since the first approval. 
According to paragraph 9 of this statute, and under the part about the duties of the 
VVIR, it was indicated that the major aim of this organisation, as a public university, 
must be to spread Islamic culture among the whole society. This organisation also has 
to try its best to create a situation for the refinement of human souls and the 
promotion of Islamic morality. According to this law, the VVIR organisation also has to 
accelerate the movement that began with the Islamic revolution, so that it is 
widespread worldwide. In paragraph 11 of this law, indicates that this organisation 
should try to expand the international relationship between the Islamic Republic of 
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Iran and other countries that conform to Islamic criteria, through producing beneficial 
programs and offering them worldwide. According to paragraph 7 of this law also, the 
right to the establishment of transmitters and the broadcasting of television and radio 
programs anywhere in the country is under the monopoly of this organisation. If 
natural or legal persons proceed to benefit by establishing any televisual or radio 
transmitter, the authorities of the Islamic Republic will prevent them from continuing, 
and they will be prosecuted (Islamic Republic of Iran Constitution, Article 175). 
THE STABILISATION PERIOD OF THE TELEVISION DISCOURSE OF THE 
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN: FROM 1981 TO 1989 
1981 was the beginning year of the sixties-decade (1360s) according to the Jalali 
calendar9, the official calendar of Iran. This decade can definitely be cited as the years 
in which the IRdisc fixed its preferred meanings in all of its social, political and cultural 
aspects. The dominant articulation of the IRdisc during this decade is the “Islamic-
Leftist” articulation. The sixties-decade began with the start of the war between Iran 
and Iraq, and finished with the death of the charismatic leader of the 1979 revolution, 
Ayatollah Khomeini. Thinking about the 60s, and discussing the legacy that this decade 
has left for Iranians today, is a struggle, which is still on-going among the different 
forces involved in today’s Iranian situation. Attempts to seize the meanings of 
signifiers, which were formed in the 60s, indicate that those signifiers, and the possible 
meanings of them, are still significant and their re-articulation by conflicting discursive 
forces will affect today’s situation. Marginalised groups and forces during the 60s, and 
the dominant one, still disagree widely about the legacy of the 60s decade. Even 
struggles about meanings, which were articulated during the 60s, are still really 
significant among the groups and persons who were dominant during the 60s and are 
now marginalised. These struggles determine the importance of the sixties-decade in 
current discursive encounters. The ideological stability of the IRdisc was formed and 
achieved in this decade. The most proper way to deconstruct the current preferred 
meanings of the IRdisc regarding specific signifiers, is to go back to the historical 
moment of their articulation. The sixties-decade was when the IRdisc, with its usage of                                                         9 In all of the chapters of this research, I will refer to the years between 1981 and 1989 as the 60s or the 
sixties-decade, according to the Jalali calendar.  
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different elements of satisfaction and suppression, could make its ideology (myth) 
hegemonic and could marginalise rival discourses.  
Undoubtedly, in contemporary Iranian history, this decade has the largest number of 
sacrifices. Sacrifices in this decade were from the two ends of the spectrum. At the one 
end, subjects were placed so that the discourse of the Islamic Republic was at the 
highest level of hegemony for them, and, at the other end, rivals discourses’ subjects 
were placed where the preferred meanings of the IRdisc were not hegemonic for them 
at all. The 8-year war between Iran and Iraq required sacrifices from groups near the 
first end, and the suppression of the dominant discourse with the usage of suppressive 
elements, required sacrifices from groups near to the second end of the spectrum.  
Arguably, one of the most important sixties-decade’s elements is television, and its 
programs in the 60s. 
Television in those days, as the ideological state apparatus, was experiencing its 
maximum rate of influence. Television in those days, without having any serious media 
rival, was articulating its discourse and trying to extend its preferred meanings within 
Iranian everyday life. The television discourse of the 60s, with the maximum rate of 
influence and referring to its discursively preferred meanings, was attempting to 
interpellate subjects. These subjects were recently distanced from the revolutionary 
crisis, and the previous discursive meanings regarding political and cultural matters, 
were deconstructed. In this new discourse, and during encounters with this discourse 
interpellation, subjects needed to find their positions and, accordingly, to identify 
themselves. Nonetheless, the sixties-decade’s circumstances, considering the 
beginnings of the war between Iraq and Iran in September, 1980, and also the 
beginning the wide making of “the others” by the IRdisc, mostly did not let subjects 
identify themselves according to different and various discourses. This means that the 
subjectivities of discursive subjects of those years were less fragmented, since they 
were not exposed to the interpellation of many discourses. Discourses of Ideological 
state apparatuses for the interpellation of subjects were mostly unique for all subjects. 
All of those people with the least opportunities in society had to use the same 
facilities. For example, schools were mostly public schools, and even the few existent 
private schools were running under the close supervision of the government. 
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Universities were only public universities under the supervision of a governmental 
section.  
In considering the mass media situation in the 60s, the governmental supervision on 
the press spread. Some newspapers, which were critics of the Islamic Republic’s 
policies, were closed down by the government, like Ayandegan. The monopoly of radio 
and television was also in the hands of the state by law. All these factors indicate that 
the subjects of the IRdisc could not easily identify themselves according to other 
discourses other than that of the Islamic Republic and, as a result; their identities were 
not so fragmented. On the other hand, if some subjects were identifying themselves 
according to alternative discourses, the suppressing apparatuses of the Islamic 
Republic were smashing them strongly, and they were represented as “the others”. 
The myth of Islam was promoted in all of the social aspects as the social imagination 
and true way to emancipation (Varzi, 2006, p107).  
In the process of Islamising the whole Iranian society and making the IRdisc the 
hegemonic discourse, from the perspective of the Ayatollah Khomeini the television 
was the most important apparatus in promoting the preferred meanings of the IRdisc:  
 
Of course, we should begin to think of how this apparatus –which might be the 
most important apparatus in our propaganda- could be Islamic both in Radio 
and Television. It means that any step there, must be endeavoured to be a step 
towards Islam, then their work is a service to the god…We are obligated to do 
everything according to the aims of the Islamic Republic, which are the same 
aims as Islam. (Sahifah’i Nur, Volume 6) 
 
This was a part of Khomeini’s speech on 2nd August, 1982, for the CEO of VVIR and his 
assistant directors in the different parts of this organisation. The management of VVIR 
during the sixties-decade did not change much. In the early years of the 60s, namely 
1982, Ayatollah Khomeini appointed Mohammad Hashemi to be the president of VVIR. 
The VVIR organisation became relatively stable in its directorial department after 
Ghotbzadeh and this organisation became consistent with other governmental parts of 
the Islamic republican state. Mohammad Hashemi was the brother of Akbar Hashemi-
Rafsanjani, the President of the parliament and one of the central members of the 
revolutionary committee. 
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By the beginning of the 60s, television discourse had started to interpellate subjects in 
relation to its preferred meanings. Studying the content of television programs during 
the 60s, and the effects of these programs on Iranian everyday life, now seems 
important. Fazeli (2012) believes that three main features of the sixties decade, 
distinguished this decade from the other years in which the IRdisc sought to articulate 
its preferred meanings. These three features caused the sixties-decade and its 
discursive meanings and signifiers still to have special significance, and they can help 
our understanding of the current circumstances of the IRdisc. These three features are: 
social cohesion, Ideological excitation, and the richness of meanings during the sixties 
decade. In continuing this section, I will try to study the position of television discourse 
in constructing these three features during the sixties-decade. 
Television and Social Cohesion in the Sixties-Decade  
From different aspects, the sixties-decade indicates an unprecedented social cohesion, 
which was formed during those years. Three years before the beginning of this decade, 
a revolution occurred. Official representation of this revolution, after passing through 
the transition period from the Pahlavi discourse to the IRdisc indicates co-ordination 
between the forces that owned the legacy of the revolution in the years after the 
revolution. This representation in the official media of the IRdisc showed the solidarity 
of a nation in resisting despotism and corruption, and the actualisation of some noble 
values, like independence and freedom. Official representations indicate that reaching 
these values become possible through the preference of the Islamic Republic’s 
discursive meanings. A year before the start of this decade, the war between Iran and 
Iraq was begun. This war was started by the Iraqis and official representations in Iran 
knew this war as the “Sacred Defence” (Defa’e Moghadas), or “Imposed War” (Jang-e 
Tahmili). This war was a major factor in the emergence of social cohesion during the 
sixties-decade. Due to the emergence of this war, lots of social forces, whether the 
preferred meanings of the IRdisc became hegemonic for them or not, were consistent 
with a stand against the aggressors in this war. Social forces and individuals, that were 
taking position against the official representation of this war, were known as “traitors” 
(Khaae’nin) by the social body and they became marginalised and were eliminated. 
Symbols of social cohesion around this Sacred Defence, like the calls for volunteers to 
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go to the front, stations for collecting either cash or non-cash aid to help warriors at 
the front, funerals for the war’s martyrs, etc., reproduced the social cohesion around 
the war. Nonetheless, this social cohesion is possible to understand from other aspects 
of Iranian everyday life during the sixties decade.  
Media consumption, and especially television consumption in the sixties-decade, is 
one of the features that caused the emergence of social cohesion in that decade. Life 
in that decade had the same rhythm for a large group. It was not possible to consume 
media, and especially television, at any time that the people wanted. Television 
programs started at 5p.m. with the broadcasting of children’s programs and ended 
before midnight. All of the people were consuming the same media, and the media did 
not split the society. Television during this decade was identified in Iranian homes with 
two channels. These channels were spending more than half of their broadcasting 
time, which was a maximum of 10 hours, on information about war events, and on 
broadcasting war news. Getting news and information about an issue in those days 
was the most important flow issue in the country, and this was possible through 
television. This fact helped the emergence of social cohesion around this medium. The 
only voice that could offer primary news and information about the war was television. 
Although radio and the press offered information about war issues, television was the 
most important resource for information about the war (Badii, 2004, pp171-178). This 
meant that primary news was broadcast through television, news, like the victories or 
failures of warriors in the front lines. Nonetheless, the most important feature of 
television, which caused the emergence of social cohesion around it, in addition to its 
information about the war, was the movement of television discourse to produce 
various programs, which could attract audiences. This meant that television discourse, 
after the revolution and by the beginning of the 60s, started to produce programs, 
which could fill the leisure time of audiences. The most important genre that the 
television discourse started to produce to attract audiences was the television series 
genre.  
The first TV series after the revolution, which was a production from VVIR, was 
broadcast in 1981. This TV series was “Masal Abaad”, and it was directed by Reza 
Jiyan. After this TV series there was “Sarbadaran” in 1983 (directed by Mohammad Ali 
Najafi), “Afasane-ye Soltan va Shaban”, in 1984, (directed by Daryoush Farhang), and 
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“Ayeneh” in 1985, (directed by Gholamhossein Latifi), which were broadcast by Iranian 
state television as the first Iranian series after the revolution. Each of these four TV 
series, the first TV series produced by VVIR, were pioneers in establishing particular 
genres. Each of these genres became the main structures of TV series production in 
later years. These genres, respectively, are: episodic series, historical series, comedy 
series, and family melodrama series. Groups of series productions, alongside groups of 
children and juveniles were among the first groups in VVIR, who produced these 
programmes, which were able to increase the numbers of the television audiences and 
also the variety in television broadcasting with the aim of entertainment (Shakib, 2012, 
p229).  
In a survey by “Film” monthly magazine (Mahname-ye Cinamaee-ye Film), published in 
March, 2012, about 30 years of TV series production in the Islamic Republic of Iran’s 
television, five of the ten most effective and favourite series in the history of Iranian 
television after the revolution, were productions of the sixties. This means that 50 
percent of the ten most popular TV series among all of VVIR’s television series 
production were produced during the sixties. Meanwhile, the proportion of all TV 
series produced during the 60s in relation to the total number of TV series produced by 
early 2012 was roughly 3.5 percent (20 TV series produced during the 60s and the total 
number of TV series produced was 600 by early 2012). Considering the development of 
VVIR’s facilities for producing TV series during the years after the 60s, and after the 
end of the war, this percentage indicates the importance and influence of the sixties-
decade’s TV series. This importance and influence caused the emergence of social 
cohesion around television products during the 60s. TV series, during the sixties-
decade were broadcast once a week. Nonetheless, when there was no rival medium to 
entertain the audiences, and when the country was involved in a procrustean war, 
these programs caused social cohesion among subjects, as they dealt with everyday 
life in these circumstances. Television audiences watched these TV series and, except 
for these productions that were not exposed to other media discourses, namely, they 
had no possibility to be the audience for other media discourses. There is a common 
phrase among people who remember these sixties-decade TV series. They say that at 
the time that the TV series were broadcast in the 60s, “streets became deserted” 
(Olad-Dameshghiyeh, 2011). This means that the broadcasting of TV series and the 
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timetable of this broadcasting were forming a rhythm for Iranian everyday life. The 
rhythm of Iranian everyday life in those days was taking shape according to the rhythm 
that the state television was representing to them.  
The form of television consumption during the sixties-decade, and the function of 
television in this decade, indicate that television consumption and, basically, the 
television discourse during the sixties decade, was a significant element in the 
emergence of the social cohesion in those years in favour of the IRdisc’s preferred 
meanings.  
Television and Ideological Excitation in the Sixties-Decade  
The sixties-decade was the time for the empowerment of a discourse that has chosen 
Islam as its nodal point. Eventually, this discourse became the hegemonic discourse 
during the sixties-decade. This discourse, during the sixties -decade was articulating its 
preferred meanings and was forming a myth accordingly. We may say that the 
ultimate goal of this articulation and myth forming was to establish the ideology of 
Islam as the social imagination among its subjects. Factors mentioned in the previous 
part, which caused the emergence of social cohesion among Iranian society, also 
played a role in the construction of a social imagination relating to the Islamic 
Republic’s preferred meanings. The war between Iran and Iraq was the most important 
factor that caused excitation and the empowerment of Islamic ideology during the 
sixties decade. War was the most suitable factor that by its referral the IRdiscs could 
construct the Islamic social imagination and justify the marginalising of rival discourses. 
Using ideological state apparatuses, and especially television, could help the IRdisc to 
gain preference for its discursive meanings and to promote Islamic ideology as the 
social imagination, which would make sense of life.  
We can divide the main functions of television discourse in relation to Islamic ideology 
into two parts. The first articulated a television discourse relating to the discursively 
preferred meanings of the IRdisc, which could interpellate subjects. The second main 
function of television discourse was the glamorisation of this ideology regarding 
making it the social imagination. In those days, the ideal subjects of the IRdisc were 
sacrificed in the war. Victims of this ideology had to be represented as heroes who had 
sacrificed their lives regarding the social imagination of the IRdisc. Creating heroes and 
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the beatification of war, as the most important battlefields in struggling for the 
ideology of the IRdisc with other ideologies, and also the explicit representation of the 
preferred meanings of the IRdisc that related to Islam, determine the function of 
television discourse in relation to Islamic ideology (Varzi, 2006, p78). 
For the actualisation of the first function in television discourse there was no 
hesitation in explicit and direct representation of the Islamic Republic’s preferred 
meanings. The emphasis of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah 
Khomeini, on Islamising television to promote Islamic ideology, and also the legislation 
of the Iranian parliament, to determine the goal of promoting Islam in the television 
discourse; resulted in different programs on television, the existence of Islamic 
elements and the observance of Islamic codes became the main conditions for 
broadcasting programs. The television discourse was not articulating its preferred 
meanings in such a way that subjects could unconsciously identify themselves 
accordingly. Nonetheless, in fact, television discourse was representing its preferred 
meanings like a manifesto through which to express the minimum expectations of this 
discourse from its subjects. In the representation and expression of this manifesto, all 
Islamic codes had to be manifested. For instance, women in television had to observe 
the complete form of the hijab; showing physical touching between men and women 
was forbidden; using western clothing codes, like ties or bow ties, was forbidden, and 
also the manner of speech on television had to be consistent with Islamic regulations. 
Apart from applying these kinds of regulations in representations, which were, in fact, 
the manifesto of the IRdisc, lots of television programs were broadcast in order to 
promote the Islamic ideology in the most explicit form possible. Broadcasting speeches 
by the ideological leaders of the IRdisc, like Morteza Motahari, and also the daily 
broadcasting of Ayatollah Khomeini’s speeches, were among these kinds of programs. 
Broadcasting the various programs with the centrality of Islam and its influences on 
the different aspects of everyday life indicated the focus of the television discourse on 
Islam as its nodal point. For instance, programs like “Morality in the Family” (Akhlagh 
dar khanevadeh) which focused on Islamic practices relating to having a better family 
life, or “Lessons from the Quran” (Dars-ha ee az Ghoraan), which was about behaving 
in daily life according to Quranic values and morals, or programs about expressing the 
Sharia rules that have to be observed in everyday life; were also among these kinds of 
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programs. Cutting television programs for Azan and changes in the clothing style of 
presenters and the rhythm of television programs during the Shiites Imams’ time of 
mourning were among clear signs of the explicit promotion of Islamic ideology by the 
television discourse. A similar style in almost all of these programs, which were 
established during the 60s, are now broadcast on Iranian state television and all of the 
Islamic codes that observing them in television became mandatory in the 60s, are still 
mandatory in television broadcasting.  
To actualise the second function of the television discourse relates to myth or 
ideology, namely, the glamorising of this ideology and the making of heroes out of 
victims of the ideology, the war between Iran and Iraq was considered to be the most 
important platform from which to reach this goal. Representation of the war between 
Iran and Iraq, not only as a war about the objective boundaries between these 
countries, but also as the war between the faithful and the infidel could meet two 
major goals. The first goal was to draw sympathy from all of the subjects of the IRdisc 
regarding the war issue. The second aim was to encourage subjects to participate in 
the war. Glamorising of the war and making heroes of its victims provided this 
possibility for the IRdisc so as to fill the objective battlefield with volunteers, who were 
eager to sacrifice their lives for the victory of faith over infidelity. Television’s role in 
these aims was to produce and broadcast programs, which could represent the war as 
a war between the faithful and the infidel, and also represent the victims of this war as 
heroes. Producing a documentary series named “Witness of Glory” (Revayat-e Fath), 
by Morteza Avini, and broadcasting this series on Chanel One during wartime, may be 
the most important factor through which television discourse could reach its aims in 
regard to the war issue. Varzi in considering “Witness of Glory” series, argues: 
 
Morteza Avini’s film series Revayat-e Fath (Witness to Glory) is the longest-
running documentary on the Iran-Iraq war, and as such it was the lens through 
which most of Iran viewed the war and its aftermath. The serial was shot live at 
the front, edited there and in Tehran, and was then aired on television across 
the country every evening of the nearly decade-long war... Avini responded by 
starting a film series to illustrate the beauty and true purpose of the war, in 
order to encourage young men to volunteer for the front…The goal was to 
mobilise forces for the front and incite martyrdom and mobarezeh 
(struggle)…Avini’s goal was to be a witness to the soldier’s faith and to film that 
 86 
faith in order to represent it to the general public…For Avini, it Was all about 
faith. (Varzi, 2006, p77 & 78) 
 
Broadcasting “Revayat-e Fath” began on 9 February 1986. The site that this television 
program could establish among the subjects of hegemonic discourse regarding the war 
issue, and especially martyrdom, fulfilled the goals of the hegemonic discourse about 
the glamorising the war and making victims into heroes. Meanings that this program 
was intending to prefer regarding signifiers like “war” and “martyrdom” caused the 
discursively preferred meanings of these signifiers to be smeared with ideological 
Islamic values. “Revayat-e Fath” was a narration based television program, and Avini 
himself was the writer and narrator of the whole series of this documentary. 
Broadcasting “Revayat-e Fath” episodes caused this program’s view of the notion of 
martyrdom and war to permeate other television programs. This view of the war was 
the dominant one and was promoting through television discourse and all of the 
ideological state apparatuses of the IRdisc. Although this kind of view of the notion of 
war and martyrdom, and even of the enemy, and the ideological excitation relating to 
these issues are the products of the sixties-decade, but in later years and even today, 
this kind of representation of these notions are the official representations of the state 
apparatuses. For instance, “Revayat-e Fath” was produced until 1996 and was 
attempting to spread this kind of insight about the veterans of the war, and even 
about the new war after the objective war between Iran and Iraq, which was known as 
the “cultural invasion” from the west. Broadcasting of this program finished in 1996, 
when Avini in one the war zones in 1996. While he was filming war-torn areas, he 
stood on a mine that was left from wartime, and he lost his life. Nonetheless, these 
insights into notions like war, martyrdom and the enemy, which Avini constructed, are 
dominant insights that are still reproduced by the state media. Several programs have 
been produced on the same pattern of “Revayat-e Fath”, about different issues and 
especially about the “cultural invasion”. “Revayat-e Fath” has also been re-broadcast 
by Iranian state television several times during the years after the war. Signifiers like 
war, martyrdom, resistance, battle and enemy, are still signifiers that are near to the 
nodal point of the IRdisc. Preferring meanings regarding to these signifiers has started 
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from sixty-decade and during all years after sixty-decade, IRdisc has tried to hold to its 
preferred meanings of these signifiers to retain their hegemony. 
Television and the Richness of Meanings in the Sixties-Decade 
In looking at television programs that were broadcast during the sixties-decade, and 
considering the two features: social cohesion and ideological excitation, indicates that 
television programs of the 60s were full of meanings. This statement does not mean 
that other television programs do not carrying meanings. Everything related to images 
and representation inevitably carries meaning. Rather, my intention is that meanings 
which television discourse was attempting to represent during the 60s were explicit, 
exoteric meanings, which mostly related to Islamic ideological values. This means that 
these meanings, and the kinds of representation of these meanings were easy to 
understand and explore. In other words, those programs were full of mottos. Mottos 
that, in some parts, were close to Islamic ideological values, and in other parts were 
promoting morality and human values, like faith, effort, battle, equality, family, etc. 
The lack of the facilities and equipment to produce domestic programs during the 
sixties caused lots of broadcast programs to be imported programs. Apart from TV 
series, which I have mentioned, there are examples of them in the previous part, the 
most influential and most important imported programs in those years were children’s 
programs. These programs were for children who were growing up and identifying 
themselves during wartime after the victory of the Islamic revolution. This period, as 
mentioned before, combined pain and affliction, and the dominant discourse tried to 
naturalise and glamorise these pain and afflictions. This pains and affliction was either 
financial hardships, because of sanctions by western countries, or pain because of the 
sacrificing of victims in the war, which was imposed on them. The process of the 
naturalisation and beautification of this situation had to be done by the IRdisc to fulfil 
two major aims. Firstly, the preferred meanings of this discourse had to become 
hegemonic among all subjects, and, secondly, pains and afflictions that were imposed 
on subjects had to be represented as natural and normal issues. I have studied 
television discourse proceedings in order to fulfil the first aim, in the last two sections. 
To fulfil the second, television discourse had to represent pains in such a way that 
these pains seemed normal and natural. The target group of this discourse were 
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subjects that had recently been placed in the process of socialisation. The television 
discourse that was playing a role in the process of social cohesion formation and 
ideological excitation among its Islamic republican discourse subjects, needed to think 
about a generation which had recently entered into the process of socialisation and 
social identification. This generation was mostly born between 1976 and 1986.  
The best way to naturalise and glamorise pain among this generation was through 
children’s programs. The main nature of the children’s programs of those years was 
the traumatic characteristics of those programs. In a research by Olad-Dameshghiye 
(2011) regarding the nature of the children’s programs of the sixties decade, that are 
still remembered by a generation born between 1976 and 1986, they elaborated that 
two features were dominant. The first one is the traumatic feature of these children’s 
programs, and the second is the emphasis of those programs on high human values. 
Most of these programs were Japanese animations that were produced after World 
War Two and the Hiroshima nuclear bombing. The animations that were remembered 
most in Olad-Dameshghiye’s research were: “Doctor Ernest Family” (Khanevade-ye 
Doctor Ernest), which was an expression of a family’s attempts to survive when 
threatened by death and natural diseases in an island. This family found themselves on 
a haunted island after their ship sank in the ocean. “Hatch, the Honeybee” (Hach, 
Zanbour-e Asal), which was about a child honeybee traveling to find her mother and 
during her travels she encounters lots of difficulties and evil characters. “Hana a girl on 
a farm” (Hana, Dokhtari Dar Mazra’e), which was about a lonely girl who was sent to a 
farm to work. “Little Women” (Zanan-e Kouchak), which was about the girls in a family 
whose father went to war and they had to manage their lives without a father and 
with a sick mother. “Serendipity”, which was about a lonely boy who was caught on an 
island without his family. “A Girl, Named Nell” (Dokhtar-i be Nam-e Nell) was the 
adventure of a girl who was traveling around different cities to find her mother. 
“Housewares” (Bi Khane-maan-ha) which narrated the story of a girl and her mother 
who were forced to leave their house after the father of the family died. “Sara Kourou” 
was the story of a lonely girl who was living in the loft of an aristocratic house and was 
one of the maids there. 
Remembering these examples of children’s programs indicates that the discourse of 
television during the sixties decade sought to naturalise pain in everyday life, especially 
 89 
for those who were slowly becoming familiar with the social environment. These kinds 
of preferred meanings were not essentially the same as the ideologically preferred 
meanings of television discourse. Rather, they were emphasising noble values, which 
should be tied to the identity of each individual. This kind of representation was not 
just limited to children’s programs, but parts of some adults’ programs were also 
delivering same meanings. These programs were mostly emphasising the value of 
effort and hope in crisis circumstances and were representing a subject position on 
which, according to them, each person could be emancipated from oppression by their 
personal efforts and hopes. These efforts were not political or emancipatory efforts; 
rather, there was more emphasis on human and noble values, like hope and faith. For 
example, the story of the TV series “Years Away From Home” (Sal-ha-ye Door az 
Khane) was about Oshin, a rural woman who became wealthy by her own efforts, or 
“Story of a Life” (Dastan-e Yek Zendegi) , this TV series was about a young woman 
named Hnikou who came from a poor family and eventually could become the first 
woman journalist in Japan. The interesting point, which is worth mentioning here, is 
the emergence of a kind of gender segregation among the preferred meanings of 
television discourse. Mostly, the heroes who are carrying the ideological meanings are 
men, and those who carry meanings regarding noble human values were women and 
children. This is shown, or instances, in the difference between the heroes of “Witness 
of Glory”, a documentary series, and “Years away from home” a TV series. 
Television discourse during the sixties, because of its influence in the construction of 
social cohesion by representing Islamic ideologically preferred meanings and noble 
human values which were not necessarily in the same category as Islamic ideological 
meanings, has become influential and determines the discourse in the history of 
television in Iran. This discourse not only could interpellate subjects during the 60s, but 
also was a primer of a kind of television discourse articulation, which we still see it. 
After almost three decades have passed since the first articulation of television 
discourse after the revolution, this discourse, by justifying its preferred meanings, still 
refers to the historical moments of their articulation. Nostalgia for the sixties-decade, 
considering its unprecedented features, is still recognisable among many in Iranian 
society. Nonetheless, it is important to discover how the masses, and also the state 
apparatuses, are facing this nostalgia. This nostalgia for the 60s and the importance of 
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this decade’s signifiers can, on the one hand, lead to the emergence of a significant 
hope for redefinition and re-articulation of those signifiers relating to the current 
situation in Iranian society. On the other hand, this nostalgia can lead to the attempts 
of beneficiary groups and individuals to extend the preferred meanings of the 60s to 
the current situation in Iranian society. It seems that the current television discourse of 
the Islamic Republic of Iran has chosen the second way. In the last section of this 
research I will consider whether this chosen method of television discourse has led to a 
loss, or an intensification of its hegemony.  
THE EMERGENCE OF RIVAL MEDIA DISCOURSES: BETWEEN THE YEARS 
1989 AND 1995 
Two happenings, in summer, 1988, and spring, 1989, have influenced the articulation 
of the IRdisc. These happenings were the announcing of the ceasefire between Iraq 
and Iran, and the death of the charismatic Supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah 
Khomeini. By referring to these two factors, the war and Khomeini were the two main 
factors around which the IRdisc could make its preferred meanings hegemonic. With 
disappearance of these two factors, IRdisc needed to apply changes to its articulation 
to remain the hegemonic discourse. Changes had to be made in such a way that the 
preferred ideological meanings of recent years remained hegemonic. When the 
preferred meanings of a discourse are facing dislocation and cohesive factors are 
missed, differences therefore become more obvious. In facing these differences, each 
discourse has two main strategies. The first strategy is to accept the logic of difference 
among subjects. The second strategy is to make others antagonistic towards forces, 
which are aimed to deconstruct the meanings of signifiers that are near to the nodal 
point. In the other worlds, each discourse has to determine its realm in accepting the 
logic of difference and to eliminate the subjects who identify themselves by meanings 
outside this realm. Representing these outside voices, as “others” will help the 
hegemonic discourse to determine its boundaries for inside subjects. The logic of the 
discursive articulation of television discourse after 1989 also follows these two 
strategies. As Sreberny-Mohammadi and Mohammadi argue: 
 
Suddenly in the summer of 1988 a new cultural atmosphere developed in Iran. 
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Some analysts attribute the changes to the sudden acceptance by Khomeini, in 
September, 1988, of U.N. Resolution 598 and the ceasefire in the war with Iraq, 
after eight devastating years of conflict. The war had created a grim collective 
determination, a central national purpose, and a ready policy for the media. 
With the end to the fighting—which carried no immediate gains for Iran -- there 
was an evident easing of cultural pressure, perhaps in recognition of the 
immense pressures and toll that the war with its urban missile attacks and 
economic dislocation had had. There were signs that the tight Islamisation of 
the past nine years was giving way to a marginally more relaxed cultural 
atmosphere, and criticism and debate about social reconstruction began to be 
heard. (Sreberny-Mohammadi & Mohammadi, 1994, p181) 
 
Through a decree by the Supreme Leader of Iran after Khomeini, Ayatollah Khamenei 
re-assigned Mohammad Hashemi as the President of the VVIR. This decree was signed 
on 24th August 1989. In this decree, in addition to the emphasis of Khamenei on the 
necessity of the Islamic being of television programs and the promotion of Islamic 
ideology and the message of the Islamic revolution by using artistic methods, this 
paragraph also has been cited: “My emphatic advice is emphasising youth’s and 
teenagers’ programs. These programs should have fundamental consistency and be 
combined by attractive, healthy and breezy methods.” (Khamenei, 1989) 
Using signifiers, like attractive and breezy, in this decree indicates that, in comparison 
with television discourse during the 60s, television discourse after the 60s, apart from 
emphasising ideologically preferred meanings and explicit meaning making for its 
subjects, needed to satisfy and entertain audiences by producing joyful and enlivening 
programs. VVIR productions after the sixty-decade, therefore, in addition to 
emphasising Islamic ideological meanings and the adherence to its manifesto in regard 
to the observance of ideological values in its representations, started to be more 
entertaining. 
The prevalence of TV series making in the years after the sixties in VVIR, and the 
appropriation of more of the governmental budget to VVIR to expand the domestic 
production indicates that the concept of entertainment became important in television 
productions. TV series broadcasting during these years increased from one night per 
week in the 60s to three or four times per week. Obviously, the aim of these series was 
not to just promoting ideological preferred meanings of the IRdisc. Although, as I said 
before, ideological elements like the hijab and the limited relationships between men 
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and women, were still observed in television broadcasting. Broadcasting TV series, 
which addressed social issues or broadcast comedy programs, have been started on 
Iranian state television.  
Putting emphasis on the television discourse on producing and broadcasting comedy 
programs since 1990 indicates that entertaining audiences has become important for 
this discourse. These kinds of entertainment programs may fulfil two aims for 
television discourse. Firstly, broadcasting these programs caused satisfaction among 
the audiences and this satisfaction helped television discourse to be the hegemonic 
media discourse. Secondly, by keeping audiences satisfied by broadcasting 
entertainment programs, this discourse may be more influential in other programs, 
which were still representing the ideologically preferred meanings. 
A television program called “Nuruz 72” was broadcast in early 1991. This program was 
the first in the comedy genre on Iranian state television. This program was 
representing different items through situation comedy. This program was not 
representing any ideological meaning nor meanings that related to noble human 
values, rather, it was just produced to make people laugh. This type of comedy 
programs became very popular in Iran through the broadcasting of a series called 
“Joyful Hour” (Sa’at-e Khosh) in 1992. This program introduced a comedy team to the 
public, a team who are still are known as the best comedians and who are producing 
programs for television. VVIR’s decision to in produce entertaining programs to attract 
more audiences was correctly shown when the third networked channel was 
established on 25th November, 1993. This channel was called “The Youth Network” 
(Shabake-ye Javan) and specifically focused on sports, especially football, and 
broadcast programs that could attract the younger generation. With the establishment 
of “The Youth Network”, the broadcasting hours of Channel One and Channel Two 
were increased.  
Between 1989 and 1995, the number of VVIR employees increased from 8,000 to 
14,000, and lots of employees who had been fired during the “clearing” (Paksazi) 
process were employed again (Khiabany, p167). A lot of new television equipment was 
bought by VVIR that could help employees and producers to provide more professional 
productions. Television discourse in those years started to offer critiques about social 
problems in the TV series in order to give preference to its desired meanings regarding 
 93 
cultural and social issues, as well. For instance, social issues like drug addiction in 
“Mirror of Edification” (Ayene-ye Ebrat), 1989; class differences in “Fragrance of 
Jasmine” (Atr-e gol-e Yas), 1991; marriage in “Homeland” (Mihman), 1991; nemesis in 
“Laugh of Life” (Labkhand-e zendegi), 1992, and the generation gap in “The Patriarch” 
(Pedar Salar), 1994; were considered to offer television discourse some insight.   
Transformations in the television discourse’s articulation happened with the influence 
of the reconstruction discourse after the war or as mentioned in the theoretical 
chapter, domination of the “Economic Development” articulation of the IRdisc. The 
government sought to overcome the crisis situations that the 8-year war had caused 
and to reconstruct the economy of the country by providing situations in which 
governmental revenues could be increased. Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, as the first 
President of Iran after the war and after the death of Khomeini, was the symbol and 
promoter of this reconstruction process. It is obvious that meanings relating to this 
reconstruction process became the preferred meanings of the Islamic Republic’s 
discursive articulation after the war. These preferred meanings, as I have described, 
were also influenced by the television discourse and its form of preferred meanings 
articulation. 
Cultural Resistance or Cultural Invasion  
Nonetheless, circumstances in Iran after the end of the war, provided situations for the 
articulation of meanings, which were suppressed during the 60s and during wartime. 
These meanings and their signifiers were contrary to the ideological values of the 
IRdisc (Farhi, 2004, p108). For instance, Hollywood films or western music, or Iranian 
exiles’ music started to be available for people who demanded these products. Iran 
was no longer that secluded a country during wartime; rather, it could establish a 
relationship with the world. For instance, as Iranian citizens became able to travel 
around the world after the country came out of the war situations, foreign tourists and 
travellers were also starting to come to Iran (Amir Arjomand, 2009, p64). Iran started 
to build a new relationship with the international community, which was not the same 
as that which was related to the Pahlavi diplomacy, nor to the international 
relationship that Iran had in the war situation. This new relationship was not only in 
governmental form, but subjects of the IRdisc could become exposed to the 
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interpellation of other discourses more than they had in the past. These kinds of 
interpellations could be carried out in relation to meanings, which were contrary to the 
preferred meanings of the IRdisc. Although the IRdisc tried to keep its subjects 
identified with its preferred meanings by accepting the logic of difference more than it 
did the past, but a significant number of these subjects were exposed to rival 
discourses’ interpellations. For instance, hearing women singing, or music like metal or 
rock, were forbidden in Iran according to the mullahs, but these kinds of music became 
popular and were prevalent among the youth in Iran after the war. This was true also 
of Hollywood films, which obviously were not favoured by the IRdisc because of their 
promotion of western and American culture, but they also became popular among 
some in Iranian society. 
Since 1992, satellite dishes have been available for installation on Iranian homes’ roofs. 
Although in the few years after 1992 applications for satellite dishes were so limited in 
Iran, and a scant number of Iranians were able to use these dishes, but this limited 
application was a sign of the prevalence of the discourse of Iranian state television 
Consequently, when subjects of the IRdisc were exposed to other discourses’ 
interpellations, which were articulating different preferred meanings, rather than the 
Islamic Republic’s preferred meanings, they became more fragmented and decentred 
subjects in the sense of identification. The prevalence of rival discourses among the 
subjects of the IRdisc was such that forms of illegal trades were acquired that related 
to exposing people to the interpellation of these rival discourses. For instance, for 
some years after the war, buying and selling video players was legally forbidden in 
Iran, but video player dealing was prevalent on the black market. For instance, film 
sellers known as “Film Misters” (Agha Filmee) were coming to private homes as film 
dealers to sell or rent Hollywood films that it was forbidden to trade in public places 
and stores.  
Nonetheless, the most widespread forms of rival discourse interpellation that became 
prevalent among Iranians in the next few years were satellite TVs. Applications for 
satellite TV became so widespread that in 1995 approximately 500,000 satellite dishes 
existed in Tehran. This means that if the average population of each family were 4 
person at that time, 2 million people of the 10 million total population of Tehran were 
exposed to satellite TV programs (Barraclough, 2001). After satellite dish application 
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became widespread, especially in big cities, the Iranian parliament approved a law on 
12th February, 1995, about the prohibition of satellite application in Iran. Nonetheless, 
the prohibition of satellite application in Iran, by law, did not lead to a decrease in the 
usage of satellites by Iranians. Statistics indicate that the usage of satellite dishes by 
Iranians has shown an ascending trend from the years after 1995 until now, so that, 
according to a survey by the “Islamic Parliament Research Centre” (Markaz-e 
Pajouhesh-ha-ye Majles), 65% of Iranians had satellite dishes in their homes in 2012 
(2013, cited in Mehrnameh magazine). This rate was estimated as 69% in a survey by 
the Iranian Association of Cultural Studies and Communications (Rabiei & Esmaeilei, 
2012, cited in Mehrnameh magazine, 2013). 
During this period, some forms of cultural consumption became prevalent among 
Iranian society and Sreberny-Mohammadi & Mohammadi (1994) named them the 
“cultural resistance”. These forms of cultural consumption were not acceptable to the 
IRdisc, but this discourse did not have any remedy to stop this kind of consumption. 
Cultural products that were not focused in the same direction as the IRdisc’s 
articulation were represented as being the “cultural invasion” (Tahajom-e Farhangi) of 
the west and American culture. When the Islamic republic could not fully stop the 
consumption of these kinds of cultural products in Iran, it started to represent 
consumers of these products as the others from the IRdisc viewpoint, the war that was 
happening on objective fronts and in battlefields now was continued in homes, and the 
west was trying to destroy the hegemony of the IRdisc inside homes. 
Ayatollah Khamenei entered the notion of cultural invasion into the literature of the 
IRdisc after his supreme leadership and the end of the war. This notion, which was 
considered to be the post-military project of the enemy, by Khamenei, refers to using 
the vast amount of propaganda from enemies to infuse their values and divert people 
(Iranian) from their innate capabilities in order to establish their hegemonic global 
order (Guivian, 2006, p84). Khamenei believed the enemy targeted Iranian culture, 
which was based on religious beliefs and Iranian-Islamic traditions. He stated: the 
cultural invasion was accomplished in order to destroy the faith of the new generation 
to both religion and revolutionary principles (Khamenei’s Speech on 11 December 
1991, Khamenei.ir). He characterises cultural invasion as being part of the propaganda 
of a political-economy collection (Western Capitalism) in order to ruin cultural bases of 
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a nation (Iranian society) and reach its political aims by enthralling that nation 
(Khamenei’s speech on 12 August 1992, Khamenei.ir). Khamenei distinguishes various 
goals among the enemies in their cultural invasion, such as promoting modernisation, 
indulging in rationalism, justifying western culture, disparaging Islamic values, and 
separating religion from politics. These goals become achievable for these enemies 
through the promotion of western fashions, films and music, circulating alcoholic 
drinks, promoting a western style of education via books and the press, publishing 
pictures and posters of famous western figures, and extensive advertising of western 
culture through communication technologies such as radio, television, satellites, 
cinema and video tapes (Khamenei, cited in Mesgar-Nejad, 1994). Khamenei sees the 
sole way to resist the cultural invasion of others as being the promotion of the 
revolutionaries’ values, Guivian (2006) believes: “The theory of others’ cultural invasion 
entails the creation of ideological consciousness and a cultural fight over meanings, 
beliefs and behaviours, a fight in which communicative and instructive apparatuses are 
the vital weapons” (Guivian, 2006, p85). The significance of television for Khamenei is 
in its capabilities to resist the enemies’ cultural invasion.  
If we consider the years before the 1979 revolution as the formative years of television 
consumption, and the early years of the revolution as the formative years of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran’s television discourse, and the years of the sixties-decade as 
fixation years for this discourse in Iran, the years between 1989 and 1995 are definitely 
the years in which that the new form of television consumption was formed. This new 
kind of television consumption is selective consumption. On the one hand, during 
these years and the following years, the programs on Iranian state television have 
become more attractive and entertaining, even though they are consistent with of 
Islamic ideological values, On the other hand, rival media discourses have also become 
widespread in Iranian society. Selective subjects, as Lacan argued, were therefore 
exposing themselves to different discourses in completing their identification process. 
This kind of television consumption, which was formed in these years, is still the 
dominant form of media consumption in Iran. In subsequent years, after the formation 
of this kind of media consumption, and after rival media discourses became influential 
in the identification of Iranian subjects, we can determine different forms of 
articulation in the Islamic Republic’s television discourse according to the contextual 
 97 
circumstances of the society. Sometimes these forms of articulations are the same as 
those that television discursively articulated during the sixties decade, with aim of 
putting more emphasis on its ideologically preferred meanings and on reproducing the 
social cohesion and ideological excitation of the sixties decade. Sometimes the current 
television discourse, although it keeps to Islamic ideological red lines, like the hijab, 
articulates meanings that are not directly related to the IRdisc’s ideological meanings. 
CONTEXTUAL CIRCUMSTANCES AND DIFFERENT ARTICULATIONS BY THE 
SAME PRINCIPLES: FROM 1995 UNTIL NOW  
So far, I have tried to show that in the early years of the Islamic Republic, after the 
1979 revolution, this state was able to form Iranian state television discourse totally in 
agreement with its ideas and preferred meanings. All of the efforts of Iranian state 
television discourse to make subjects and to form subjectivities by representing 
subject positions and preferred meanings must be understood as being the efforts of 
the IRdisc in order to form its subjects. Especially after May, 1991, as I mentioned 
before in this chapter, when appointing the president of VVIR according to a law 
approved by the parliament this became the exclusive right of the supreme leader. 
Iranian state television discourse therefore became more tied to ideas of the IRdisc. 
VVIR’s apparatus thus became the main ideological state apparatus of the IRdisc under 
the direct supervision of Ayatollah Khamenei, the supreme leader, which represents 
the preferred meanings, and ideal subject positions of this discourse in different 
periods when the IRdisc faced different objective conditions in social contexts.  
The main characteristic of Iranian state television after 1995, under the influence of 
the emergence of rival media discourses in Iranian everyday life, is recognisable 
according to the notion of the “cultural invasion”. In 1994, after 10 years under the 
Presidency of Mohammad Hashemi at VVIR, Ayatollah Khamenei appointed Ali Larijani 
as the President of the VVIR organisation. Meanwhile, the name of this organisation 
changed to Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB). In the appointment letter of 
Larijani, Ayatollah Khamenei clarified the main policies of the IRIB organisation. In this 
letter, he clearly declares that all the IRIB’s activities should be oriented towards 
defeating the others’ cultural invasion. 
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In all programs the main direction must be defeating cultural, promotional and 
the news invasion of arrogance (Istikbar). This significant principle must be 
observed not only in news sections, but also in all reports, scientific and social 
and political programs and especially in entertaining and artistic programs like 
dramas and series. This principle must be cleared correctly for all employees, 
that alien invader culture, affects the mentality and people behaviours’ through 
dramas and entertaining programs more than face-to-face dialogues. This 
unwelcome effectiveness must be avoided wisely and deliberately. (Khamenei, 
Appointment letter of Ali Larijani, 13 February 1994, Khamenei.ir). 
 
After 1995, and the establishment of Iranian state television discourse, and after the 
IRdisc could shape the television discourse to represent its desired preferred meanings 
and subject positions, Ayatollah Khamenei has declared the main policies of this 
organisation.  
The proper discourse analysis of Iranian state television seems impossible if we don’t 
consider the circumstances that the IRdisc faced in each era. As I have discussed in the 
theoretical chapter, discourses, in preferring their desired meanings, have different 
articulations in different historical periods according to the conditions of their realms. 
Consequently, the articulation of the preferred meanings of the IRdisc was also 
changed according to the different periods that this discourse passed through after the 
revolution of 1979. 
IRIB Protects the Principlist Articulation 
Understanding television discourse under the presidency of Larijani is impossible 
without considering the social and political conditions of the society. The first years of 
his presidency coincided with the last years of the presidency of Akbar Hashemi 
Rafsanjani, and the first years of the supreme leadership of Khamenei. During those 
years, IRIB policies were consonant with the Reconstructionist cabinet. Nevertheless, 
after the election of Khatami and emergence of the “Reformist” articulation of the 
IRdisc, IRIB policies changed. During the presidency of Larijani, the reformist cabinet 
under presidency of Seyed Mohammad Khatami was elected. In consequence of this 
election, IRIB started to criticise the reformist cabinet, since, as I have said, the policies 
of this organisation were determined under the direct supervision of the supreme 
leader, who promoted his ideas of the IRdisc. Iranian state television discourse was 
therefore seeking to promote definitions of reforms according to Khamenei’s ideas. 
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Social activists that were known as reformists have been criticised in lots of IRIB’s 
programs according to a split that emerged between the two active forces of the IRdisc 
that were known as Principlists and Reformists. As argued in Chapter Two, this split 
emerged in consequence of the Khatami presidency.  
Khamenei distinguishes two levels of cultural invasion, the internal and external levels. 
The external level refers to the efforts of outsiders towards cultural invasion and the 
internal level refers to insiders who, consciously or unconsciously, collaborate in this 
invasion (Mesgar-Nejad, 1994). As argued in Chapter Two, the reformist articulation of 
the IRdisc was formed around signifiers like civil society, democracy, human rights, and 
socio-cultural freedom. Khamenei, during a speech in 20th April, 2000, clearly 
indicated the prevalence of the above notions within society by the insiders, and this 
causes the advancing cultural invasion of enemies (Khamenei.ir). Obviously, Iranian 
state television, considering its policies were cleared by Khamenei, stood on the side of 
the Principlists. For instance, IRIB broadcast a conference in 2000 that was held in 
Berlin, with the participation of numbers of reformists. During this conference, some 
attendees that were against the Islamic Republican state, chanted slogans against the 
Islamic Republic, and a woman started to dance in front of the reformists from the 
Islamic Republic of Iran. A man also appeared totally naked to show his opposition. 
IRIB broadcast this conference and lots of programs were produced to show that the 
reformists had passed the red line of the IRdisc by their presence at such conferences. 
After this broadcast, many of the reformist press were banned, and lots of intellectuals 
and reformists who attended the conference were arrested. During the years of the 
Khatami presidency, the reformist cabinet, IRIB started to represent its desired 
definitions of reforms in its programs. For instance, a program named “The Light” 
(Cheragh), broadcast in 1999, was about the role of reformists in the serial killing of 
intellectuals during those years. Or there was a program called “The Identity” 
(Hoviyat), which was aired on Channel One of IRIB in 1998 in order to criticise 
intellectuals who were supporting the reformist cabinet and to introduce them as 
being non-religious, or anti-religious, traitors, who are serving the enemy.  
Larijani was a member of the revolutionary guard of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
(Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enghelab-e Eslami). All presidents of IRIB after Mohammad 
Hashemi, including Ali Larijani (1994 to 2004), Ezatollah Zarghami (2004 to 2014) and 
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Mohammad Sarafraz (2014 to date) were appointed by Ayatollah Khamenei, the 
current supreme leader, and were members of the revolutionary guard of the Islamic 
Republic. The revolutionary guard always has a close relationship with Ayatollah 
Khamenei, and Khamenei has always trusted this organisation. Ayatollah Khamenei 
knows members of this guard as the most loyal persons to him. Therefore all 
presidents of IRIB after 1994 were flowing the pattern of promoting ideas of Principlist 
articulation of the IRdisc. In all appointment letters of Khamenei for the presidency of 
IRIB, two main issues are recognisable: First his emphasising on defeating enemies’ 
cultural invasion and second promoting the ideal Islamic lifestyle.  
The first concern of Khamenei is related to how the state television discourse 
represents the others and the second one is related to ideal subject positions of the 
IRdisc. The first concern of Khamenei led to producing programs like “the identity” and 
“The light” in order to determine others by the IRdisc. These kinds of programs 
continued to be aired during and after the years of the reformist cabinet. For instance, 
confessions by reformists like Hossein Ghazian and Abbas Abdi and Siamak Pourzand 
that were recorded in the prison, broadcast by IRIB in 2002. These confessions were 
about their relations with foreigners, and all of the mentioned persons, after coming 
out of prison, admitted that their confessions were taken by force. In 2012, Larijani, 
during a speech for university students, stated that during his presidency of IRIB, he 
was trying his best to take a position against the reformists. He also said that through 
producing programs like “The Light” and “The Identity” he had tried to reveal the 
treason of the reformists (Larijani, 2012, Tasnim News Agency, cited in Jaras).  
The second concern of Ayatollah Khamenei led to the expansion and diversification of 
state television programs in different realms. Nonetheless, the main form of this 
expansion is recognisable in the efforts of IRIB to produce TV series. By 2012, almost 
600 TV series had been broadcast by IRIB. Meanwhile, only 50 of these TV series had 
been broadcast by 1994. Namely, almost 550 TV series had been broadcast by IRIB 
from 1994 until 2012 (Film monthly magazine, 2012). These TV series were produced 
in order to promote the ideal Islamic lifestyle, according to the second concern of 
Khamenei. As I have mentioned before, discourse analysis of these TV series is possible 
when we consider in what circumstances these series were broadcast. Nonetheless, 
according to what has previously been discussed, these TV series were definitely aimed 
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to represent the ideal subject positions of the IRdisc in order to construct meanings for 
the ideal Islamic lifestyle. 
IRIB’s Resources 
The numbers of TV channels and productions of IRIB have increased during recent 
years; for instance, currently this organisation is broadcasting its programs through 22 
domestic channels, 10 satellite channels, and 34 local channels. Domestic channels are 
available via digital receivers with coverage of 90% nationwide. Among these channels, 
6 are the main channels of IRIB that are known as the Nationwide Channels (Shabake-
ha-ye Sarasari). These channels can be received via TV aerials with coverage of 98% 
(Mehrnameh Magazine, 2013). Actually, the greatest IRIB budget, in terms of 
production, is assigned to six nationwide channels, and the other channels mostly re-
broadcast these products or produce low budget programs, such as talk shows. For 
instance, all of the TV series, which have been broadcast by IRIB (except two), are 
productions from these six channels. These channels are the oldest TV channels of 
IRIB, and they are: Channel One, known as the national channel (Shabake-ye Melli), 
which is mostly referred to by audiences because of its series, news sections, political 
and religious programs. Important occasional events, such as Khamenei’s speeches, 
are also broadcast by this channel. Channel Two, known as the family channel 
(Shabake-ye Khanevade), has mostly targeted children, teenagers and families with its 
programs and TV series. Channel three, known as the Youth Channel (Shabake-ye 
Javan), is the most popular TV channel, mostly broadcasting more attractive programs, 
like sports matches and TV series. Channel Four, is famous because it broadcasts 
scientific documentaries and programs. Channel Five, known as the Tehran Channel 
(Shabake-ye Tehran) is the local channel of the City of Tehran, but it can be received 
nationwide and is the sole local channel which produces TV series. Channel Six, is 
known as the News Channel (Shabake-ye Khabar) and contains various news sections 
and the analysis of news, according to the general policies of IRIB. All the other 
channels cannot be compared with the mentioned 6 channels in terms of audiences 
and productions. 
The role of IRIB in promoting and representing the ideal subject positions of the IRdisc 
that, as defined in the constitution, has to support the ideology and interests of the 
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state, which may occasionally be different from what the cabinet of the day 
(promoting Iranian Constitutional Law, Article a75) has been maintained in all of the 
programs of the mentioned TV channels.  
It is worth mentioning that IRIB's funding comes from two main sources, firstly, the 
annual governmental budget, and, secondly, income from broadcasting 
advertisements and other commercial activities by this organisation. It also includes a 
TV license fee in the form of a supplement that is added to all electricity bills 
(approximately 5 US dollars per year). According to a report by the “Cultural 
Commission of the Islamic Parliament” in 2014, the total budget of the IRIB 
organisation was roughly 600 US million dollars, and IRIB received about US 300 million 
from the governmental budget and earned the other half from advertisements and TV 
licenses (Islamic Consultative Assembly News Agency, 30th January, 2015). 
Further Consideration of IRIB’s Products in this Research 
During this chapter I have tried to present a narration of the formation and 
establishment of the Iranian state television discourse in order to argue that the 
Iranian state television discourse has always represented preferred meanings and ideal 
subject positions of the dominant articulation of the IRdisc in different contextual 
circumstances. Nonetheless, as I mentioned, the main concern of this research is to 
explore the micro level, namely discourse analysis of Iranian state television 
productions. Proper discourse analysis of these productions is possible when we 
consider the social and political conditions in which these programs have been 
broadcast.  
In this research, a discourse analysis of the three most popular TV series from 2009 to 
2013 will be the main concern of the study. These TV series are “The Mansion of the 
Sun” (Shams-ol Emareh), “Condition White” (Vaziyat-e sefid), and “The Book of 
Mukhtar” (Mukhtar Name). All three TV series were aired after the presidential 
election of 2009 in Iran, and after the emergence of the Green Movement. My 
intention in studying these series is to understand in particular conditions, that the 
IRdisc faced a crisis after the presidential election, how this discourse has tried to 
overcome the crisis by the mediation of its main media apparatus. Obviously, some 
programs were aired after and during the aftermath of the presidential election in 
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order to make others and to determine who were the antagonists to the IRdisc. For 
instance, on 1st August, 2009, the trial of the arrested activists after the election, and 
their confessions in front of the state’s TV lenses were aired. Nonetheless, as Ayatollah 
Khamenei has mentioned in his appointment letters to the presidents of IRIB, the ideal 
Islamic lifestyle should also be demonstrated during dramas and entertainment 
programs. I therefore intend to present a discourse analysis of the mentioned series in 
order to figure out which preferred meanings, and which subject positions, were ideal 
for the IRdisc during the mentioned period in order to overcome the crisis and to be 
the hegemonic discourse. In Chapter Six, I am going to study which signifiers were 
most important for the Islamic Republic’s television discourse in order to articulate its 
preferred meanings that referred to them in the mentioned TV series.  
In the next chapter, by presenting a historical narration of the emergence and 
evolution of the Tehranian middle class, I will discuss the significance of the “Tehranian 
middle class” for the IRdisc. During the next chapter I will argue about why 
constructing the subjectivity of the Tehranian middle class is significant for the IRdisc in 
order to be the hegemonic discourse.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: THINKING ABOUT MIDDLE CLASS IN OIL-
RENT IRAN 
 
Before considering the emergence, evolution and significance of the Tehranian middle 
class in contemporary Iranian history, it is crucial to justify what this research means by 
the “Middle Class”. In the coming section I will elucidate on the approach of this 
research to the notion of “middle class” and will then discuss the position of the 
Tehranian middle class according to this approach. 
THE CONCEPT OF THE MIDDLE CLASS 
“Middle class” is a theoretical concept that has been widely used by social theorists to 
study the social dynamics of societies according to classes. Meanwhile, class based 
analysis has widely been influenced by Marx’s theories of classes. The classical 
definition of social classes in Marx, as Lenin argued, is:   
 
Classes are large groups of people differing from each other by the place they 
occupy in a historically determined system of social production, by their relation 
(in most cases fixed and formulated by law) to the means of production, by their 
role in the social organisation of labour, and, consequently, by the dimensions 
of the share of social wealth of which they dispose and their mode of acquiring 
it. (Lenin, 1971, p14) 
 
According to above definition, Marx distinguishes three basic classes in 19th century 
UK: The proletariat or working class, the bourgeoisie or capitalists, and the landlord 
class. Nonetheless, with the development of capitalism, the landlord class has lost its 
importance and the capitalists or bourgeoisie, stand in the position of the upper class, 
and a new class has emerged: the petty-bourgeoisie. In classic Marxist theory, 
therefore, each capitalist society contains three classes: the bourgeoisie as the owners 
of the means of social production and employers of wage labour, the proletariat, as a 
class having no means of production and that has to sell its labour in order to live, and 
the petty-bourgeoisie, who are the owners of small properties and small means of 
production without employing waged labourers. The petty bourgeoisie in Marxism also 
refers to employed persons who have a supervisory function for the bourgeoisie in 
order to increase the efficiency of the working class. As Marx stated: "An industrial 
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army of workmen, under the command of a capitalist, requires, like a real army, 
officers (managers) and sergeants (foremen, overlookers) who, while the work is being 
done, command in the name of the capitalist." (Marx, 1887, p. 228) 
The petty bourgeoisie therefore refers to a wage-earning section of a society, which 
stands between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, since they do not exclusively 
perform the function of labour, but, on the contrary, they exercise the powers of 
capital (Milios & Economakis, 2011). However, the term “middle class”, in English, is 
synonymous with the Bourgeoisie in French, but Bottomore (1991) argues that the 
term “middle class”, in Marx’s theories, refers to the petty bourgeoisie and determines 
a class which stands in between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie; however, Marx 
hasn’t systematically and accurately distinguished between different categories in this 
class, such as sections that own small means of production and those wage-earners 
who are state employees, specialised workers, teachers, professors, and so forth. 
Bottomore believes that the common definition of the middle class during the 19th 
century referred to the middle class as being in a position between the landowners 
and the agricultural and urban labourers. However, in the 20th century, the term 
middle class has been used to refer to white-collar workers, which group contained an 
extensive range of societies, like doctors, accountants, lawyers, government 
employees, university professors, service jobs, and, in sum, all jobs that cannot be 
considered to be labour jobs (Bottomore, 1993, p381).  
Mann considers the middle class to be a part of the stratification of the workforce or 
the stratification of social-economic systems in societies that, on the one hand, has no 
sublime position in societies, in terms of having welfare and social prestige, and, on the 
other hand, they haven’t been placed among the low and disadvantaged levels of 
societies. This means that the mentioned class is positioned somewhere between the 
“labour class” and the “upper class”. The labourers are mostly working in 
manufactories, and the upper class contains capitalists and regnant élites (Mann, 
1989). 
Although Marx has distinguished social classes under the capitalist mode of 
production, according to Althusser (1986, p180), the same nature of the relations of 
production is recognisable, under the domination of different modes of production 
and according to three positions that each class can occupy in relation to the means of 
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production. Social classes are therefore determinable according to their place in the 
relations of productions. These three positions are: ownership -- as controller of the 
production means, possession -- as management of the production process, and use of 
the means of production as the exclusive performance of the actual labour. 
Determining these three positions in each mode of production leads to the 
determination of social classes according to the position that they occupy, and the 
content of their position depends on the status of the dominant mode of production 
(Althusser, 1986). Different modes or forms of production therefore form the 
economic base of social classes.  
Considering application of suggested positions by Althusser in determining and 
distinguishing social classes, it seems necessary to briefly justify the application of 
Althusser’s considerations of structural positions (which is determined on an economic 
basis). Similarly, in my theoretical chapter I mentioned the differences between the 
Post-Structuralist approach and the Structuralist one in their contributions to the 
notion of ideology. Now, in in my research, which is a class-oriented analysis under the 
influence of Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory, I will look at Althusser’s concerns 
(as a Structuralist-Marxist figure). On the concept of social class, Laclau believes, 
although individuals are placed in structural positions, and these positions arguably 
shape their living conditions, nevertheless they have come to a position within the 
network of power relations that is relatively stable albeit temporarily. Considering the 
essence of temporality and contingency for the stability of power relations (as 
elaborated in the theoretical chapter) on the one hand, and on the other hand, 
acknowledging the great influences of these power relations in determining structural 
positions, refers to the fact that structural positions have been constructed within 
sediment and normalised articulatory practices. This result does not mean neglecting 
the influences of the dominant mode of productions in determining social classes 
(Laclau, 1990, pp9-16). However, in a Structuralist point of view, social classes are 
recognised as constant coherent objectivities. Carrying out of a class-oriented 
contextual analysis requires considering the distinction between three concepts: 
subjectivities, subject positions and structural positions. Laclau and Mouffe believe 
that, on the one hand negating the interference of structural positions in constructing 
subjectivities, and on the other hand, believing in the absolute determination of these 
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structures are futile claims (1990, 107). Accordingly, within each contextual 
circumstance, the hegemonic discourse, by representing its ideal subject positions, is 
attempting to construct subjectivities according to the existing structural positions, in 
order to resonate better and also avoid dislocations. Nonetheless, since in the 
discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe, perpetual closure a discourse’s meaning 
system is impossible, then it is possible to search for ideas that bring possibilities for 
resisting the class-oriented subjectification processes within discourses. The 
requirement of this resisting is the mapping of the articulatory practices and also 
structural possibilities through which discourses are reproducing and normalising the 
existing class based structural positions. Arguably, the reproduction of the social 
structures becomes possible through emphasising the economic bases of these 
structures, which is determined by the dominant mode of production. Since Marx also 
recognises the necessity of some kind of political intervention in order to develop the 
proletariat’s identity as a revolutionary class (Smith, 1998, p63), accordingly Laclau and 
Mouffe have not completely rejected Marx’s and subsequently Structuralist Marxism 
considerations on social classes. Rather, based on the main principle of their discourse 
theory, which underlines the impossibility of closure within discursively constructed 
meanings, they emphasise the possibilities for deconstructing existing social 
structures, which the assumption of their perpetual stability, raised through 
articulatory practices of the hegemonic discourses. 
Moreover, as Norval argues, structural positions and power relations that limit 
individuals’ class positions; are more or less determining the access of individuals to 
different discourses within identification and subjectification processes (1996, p4). 
Therefore, hegemonic discourses, through their articulatory practices, which surely 
based on the dominant mode of production, by representing a myth of their integrity, 
which arguably contains the ideological functions (as argued in the theoretical 
chapter), attempt to associate subject positions with structural positions and through 
subjectification processes, naturalise this association (Laclau, 1977, 42). Considering 
the principles of Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory, it is possible for subjects to 
overcome the particular form of subjectification, by deconstructing preferred 
meanings of the hegemonic discourse, dislocating its ideal subject positions, denying 
essentiality of structural positions and imagining the moment of subversion. Laclau 
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and Mouffe even consider the possibility of class-oriented subject positions’ solidarity 
in constructing the collective “Political” identities for deconstructing the articulation of 
the hegemonic discourse (Smith, 1998, p115). Therefore, carrying out a discourse 
analysis by contextualising Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory, may take benefits of 
class-oriented analysis, which has formed under the influence of Structuralist Marxism 
thoughts, in order to map articulatory practices of the hegemonic discourse for 
associating subject positions with structural positions under the influence of a 
particular mode of production.    
Accordingly, understanding the dominant mode of production according to each 
context reveals the constructed positions of temporary stabled social classes according 
to the relations of ownership, possession and the use of those means of productions. 
One of the modes of production that was recognised by Marx is “Rentier Capitalism”.  
Rentier-capitalists, in Marxism, refers to a group that doesn’t gain profits from 
operating the means of production that they own, rather, they gain profit from 
properties that they own, in terms of rent, interest, intellectual property rights and 
dividends. Consequently, a rentier state refers to the states that own these properties, 
such as land or natural resources, and that gain profits and income by renting or selling 
these properties. According to Beblawi and Luciani (2016, pp1-22), a rentier state is a 
state that earns more than 42 percent of its income from exporting a raw material that 
is extracted from its natural resources, such as Oil. These states have the monopoly on 
receiving and spending the income that is gained from selling raw materials. In rentier 
states, therefore, the state stands in the position of the ownership that controls the 
circulation of capital. Consequently, in considering these states, it is crucial to 
understand the positions of possession and use, how and by whom, have they been 
occupied? 
In Iran, oil resources, since the exploration for oil in 1908, have always been under the 
ownership of the state. Although, in different historical eras, sometimes through 
contracts, privileges for the extracting and exporting of oil, this has been assigned to 
foreigners, but the state was still the main recipient of the incomes from these 
assignments. Additionally, since 1957, the income of all governments from exporting 
oil has always constituted more than 42 percent of all governmental income (Torkan & 
Farnam, 2012). 
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In rentier states, social classes are being represented or constructed by the state by 
being located in structural positions that have been constructed and determined by 
the state, as the owner of the means of production. A social class that occupies the 
position of possession is not therefore independent of the state since the subjectivity 
of this class has been constructed regarding ideal subject position of the state’s 
discourse, and made this class to being located in a needy structural position. They 
mostly are the brokers, staff and intermediate agents for the government, and the oil-
rent determines the formation and nature of the social classes. However, as I will 
mention, according to the temporality essence of the stability of the structural 
positions and also the subjectivity that has occupied the mentioned position, within 
the context of the Iranian society, subjects that have been located in this position, 
have never been totally dependent to the state.    
According to the positions of ownership, possession and use that determine social 
classes, I believe that four social classes are recognisable in Iran: the bourgeoisie as the 
state, the middle class as the wage earners who advance the demands of the state in 
different social realms, the labouring class as the workers in the state’s manufactories 
and factories, and poor people who could be a labour force, but for whom there is no 
demand for their labour in the manufactories and factories. These four classes are the 
products of oil-rent based relations, and government interactions with the middle class 
are forming different political forces in Iran. 
Maljoo (2010) believes that the taking of profits from the oil-rent in Iran by the 
different states, either in the Pahlavi era or after the revolution of 1979, and the 
management of this oil-rent by different governments in different periods, have 
caused the dependency of dissimilar parts of a social class that occupies the position of 
possession in production relations, but always has caused the elimination and 
marginalisation of the labour class. On the one hand, the state in Iran, as the owners of 
means of production, have always aimed to use the middle class as its ideological 
means through which to reach hegemony, either in modernisation or in establishing an 
Islamic state. On the other hand, this usage of the middle class by the Iranian rentier 
states, has caused the enlargement of governments. Since the state has become the 
sole source for recruiting social capacities, and also middle class members are 
approaching the government with demands to increase their financial profits. 
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Poulantzas (1974, p237) considers attaining a justified definition of the petty 
bourgeoisie, which occupies the position of possession in Althusser’s consideration of 
the relations of production, and who are generally the middle class, to be a focal point 
in the Marxist theory of social classes, and this eliminates the difficulties and 
unresolved issues that are related to class analysis. Accordingly, he believes there is no 
definition of middle class that can contain all of the social groups and agents that do 
not belonging to the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, and he divides the middle class 
into three sub-categories:  
 
The traditional petty bourgeoisie is the class of self-employed simple commodity 
producers; … the new petty bourgeoisie is the intermediate social class of wage-
earners which exercises powers in the name of the capitalist system; … the 
middle bourgeoisie is the class of small self-employed entrepreneurs... 
(Poulantzas, cited in Milios & Economakis, 2011) 
 
Considering the constructed structural position of the middle class, which stands 
somewhere between the upper and the labouring classes, Nozari (2005) has also 
suggested considering the difference between the traditional, new, and the middle 
class in Iran. He believes that the traditional and middle class in Iran contains social 
groups like the clergy and traditional bazaar traders. These middle classes existed in 
Iran before the emergence of the modern state under influence of Reza Shah’s 
modernisation process, which started from 1925, when Reza Shah became the King of 
Iran. Nonetheless, the new, or modern, middle class is the product of Reza Shah’s 
modernisation (Abrahamian, 2008, p90). 
After World War Two, the discourse of modernisation under the effect of an increasing 
trend to industrialisation and modernisation in the west, and also the development of 
communications, which lead to a worldwide demand for them. The beginning of 
modernisation in Iran caused governmental attention to employ forces in order to 
reinforce the increasing growth in industries and in the administrative and 
bureaucratic system of the country. This caused the educational system of the country 
to face major changes and development. Higher education emerged and developed in 
order to train experts to support (intermediate) the modernisation trend in Iran 
according to the demands of the state (Abrahamian, 1982, p225). The development of 
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modern education and the emergence of universities in Iran, and the consequent 
increase in the number of educated people, both inside and outside the country, 
shows that the modernisation trend in Iran needs experts and educated forces. The 
development of modern education and the emergence of the western style university 
in Iran caused the emergence of educated bureaucrats, professionals, economists, 
artists, intellectuals and writers in Iran, who could advance the articulation of Reza 
Shah’s discourse of modernisation. This modern middle class had characteristics, which 
were different from those of the traditional middle class. The modern middle class’s 
subjectivity was the product of the emergence of subjects who identified themselves 
with newfound social organisations and of industrial governmental complexes and 
forms of bureaucratic relations in governmental systems (Ibid). Although, before 1957, 
the oil-rent constituted less than 42 percent of state income, as Uchida (2006) has 
argued, the state and the royal family owned more than 90 percent of the entire land 
in Iran. Consequently, Reza Shah’s modernisation was financed by revenues from these 
lands, in the forms of tax extracted from peasants, and revenues from state monopoly 
enterprises in tea, sugar, etc., alongside revenue from oil concessions and oil tax 
(Uchida, 2006, p46). Nonetheless, after 1957, in the Mohammad Reza Shah era (he 
was the son of Reza Shah), when state incomes from exporting oil rapidly increased, he 
declared a “White Revolution”. The White Revolution (Enghelab-e Sephid) is the name 
for a series of social and economic reforms, according firstly to 6 and then to 19 
principles that were announced by the Shah and that were approved during a 
referendum on 26th January, 1963. Economic changes were mostly on the basis of the 
privatisation of the state owned lands. The first principle of the White Revolution 
referred to the transformation of the ownership of agricultural lands in the favour of 
peasants. Namely, big estates were divided into smaller pieces of land and peasants 
became the owners of these small parcels of land (Abrahamian, 1982).10 Since then, all 
of the successive Iranian states can be considered to be oil-rentier states.                                                           10 Social changes, in consequence of the White Revolution, mostly led to more liberation for women. 
For instance, the principles of the White revolution granted Iranian women the right to vote, increased 
women's minimum legal marriage age to 18, and improved women's legal rights in divorce and child 
custody matters. These reforms were opposed by some clergy, in particular, Ayatollah Khomeini, who 
considered these changes to be the westernization and, in particular, the Americanisation of the society. 
Khomeini led the June 5th, 1963 uprising, opposing the Shah and the White Revolution, and this uprising 
and Khomeini's other activities eventually led to his exile to Iraq in 1964 (ibid). 
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The emergence of the modern middle class in Iran is related to the articulation of the 
modernisation discourse that was initiated by the state, not consonant with 
subjectivities of citizens (or at least, of the majority) in being subjects of the 
modernisation discourse. Therefore, the state’s discourse attempted to make a kind of 
subjectivity that is consonant with its desired articulation of the modernisation 
discourse. Accordingly, the Iranian modern middle class has formed regarding ideal 
subject positions of the modernisation discourse. When I speak about the middle class, 
I therefore consider the modern middle class. Although the middle class is a non-
uniform class in this definition, it is possible to present a categorisation of the middle 
class in Iran in order to determine it. Kazemi (2009) believes that four social categories 
form the modern middle class in Iran. First: white-collar workers in service jobs, most 
of whom are government employees. Second: experts who are working for the private 
sectors in private industries and companies. Third: people who are working in markets 
and trades (except in the traditional bazaar), and fourth: private intellectual jobs, like 
artists and writers.  
As discussed, one of the impacts of rentier-capitalism on societies, and especially on 
Iranian society, is the enlargement of the body of the governments, namely the first 
category mentioned above, alongside the increase in the urban population. According 
to Asharf & Banuazizi (1985), in 1925, when Reza Shah became the king, 21 percent of 
the Iranian population was living in cities, while this percentage was 47 in 1977. 
According to the Statistical Centre of Iran (SCI), this amount was 68.5 percent in 2006, 
and, in 2011, the urban population of Iran was 71.4 percent of total population 
(Statistical Centre of Iran, Census 2011). Meanwhile, in 1925, 24,000 persons were 
employed by the state, 0.22 percent of the population. This percentage was 1.6 in 
1946, and in 1977, the number of government employees were about one million 
persons, namely 2.9 percent of the total population (Ashraf & Banuazizi, 1985). 
According to SCI, the average urban family size in 1977, was 4.9, therefore if we 
assume state employees to be heads of households, consequently 14.5 percent of the 
total Iranian population were financed by the state’s budget. The state revenue from 
exporting oil, constituted 67.8 percent of total state incomes in 1977 (Karshenas, 
1990).  
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The ratio of state employees has increased since the revolution of 1979, so that in 
1986, 2.9 percent; in 1997, 3.9 percent, and in 2005, 3.1 percent of the total Iranian 
population were state employees (Statistical Centre of Iran, Census 2005). In 2013, the 
total population of Iran was estimated by SCI as being 77,336,980 persons, while the 
number of government employees was announced to be 3,985,488 persons, namely, 
5.1 percent of the Iranian population. This is while the state is also providing the 
pensions of almost 4,491,000 state retirees. This means that almost 8.5 million Iranians 
are paid by the state each month, namely, 10.9 percent of the total population (Mehr 
News Agency, 2015). The average size of urban families, announced as being 3.47, in 
2013, by the Statistical Centre of the Central Bank of Iran (Survey of Household 
Budgets in Urban Areas, CBI, 2014), therefore, again, if we assume the recipients of 
money from the state to be heads of households, roughly 29.5 million of the total 
Iranian population benefits from the state budget, namely, about 38 percent of the 
total Iranian population. This is apart from the subsidies (Yarane) that the government 
has paid each month to all Iranians, since 2010. 
The mentioned numbers and statistics, on one hand, demonstrate the dependency of 
the Iranian modern middle class on the rentier state, and, on the other hand, show the 
significance of this class for the state in its advancing, or articulating its desired 
discourse.  
Although it seems that the middle class, according to its financial and economic 
dependency on the state, has a passive nature, and states can limit the middle class by 
the mediation of oil-rent, this middle class can, however, always question the state on 
issues, apart from economic development, such as political development.  
In the next part of this section, I am going to consider the relation between this 
modern middle class and the state in the City of Tehran, as the venue of the 
emergence and evolution of the modern middle class. I will consider how the 
subjectivity of this class has been formed and transformed in relation to the discourses 
of different states and the significance of this class in relation to these discourses and 
their being hegemonic will be considered. 
THE EMERGENCE OF THE MODERN MIDDLE CLASS IN TEHRAN 
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The Iranian constitutional revolution (Enghelab-e Mashruteh) took place in Iran with 
the centralisation of Tehran from 1905 to 1907. This revolution led to the 
establishment of the first Iranian parliament and the approval of the first constitution 
in Iranian history in 1906. The occurrence of the constitutional revolution was the first 
event that clearly showed the emergence and growth of a social group as the middle 
class. This group demanded their desires, which were based on individualism, freedom 
and modern values (Abrahamian, 1982).  
Safamanesh (2005) has categorised the evolution of Tehran before the Islamic 
revolution of 1979 according to a modernisation process, which is broken down into 4 
categories in relation to their functions and historical emergence. I will present this 
categorisation briefly, and based on my research’s priorities; I will ace the emphasis on 
post-revolutionary Tehran.  
Before The Islamic Revolution of 1979 
In the first period (before 1896), “The City as a Place for the Emergence of a Pre-
Modern Middle Class”: In this period, rituals, habits, traditions and collective memories 
were the most important of the features that formed the middle class in relation to 
Tehran. A considerable part of people’ lives was spent in their homes. City spaces were 
formed in the traditional context, and the main function of public spaces, like streets 
and passages, was just for transit. In this era, spaces in the city became public only in 
relation to traditional rituals. For instance, the traditional bazaar was a place for some 
rituals, like mourning for Imam Hussein, at specific times of the year. In this period the 
traditional middle class had the pulse of the city in its hands.  
In the second period (1896-1921), there was “The Preparation for the Emergence of 
the Modern Middle Class in Tehran”: At the beginning of this era, the very first 
encounters between Iran and the west were formed. Few travelled to the west, and 
this oriented the government and people to the values and culture of the west, which 
were unknown before. In this period, according to various changes in the city, arguably 
the mental image of the city changed for Iranians. The consequences of the 
constitutional revolution were the challenges to traditional thought and the first 
experiments with other possible lifestyles by the class that had accepted and followed 
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the values that caused the constitutional revolution, which were unknown before this 
era. The middle class that emerged started to change its traditional lifestyle.   
In the third period (1921-1949), there was “The Fundamental Measures in the 
Formation of Ideal Modern Middle Class under Influence of Modernisation”: In this 
period, the base of all changes in the formation of the modern city and the modern 
middle class was an idealistic point of view, which was just looking to the western 
world outside the Iranian borders, both the subjective and objective borders. This 
trend started at the beginning of the first Pahlavi era, with the reign of Reza Shah, who 
is known as the father founder of modern Iran, like Ataturk in Turkey (Friedman, 2006, 
p286). In this period, all effort aimed to change the nature and identity of the city 
according to a modernisation process, in order to make the city and its residents (as 
the modern middle class) more like those in western cities.  The conflict of modern and 
traditional values continued in this era, explicitly if compared to the previous eras. 
Reza Shah knew his reign was a symbol of modernity, and of a modern Iran, while past 
reigns were symbols of mustiness and cumbersome traditions. Reza Shah’s authorities 
criticised the traditional middle class, like the clergy and traditional bazaar traders, and 
the modernisation process was started (Keshavarzian, 2007, p58). 
Tehran is a starting point for Iranian modernity; this city has experienced lots of social, 
political and cultural events and occurrences. At the same time as the city’s 
appearance was formed, the appearance of the people also changed. Newspapers, the 
cinema, and other media, started to play a role in the people’s everyday life (Vahdat, 
2003). People in Tehran started to experience bureaucratic systems and in 
consequence of the emergence of the elements of modernisation in Tehran, their work 
became divided from their daily leisure, and the division between different features of 
modern urban life became meaningful to them. Gradually, when this division included 
more and various forms, the city formed its different social and urban spaces according 
to the tastes of the people. These spaces were not just geometrical spaces; they also 
formed the mental life in the city. Streets in which people spent their leisure time; 
new, modern cultural centres which gave people identities; administrative 
organisations which provided new career positions for residents, and spaces which 
created new roles for women and youths. Such trends changed the absolutely 
traditional form of Tehran. 
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Although it is not true to say that these trends transformed the traditional Tehran into 
the modern one, these changes provided the situation in which Tehran and its 
residents experienced the different elements and features of modernity. The conflict 
between modernity and traditions has been formed as a consequence of the 
emergence of these trends.  These trends have created new social classes, which have 
gained their identity from the city (Gheissari, 2009, p50). This caused a link between 
Tehran and the emerging, new, urban middle class. The creation and emergence of the 
urban middle class related to the emergence of Tehran as the symbol of modernity. 
With the expansion of the urban middle class, Tehran expanded physically and it also 
became more modern.  
Living in modern Tehran as in other modern metropolises- needed a kind of rationality 
that makes acting and finding the relations in the city possible. The modern Tehranian 
middle class has been formed around this rationality, or better to say, subjectivity. This 
subjectivity was mostly formed under the influence of Reza Shah’s modernisation 
discourse, which tried to articulate its preferred meanings regarding modern values 
and consequently signifiers related to the modern social concepts like individualism, 
the improvement of education, the spread of technology use, debates about social 
justice, especially around women’s issues, etc,. A large number in this class has kept to 
the traditional values, which mostly arose from their religious background, and which 
provoke a patriarchal system in society. Values, like the traditional Hijab, have 
predetermined different roles for men and women, both in the family and society, and 
through concepts like honour and manhood, against femininity. However, the struggle 
between modernity and the traditions is still on going for them. 
Nonetheless, the base of the city and class relations was formed on the traditions and 
changing this base was not so simple. The result was the emergence of twofold spaces 
and classes in Tehran. There were spaces that related to the previous institutional 
reigns by the support of traditional middle class against the new ones, which were 
realms of the modern middle class. These dualities were recognisable in public places 
like commercial and cultural spaces, and also in streets and passages (Bayat, 1997, 
p25). This duality intensified especially after declaring the rule of “The Unveiling” 
(Kashf-e Hejab) by Reza Shah in 1936. According to this rule, all women were banned 
from wearing any kind of Hijab, such as headscarf or chador, in public (Abrahamian, 
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2008, p95) In a nutshell, the construction of the traditional, old city and the traditional 
middle class stands against the construction of the new places in the city and the 
modern middle class. The influences of this era have changed the destiny of Tehran 
forever.  
The fourth period (1949-1979) demonstrated “The Evolution of the Modern Middle 
Class in Facing the Heterogeneous Growth in the Population and the Development of 
the City based on Opportunistic Thoughts”: In this period, the stabilisation of the 
previous period’s achievements was considered, but the strong insight of the previous 
period in achieving development and progress in all urban matters was neglected. City 
constructions and public spaces have faced essential changes (Bayat, 1997, p10). In 
this era, new city planners paid attention to the reproduction of thoughts and 
products, which the original ones had invented and created in the previous period. 
This new group did not create anything new, but changes were the outcomes of what 
had already begun in the past. This continuing trend caused the intensification of the 
gap that has emerged in the past era, the gap between the traditional middle class of 
the city and the emergent modern middle class. 
The traditional middle class members, who were trying to keep their traditional values, 
became marginalised by the state. These two kinds of middle class led to two different 
rationalities that stood against each other in order to take over the city (Vahdat, 2003). 
Both have their own spaces and crowds, but state power was on the side of the 
modern one. What I mean here by modernity is not a modernity that considers all its 
features, but I mean the objective side of modernity, which is modernisation. In 
Tehran, modern streets have been created and lots of public spaces have been 
developed. Spaces like cafés, bars, discos, modern restaurants, dancing clubs, etc., but 
the problem was that lots of people were marginalised in this new city planning and 
wanted their city back.  
The rather accelerated dependent economic development in Iran during the years 
1950-1970, although it caused an increase in incomes and the accumulation of capital 
which were gained due to the sudden increase in the oil price (especially during the 
1970s), meant that this capital and income tended to belong to privileged minorities 
which were close to the authorities, which was according to the nature of rentier-
capitalism (Nozari, 2005). The unbalanced accumulation of national capital has caused 
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unbalanced development in Iranian society that has resulted in an increase in poverty 
and a social gap between classes and even among members of the middle class. Some 
parts of the middle class were placed in privileged structural positions according to the 
support of the Pahlavi regime and were subjects of the articulated state’s discourse, 
while some others were trying to deconstruct preferred meanings of this discourse and 
eventually the total deconstruction of this discourse. The unbalanced development in 
the cultural atmosphere has caused the emergence of dependency on western 
patterns of cultural consumption, the transferring of economic activities to the private 
sector, the growth of dictatorship and censorship to check any activities, which go 
against the pattern of rentier-capitalist development in Iran.  
These cultural changes and the class gap have caused the modern middle class, which 
emerged because of modernisation, to also criticise the authorities. Since, as 
Abrahamian (1982) has argued, the majority of this middle class were the next 
generation of the traditional middle class, and had not totally accepted all of the 
values that the authority wanted to expand. Although the modern middle class has 
been educated and has integrated into the modern relations in the society, a 
significant part of this modern middle class have kept their traditional values and also 
have been influenced by the authorities’ decisions, which have caused the emergence 
of a class gap, especially in terms of the economy and incomes. The modern middle 
class that were the product of governmental modernisation have therefore become 
the main critics of the authorities, since this authority couldn’t establish any kind of 
social justice that was in accord with elements of Iranian modernisation.  
The modern middle class has become powerful because it has been educated and has 
become effective in the society, since they have integrated into the bureaucratic 
system of administration, and then this class were criticising the authority because it 
wanted to form this middle class according to the imperative values of modernisation, 
which were mostly against the values of this modern middle class, both in terms of 
values that they have kept from their traditional families, or those gained from a 
modern form of education in universities. The authorities, in facing criticisms from this 
modern middle class, have established forms of repression. SAVAK (the Organisation of 
Intelligence and National Security) expanded its activities in universities, and it started 
to arrest and repress students who were criticising the Pahlavi forms of administration. 
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Lots of intellectuals were arrested, and the authorities did not tolerate any form of 
protests (Parsa, 1989, p181). The demands of the modern middle class stood against 
the demands of the authorities in relation to forms of imperative modernisation, and 
the gap between the modern and the traditional middle class in supporting the 
modernisation process has cracked. The modern middle class became the main critic 
of the authorities and their demand was the establishment of social justice and 
political development, which can be considered to be modern values.  
Mentioned factors alongside other historical factors, like the emergence of active 
political movements worldwide, and the interest of significant parts of the social and 
academic forces in political activities, caused a significant social struggle with the 
Pahlavi rulers, which led to the Islamic revolution in 1979, and the collapse of the 
Pahlavi dynasty (Gheissari, 1998, p78). 
As Abrahamian (2008, p35) has argued, the emergence of the modern middle class 
under the influence of modernisation, and also emergence of the gap between this 
middle class and the authorities, due to the unbalanced development of Iranian 
society, has caused this middle class to become the main factor in the Pahlavi collapse. 
Nozari (2005) sees the Islamic revolution of 1979 as a middle class revolution. He 
argues that middle class revolutions basically happened when the rentier-capitalist 
system lost its legitimacy in the region because of its inability to establish social justice. 
In these circumstances, middle class revolutions are formed with the mediation of a 
widespread coalition between national and social forces mostly through the leadership 
of middle class’ intellectuals and élites. Most of these revolutions were influenced by a 
kind of native ideology, and have had nationalist characteristics and natures. Most of 
these revolutions, as we can see today, either have faced defeat and failure or, again, 
have returned to capitalist development methods (Nozari, 2005).  
After the Islamic Revolution of 1979 
According to the different policies of the Islamic Republic’s state in confrontation with 
the middle class, I have divided the post-revolution era into 6 periods in order to show 
the evolution of the modern middle class in the Islamic Republic’s era, I will present a 
brief analysis of this evolution in each period and then elaborate my research question 
in relation to the Tehranian middle class. 
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The first period (1979-1981) was the: “Post-Revolutionary Era and the Establishment 
Period of the Islamic Revolution”: The conditions mentioned led to the 1979 revolution 
that changed and transformed social orders according to the revolutionaries’ demands 
for the reconstruction of the social (Bayat, 1997, p59). The circumstances before and 
after the revolution are different, and this is the nature of revolution.  
These changes have had their effects on modern middle class and urban life, effects 
that totally distinguish this era from the past. Amirahmadi (1988) believes the 
revolution of 1979 indicates a national reaction against dependency on imperialism 
and the unbalanced development of Iranian society in different realms of the economy 
and politics, and it also shows the tendency of the modern middle class towards 
political participation and the establishment of social justice and, more importantly, it 
shows people’s passion for a return to their traditional culture and native lifestyle 
(Amirahmadi, 1988, p236). 
For many years before the revolution, the relationship between authority and power in 
Iran was the reproduction of the different kinds of traditional authority among the 
middle classes. The twofold space, which was created under the influence of 
governmental modernisation, was reproduced for many years (Amanat, 1989). Tehran 
was divided into two totally different cities, with two different cultures. There was an 
invisible wall between these two cities. The geographical co-ordinates of these two 
cities were the same, but there was a huge mental distance between them. Amir 
Ebrahimi (2004) believes that the revolution transformed public spaces in Tehran into 
spaces for the public, which could be spaces for presence of the modern, middle class, 
and their demands, which were the establishing of social justice and political 
development according to their national values and traditions. Tehranian 
revolutionaries occupied the whole city and tried to destroy the existing class-based 
authority. Amir Ebrahimi (ibid) argues that, in those revolutionary days, the whole city 
was under the effect of this movement.  
Revolutionaries chose a street as a centre for their demonstrations. This street was 
called Enghelab (revolution), after the victory of the Islamic revolution. At the end of 
this street there was a square named Shahyad (the memory of the king), and that 
square was the destination of the demonstrations that were held in Enghelab Street. 
After the victory, this square was called Azadi (Liberty). In those days “Revolution 
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Street” led to “Liberty Square”. Enghelab Street has a feature in that it could gather all 
of the people from all of the districts of Tehran. It is in the centre of Tehran and is 
almost equidistant from the north and south of Tehran, as the two opposite poles of 
wealth and poverty. The University of Tehran, the most prestigious Iranian university, 
is in this street, and also cultural centres, like City Theatre and the main bookshops, 
are there. The fact that this street, with all its features, is known as the centre of the 
Iranian revolution in Tehran indicates that, in the revolutionary era, all efforts were 
made to destroy the border that the authority erected between the modern and 
traditional middle classes and the two spaces that belong to each of them. The 
authorities were destroyed, and the Islamists considered that it was their right to seize 
the revolution’s heritage and also the public spaces. The struggles around seizing 
urban spaces were over, and the result was in favour of the Islamists. This new 
authority that depended from its revolutionary demands, didn’t want, and couldn’t 
tolerate, the other parallel culture in the city.  
Amir Ebrahimi (2004) believes that after the revolution governmental power aimed to 
reproduce traditional authority that was based on Islamic and religious ideas. This 
authority was formed according to the demands on the part of the revolutionaries, 
who were Islamists. The revolution, which gained victory with the participation of 
many groups, entered a new level, a level of establishment. 
The middle class’s revolution, which happened with the mediation of the middle class 
that was the product of modernisation, needed leadership. The ruling class therefore 
emerged to take on leadership of the revolution and to present the development 
patterns, which were consonant with the revolutionary demands of the 
revolutionaries.  
The Islamic Republic was chosen in the 1st April, 1979, referendum, and then the 
Islamists took the responsibility to expand revolutionary demands in the whole society. 
Although, at that time, the revolutionary government was not homogenous and the 
narration of being Islamic was different in different parts of the government (Amanat, 
1989), it took time for the government to become homogenous. The main body of 
society was supporting the state in expanding these ideas, the body in which tradition 
and religion were playing a major role in their lives. At that time, women and youths 
were influenced by the rules, which demanded the homogenisation of the society 
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more than did other groups. The compulsory Hijab (veiling) is the most explicit symbol 
of this homogenisation (Gheissari, 2009, p48).  
In rentier states, the middle class and its lifestyle are so connected to the development 
patterns of the governments, both in accepting and rejecting these patterns. The ruling 
class, after the 1979 revolution, who were Islamists, had to present a development 
pattern so as not to lose the accompaniment of the middle class. So, inevitably, they 
needed to transform and change the political and ideological structures of the society, 
and even to change the attitude of the middle class according to the pattern of 
development after the revolution. 
The development pattern of the Islamic republican state after the 1979 revolution 
sought for a pattern which had roots in national culture, national characters, religious 
and historical symbols, and the ideals of the middle class. This state, through 
highlighting the slogan: “Not west, nor east, but the Islamic Republic” was seeking to 
present a kind of development pattern that, firstly, neglects the west, because they 
follow imperialistic ideas and patterns (namely, what the revolutionaries criticised in 
the previous regime), and, secondly, that neglects the east (specifically, the Soviet 
Union) because they were following a socialist system that, ideologically, was known to 
be an atheistic system. 
The second period (1981-1989) was: “War-Time”: Nonetheless, what happened in the 
reality of Iranian society was the emergence of kinds of eclectic pattern of 
development, which more emphasised on the socialist pattern under the influence of 
emergence of the “Islamic-Leftist” articulation of the IRdisc. During the years between 
1980 and 1988, when the Islamic Republic’s state was experiencing the war with Iraq, 
the pattern of development emphasised encouraging people towards contentment, 
low intake, dedication, devotion, assistance to the government, neglecting western 
consumption patterns and luxuries, on one hand, and, on the other hand, emphasising 
the ideological values of Islam. The state was trying to hold all revenues since it 
needed to budget the war under the situation of being sanctioned by the loads of 
countries, which were previously buyers of Iranian extracted oil. Therefore the 
economy was extremely under the state control to support the war effort (Maloney, 
2015, p16). 
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Additionally, the start of war with Iraq in 1980 provided a situation in which the 
Islamists could promote their ideas more than ever. This promotion was often 
accompanied by coercion. They referred their opponents to the tense conditions that 
Iraq had caused and started internal repression; they repressed internal opponents 
with the excuse that internal forces had to be united against Iraq. They aimed to 
expand their ideas to the whole society (Farhi, 2004, p104). The new authority, which 
was close to governmental power, expanded in the public spaces and among the 
middle class. The controlling governmental power established new norms and rules on 
the appearance of the middle class in public spaces. The state’s power determined the 
conditions that related to being in public spaces (the influences of war situation in the 
Iranian society have been discussed in the previous section). 
The third period (1989-1997) was the: “Constructionist Cabinet”: Nonetheless, after 
the end of the war, and also after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, who was the 
symbol of revolution and its charismatic leader, the demands of the middle class 
changed. With the end of the war, the Islamic Republic’s state emphasised the 
reconstruction of Iran. The first government after the war, with the presidency of 
Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who was closest to Ayatollah Khomeini, named the 
constructionist cabinet (Dolat-e Sazandegi), and Hashemi Rafsanjani was named as the 
Commander of Construction (Sardar-e Sazandegi). This cabinet is the representative of 
the “Economic Development” articulation of the IRdisc.  
This construction needed a development pattern, an eclectic pattern of development 
was experienced during the war and now the state needed pattern, which could 
reconstruct following the war’s defeats and damage. In the absence of any alternative 
pattern of development which would belong to Iran and to the nation, the 
constructionist government, after facing the objective problems of Iranian society, 
again applied rentier-capitalist patterns to construction, because of the absence of any 
alternative pattern or creative economical state based ideas, and of being rooted in 
the pattern of rentier-capitalist development during Iranian modernisation before the 
revolution. For instance, the Hashemi administration followed policies of taking 
international loans, cutting subsidies, and devaluing the Iranian currency in order to 
accumulate national capital in the state (Maloney, 2015, p189). Nonetheless, this 
government was emphasising the ideological basis of the Islamic revolution, like 
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Islamic culture. The way in which the Islamic authority was dealing with the middle 
class in the city changed under the influence of the ending of the war and the 
addressing of the construction process.   
For example, in the main squares and streets of Tehran, the function of these places 
was changing as a result of the sudden appearance of governmental forces. Shopping 
centres in the city, for instance, which were considered symbols of consumer culture in 
modern cities, became places for the manifestation of undisputed governmental 
power at any time (Mahdavi, 2009, p23). Governmental forces were suddenly 
appearing in public places to prove that these places were also under the control of 
the authority of the Islamic state, and the twofold spaces, which appeared in the 
Pahlavi era, were not allowed to be reproduced. This presentation of power is 
happening in more modern spaces and places in Tehran, like shopping centres and 
high streets. In these places the Islamic codes were more neglected by citizens who act 
differently from the way that the government expects its citizens to act. 
So, the government came to the scene with its executive forces, such as the police and 
Basij to possess public spaces. The important matter here is that what the Islamic 
authority was facing in public places was the public form of modern middle class 
appearance. This middle class played an effective role in the victory of the 1979 
revolution, and after the Islamists took authority, they were confronting this middle 
class according to Islamic values. Nonetheless, this middle class, which was the product 
of modernisation, has gained and kept some modern values, like secularism and 
individualism. These values stood against the Islamic values that the Islamic authority 
wanted to expand in society.  
The governmental power and behavioural codes, like codes of dressing, the prohibition 
against being with somebody of a different sex without any official relationship, etc., in 
public spaces, took away the freedom to act in public spaces from the modern middle 
classes. For years, the inner space of homes thus became a safer and more secure 
place for people, where they could be invisible and unknown in their inner places. 
These inner spaces became spaces where people could behave freely, regardless of 
governmental authority (Mahdavi, 2009, p172). One of the important features of the 
middle class lifestyle in Tehran in the years after the revolution was home-based 
leisure, although, as I will consider later, the middle class could not leave public spaces.  
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The increasing importance of private spaces, due to the shortage of ideal public spaces 
does not mean that the modern Tehranian middle class were ignoring public spaces in 
terms of what the state expected of them.  Tehran, more than other cities and places 
in Iran, gives people opportunities to be different, despite the problems and difficulties 
that governmental control may cause. In Tehran, as an urban space, different types of 
people were distinguishable according to different types of consumption and leisure. It 
was possible to present these kinds of lifestyles in urban spaces with the crowds of 
people in them. These crowds would be possible in public urban spaces. Due to the 
control of this kind of urban space by the state, the lifestyle of the urban middle class 
is formed differently in Tehran (Lajevardi, 2009). 
The fourth period (1997-2005) was that of the “Reformist Cabinet”: People were acting 
in public spaces and could not abandon them. This causes the formation of resistance 
against governmental power, and other forms of power, that wants to seize public 
spaces. The entrance of marginalised groups, like women and youth, into the public 
spaces, and the paradox that this emergence causes in contrast with the spaces, which 
are under the control of governmental power, leads to the formation of different kinds 
of resistance in those public spaces. These kinds of resistance were recognisable in 
public places, particularly after the presidency of Seyed Mohammad Khatami, who was 
the head of the Cabinet, which was known as the Reformist Cabinet. With the rise of 
the Reformist Cabinet on 23rd May, 1997, and emergence of the “Reformist” 
articulation of the IRdisc, the modern middle class came back to the city with social 
reformist demands. The numbers of published newspaper increased, university 
students became more active, and public places became venues for modern middle 
class appearance. This caused the authorities of the Islamic Republic state, which was 
supported by the Supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Khamenei, to claim that the 
Reformist Cabinet had neglected the values of the Islamic revolution. There have been 
many conflicts between the Reformists and the political group that is called the 
Principlists, who were demanding to go back to Islamic revolution values. Nonetheless, 
what cannot be neglected about this era is the emergence of a modern middle class in 
the city. This middle class, as I mentioned before, couldn’t leave the public places for 
the Islamic state. Khatami and the era that was named the Reforms Era provided a 
situation for the middle class in order to come back to city. We cannot neglect the fact 
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that Khatami himself was the man of the system. He was among the Islamists 
revolutionaries and was close to Ayatollah Khomeini, and he also was the Minister of 
Culture in the Constructionist Cabinet. He didn’t question any of the fundamental 
values of the Islamic Republic’s state. Nonetheless, by bearing the red lines of the 
Islamic Republic’s state in mind; he addressed the lifestyle and modern values of the 
modern middle class (Abrahamian, 2008, p186). His emphasis on “civil society” and the 
changes that his cabinet made to aspects like cinematic productions, book publishing, 
the numbers of published newspapers, and the civil rights of citizens, caused the 
empowerment of the middle class. If we consider the demands of the Constructionist 
Cabinet in relation to economic development after the war, we can say that the 
demands of the Reformist Cabinet were for political development with an emphasis on 
civil rights (Mirsepasi, 2010, p120). The middle class again became significant and 
effective in society, and this class came back to the city. Kazemi (2009) believes that 
the middle class in this era formed a kind of civil resistance against the fundamentalist 
parts of the Islamic Republic’s state by questioning the values of these fundamentalists 
in public. Fashions became important, and the appearance of the middle class in the 
city changed. Shopping centres, cafés, cinemas and streets became venues for middle 
class social appearance, and this kind of appearance became possible under the effects 
of the Reformist Cabinet.  
The fifth period (2005-2009) was that of the “Principlist Cabinet”: Although the 
Reformist Cabinet and Khatami have played a determining role in the empowerment 
of the middle class, at the end of the 8 years of the Reformist Cabinet, a Principlist 
Cabinet arose with the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, in 2005. This cabinet 
was totally supported by the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei. As a consequence 
of the election of the Principlist cabinet and emergence of the “Principlist” articulation 
of the IRdisc, the authority of the Islamic Republic’s state again became powerful in 
dealing with the middle class and urban spaces. Particular police forces were formed to 
control the conditions of the citizen’s existence in public places. These forces were 
named the “Moral Police” (Gasht-e Ershad)11 and mostly controlled dress codes to 
                                                        11 “Gasht-e Ershad” or the Moral Police is a department of the “Law Enforcement Force of Islamic 
Republic of Iran” (Iranian Police), which is in charge of monitoring the observation of Islamic codes, such 
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promote the proper Hijab for women, and also questioned the relationships between 
people of opposite sexes.  
The total amount of oil revenues in Iran after 1979 and until 2011 was 976 billion US 
dollars, while more than half of this revenue, namely, 531 billion US dollars, was 
obtained between 2005 and 2009, and this constituted 76 percent of all state 
revenues. Meanwhile, almost 83 percent of this revenue was spent on importing 
consumer goods, like clothes, cars, and even food and fruit (Torkan & Farnam, 2012). 
This means that the rentier state, as the bourgeoisie who own the capital, decided to 
spend the mentioned revenue on developing a consumerist culture by importing 
consumer goods. Additionally, the body of the government, namely its employees with 
permanent contracts, increased 12 percent between 2005 and 2009 (Mehr News 
Agency, 2012), this is while, only 10 percent of labourers contracts were permanent 
contracts in 2014 (Rabiei, the Minister of Cooperatives Labour and Social Welfare, 
cited in Fars News Agency).  
The authority was therefore facing the members of a middle class, which was made up 
of the consumers of the Iranian trade markets, government employees, retail market 
consumers, the consumers of goods imported by the state, and, in sum, white-collar 
workers, on one hand, and, on the other hand, this middle class was neglecting the 
values of the Islamic republican state. The state couldn’t repress the middle class 
anymore because it needed it, since they were the consumers in a market that 
emerged from the wasteful importing of consumer goods, and also this state needed 
to distinguish itself by emphasising Islamic values. The IRdisc was thus articulated in a 
way that could make its desired subjects those who were among the middle class, on 
one hand, and, on the other hand, in a way that emphasises and highlights the values 
of the Islamic revolution. The middle class that became powerful in the Khatami era 
never came back to their homes, and also the state didn’t want them to. This middle 
class became powerful in the city, and it was forming the city’s relations. What thus 
seems crucial here for the IRdisc is the forming of a kind of rationality and identity 
according to this middle class, in order, firstly, that this class does not question the 
values of the Islamic state, and, secondly, to drive the economic engine of the state by                                                                                                                                                                   
as the Hijab, and opposite sex relationships in public places. The forces of this department are allowed 
to arrest people who are not observing Islamic codes in public places. 
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consumption. It means that a form of the Islamic bourgeoisie has emerged that 
needed a petti-bourgeoisie for advancing its demands both in ideological domination 
and capitalism consumption. 
In the Ahmadinejad era a policy regarding economic development emerged which was 
called privatisation, according to Article 44 of the Islamic Republic’s Constitutional Law. 
This article indicates that the government must provide a situation in which the private 
sector is able to investigate the basic industries of the country. Again, an eclectic form 
of development has emerged. Ahmadinejad started to privatise industries, but, in the 
absence of powerful private sectors, and under the effects of sanctions because of the 
nuclear program, in fact, the state capital, which was supposed to be provided to the 
private sectors, was instead delivered to the semi-private sectors. These semi-private 
sectors were mostly operated by the mediation of the Army of the Guardians of the 
Islamic Revolution (Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enghelab-e Eslami). This army became 
determinant and effective in the economic policies of the Principlist Cabinet under the 
tent of privatisation. 
What seems obvious, is that this type of economic policies need the crowd of people in 
the city in order to support the financial actions of the government and to make 
money for its policies. The state should deal with the modern middle class in such a 
way that they don’t leave the public, on one hand, and, on the other hand, that they 
don’t question the legitimacy of the state. For instance, in 2005, 25 shopping centres 
were operating in Tehran. By 2009, this number had increased to 38, and there were 
also 34 other shopping centres under construction, and the start-up capital for all 
these shopping centres was provided by the mentioned semi-private sector and, 
accordingly, by revenues that came from the exporting of oil (J.C Williams Group 
Report, 2012). This means that the state has tried to form a new kind of rationality 
among the middle class. 
As Nozari (2005) has argued, the state needed to make changes in three major realms 
and to integrate these changes into its development pattern to keep the revolution 
meaningful, because, in terms of economic development, this state again turned back 
to patterns which might be known as rentier-capitalist patterns of development. These 
realms are ideology, politics and culture. The Islamic republican state had to articulate 
a discourse according to its preferred meanings around the three mentioned realms in 
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order to remain significant. This discourse therefore needed to make its desired 
subjects among the modern middle class by preferring its desired meanings according 
to the three mentioned realms. In the case of ideology, the Shiite reading of Islamic 
ideology became the main ideology of the Islamic republican state. In the case of 
politics, the protectorate of the Islamic Jurists and the Supreme Leadership’s theory 
(Velayat-e Faghih), which had been founded by Ayatollah Khomeini, became the main 
line in the policy of the Islamic republican state. In the Constitutional Law of the Islamic 
Republic, in article 57 and 110, it is frankly stated that every party and individual who 
wants to carry out political activities in the Islamic Republic of Iran, must firstly accept 
and believe in the rule of the Supreme Leadership as the main overseer of the values 
of the Islamic republican state. In the case of culture, the IRdisc has tried to prefer its 
desired meaning regarding the signifiers that make the everyday life of the middle 
class in accord and consonant with the other two realms. 
The condition of the Iranian state in 2009 was very similar to that in 1975, when the 
modern middle class intensified its questioning of the government because of 
unbalanced developments in the economy and politics.  In both years, the oil revenue 
formed almost 75 percent of all governmental revenues, and a kind of consumerist 
culture was promoted by the government. As in 1975, in 2009, the modern middle 
class, especially in Tehran, as a consequence of the presidential election, started to 
question the legitimacy of, the Islamic republican state. This middle class, most of 
whom, especially in Tehran, supported Mir-Hussein Mousavi, has raised claims of fraud 
in the election. The Green Movement was formed and the IRdisc faced its most major 
legitimacy crisis in almost 30 years. Accordingly, my question is: how has the IRdisc, 
four years after the emergence of the Green Movement, dealt with this legitimacy 
crisis? I do not agree that all of the efforts of the IRdisc were repressive actions, 
undertaken in order to repress the Green Movement’s members, but what I am going 
to elaborate on in the next chapters is that the IRdisc may form a kind of subjectivity 
among this middle class, who were the cause of the legitimacy crisis; and 
characteristics of this subjectivity have not only helped this discourse from being 
collapsed or deconstructed, but have also guaranteed the hegemony of the IRdisc.  
According to what has been discussed in this chapter, the desired form of subjectivity 
through the IRdisc will be explored by analysing the productions of Iranian state 
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television and the hegemony of this subjectivity will be examined by interviewing 
members of the Tehranian middle class. In the next chapter, the methodological 
principles of this investigation will be discussed.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: METHODOLOGY 
METHODOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES 
In the recent decades, the Cultural Studies tradition has been mainly focused on 
studying social and cultural practices. Within this milieu, meaning is constructed and 
cultural activities are formed. Considering mass media and other forms of cultural 
products makes for an especially fruitful analysis. As was developed in the theoretical 
chapter, the discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe also provides a conceptual 
framework for considering the processes of meaning construction within discourses. 
Putting together these frameworks, which are both concerned with presenting a 
proper analysis of practices within which meanings are being constructed, better 
illustrates the significance of the notion of articulation as both theory and method.  
As argued by Slack (1996), Hall considers the theory of articulation as a way to 
characterise a social formation without falling into the twin traps of reductionism and 
essentialism. Meanwhile, articulation, as a method, is an attempt to contextualise the 
object of studies. And this would mean not just analysing the context, but also 
providing possibilities in order to change it within the attempts of re-articulation. This 
refers to the main principle from the discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe. Their 
theory of discourse emphasises the impossibility of closure and the arbitrary 
connection between the signifiers and the signified. In other words, in their discourse 
theory, the meanings of signifiers are constructed and are not inherent and essential 
meanings. During the articulatory practices of a discourse, elements transfer into 
moments. As Laclau and Mouffe argued, an articulatory practice is any practice that 
aims to establish a relation among elements, such that their identity is modified as a 
result of the articulatory practice (1985, p 105). 
As discussed in the theoretical chapter, the concept of articulation is well elaborated in 
the discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe, and Hall has applied this concept well in 
order to map the play of forces among which meanings are being constructed. 
Mapping these forces is indeed extremely related to the context in which these plays 
are on-going. Context, for Hall, is the subject of theory, and, at the same time, it is the 
condition of theorising. This insight into the theory of articulation refers to the fact 
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that the meanings of each social act and texts are extremely linked to the context. The 
antagonism of social forces to constructing meanings is detectable within a context, 
and the aim of cultural studies is deepening the processes during which the dominant 
cultural order has been legitimated (Slack, 1996). These processes are the conditions 
and practices of the articulation that are constructing the dominant structures of 
meaning and power in a society. As Laclau argues: “A class is hegemonic not so much 
to the extent that it is able to impose a uniform conception of the world on the rest of 
society, but to the extent that it can articulate different visions of the world in such a 
way that their potential antagonism is neutralised” (Laclau, 1977, p 161).  
One theory in cultural studies is therefore raised from the context and is a base from 
which to engage in political activities, which refers to actions with which to re-
articulate the dominant articulation, and to break the arbitrary connection between 
the signifiers and the signified in order to transform a moment into an element in a 
discursive articulation (Mouffe, 2005). Considering the significance of context, 
Howarth sees studying the method of articulation, namely the articulatory practices, 
during which a moment is transformed into an element, as the only reliable method 
for doing practical research under the influence of the discourse theory of Laclau and 
Mouffe (Howarth, 2005, p316). Likewise, Slack (1996) believes that the concept of 
articulation, and using this concept as theory or method, either to characterise a social 
formation (theory) or to contextualise the object of analysis (method), has influenced 
cultural studies’ works in recent decades. This influence has caused researchers from 
this school to pay more attention to issues such as the construction of meanings in a 
social process, the role of various discourses in making subjects, and the role of power 
relations in meaning construction processes and the hegemony of discourses. 
Howarth (2005) distinguishes two main research strategies in discourse theory in 
relation to the mapping of articulatory practices: case study and comparative method. 
In case study, the main aim of discourse theory is to map articulatory practices in a 
context. To do a case study it is crucial to have texts, as empirical data, in hand for 
studying how, in texts, signifiers are related to their signified, and how the producers 
of texts are attempting to transform the elements to moments. These texts could be 
any material that demonstrates a relation between the signifier and the signified, such 
as images, newspaper reports, films and visual texts, like television programs. These 
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texts may be accessible from archives, qualitative interviews, and non-linguistic data 
(ibid). Nonetheless, from wherever these data have been obtained, these texts need to 
be analysed in order to reveal the articulatory practices in the production of texts. 
Howarth (2005) believes: “A central aim of textual analysis in discourse theory is to 
locate and analyse the mechanisms by which meaning is produced, fixed, contested, 
and subverted within particular texts” (Howarth, 2005, p341).  
On the other hand, as argued in the theoretical chapter, in cultural studies, mapping 
forces that are attempting to make a particular articulation of meanings may be 
recognisable in media texts, since the media are considered as the ideological 
apparatus that plays a significant role in interpellations. The process of communication 
within media texts may be considered to be articulatory practices in the field of 
cultural practices, which are shaped by the mediation of social, economic, technical, 
institutional and political forces, in order to construct a particular way of 
understanding and conception of the world in the everyday life of subjects (Hall, 1989, 
p49). 
Stuart Hall (ibid) considers communication processes to be one of the realms that 
demonstrate the play of forces that are attempting to articulate a discourse by linking 
a particular meaning, among all of the potentials for a particular signifier. Hall’s model 
of encoding and decoding, which critiqued the former communication analysis of 
sender, text and receiver, demonstrates his approach through considering 
communicative messages as articulations, the articulation of encoding, and the 
articulation of decoding (Hall, 1980). Hall considers both sides of a communicatory 
process as articulations, and therefore, potentially, these articulations can be formed 
differently, and decoding a message (text) may be totally different depending on the 
attitude of the encoding processes. This attitude to communication processes 
emphasises creativity and the activity of audiences in the construction of meanings 
from texts.  
This approach therefore depends on a diversity of audiences. In this approach, 
audiences are not a homogenous mass at all, but they belong to different and various 
social groups and classes, and due to their access to different discourses, they cannot 
be considered as a coherent whole. What is the object of desire here is the analysis of 
audiences and their readings of texts within the framework of a kind of “structured 
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social context”. Researchers in the cultural studies tradition assume that the reading of 
texts by audiences is done by the mediation of discourses, which are socially 
constructed, and the main aim in this approach is to grasp how meanings are 
constructed through the process of production and consumption (reading) in the 
relationships between text and audiences, ideology and subjects, and hegemony and 
resistance. 
Following Hall’s model of communication, Morley and Brunsdon in “The Nationwide 
Television Studies” (1999) used this model in analysing the relationship between the 
articulation of encoding the television text (production), and the articulation of 
decoding the meanings of television texts (consumption) among a predetermined 
social group. Morley (1992) believes that, apart from texts, there are detectable social 
groups in societies that can be considered as real audiences. These groups have been 
socially formed according to variables such as age, sex, ethnicity, class, etc. We can 
therefore say that these social groups have been formed according to the access of 
individuals to various and different discourses during their identification process. 
Morley (1989, p40) believes that different socio-cultural contexts are providing various 
cultural features and sources for individuals, who belong to different social groups and 
categories, and this will cause different readings of a single text by the audiences. 
Morley thus believes that the main task for each researcher in the cultural studies 
tradition is to find out how social positions, plus the discursive positions of individuals, 
are forming their reading of a text.  
 
“Members of a given sub-culture will tend to share a cultural orientation 
towards decoding messages in particular ways. Their individual readings of 
messages will be framed by shared cultural formations and practices, which will 
in turn be determined by the objective position of the individual in the social 
structure. This is not to say that a person’s objective social position determines 
his consciousness in a mechanistic way; people understand their situation and 
react to it through the level of sub-cultures and meaning-systems.” (Morley, 
1992, p81) 
 
Following Morley’s method, lots of work has been carried out to study the relations 
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between texts and audiences, considering that audiences interpret the meanings of 
programs according to the kind of “understanding frameworks” which have been 
formed according to individual’s social positions. These “understanding frameworks” 
could be categorised through consideration of features like politics, economy, culture, 
etc., and arguably social classes. These frameworks contain criteria with which 
audiences, in different frameworks, evaluate the forms and content of programs. 
We therefore need to understand that when a text seeks to interpellate subjects 
regarding discursively preferred meanings, at the same time, what is making identities 
is not just a discourse. Rather, subjects are exposed to other discourses’ interpellation 
due to their accessibility. Interaction between texts and audiences has always been 
subject to influence by other discourses’ interpellation, rather than the discourse that 
has produced the text. Audiences interpret texts according to their positions in various 
discourses, and also according to their social positions. Although these social and 
discursive positions have been constructed socially, categorising audiences according 
to these positions, based on reliable variables, would be helpful for each individual 
research project in order to understand the level of hegemony of different discourses 
among different social groups and classes. 
Additionally, determination of these pre-existing categories by discourses would help 
the discourses to obtain a preference for their desired meanings among a specific 
social group. Although individual identification regarding discursively preferred 
meanings is important for discourses, what is crucial to them, regarding being 
hegemonic, is the expansion of their desired identification process among social 
groups and classes. Social groups and classes are significant because the positions of 
subjects in social formation determine the amount and method of their access to 
different discourses and ideological codes. The main advantage of the application of 
the approach that considers audiences as cultural categories which have been formed 
socially (not as homogenous masses or collections of socially-demographic fixed 
clusters), is the demonstration of relations between social positions and cultural 
frameworks together with the individual’s readings of texts.  
Here, I can conclude that a discourse, in order to be hegemonic, needs to recognise 
these social positions and cultural frameworks. This would be helpful in order to give 
preference to specific meanings among specific social groups through consideration of 
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their natures. In other words, the recognition of these social positions and groups will 
cause discourses (according to the characteristics and attributes of social groups and 
classes) to desire to expand specific kinds of identification among these groups. It is 
worth mentioning that the desired forms of discourses of identification may be totally 
different among those with diverse social positions. Recognition of these social 
positions by researchers who are studying from within the Cultural Studies tradition 
would help them to understand what kinds of identification, according to various social 
groups and cultural frameworks, have been desired by discourses, in order to gain 
subjects and to be hegemonic. 
Although, in the current research, I am not going to undertake audience research, the 
model proposed by Morley, in dividing texts from audiences, has influenced the 
methodological strategies of the current research. I intend to examine the homology of 
two forms of articulations by the subject of particular signifiers, articulation of the 
IRdisc, and the articulation of the subjectivity of the Tehranian middle class. 
Methodological strategies used in this research have thus been divided into three 
steps.  
First, finding the preferred meanings of the IRdisc and its ideal subject positions in a 
set of particular TV series that have been broadcasted from Iranian state television. 
Second, determining Tehranian middle class as social positions and cultural 
frameworks that aimed, by using the IRdisc, to expand its preferred form of 
subjectivity among them. Third, examination of the prevalence and hegemony of the 
desired form of subjectivity by the IRdisc among the Tehranian middle class. In the 
remainder of this chapter, I will discuss the methods that have been used in this 
research to pass through the 3 mentioned levels. 
METHODOLOGICAL STRATEGIES 
Finding the Preferred Meanings of the IRdisc  
During chapter three, I have tried to present a proper analysis about the role of a 
specific institution, namely, IRIB, in the representation of the desired subject positions 
and the preferred meanings of the IRdisc. As I have mentioned in this chapter, Iranian 
state television, in different circumstances and in different articulations of the IRdisc, 
has always represented the preferred meanings and ideal subject positions of this 
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discourse. The main subject of the current study is the analysing of the interpretations 
and treatments of the Tehranian middle class regarding the preferred meanings of the 
IRdisc that have been represented in some of the most popular sets of TV series, both 
during and after the Iranian presidential election of 2009.  
The three TV series that have been selected for reviewing in this research are: 
“Mukhtar Nameh” (The Book of Mukhtar, 2010), “Vaziyat-e Sefid” (White Condition, 
2011) and “Shams-ol Emareh”, (The Mansion of the Sun, 2009). “Mukhtar Nameh” was 
broadcast from October 2010 to July 2011, by Channel One or the “National channel” 
(Shabake-ye Melli). Meanwhile, “Shams-ol Emareh” was broadcast from July 2009 to 
October 2009, by Channel Two or the “Family Channel” (Shabake-ye Khanevadeh). And 
finally, “Vaziyat-e Sefid” was broadcast from November 2011 to March, 2012 from 
Channel Three or the “Youth Channel” (Shabake-ye Javan). These three channels are 
the oldest and most popular channels among all of the 22 domestic state television 
channels. This set of TV series were the most popular among all of the series that were 
broadcast from summer 2009, to the end of 2013 on IRIB. According to IRIB officials, all 
these TV series have captured more than 70 percent as audience (Research Centre of 
IRIB, 2014). The reasons that I have chosen these three TV series for consideration is 
their popularity among all the state television TV series from summer 2009 until winter 
2013, when the IRdisc was facing the Green Movement, which was questioning its 
legitimacy. 
Nonetheless, it seems crucial to justify the method of reading these television texts 
and the method of exploring the preferred meanings and the ideal subject positions of 
the IRdisc while studying their representations on Iranian state television. Justifying 
this method needs a proper understanding of works of representation. As I have 
discussed during the chapter on the theoretical framework, the approach of this 
research to the notion of representation is the constructivist approach. What is 
considered the constructivist approach can be highlighted in two ways. First there are 
the representations as practices that aim to construct meanings by the arbitrary 
referring of signifiers with the preferred signified. And second, there is the 
representing of the ideal subject as s/he who accepts this constructed relation.  
When we study representation under the influence of Foucault’s insight into the 
notion of discourse, the consideration of representation will contain questions like: 
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what features of reality become preferable in the representation, and what aspects 
will be ignored? What discourses and ideologies are constructing the meanings of 
representations? What features of unequal power relations are produced by the 
media’s contents? How are particular forms of media content forming public opinions? 
How are particular forms of media representing social matters, like social class, 
sexuality, ethnicity, etc.? 
What seems obvious in responding to these questions is the importance of using 
semiological methods and discourse analysis together. The point that indicates the 
vitality of the combination of the two methods of semiology and discursive analysis is 
to discover the influence of the meaning system in which discourses and 
representations were formed. To do this, we must use semiological methods to 
discover what elements are used by a particular discourse or ideology to represent and 
naturalise its ideas.  
Hall (1997) believes that although a semiotic approach is a proper approach for 
analysing the representation processes. However, to extend and develop the idea of 
representation, we should search for an idea which elaborates the representation 
processes as sources for producing social knowledge (an idea that is related to social 
acts and the issue of power). This idea emphasises the semiotic analysis of a text, by 
bearing in mind that representations are discursive attempts to form common sense. 
Hall mixes the notion of representation with the concept of common sense, and he 
argues that all efforts to prefer a meaning system should be done through the 
representation. The process of representation tries to give preference to one meaning 
among all of the positional meanings of signifiers (Hall, 1997, p228). These preferred 
meanings form common sense by being represented in various methods and forms. 
We can obtain a proper understanding about the power relations in a context if we 
study these preferred meanings and methods which form “the common sense.” Hall 
took this concept from Gramsci, and he turns it into a key concept of cultural studies. 
In Gramsci’s sociology, common sense refers to the agreed knowledge among a 
particular group and class of people, which causes a common standpoint between the 
members (Holub, 1992). 
The noticeable fact in considering the notion of common sense is the forming of 
common sense by the intermediation of institutions and social constructs. These 
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institutions function in the interests of a particular discourse that aims to be 
hegemonic by forming common sense (IRIB, in this research). 
On the other hand, and from the perspective of Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory, 
Howarth (2005, p336) also sees semiotic method as the most suitable way to analyse 
the meanings of textual data in the discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe. He believes 
that the application of semiotic methods reveals, or maps, the articulatory practices 
within discourses. Nevertheless, semiotic, in this sense, means using the conceptual 
framework of the discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe to understand how signifiers 
are related to the signified. Namely, detecting concepts like the nodal signifier, 
moment, element, floating signifier, etc., in the texts of a discourse produced.  
Moreover, Hall (1997) believes that discourses use various representations and 
strategies in order to form common sense according to their preferred meanings. 
Representation is a complicated issue, especially when discourses deal with 
differences. These differences must be ignored and normalised through different 
representation strategies, and by giving people the same cultural identity through the 
mediation of social constructions and institutions. 
As Hall (1997) has argued, discourses apply different kinds of representation strategies 
in order to make subjects. He believes the consideration of different representation 
strategies would help us to map the play of articulacy practices that discourses apply in 
order to make their desired subjects. In other words, this will help us to understand 
what discourses are doing, regarding making homogenous subjects. The success of 
representational strategies means the formation of common sense according to 
discursively preferred meanings. The three different representational strategies are 
more discussed in Hall’s considerations of such notion are: making others, making 
stereotypes, and naturalisation (Hall, 1997).  
Representations are cultural processes and cause the formation and establishment of 
individual and collective identities. As I have argued in the section on the “Notion of 
Discourse”, the identification process of each individual means temporarily accepting 
the subject positions and articulated meanings that have been represented in different 
forms by a discourse. Hall believes that identities are made in discourses by 
representations and differences (Hall, 1997, p24), and that the consideration of the 
notion of difference is an important element in the study of representation. When 
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differences are represented, we can identify ourselves according to what is 
represented as difference that belongs to others.  
The stereotype making processes makes differences homogenous. Stereotypes reduce 
differences and make them natural and inherent. Power always stands against 
marginalised groups. Stereotypes keep social order and protect the symbolic order of 
society. From a Foucauldian point of view, stereotypes form and act as the basis of 
power/knowledge discourses. 
Naturalisation is the other strategy of representation. Naturalisation has ideological 
functions and reinforces the conditions of the dominant ideology or class. Discourses, 
which have aimed to naturalise everything, represent class, gender and ethnic 
inequalities, and injustices as normal and natural facts (Fisk, 1998). The function of 
myth is to skew social phenomena, not to hide them. In this trend, the myth starts to 
normalise social and historical phenomena and the myth is formed in this process. The 
myth transfers the historical to the natural and becomes a speech that seems to be 
justified (Barthes, 1973, pp143-55). In other words, myths represent common sense, 
which is a historical matter, in a way that seems to be natural (the notion of myth and 
its function in discourse theory has been elaborated on in the theoretical chapter).  
Considering what has been discussed above in regard to studying the representation of 
preferred meanings and the ideal subject positions of discourses, the method for 
analysing the three mentioned TV series contains two features. The first is analysing TV 
texts by a semiotic method, influenced by the discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe, 
which, as Howarth (2005, p341) suggested, detects concepts of discourse theory in the 
text. Namely, I have detected concepts such as moment, element, signifier, signified, 
floating signifier, nodal signifier, subject position, etc., in the narration of this set of TV 
series. Secondly, I have tried to relate the representation of ideal subject positions and 
the preferred meanings of the IRdisc in each of the mentioned set of TV series to one 
of the representation strategies that I have named above.  
In the “Synopses and Analysis of TV Series” in Chapter Six, I am going to elaborate on 
what the preferred meanings of this set of three TV series are, according to which 
signifiers these preferred meanings have been articulated, and what subject positions 
these TV series are representing.  
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Identifying the Tehranian Middle Class as the Social Position of 
Consideration 
After figuring out what might be the preferred meanings of this set of TV series, and 
according to which signifiers these preferred meanings have been articulated, I needed 
to understand what the relationship of the Tehranian middle class with the articulated 
preferred meanings and represented subject positions is in relation to the main 
concerns of this research. This research is an attempt to understand the relationship 
between the Tehranian middle class identification and the preferred meanings of the 
IRdisc. This relationship will be examined by focusing on the signifiers that state 
television has tried to articulate to achieve the preferred meanings of the IRdisc that 
relate to them, when the IRdisc was facing a crisis that could very well deconstruct its 
meaning system.  
Therefore, in order to examine the subjectivities of the Tehranian middle class 
regarding ideal subject positions of the IRdisc, I needed some reliable facts to identify 
the Tehranian middle class according to them. According to features and 
characteristics of this middle class that have been discussed in Chapter Four, in order 
to identify the Tehranian middle class I have considered some factual indices. The 
considered indices according to the suggestions of the Statistical Centre of Iran (2013) 
are: annual disposal income per household, highest level of education, literacy rate for 
three members of household, religious affiliation and car ownership. By considering 
these indices, I have tried to explore which locations of Tehran have more middle class 
residents and consequently I went to these locations to conduct interviews.  
Tehran is the capital and largest city in Iran (2006 census). Today it is estimated there 
are 17 million residents in the greater Tehran area. Tehran is the world’s 56th largest 
metropolitan economy as measured by GDP. According to the segmentation of 
Tehran’s urban areas (which has been done by the mayor of Tehran) this city contains 
22 districts.  
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In order to understand in which one of these districts the Tehranian middle class is 
more settled, I am going to examine the mentioned indices one-by-one according to 
these 22 districts. Nevertheless, before doing this I should note that regarding the 
annual disposal income, I could not find any reliable data that considered annual 
income per Tehranian residents according to the 22 districts of Tehran. The reliable 
statistic that I could find about incomes, just illustrates annual disposal income per 
household in Iran.  
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Annual Disposable Income per Household (Constant 2013 IRR) 
Annual income per household (IRR) 
Number of 
households 
in 2006 
Number of 
households in 
2013 
Number of 
households in 
2020 
Annualised 
growth 
1 6.1 to 12.2 million 349,000 496,000 603,000 25.0% 
2 12.25 to 61.2 million 414,1000 5,514,000 6,262,000 25.1% 
3 62.25 to 122.5 million 4,804,000 5,886,000 6,798,000 29.4% 
4 122.5 to 306.2 million 6,091,000 6,950,000 9,037,000 38.4% 
5 306.25 to 551.2 million 1,373,000 1,496,000 2,474,000 66.5% 
6 551.25 to 918.7 million 275,000 297,000 586,000 69.2% 
7 918.75 to1838.5 million 150,000 162,000 227,000 40.2% 
8 1838.5 + million 111,000 122,000 170,000 40.1% 
Source: National Statistic Office, Euro monitor International  
 
According to the census of 2013 by the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
(CBI), the minimum income for a middle class household in 2013 was 65.90 million IRR 
and the average income was 284.46 million IRR. Therefore, I have considered rows 3, 4 
and 5 as the income of middle class households since in terms of income as I 
mentioned before this class stands between upper and lower classes of a society and 
in terms of population this class is more populated than the other two classes. 
The following represents key attributes from the Atlas Tehran Study. The data is based 
on the 2006 Census (sometimes comparing to the 2001 Census). By reviewing the 
maps that demonstrate the density of Tehran’s residents according to the indices that I 
have mentioned, my aim is to elaborate which districts of Tehran have more middle 
class residents. This would be helpful for this research in order to conduct interviews 
from the Tehranian middle class according to where they live.  
Highest level of education:  
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According to the above map, districts 1, 3, 6 and 2 have a high concentration of 
residents with the highest level of education. After these, districts 7, 5 and 11 have the 
most residents with the highest level of education.  
Literacy rates for three member of household:  
 
According to the above map, districts 1, 22 and 21 have the highest rates of literacy. 
After these, rates of literacy in districts 2, 5, 4, 15, 19 and 20 are higher than in other 
districts.  
 
Religious affiliation: 
 
According to the above map, residents in districts 3, 6, 7, 2, 5 and 1 are having more 
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moderate religious affiliation than other districts of Tehran. The rate of religious 
affiliation in these districts is from 89% to 92%. Considering the fact that Iranian 
society is a religious society, the above rate can be considered a moderate rate of 
religious affiliation in Tehran. Assessing religious affiliation in identifying the Tehranian 
middle class is important, since as I argued in the section of middle class, this class is 
more secular than other classes in the Iranian society.  
Car ownership: 
 
According to the above map, residents of districts 1, 3, 2, 5 and 22 own cars more than 
residents of other districts.  
With comparison of the above maps we can conclude that the middle class people in 
Tehran according to indices that have been considered, are probably more likely to 
reside in districts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 11. Therefore, in order to identify people who 
belong to the modern Tehranian middle class, I used a geographic grid and went to 
specifically those districts in order to conduct interviews. In addition, according to 
what was discussed in the chapter on the middle class, about occupation and the 
lifestyle of this class which takes advantage of technology and modern facilities of 
communication, I considered some other factors like occupation, using satellite TV, 
using internet and housing as complementary factors in order to identify members of 
the Tehranian middle class alongside mentioned indices. These factors were illustrative 
especially when I approached women who were housekeepers, students who didn’t 
have full-time jobs, or people who didn’t have any university degree, but still in terms 
of their lifestyle and use of the middle class’ structural facilities, like internet and 
satellite, could be considered as members of the Tehranian middle class. 
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Examination of Prevalence of Desired Form of Subjectivity by IRdisc 
among the Tehranian Middle Class 
As the main concern of this research, I am going to study the perception of Tehranian 
middle class of subject positions that have been represented in a particular set of TV 
series on Iranian state television. I have considered this set of TV series as formations, 
which contain different and sometimes antithetical features in order to present 
subject positions and articulate discursive preferred meanings regarding to specific 
signifiers. On the other hand, subjectivities of the Tehranian middle class also have 
been considered as formations. These also, of course, contain different and 
antithetical features and elements. The ultimate goal of this research is to study 
interactions and confrontations of these formations. In order to grasp this relationship 
I have selected the method of the semi-structured qualitative interview. As Howarth 
argues:  
  
“For an approach that stresses the importance of subjectivity in explaining 
social reality, and which seeks to provide ‘thick descriptions’ of events and 
processes, which are not readily achievable from a purely positivistic point of 
view, in-depth qualitative interviewing is an important means of generating 
primary texts” (Howarth, 2005, p338). 
 
The method of analysing data that was collected from qualitative interviews 
accordingly requires specific methods of qualitative analysis of data. I now must 
therefore present the methods for gathering and analysing data from interviews. 
Method of collecting data 
The application of qualitative methods can be considered as the most common and 
proper method in studies under the influence of the cultural studies school. Methods 
like “focused group”, “interview”, “ethnography”, etc. are among the qualitative 
methods. In addition, in the discourse theories of Laclau and Mouffe, application of the 
method of qualitative interview is known as a method that investigates processes of 
the construction of subjectivity. As Repstad (1987) and Ryen (2002) argue: “A 
qualitative interview is an excellent method if you want to gain insight into the 
intentions, feelings, purposes and comprehensions of the interviewee. The interview 
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can also represent insights into how individual interviewees interpret themselves and 
how they interpret the phenomenon under study” (cited in Cruickshank, 2012). 
Therefore, the main method that I have applied in order to understand the 
relationship between preferred meanings of texts and subjectivity of the Tehranian 
middle class members, is the “interview.” In general, researchers have applied five 
methods of interview: 
1- Structured interviews  
2- Semi-structured interviews 
3- Non-directive interviews 
4- Focused interviews 
5- Informal conversational Interviews (Gray, 2004, p215). 
In the current study the kind of interview that I have aimed to apply, is the semi-
structured interview. In this method the researcher has a list of questions and issues to 
be covered and is trying to understand the position of the interviewee with regards to 
a specific issue. However, questions are not constructed and interviewees are allowed 
to express their opinions about the researcher’s questions (ibid). In the qualitative 
methods of research, the sampling methods of probability sampling and randomisation 
are often not applied at all. Unlike quantitative methods where sampling is based on 
statistical logic, in qualitative methods, samples are being selected strategically. One of 
these strategies is “theoretical or purposive sampling”. In this strategy, the sampling 
will be done based on a theoretical basis, instead of relying on randomisation. In 
theoretical or purposive sampling, the magnitude of samples is not determinant. 
Instead, samples have to be selected in a way to help the researcher in expanding and 
examining the theory and hypothesis of research. In qualitative methods, normally, 
because of practical reasons, the sample groups are smaller than when quantitative 
methods are used. In addition, in qualitative methods, normally researchers are not 
pre-determining the number of samples. In this method, the process of expanding and 
examining the hypothesis during the research determines the sufficient number of 
samples. The number of samples is sufficient when the research reaches the 
theoretical saturation point. This is a point that the researcher can claim that the 
research is presenting the reliable image of the case study related to the theory and 
hypothesis of research (Gray, 2004). 
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Since in qualitative methods the predetermination of amount and size of sampling is 
not recommended, therefore in this research in conducting interviews from the 
Tehranian middle class members, I continued to interview till I was satisfied that the 
research has reached the theoretical saturation point. It means that I was convinced 
that further data gathering from interviewees would not increase my knowledge of the 
question of research and would not add any new kind of Tehranian middle class 
perception from subject positions and preferred meanings that have been 
represented. 
In the current study firstly I aimed to interview 45 individuals, but after 45 interviews I 
realised that interviewing more could add to the overall information gathered. 
Therefore I decided to increase the number of interviewees to 90 in order to avoid any 
methodological or sampling failure and negligence. In the current study I have 
interviewed 90 individuals and all these 90 interviewees can be considered as 
Tehranian middle class according to the indices that I have mentioned above. 
Process of interviews 
In order to conduct interviews on the basis described above, I went to those districts 
that had a significant number of middle class residents. The first question that I have 
asked from each interviewee was about the considered indices to make sure that the 
interviewee can be considered in the category of the middle class. Questions about 
sex, education, district of residency, monthly household income, occupation, rate of 
religious affiliation from 0 to 10, car ownership, usage of satellite TV and usage of 
Internet were the primary questions, which I asked each interviewee. If answers of the 
interviewees to these questions demonstrated that they belong to the Tehranian 
middle class, then I proceeded to interview them. 
As I have argued before, according to mentioned indices, nine districts of Tehran have 
the most middle class residents, therefore I conducted 10 interviews from each 
district. In my sampling I have tried to observe the gender balance. Thus, 48 of the 
interviewees were female and 42 were male. I have conducted all interviews in public 
places such as cafés (15 interviews), parks (19 interviews), metro carriages/stations (11 
interviews), restaurants (18 interviews), work offices (11 interviews) and streets (16 
interviews). Most of the interviews have been conducted during the lunchtime of the 
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employees.  
Each interview started with questions such as: can I take a few minutes of your time? 
Can I talk to you for a few minutes? And people mostly responded: about what? And I 
explained to them that I am a Ph.D. student in London and need to conduct interviews 
to complete my thesis. Also, I showed them my student card to assure them that I am 
a student. Except 13 people that told me that they did not have enough time right 
now, everyone else engaged me in conversation immediately upon seeing my SOAS 
student card. When they asked me questions such as the nature of my studies, I often 
responded to them that they will realise what I am studying during the interview. I had 
to deflect any questions they had for me so that I could begin the interview and 
determine if they were classified as Tehranian middle class. I also needed to explain 
why I had to ask certain personal questions and the scope of my research. Some 
people according to their responses to primary questions couldn’t be considered as 
middle class members, so I apologised to them and finished the interview respectfully. 
In order to conduct 90 interviews, I approached approximately 137 people. Thirteen of 
these people did not agree to the interview since they had time constraints and 34 
persons could not be considered as members of Tehranian middle class according to 
their responses to my primary questions. The maximum time of interviews was 45 
minutes and the minimum time was 15 minutes. The average time of interviews was 
about 30 minutes. I have conducted interviews during two periods. The first period 
was from 12th of July 2013 to 19th of October 2013 and the second period was from 
16th of May 2014 to 30th of July 2014. In each period I conducted 45 interviews. All 
interviews have been recorded by a voice recorder and transcribed on the same day of 
the interview. 
As mentioned before, I have conducted semi-structured interviews, consequently, I 
have tried to carry interviews without any prejudice and inducing particular ideas, but 
meanwhile I have tried to propel the direction (not content) of interviews to questions 
related to nodal signifiers of TV series.  
Content of interviews  
The subjects of the interviews were signifiers that were discussed in the set of three TV 
series to represent the ideal subject positions and preferred meanings of the IRdisc 
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regarding them. In the coming chapter of this research I will describe the analysis of 
the television programmes. Suffice it to say here that I identified three nodal signifiers. 
The nodal signifier in “Shams-ol Emareh” is signifier of “woman”. In “Vaziyat-e Sefid” 
the attempt of the IRIB seems to be the articulation of its preferred meaning regarding 
the signifier of the “60s decade.” Finally, the “Mukhtar Nameh” can be considered as 
an attempt to represent ideal subject positions of IRdisc by clarifying the position of 
others in regards to the signifier of “sovereignty”. Therefore each interview that I have 
conducted consisted of four parts. The first part was about general information about 
indices as I have mentioned above. According to the interviewees’ answers to the part 
one, if they could be considered as the Tehranian middle class, I began to ask them 
questions about their relationship to the above signifiers in three parts in order to 
grasp how they are identifying themselves according to each signifier. Since the 
interviews were semi-structured, I have not asked all interviewees the same questions 
to clarify their positions with regards to those three signifiers, but I have managed 
interviews in a way that at the end of each interview, the position of the interviewee 
regarding the three signifiers was clear to me and their answers were valuable for 
explanation of the theory and the hypothesis of research. Some examples of the 
questions that I have asked in interviews in regard to the signifier of “woman” were: in 
your opinion, in the division between house chores and earning money for household, 
what is the difference between the roles of women and men? Are you considering the 
role of being a mother as a role that historically has been formed or do you consider 
women as inherent mothers? After a couple becomes mother and father, which one 
should take the major responsibility for upbringing children? Do you believe that a 
mother can have a job and earn money? What kind of social activities do you believe 
that a woman can have? 
In the third part of the interviews, the subject of the signifier was the 60s decade. This 
refers to the years 1360-69 on the Iranian calendar, which equates to March 1981 to 
March 1991 on the Gregorian calendar. Here, I asked questions like: Do you have 
nostalgia for the 60s? How do you describe your living situation during the 60s? What 
are the significant features of the 60s decade in your opinion? How were the relations 
between people during the 60s? When you think about the 60s, what elements do you 
think specifically belong to that decade? 
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As I continued the interviews, I began the fourth part by the subject of the signifier of 
sovereignty by asking questions such as, what is your opinion about the concept of 
supreme leadership and the protectorship of the Islamic Jurists (velayat-e faghih) in 
the Islamic Republic? What do you think of the actions of the current supreme leader 
(vali-ye faghih)? How do you see the role of the supreme leader in governing the 
state? Do you believe in the legitimacy of the sovereignty under the supervision of the 
supreme leader? Interviewees’ responses to these kinds of questions in each part, 
have clarified their positions in regards to signifiers that I have mentioned above. 
Since before conducting interviews, preferred meanings of the IRdisc regarding 
mentioned signifiers were clear for me, therefore, questions of interviews have been 
asked considering these preferred meanings in order to examine interviewees 
subjectivities to these meanings that will be discussed during the next chapter which 
contains analyses of the set of the three TV series. 
To summarise, I interviewed 90 members of the Tehranian middle class. Through these 
90 interviews, I have highlighted two basic phrases by each interviewee that are 
demonstrating the position of each interviewee regarding each signifier of “women”, 
“the 60s” and “sovereignty”. Thus 180 statements have been highlighted according to 
each of the three selected signifiers--totalling 540 statements--which are the exact 
words and phrases used by the interviewees. In the next section I am going to present 
the method that I have applied for analysing data that I have collected from interviews. 
Difficulties of doing the research 
Unlike my assumption before starting to conduct interviews, the process of conducting 
interviews passed very smoothly. Although conducting interviews took a long time and 
sometimes was exhausting, I did not face any major difficulties either in sampling or 
reaching interviewees. The only difficulty that I faced in doing my research was 
obtaining data from officials. Since I was collecting data for this research at a time after 
the election of 2009, officials of IRIB never cooperated with me despite my efforts to 
obtain some data from this organisation about percentages of their audiences, and 
policies of this organisation after the presidential election of 2009. As I was told, after 
the emergence of the Green Movement, a declaration by the chief of IRIB has required 
all departments of this organisation to not cooperate with any researchers or 
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educational institutions in handing them any data or statistics. Nonetheless, I could 
just obtain statistics about the most popular set of TV series, from summer of 2009 to 
winter of 2013, from the official site of IRIB, since they released their data on popular 
programs every year. In encountering this difficulty, instead of relying on statistics, I 
have tried my best to respond to the main concern of this research through the 
application of a theoretical framework, which made it possible for me to theoretically 
respond to the main question of the research by elaborating the significance of 
studying representations of IRIB, as an ideological state apparatus of the IRdisc.  
Process of Data Analysing  
Data that have been obtained from interviews could be analysed by using three 
different methods. The first one is quantitative method. The second is structural 
analysis and the third is interpretive analysis (Gillham, 2000). 
In the first method, the researcher uses statistical methods in order to present a 
proper analysis of data that have been collected from interviews. In the second 
method, structural component of interviews’ texts, namely words, terms, concepts and 
relations between them are reviewed based on their repetition rate and the numbers 
of words, terms and other factors which have been used in sentences by interviewees 
in order to discover the patterns of statements. And in the third method the 
researcher tries to demonstrate hidden messages in the interview texts (Gilham, 2000, 
p63).  
The method of this research in analysing interview data is interpretive analysis. In 
order to present a proper analysis regarding interview data, Gillham (2000) suggested 
that interviews’ data should be categorised. Categorising data of interviews is the most 
efficient way of analysing highlighted statements in order to grasp the positions of 
interviewees. The categorisation could be done in two different ways. Firstly according 
to a theoretical framework of the study and secondly in order to reach a contextual 
theory according to the interview data (ibid). Since this research considers the theory 
of discourse analysis by Laclau and Mouffe as the main theoretical framework of the 
study, I have decided to define categories based on this theory. 
As Rubin (2005) has suggested, in order to reach proper and effective categories for 
data analysis, it is necessary to follow certain steps: 
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1- Setting down the interview texts and reviewing them.  
2- Highlighting basic statements and eliminating repetitive and non-related 
statements. 
3- Highlighting statements which contained new points of view on the issue of the 
interview. 
4- Going back to the main texts of interviews to be sure there is no neglect in 
highlighting any basic statements.  
5- Putting together the highlighted statements, which were demonstrating the 
similar point of view by interviewees regarding to issue of interviews.  
6- Extracting categories based on the theoretical framework from the similar 
statements and naming them.  
7- Reviewing categories in order to avoid any mistakes in putting the similar 
statements together, and being sure of the consistency of each statement 
within the related categories.  
8- Reviewing the list of categories and testing the chance of elimination or 
combination of obtained categories. 
9- Listing the highlighted statements under related categories.  
It is worth mentioning that in passing the eighth step, after defining some categories 
based on the content of interviews, I have modified the determined categories. The 
base of category modification was elimination of non-related content to the subject of 
the study. The merger of similar categories and the highlighting of the topics and 
headlines that illustrate the content of the interviews came next. The modification of 
categories based on elimination of non-related content seems necessary in this 
method. After all, the method of the conducted interviews was semi-structured. I did 
not interrupt my interviewees when they spoke. Sometimes not interrupting 
interviewees caused the emergence of a new category that was related to the subject 
of the study and sometimes caused the deviation of interviews from the main topic. 
Therefore in order to avoid any deviation from the subject of the study in the data 
analysing, I have eliminated categories, which were non-related. Additionally, I have 
eliminated categories that although were related to the question of the study, were 
mentioned less than five times overall by the interviewees. Merging related categories 
also helped me determine a range related to the different topics and headlines that 
 154 
have been mentioned by interviewees. This means I have merged categories that were 
presenting the same formation but were mentioned by interviewees under different 
topics and headlines. 
After completing the steps, and based on the interviews, four categories in regard to 
signifiers of women and sovereignty and two major categories plus four sub-categories 
in regard to signifier of the 60s  were obtained. Each category represents a kind of 
subject position in regard to preferred meanings of the IRdisc. In categorising the 
interviewee’s statements, I have used a conceptual framework that Laclau and Mouffe 
have articulated in their discourse theory. All theoretical concepts that I have used in 
naming and analysing categories have been discussed and elaborated in the 
theoretical chapter of this research.  
Accordingly, I have reached the number of categories that were representing 
subjectivity of interviewees regarding the three signifiers that I have mentioned 
before. In analysing each category I have tried to not just repeat statements by 
interviewees, but I have tried to present understandable analysis based on the 
theoretical framework of this study. I have quoted some statements in the text of the 
analysis and have provided a table of statements related to each category, which is 
available in appendices. Additionally, I have not asked the name of interviewees during 
the interviews. Therefore in quoting from interviewees in the text, I have mentioned 
the number that I have given to each interviewee in the table of interviewees, which is 
also available in the appendices. Furthermore, as Gillham (2000) has suggested, in 
analysing each category I have mentioned the number of interviewees and statements 
and their percentages; and in the conclusion of each category’s analysis, I have 
provided a table of these numbers to reach a proper examination of the hegemony of 
the IRdisc in constructing the subjectivity of the Tehranian middle class.  
Since the categorisation of the interview data has been done based on the position of 
the interviewees in regard to preferred meanings of the IRdisc regarding mentioned 
signifiers, during the next chapter, by presenting synopsis and analysis of each TV 
series, I am going to elaborate what particular preferred meaning and subject position 
each TV series has tried to represent.  
Afterwards, in Chapter Seven, I am going to demonstrate what categories have been 
obtained through interviews regarding each signifier, and will present a proper analysis 
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of categories, based on Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse analysis theory. 
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CHAPTER SIX: BODY OF THE RESEARCH, FINDINGS 1: TV 
SERIES; SYNOPSIS AND ANALYSIS 
During this chapter I am going to present a synopsis of each TV series and 
consequently will provide an analysis of each TV series. During my analysis of each TV 
series I explore the signifiers through which the IRdisc has tried to represent its ideal 
subject positions and preferred meanings and will make an argument about exactly 
what are these preferred meanings and desired subject positions. Through my analysis, 
I will try to argue each mentioned TV series is following one of the representation 
strategies: making others, making stereotypes and naturalisation. I will try to argue 
that preferred meanings of each TV series have different functions for the IRdisc in 
order to construct subjectivities that secure this discourse from being deconstructed 
and remain the hegemonic discourse. Consequently, I will refer each of these 
strategies to a conceptual framework of discourse analysis that I have elaborated in 
the theoretical framework chapter.  
I should point out here that although it is possible that these TV series were produced 
before emergence of the dislocation within the IRdisc preferred meanings, but this is 
really not important in reading these texts according to contextual circumstances after 
the emergence of the dislocation. Since as I have argued in the theoretical chapter, the 
reading of a text, should be done according its contextual conditions of representing 
discursive ideal subject positions and preferred meanings, not the intentions of the 
producers. These TV series broadcasted after the 2009 election and I need to read 
these texts according to contextual conditions of their broadcasting, since 
interpellation of subjects is tightly related to the contextual conditions of 
representation. This is the work of discourse analysis to read texts contextually when 
they attempt to interpellate subjects.  
“SHAMS-OL EMAREH” TV SERIES  
This TV series has been broadcasted from Network Two of IRIB during summer of 2009 
in 26 episodes.  
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Synopsis of “Shams-ol Emareh” TV Series 
The “Shams-ol Emareh” series narrates a story about a family living in a luxurious 
mansion. This mansion that the residents call “Shams-ol Emareh” (Mansion of the 
Sun), is a very expensive building that has come into the possession of its occupants 
through inheritance. The original owners of the mansion are a brother and sister who 
inherited parts of it and bought the rest from their siblings. Leila (the main character) 
is the daughter and nephew of this brother and sister respectively. Other residents of 
the mansion include Shamsi who is Leila’s aunt (her father’s sister) and the owner of 
the mansion. She is a middle-aged single woman who is suffering from a serious illness. 
However, all the mansion’s affairs are done under her supervision. When young, 
Shamsi was in love with a man called Farrokh, but this love for reasons that Shamsi 
calls selfishness did not end well, and Shamsi has not entered a relationship with any 
man since. She seems a self-made, tough and independent woman who despite her 
illness is still in charge of the mansion. She is charismatic and enjoys the respect of all 
who set foot in the mansion. Hormoz is Shamsi’s brother and Leila’s uncle (her father’s 
brother). He is a middle-aged divorced man. He is a traveller and he has sold his share 
of the mansion to his sister to travel around the world. He has recently returned home 
after spending most of his life traveling abroad. This has made the residents see him as 
an experienced and cosmopolitan man and they seek his advice in their affairs. 
Rahmat and Zivar are a couple and the caretakers of the mansion. Rahmat’s humour is 
a main appeal of this TV series. He has grown up in the mansion and his father was also 
the mansion’s caretaker. He is the servant of the house who also considers himself to 
have some authority. He feels he has a say in everything and also ownership rights, 
since he was born in the place and has lived there all his life. His comments are mostly 
about marginal problems to make him convey the humour of the story. His wife is a 
woman who, despite being the wife of the mansion’s janitor, engages with the main 
residents. She is from a lower social status but has adopted the values of the residents’ 
social status. She goes to yoga and aerobic classes and wants to learn working with the 
computer and the Internet. 
This couple has a daughter named Sharifeh who is the same age as Leila. She is 
educated and has gone to university and wants to continue her education. As a kid she 
was the playmate for Leila, but now she is more aware of the social gap between 
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them, and some manifestations of this gap bother her. Shakour is Leila’s cousin (her 
aunt’s son) who has recently married and is living in a room of the mansion with his 
wife, Darya. Throughout the story, this couple is constantly involving the rest of the 
residents in their marital problems, problems such as Shakour’s unemployment and 
profound lack of interest in anything. During the entire story, Darya compares her life 
with Leila’s and the fact that her life quality is lower than Leila’s bothers her. She asks 
Shakour to improve their life; but Shakour is satisfied with his life. Pari is Darya’s 
mother who lives in the mansion as well. She has a humorous character and good 
social skills. She has been married and divorced three times. She falls in love with 
Hormoz. Pari also has come from a different social status from the owners of the 
mansion and tries to copy their manner, which in turn causes many comic situations in 
the series. She compares her position with Shamsi’s in the mansion of which she is 
envious. Unemployment is another point that reflects the lifestyle of the original 
owners of the mansion. Apparently, all of the main family members (except Rahmat 
and Zivar who are the janitors of the mansion) are unemployed. There are no concerns 
about daily living expenses among these characters, and they do not show any 
attempts to make money. 
The story of the series begins with the death of Leila’s father, who was suffering from 
diabetes and died from eating sweets in Shakour and Darya’s wedding. After the 
funeral, Shamsi passes Leila her father’s will. According to the will Leila will inherit the 
Shams-ol Emareh mansion if she marries the secret suitor intended by her father from 
amongst 12 men who will propose to her. Leila does not know the identity of the man 
chosen by her father. So these men begin to come to Shams-ol Emareh and propose to 
her. Leila, the daughter of this respected and wealthy family has to get married to 
inherit this wealth and respect, of course to someone who suits her status and is 
already chosen by her father. These men come to propose to her one after another 
and she needs to choose. This is the only way of keeping the family heritage, the 
Shams-ol Emareh. Each one of the men who come to propose to her are welcomed to 
stay in the mansion for several days so Leila will be able to evaluate the different 
aspects of the suitor’s life and personality and discover whether he is the chosen 
person so that marrying him will lead to inheriting the mansion. In order to get well 
acquainted, they have to talk to each other. This kind of dating is done in Shams-ol 
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Emareh and under the supervision of her aunt, Shamsi. Along with these proposals, the 
main characters of the story get involved in evaluating these men. All of this is 
happening while Leila had decided to go and live abroad before the death of her 
father, but the turn of events have dissuaded her from her decision. 
Episodes of the series include meeting sessions and evaluation of the people who 
propose to Leila. Only six of the 12 men who were supposed propose to Leila actually 
get a chance to do so as Leila ends up marrying the seventh man and inherits Shams-ol 
Emareh and forgets about going abroad. The seventh man is Sepehr Parsa, the son of 
Farrokh. Farrokh was the one Shamsi as a young lady had been in love with. He was 
missing for a long time and the mansion’s residents did not have any information 
about him. Watching her aunt’s condition deteriorate, Leila looks for Farrokh to make 
her aunt feel better. When Sepehr and his father come to see Shamsi, Leila and Sepehr 
fall in love with each other and this mutual affection leads to marriage. The interesting 
thing is that in examining each of the six previous suitors who had proposed to her, she 
was highly logical and did not care about love. However, she eventually married the 
man she really liked. She had reasonable excuses to reject each one of those six people 
who had proposed to her. 
Shahrokh was the first suitor. He obviously suffered from low self-esteem and was 
constantly joking to conceal this problem. He simply accepted all the demands Leila 
made and proved weak in his relationship with her. This lack of self-esteem or 
according to Leila in the show “lack of masculinity” meaning “surrendering too quickly 
to the demands of others” discouraged Leila from choosing him. 
The second man was Mehran. Having a poor relationship with his father and viewing 
his father as a man who had been always been working and had neglected his family, 
Mehran was dependent on his mother too much. After his mother’s death, to 
“alleviate this pain” he took refuge in work and now he is a very successful architect. 
He is clearly looking for a motherly personality in Leila and tries to fulfil the need of 
having a mother by marrying Leila. He is looking to recreate a maternal bond with 
another woman in his life. Leila clearly refuses to take a maternal role in their 
relationship and believes that Mehran should cope better with the trauma of losing his 
mother. She rejects him too, because she does not want to fulfil a maternal role in a 
marriage. 
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The third person is Behrooz. As a child, he was Leila’s playmate and friend. His 
personality is very much in line with Iranian culture's ideals of masculinity. He is very 
understanding and supportive. He is very devoted to his friends and as he says, he is 
willing to even sacrifice his life for them. Leila likes this character more than the two 
previous ones. But in this relationship, Leila realises that he is too devoted to his 
friends the she cannot tolerate this. Behrooz himself confesses that he has gone 
bankrupt two times to help out his friends. She feels insecure about living with him. 
Although she likes his masculinity, she feels insecure about the decisions Behrooz may 
take in helping his friends and concerned about the crises they may face in their life 
because of these decisions. When Leila wants to respond to his proposal she says, 
“Your devotion to your friends is beautiful and great, but it belongs to the movies not 
to real life and puts a marriage in danger”. 
Peyman is the fourth person. Apparently he is very lively and always craves variety in 
his life. He has been married once and divorced because of his spirit of variation 
seeking. He believes that everyone should do whatever they desire with their life, 
should enjoy every second and not be afraid of the consequences of this style of living. 
Peyman’s instability in life and variety seeking and adventurous character is very 
attractive for Leila, but she eventually rejects him because of the same characteristics. 
Parham is the fifth suitor. He is educated in Sweden and works there. Since he is 
Iranian and likes Iranian characteristics, he has returned temporarily to Iran to choose 
an Iranian wife. He is very lonely in Sweden and living so long there made him behave 
as the Swedish people do. He is much organised and is indifferent toward emotions. If 
Leila accepts to marry him, she will have to go and live with him in Sweden. This 
indifference in his characteristic and the boring life that she may have with him and 
especially living in Sweden, the country she does not like for living, makes her reject 
him too. 
Farhad is the last person who proposes to her. He is a painter, with an artistic and 
romantic character. He is suffering from a chronic disease, which was supposed to kill 
him a few years ago.  Having a very high spirit and relying on mystical teachings, he has 
succeeded to defeat the disease; but it may return at any moment. Farhad says he 
would not come forward to propose to her because of his condition if Leila’s father 
had not persistently asked him to do so. However, he feels happy proposing and being 
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there. Because of Farhad’s condition and uncertainty of the future of the relationship, 
Leila rejects his proposal too. However, Farhad’s presence in Shams-ol Emareh, 
especially when Shamsi’s illness gets worse, makes Shamsi feel better by seeing him as 
someone who has beat a fatal disease and he becomes an inspiration for her. 
After rejecting all her suitors, Leila comes across Sepehr while she was looking for 
Farrokh to make her aunt feel better. At the end of the show, there is a scene in which 
Farrokh and Sepehr come to Shams-ol Emareh to ask her to marry Sepehr when Leila 
opens the door for them there is a narration by Leila herself which says: “I finally 
realised that the decision is made by my heart” and she continues by talking about the 
faith in Sepehr’s heart. In the meantime, Farrokh and Shamsi are talking about their 
own future together and decide to get married with each other. The final scene of the 
series is the marriage ceremony of Sepehr and Leila in which Farrokh and Shamsi are 
sitting there as a couple too. 
There is another side story in the show, which seems important to be mentioned in 
reviewing the series. It is about Sharifeh, the daughter of Shams-ol Emareh’s 
caretakers. She is the same age as Leila and has a university degree. In the course of 
the story, a man who is one of the Shams-ol Emareh’s neighbours proposes to her. He 
is very suspicious and tries to take advantage of the naivety of Sharifeh’s father and 
convince him to let them get married. He is a criminal and goes to jail. Another person 
who also proposes to Sharifeh is the brother of one of her classmates at university. 
This classmate is unaware of Sharifeh’s family living conditions. Sharifeh is 
embarrassed to let them come to Shams-ol Emareh and visit her family, so she gets a 
scholarship and decides to leave the country. In the meantime, the brother of 
Sharifeh’s friend learns about her living conditions and by stating that his family also 
does not have better financial status and faith is the most important thing in life, 
convinces her to marry him. They eventually get married. 
In the midst of these proposals in Shams-ol Emareh, Shakour and Darya compare Leila 
and the people who come to propose to her with them, which put them in some 
marital crises. However, after having a child, Shakour, who is now a father, takes more 
responsibility, which makes his marriage more stable. 
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Analysis of the “Shams-ol Emareh” TV Series 
The show clearly aims at discursive articulation of the nodal point of “woman”. It 
actually tries to make the meaning of the signifier “woman” preferable. This type of 
representation of a reference for “woman”, begs the question what class of citizens 
the discourse of the Islamic Republic aims to represent in its preferred subject position 
regarding the signifier “woman”. It means, firstly I need to investigate what is the 
structural position that the IRdisc has aimed to prefer its desired meaning regarding 
signifier of woman. After finding answers for this question, I will focus on the preferred 
meaning that this series tries to articulate.  
Targeted Structural Position of Interpellation 
I believe the Shams-ol Emareh series has sought more recognition for the logic of 
difference in hegemonic discourse of the Islamic Republic. The focus of the series is 
clearly the structural position of the society’s middle class. Choosing the issue of 
proposing to someone through a traditional ceremony and the manner and style and 
the reasons for dealing with this issue indicates that the Islamic Republic of Iran 
Broadcasting (IRIB) has targeted urban middle class citizens, particularly Tehranian, as 
the structural positions that needs to be identified with the ideal subject position of 
the IRdisc in regard to signifier of woman. This structural position is the same class that 
the state recognised responsible for the protest movement and consequently the 
legitimacy crisis. The lifestyle of those who live in Shams-ol Emareh is clearly not 
reflecting the lifestyle of those who are the lower class in Iranian society. The issue of 
the main character, Leila, is the issue of choosing a spouse considering the factors that 
are common among urban middle class citizens who live in Tehran. Considering the 
reasons for rejection of each of those who proposed to Leila and their social origins, 
indicate that these factors are both modern and traditional. For example, Leila’s 
reason for rejection of one of the men was not to accept a maternal role in the 
relationship. She believed that accepting such a role is not ideal in a marriage 
relationship. In another case, her reason for rejection was the man’s relations with 
people other than family members, like friends and colleagues. This means that Leila’s 
criteria for marriage and choosing a husband are so modern that they keep her from 
committing to traditional ones. On the other hand, she does not choose the man who 
has lived outside of Iran and his behaviour does not comply with Iranian culture 
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anymore. This is exactly the way that Iranian middle class members identify 
themselves. Their identity constructed from torn fragments shaped by the 
interpellation of various and different discourses that represent tradition and 
modernity. The represented lifestyle in the show and among the residents of the 
mansion is middle class in such a way that even the wife of the janitor is following the 
same manners and seeks the same values as the middle class, values in terms of 
lifestyle, such as using social media or the ways of spending leisure time. The problems 
that the other couple in the series, Shakour and Darya, are facing are also the common 
problems of the middle class such as job prospects and earning more income, having 
children, mutual understanding in marriage, etc. 
In addition, the middle class and its lifestyle is represented in the show as very secular 
and devoid of any ideology, even not the official ideology of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran. For example, none of the characters of the show has a religious name. Assigning 
religious names is very common in Iran and can be found in any Iranian family. 
Although none of the characters of the show has a religious name, there is no bad 
character in it. There can be some disagreements among the characters, and all the 
characters of the show are represented not too badly and not too well; rather, the 
main issue arises where the show does not put any two characters in conflict and does 
not distinguish between good and bad and is not trying to represent something or 
someone as true or false (which is very common in producing any TV series in IRIB). 
Therefore, the series is about lifestyle which is the lifestyle of the secular middle class.  
Arguably, the structural position that the IRdisc has represented its ideal subject 
position regarding signifier of woman for them is the middle class. At the same time, 
this does not mean that the middle class is the only audience. The appeal of the 
lifestyle of this social class and also fine technical and visual representation of it, has 
attracted audience from other social classes too.  
The main question here is why at this legitimacy crisis of IRdisc, IRIB has undertaken 
building its desired preferred meaning regarding the “woman” signifier in this lifestyle, 
while in most productions of IRIB and also the official discourse of the state, this social 
class and its lifestyle, if not totally blamed, it is definitely ignored. 
The discourse, which was experiencing a legitimacy crisis in its preferred meanings, 
was indeed experiencing dislocation. Making subjects among those who form a 
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structural position that triggered the existence of a legitimacy crisis in IRdisc is at the 
heart of the issue here. If the discourse succeeds to match the middle class’ preferred 
meaning of the signifier “woman” on its own, it will be successful in dealing with one 
of the main signifiers of the discourse of the Islamic Republic which forms its 
protective belt around the nodal point. And as I said in the methodology chapter, 
making or emphasising stereotypes for the mentioned signifier (woman), could unite 
subjects which were different and dissimilar, or were considered as threats for the 
hegemony of IRdisc in accepting a stereotype regarding this signifier and become 
homogenous in line with the desire of the IRdisc.   
Purpose of Targeting the Middle Class 
The series was aired a few months after the events following Iran’s presidential 
election of 2009. The investigation of Iran’s official discourse regarding the issue is 
revealing in that this discourse attributes the protest movement to the middle class. 
This movement started in Tehran and was just prevalent in Tehran and was present in 
its middle class, not the low class strata of people. This claim seems viable. Even some 
of the experts who have discussed the Green Movement believe the movement and its 
demands were limited to the middle class. Dabashi (2011, p13), for example, suggests 
that the limitation of demands to middle class and their inability to attract the support 
of the lower class for the movement, is one of the reasons that has contributed to the 
weakening and vanishing of this active protest movement. I believe that this inability 
of the middle class to attract the support of other layers of society has only been 
magnified by the discourse of the Islamic Republic, an issue that will be discussed later 
on. 
This movement that caused a legitimacy crisis for the IRdisc is so very connected to the 
middle class that the IRdisc had to recognise this fact. Indeed, the middle class in Iran 
is often the main driving force for different political, cultural and economic aspects of 
the country. This, therefore, leads the official discourse of the Islamic Republic to 
reconsider its approach in dealing with this middle class. This reconsideration definitely 
did not mean that the discourse of the Islamic Republic accepted the stance of the 
middle class. Yet, the new articulation of preferred definitions that would directly 
affect this class and its lifestyle have become the focus of much attention. So 
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representation of subject positions, which firstly was in line with the discursive 
articulation of the Islamic Republic and secondly would attract at least some parts of 
the middle class and would lead them to identify themselves with these subject 
positions, helped the IRdisc to become more hegemonic. As discussed in the 
theoretical chapter, recognising the nature of the nodal signifier of the IRdisc, this 
discourse in crisis conditions tries to reinforce its protective belt around the nodal 
point in order to avoid dislocation of the meaning of this signifier. The reinforcement 
of this protective belt during a legitimacy crisis is an effort to remain hegemonic. As 
also mentioned, the effort to become or remain hegemonic draws on a combination of 
satisfaction and suppression methods. The reinforcement of the protective belt of the 
nodal signifier of discourses in the situation of a legitimacy crisis has become possible 
by applying either of these two strategies. Suppression method leads to elimination 
and, in discursive terms, the building of a constitutive outside force. And the 
satisfaction method requires more acceptance of the logic of difference within the 
discourse. 
Hegemonic discourses are always trying to hide existing differences in their field of 
discursivity. Although it is possible for hegemonic discourses to admit that there are 
some differences in their defined field of discursivity, they also try to represent this 
field as a homogenous whole. The field of discursivity in this sense can be considered 
as the influence sphere of each discourse. The hegemonic discourse tries to 
homogenise its field of influence by creating a “chain of equivalence”. The chain of 
equivalence means that in the articulation process, main signifiers with still hegemonic 
meanings are combined with other signs in this chain and stand against threatening 
the other (De Vos, 2003, p105). 
Nevertheless, emphasising the plurality feature of society and stressing differences 
between social groups or structural positions causes the destruction of the chain of 
equivalence. The existence of differences and emphasising plurality in social realm is 
called the “logic of difference” in Laclau and Mouffe discourse theory. The “logic of 
difference” emphasises the existence of differences and social boundaries between 
structural positions within a society. In contradiction, the hegemonic discourse 
emphasises the chain of equivalence and tries to reduce distinctions between social 
structural positions. It places part of them in its articulation to integrate them against 
 166 
“the other”. Therefore, existing distinctions among structural positions will be 
forgotten and all of them dissolve in the meaning system of hegemonic discourse by 
identifying themselves with subject positions that have been represented linked to 
their structural positions (Smith, 1998, p89).  
It is worth mentioning here that a hegemonic discourse never tries to show that there 
are no differences in its field of discursivity. To some extent all hegemonic discourses 
accept the logic of difference. As I have mentioned, the existence of distinctions 
among social structural positions and consequently subject positions that occupy 
structural positions is really important for a discourse. This is because according to 
distinctions and differences, a discourse starts to make otherness and fixes and 
establishes itself. However, the question is what a hegemonic discourse does regarding 
the differences which are not threatening the legitimacy and hegemony of that 
discourse? Is the hegemonic discourse emphasising on differences and distinctions just 
in order to make “otherness” for its subjects? Or does the hegemonic discourse also 
take advantage of differences in its articulation and being hegemonic? 
In a particular hegemonic discourse, it is possible to find signifiers, which have 
different and dissimilar significance. For instance, the meaning of signifiers in sport or 
entertainment is not the same by all subjects of the IRdisc. Although it is possible that 
subjects of a hegemonic discourse have different preferred meanings according to a 
particular signifier, they are not identifying themselves as alternatives for the 
hegemonic discourse. And also, the hegemonic discourse doesn’t consider them as the 
others and doesn’t ignore or suppress them.  
Even the hegemonic discourse may provide situations for different groups to justify 
their preferred meaning regarding particular signifiers. This could happen for two 
reasons. First, those signifiers, which are floating signifiers and haven’t been 
transformed to moments in the hegemonic discourse articulation, are far from the 
nodal point in the hegemonic articulation. This means that the importance of signifiers 
for hegemonic discourse is relevant to their distance from the nodal point. When the 
meaning of a signifier is far from the meaning of the nodal point, the hegemonic 
discourse does not try to definitely mean that signifier. A hegemonic discourse prefers 
meanings for signifiers when other possible meanings threaten the preferred meaning 
of the nodal point. Or different possible meanings for a floating signifier cause 
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disruption in the articulation process. Whatever alternative meanings for a floating 
signifier are closer to the nodal point, the hegemonic discourse attempts more for 
preferring its ideal meaning. And also, there is then less tolerance in facing alternative 
meanings.  
Second, competition among social groups on meanings of floating signifiers, which are 
far from the nodal point regarding their meanings, will increase the level of satisfaction 
among subjects. This kind of competition reinforces this feeling for subjects that they 
have freedom of choice in preferring their own meanings. This feeling of freedom 
satisfies subjects of hegemonic discourse in sense of their involvement in social 
matters. Having freedom of choice in preferring meanings for floating signifiers far 
from the nodal point causes the naturalisation of hegemonic discourse’s preferred 
meanings regarding its moments. Because subjects don’t understand that some 
meanings are induced to them, since they feel the freedom of choice and satisfaction. 
Therefore, the aim of the IRdisc in addressing the structural positon of middle class is 
more recognition of the logic of difference and building a chain of equivalence with 
regards to these differences in order to make a meaning preferred regarding a signifier 
which is more important for this discourse rather than signifiers which have caused the 
emergence of a logic of difference. This means that the chain of equivalence by 
recognition of the logic of difference among its subjects (by recognition of middle class 
lifestyle) is working in the favour of the IRdisc in making a stereotype in regard to one 
of the signifiers that is close to the nodal point of this discourse or ensure that this 
nodal point will not be dislocated. Identifying with this represented stereotype by 
various and different subject among the targeted structural position, will strengthen 
the chain of equivalence and consequently the hegemony of the IRdisc. 
I will continue by discussing the preferred meaning (stereotype) of the show and also 
of the IRdisc for the signifier “woman”.  
Preferred Meanings and Ideal Subject Positions of “Shams-ol Emareh” 
Shams-ol Emareh series and the discourse that this series has tried to articulate are 
formed around the nodal signifier of “woman”. As mentioned before, the series is 
trying to make a meaning preferable among all the potential meanings that the 
signifier of woman could get. And also this preferred meaning has been represented in 
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this TV series in order to make the middle class of urban citizens as subjects for the 
IRdisc. Recognising this class of society as it is done in the show by the IRIB could be 
interpreted as acceding to the official voice of the state’s discourse. 
Considering the Laclau and Mouffe discourse analysis and the fact that the nodal 
signifier is mainly an empty signifier with its features, I am going to present the 
signifiers that this TV series has tried to highlight in order to make its desired meaning 
regarding the signifier of woman.  
Marriage and Proposal 
One of the possible closest meanings of the nodal signifier (woman) in the discourse of 
the show is “marriage”. Leila is a girl who has to make a right choice in marriage to 
inherit the mansion, which is her family heirloom. The whole narration of the TV series 
is based on conditions that may lead to a successful marriage. The main concern of all 
main female characters of the TV series is marriage and finally all of them find 
marriage as the way that makes them happy. Shamsi, Leila, Sharifeh and Pari, single 
females of the narration, who had different concerns during the narration, like going 
abroad to continue their education, illness and loneliness, get married at the end. In 
the final episode of the show all of them are happy and the reason of this happiness is 
their marriage, not any other condition that can indicate any independency in reaching 
happiness for women of the show. Also the main concern of Darya, which was her 
unhappy marriage with Shakour, has been fixed. Darya, at the end of the show, is 
carrying her child and has found happiness in fixing her marriage with Shakour who 
was rejecting the responsibilities of the “ideal marriage” in supporting his wife, 
financially and emotionally. Therefore, it can be said that in this series, the main 
meaning that accordingly clarifies the ideal position of women is marriage, since not 
only the main concern of all female characters of the show is marriage but also at the 
end what could make them happy was their marriage. Women of the series, at the 
end, are dependent women who when were single had lots of concerns and difficulties 
but their marriage makes them happy regardless of any other factors that could make 
them happy and also independent like higher education, having a job, earning money, 
and so on.   
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Accordingly, the other signifier that its meaning clarifies the ideal type of marriage is 
“proposal”. The narration of the TV series has been based on proposing to Leila. 
Reasons that Leila uses to reject various proposals, clarifies the criteria that could lead 
to the ideal type of marriage for women who belong to the middle class structural 
position. During Leila’s conversations with the men who proposed to her, except for 
Sepehr who she eventually marries, Leila is always trying to get them to agree with 
some privileges, such as working outside of the house and going abroad. But she finally 
realises that none of these privileges are enough for her to marry someone. At the end 
of the series, when Leila gets acquainted with Sepehr and marries him, during a 
narration she says, “The wedding gift that Shamsi has given me is the mansion. I have 
eventually realised that the only thing I was required to do to inherit the house was to 
get married, not to someone who was pre-picked for me. All the communication with 
the people who came to propose to me was like a journey for me. A journey that 
increased my experience, and gaining these experiences let me to make a right choice, 
Sepehr Parsa. My partner is a man who is a true believer in God and this encourages 
me to live with him”. She continues by saying that choices made based on other 
criteria will be unstable and wrong, criteria like money and beauty. It can be said that 
the journey that Leila has passed, eventually led to her marriage with somebody who 
truly believes in God. Beside the narration of the series that represent the various 
session of proposing to Leila, in order to emphasise on the need of having proposal 
sessions in the house, under supervision of other members of the family, the criteria of 
the ideal marriage have also been clarified in this show. Reasons that Leila rejected 
men who proposed to her were: lack of masculinity, rejecting to play maternal role in 
the marriage, having over relations with friends, having an adventurous character, 
living abroad and illness. All mentioned factors are factors that may put dependency of 
Leila to her husband at risk. Therefore, although the main factor that accordingly Leila 
accepted to marry Sepehr was his believing in God, but actually the main reason was 
finding nothing in him that may put Leila’s dependency to him at risk. In continuation, I 
will elaborate the main factor that causes demanding this dependency in the show. 
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House 
The other signifier that the series tries to highlight in order to establish its preferred 
meaning regarding signifier of woman is the signifier of “house”. Throughout the show 
we see that Shams-ol Emareh becomes a shelter for those who are looking for stability 
and peace, and the only reason that this mansion turns to such a place is that it is 
protected by the woman who owns the place. All main characters of the TV series 
somehow feel comfortable in the mansion and all problems that they had, have been 
solved in the mansion by the mediation of the keeper of the mansion who is a woman, 
namely Shamsi. At one point of the show, Hormoz, Leila’s uncle says that he is tired of 
traveling and instability and needs to stay somewhere so he has come back to Shams-
ol Emareh. He continues: “a house that is maintained by a woman is the warmest and 
most comfortable place in the world”. 
During the TV series, the relation between Leila and the mansion has changed, at the 
beginning of the series the relationship between Leila and the mansion was nothing 
but inheriting the mansion by making the right choice in her marriage. But the young 
and beautiful woman in the show who at the beginning of the show wants to improve 
and continue her studies and go and live abroad, and could be considered as an 
independent woman, at the end of the story, finds herself utterly satisfied with 
inheriting the mansion and having been married with a man who is a true believer in 
God. Nonetheless the question is how a married woman can be related to a house and 
sees this place as her comfort zone. Relating “marriage” to “house” and seeing the 
house as the main realm where women belong in the show, indicates the main role 
that a woman can get in a house, namely being a mother. The role of motherhood has 
been considered as the role that relates a woman to a house.  
At one point in the series, Darya, Pari’s daughter, realises that her mother has fallen in 
love with Hormoz, complains to her and reminds her of her failed marriages. Pari who 
eventually falls in love with Hormoz, has been married and divorced three times. In 
response to her daughter, Pari accepts her previous mistakes and says that she has 
sought personal gain in all of the previous marriages, but this time wants to be the 
“housewife”, meaning a housewife who is a mother. Actually, Pari believes that giving 
priority to being a wife and a mother and acceptance of these roles by a woman will 
stabilise her life and after all the adventures in her previous relationships, she has 
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concluded that being a housewife is the ultimate desire she has always wanted to 
fulfil.  
The final sequence of Shams-ol Emareh depicts Leila writing to her son a letter, 
through which the way the story is narrated. A letter that she is writing to her 1 year 
old son and explaining how she has passed all the ups and downs in making a decision 
to get her where she is now, namely a mother in a house that she loves. In fact, the 
story by relating the signifier of woman to two signifiers of “marriage” and “house” 
denies all the possible meanings it could have given to the signifier of woman and 
existed in the field of diversity of urban middle class citizens of Tehran and chooses a 
“mother-wife” meaning (stereotype) for this signifier which may be achieved through 
marriage. At the end, Leila is nothing more than a wife and/or a mother, a mother who 
wants “to make Shams-ol Emareh a home for all the children who are orphaned.” 
Therefore, the mansion which was considered as an economic capital by Leila at the 
beginning of the show, eventually becomes for her a place that has to be kept in order 
to raise children in it. 
Conclusion 
In fact, I believe the meaning that the series is trying to make preferable regarding the 
signifier of woman, is to reduce the role of women to solely being a wife and a mother 
and emphasise on the stereotypical role of women. This stereotype as the ideal subject 
position of the IRdisc regarding the signifier of woman, has been represented for the 
structural position of the middle class by highlighting the two signifiers in relation to 
the ideal subject position of the IRdisc regarding the signifier of woman. These two 
are: 
1) Marriage: as the only way that finally can make females happy with their life. 
2) House: as the sphere of women’s prosperity for being mothers. 
Even the lifestyle which is recognised by IRIB in this series and presented in the show 
as the middle class lifestyle integrated with modern elements, but the role of women 
and its meaning is formed around her relation with a man and a house more than 
anything else. This could be interpreted as emphasising on a chain of equivalence.  
CONDITION WHITE (VAZIYAT-E SEFID) TV SERIES 
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This TV series contains 42 episodes and has been aired from network Three of IRIB, 
which is known also as the “Youth Channel” (Shabake-ye Javan), from November 2011 
to March 2012.  
Synopsis of “Condition White” TV Series 
The series “Condition White” narrates a story of a large family where all members have 
to live together for a while. The narration of the story begins in February 1988 when 
the Iraqi Baathist army had started launching missiles at the Iranian capital, Tehran, 
during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War. It finishes in September 1988 when the war ends 
with the adoption of UN Resolution 598. The story begins when the mother of the 
family who lives in a garden in a village near Tehran, comes to Tehran to visit her 
children and goes to their houses one by one. During these visits, the viewer realises 
the critical situation of the relationships among the family members. Almost all the 
siblings are angry at each other and complain about each other to their mother. A few 
days when the visiting ends and she returns to the garden, the missile strikes by the 
Baathist army begin. Amir, one of her grandsons, asks all the family members to go to 
the garden to avoid any possible danger of missile strikes, because it is safer than the 
city and all the siblings of this large family along with various in-laws and their children 
go to stay in the grandmother’s garden. The grandmother’s garden is very big and all 
the family members temporarily take up residency in it. The members of this large 
family are two sisters and four brothers and all of them are married and have children. 
The oldest brother is called Bahram. He is not angry with any sibling but cannot 
reconcile them. He inherited his late father’s job and owns a greenhouse in Tehran. His 
wife’s name is Eftekhar and they have two children named Amir and Monireh. Amir is a 
16 year old teenager and Monireh is approximately 20 years old. Ahmad is Monireh’s 
husband and is a bank employee and has gone to the front several times. The second 
brother is called Bijan. He works in Tehran bazar (Bazar-e Tehran) and is in the import-
export business. The war condition destroyed his financial situation and left him 
indebted to some people. Sima, his wife, is clearly suffering from a mental health 
problem and is severely depressed. Their children are Shahnaz, Shahram and 
Shahrooz. Shahnaz is a 16 years old girl and Shahram is a 6 year old boy. Shahrooz is a 
17 years old teenager who has been staying in the garden before others. He has now 
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reached the age of conscription and has fled to garden to avoid going to the war front 
and wants to flee the country. Bijan, his father, also wants to help him flee to another 
country to avoid the compulsory military service. 
Behzad is another son of the family. He is a civil servant. He has a wife named Mahnaz 
and a little girl named Sanaz. Behrooz is another brother. He is jobless and an addict 
and his financial condition is worse than the others. His wife is named Manijeh who is 
pregnant. The girls of the family are Ehteram and Mohtaram. Ehteram lives in a very 
luxurious house in Tehran. Her husband, who is a great businessman, is in jail for 
financial crimes and hoarding during wartime. The rest of the family thinks that he is 
out of the country. Faraz and Naser are Ehteram’s grandsons. Faraz is a young man 
who has a shop in Tehran and is in love with Shahnaz, Bijan’s daughter. Naser is also a 
young man who has a physical disability and is not able to walk or speak properly, but 
he has full comprehension. Homayoon is Ehteram’s son and comes to the garden for a 
short time. He wants to borrow money from the residents of the garden so he can 
work with someone else. Hooshang is Mohtaram’s husband. He owns a laundry in 
Tehran and seems wiser than the rest of the family. He likes poetry and takes a 
reasonable position in all critical situations. This couple has two children named Reza 
and Mina. Reza is a 16 year old boy and Mina is a girl of the same age. Ehteram and 
Mohtaram have problems with each other. Mohtaram believes that Ehteram is 
wealthy and so she does not respect others. Ehteram is also angry with Bijan. They 
have so many problems that Bijan says that they are not brother and sister anymore. 
Behzad and Behrooz are angry at each other too. Because Behrooz believes not having 
a home is the reason for all his financial problems. He used to live in their family house 
in Tehran, but Behzad sold it. Behzad who is married to a wealthy girl employed by the 
government, considers himself a better person than Behrooz who is jobless and an 
addict. There is also another family that has come to the garden. Abbas is a middle-
aged man who is a family friend. Since Shirin, his teenage daughter is afraid of the 
missile strikes in Tehran and he does not know any place out of the city except for this 
garden, he asks the grandmother to let them temporarily live there and she accepts. 
There is a school near the garden, which is turned into a shelter for those who have 
lost their houses in the war.  
 174 
At the beginning, Abbas’ family could take a room in this school. Afterwards, since 
Mohtaram and Ehteram have had a quarrel and could not tolerate each other, 
Mohtaram’s family moves to this room and Abbas’s family goes to the garden.  
The protagonist of this series is Amir, Bahram’s son, who advances the narration. Amir, 
a 16 year old is not taken seriously by the other members of the family. He is even 
called “Mad Amir” by some. In fact, “Condition White” is narration of a slice of Amir’s 
life. Sometimes, the story is advanced by him and some other times he is the spectator 
who observes the incidents of the garden. Thus, the plot is the story of crises and 
dilemmas of Amir’s life in this period, while marginal stories of other members of the 
family are taking place.  
Condition White has no linear plot in narrating the story. In fact, the aim of this series 
is to represent the atmosphere of life during the 60s (1981-91 in the Gregorian 
calendar) and wartime in Iran. This has been done very well and every detail of life in 
that time has been reconstructed in an excellent way. At the end, all family members 
reconcile and reach ‘condition white’.  
Analysis of “Condition White” TV Series 
Prior to my analysis of the series and a search for its meanings, which this series is 
trying to make them preferred, it is necessary to answer the question about the aimed 
structural position of this product. In other words, which structural position of the 
society is aimed by the IRdisc to interpellate according preferred meanings of this TV 
series? 
Targeted Structural Position of Interpellation 
As mentioned, the plot occurs in the last years of the 60s and the last year of war 
between Iran and Iraq. I have discussed the 60s and the qualities that have made it 
different to other decades of the Islamic Republic discursive hegemony, in the chapter 
on the television discourse. Therefore, as elaborated, the main indicator of this 
differentiation is the war between Iran and Iraq in this decade. War affected every 
aspect of life during the 60s. In this chapter, the relationship of the official discourse of 
the Islamic Republic with the Iran-Iraq war and the representation, which is preferred, 
by this hegemonic discourse has been discussed. 
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One of the main indicators of this official representation is the way that ordinary 
people relate to the war. In fact, ordinary people who did not choose to go to the war 
front are mostly represented as self-involved parasites who only care about their own 
interests. These people had always been particularly ignored in the official 
representation of Islamic Republic or evaluated as inferior citizens compared to those 
who had gone to the front.  
In Condition White, similar to Shams-ol Emareh, we notice the acceptance of the logic 
of difference in the official discourse of the Islamic Republic. In the narration of this 
period of life in a normal family during the last days of war, none of the family 
members (except for one) is involved directly with the war. It is worth mentioning that 
many of soldiers taking part in the war were volunteers and that is why the official 
voice of Islamic Republic has always tried to represent the ones who did not choose 
the war as their priority in life as “Others”.  
The reason I claim that this series is a step towards acceptance of the logic of 
difference, lies in the fact that this series narrates the life of a family during war as 
none of the family members experience the war directly, while before, the narrations 
of war were exclusive to the heroism and stories of veterans that took part in the war. 
Moreover, each of these characters (while theirs lives are affected by the war) are 
following their own lives and personal struggles. The protagonist is obsessed with love, 
earthly love, which is not much acclaimed in the ideological discourse of the Islamic 
Republic. Bijan has money issues and has a relationship with a woman other than his 
wife. Behzad’s main concern is to get promoted in his office and Bahram is engaged 
with his work, cultivation of flowers and plants. The grandmother, who is the 
charismatic character of the series, is merely worried to bring peace back to her family. 
Although the interesting point is that none of them are represented as bad or wicked 
characters. Similar to Shams-ol Emareh, all characters are grey and you can sympathise 
with any of them. At the end of the day, it can be said that White Condition is 
recognition of voices that chose to live a normal life during the 60s.  
The lifestyle represented in this series is the lived experience of the middle class during 
the wartime. The director has tried to represent this lifestyle perfectly via detailed 
images of life for this class that mostly did not participate in war but lived a normal life, 
though affected by war. This group indeed seemed classified as inferior in the official 
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discourse of the Islamic Republic, compared to soldiers and heroes who attended the 
front. The question that intrigues me is why this recognition occurred while the Islamic 
Republic faced a legitimacy crisis? The reason seems to be the preference of some 
meanings among middle class subjects of the IRdisc, in order to survive the legitimacy 
crisis. Thus, preferring the meaning that this series has represented would reinforce 
the safety belt of the IRdisc and secures it against the crisis.  
Purpose of Targeting the Middle Class 
As I explored in Chapter Three, the 60s is of most vital concern in the Islamic Republic’s 
history. The signifiers that historically emerged in this period make this decade vital for 
the existence of IRdisc. The signifier of war and the charismatic leadership of Ayatollah 
Khomeini is one of the most important of these signifiers which is very close to the 
safety belt of the nodal point of the IRdisc and moreover, has given meaning to it.  
During the course of legitimacy crisis in the discourse of the Islamic Republic, one of 
the most important struggles was to redefine the signifiers, which were emerged 
objectively in the 60s, and to bring their values back. The struggle to make signifiers 
such as charismatic leadership of the Ayatollah Khomeini and war, of their own by the 
opposition of the Islamic Republic on the one hand and the efforts of official discourse 
of the Islamic Republic to articulate its preferred meanings regarding these signifiers 
on the other hand, are struggles that create a situation for both sides to prove them 
historically. 
As said previously, Fazeli (2012) believes that three characteristics make this decade 
unique compared to the other times of Islamic Republic governance. These are social 
cohesion, ideological excitation and richness of meanings. Simply, it can be asserted 
that each discursive opposition forces, either IRdisc in its legitimacy crisis, or the 
opposition forces trying to disarticulate the preferred discursive meanings of the 
Islamic Republic, could win the discursive struggle over the legacy of the 60s. If each is 
able to make subjects regarding their preferred meanings related to these three 
matters and the 60s that one will be the winner. 
There would be such opportunity for the IRdisc to articulate its discursive preferred 
meanings over these characteristics, if it could make the subject to construct nostalgia. 
Here, nostalgia means preferring the meaning of the 60s in a way to recall it as 
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beautiful and glamorous. Thus, the discourse should be able to present notions of 
social cohesion, ideological excitation and richness of meanings as beautiful notions 
related to the past and lost today. The idea is to make the subjects sadly miss the 
beautiful situation they lived in before. Therefore, the minds of these subjects would 
reach the same historical longing though an abstract point and secure the discourse 
against the collapse and deconstruction of its preferred meanings.  
On the contrary, if the opposition could present the emergence of these notions in the 
social sphere to be concurrent with oppression of the opposition or marginalisation of 
a large group of people, they could resist this abstract connection of minds and 
secureness in the IRdisc.  
Skilful reconstruction of life situations of the 60s and perfect utilisation of objects and 
images specific to this decade in Condition White, unconsciously revives the memories 
of those who have lived it. Moreover, the form of narration and the glamorisation of 
signifiers of the 60s can provoke those who have not lived it to regret not experiencing 
its beauty and develop a sense of longing and nostalgia. It should be noted that the 
period in which the story is told, and when it ends in the summer of 1988, is when the 
Islamic Republic is defining the “other” in the harshest terms. In summer 1988, more 
than 1,500 political prisoners were suddenly sentenced to death by a revolutionary 
court and were executed in large groups. Most were leftist and had an important role 
in the victory of Iran’s Islamic revolution of 1979. Still, the question we are 
contemplating is not the objective situation of the 60s, but rather the preferred 
meaning of the IRdisc of subjects about this decade.  
Moreover, as argued in the theoretical chapter, a myth to become pervasive and 
transform the social imagination has to go beyond existing social demands and needs. 
It has to be presented in idealistic, authentic and metaphoric forms. Therefore, a 
discourse can show itself as the general and universal discourse, which can respond to 
all existing social demands and desires if subjects accept its ideal social imagination 
(Laclau, 1990, p62). Through creating myths and expanding social imaginations, the 
point that the hegemonic discourse could not represent all social classes and groups 
and respond to their demands and desires will remain hidden if subjects accept the 
created social imagination. Therefore, presenting myths is a strategy for naturalisation. 
The preferred meanings and current situation and objective circumstances of the 
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hegemonic discourse that has faced crisis needs this strategy. 
The emerging discourses, existing discourses or dominant discourses in order to be 
hegemonic have to represent themselves as the unique salvation for existing crises. 
Myths are becoming social imaginations by embodying metaphoric, authentic and 
idealistic situations. There is always an unfilled gap between objective situation of the 
social realm and represented ideal forms of the society. This gap provides situation for 
emergence of new discursive articulations and new myths. In Jorgensen and Phillips’s 
point of view the role of the discourse analysis is to: “One aim of discourse analysis is 
to pinpoint and analyse the myths of society as objective reality that are implied in talk 
and other actions. How it is that some myths come to appear objectively true and 
others as impossible is a central question. “(2002, p40). 
Preferred Meanings and Ideal Subject Positions of the Condition White 
If we return to the three characteristics that Fazeli mentions as the most important 
about the 60s, we can claim that “Condition White” attempts artfully to distinguish 
two of these three characteristics and beautify the everyday life of that time through 
representing a myth of existence of social cohesion and richness of meaning during the 
60s. 
Social Cohesion 
Basically, the series is a narration of a family that has lost their cohesion and most of 
them are not on talking terms with each other. Though, the bombardment of Tehran 
and the mode of life in the 60s makes them all reunite and find their lost cohesion. 
Furthermore, there are the same cohesive aspects amongst the family and evacuees 
sheltered in the school: financial and material aid they give is a symbol of collective 
spirit leads to social cohesion. The only person in the series about whom we hear 
much, but he is always absent as he is in prison, is Ehteram’s husband. His crime is 
hoarding during wartime and his absence is due to his confrontation against this 
collective spirit and pursuing personal gain. In sum, a family that was about to collapse, 
due to the war is forced to live beside each other and the lifestyle that has been 
formed as a result of the emergency situation of bombardment, causes them to find 
cohesion. As said in the synopsis of the TV series, all siblings of the family were angry 
with each other. Nevertheless, at the end of the series all of them reconcile. Signs of 
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this reconciliation are marriage of Shahnaz and Faraz, daughter of Bijan and grandson 
of Ehteram who were angry with each other more than other siblings. Additionally, 
Ehteram helps Behrooz to quit using drugs and also helps him financially to be able to 
rent a decent place for his family after he became a father. Behzad and Behrooz who 
were struggling over their father’s legacy, reconcile after Behrooz saved Behzad’s life 
when he was stuck in his apartment after a bombardment. Ehteram and Mohtaram 
also reconciled eventually due to Hooshang’s emphasises on their misunderstanding of 
each other.    
The last scene of the TV series is the Faraz and Shahnaz wedding near the 
grandmother’s garden. Everyone reunites and has passed their crises. War made the 
family stable, and after the red condition of war, the family finally reaches the white 
condition. This colour coding system was used during the wartime to signal the threat 
level. As mentioned, the narration of this series is full of marginal stories which express 
the atmosphere of life in the 60s, but arguably the main point of the narration is about 
the reconciliation of family members. 
Richness of Meaning 
It can be asserted that one more thing that the series was successful in approaching is 
richness of meanings of the 60s. The way that Amir’s love is narrated and basically, the 
perfect narration of earthly love, which has affected Amir, makes the audience 
sympathise. He is a simple character, with no complexity. This is attractive for the 
audience. He has no pride or grudge. He is the reminder of honesty, passion and 
simplicity, which is lost for many living in current times, facing different problems of 
life. Although there are also other signs in the series for highlighting the richness of 
meanings during the 60s like the concept of martyrdom for Ahmad who is going to the 
frontline or the gathering of humanitarian aid for the frontline in the school, but I claim 
that richness of meanings and nostalgia for these meanings is illustrated in Amir’s 
character. As the protagonist, he makes the most humanistic and moral position 
against incidents and his vain love makes nostalgia of meanings of life in youth. Images 
and objects that Amir uses during the series are particular to the 60s, simple toys of 
that time, a bullet turned to a pen, pictures of martyrs, etc. And this is a trick to 
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deepen the connection of the lifestyle of the 60s with meanings which Amir 
represents, especially his pure love to Shirin. 
From the first moment that Amir sees Shirin, he falls in love with Shirin, Abbas’s 
daughter. He neither has the courage to express his love, nor can he manage his 
behaviour so others do not realise his affection for Shirin. He also cannot make Shirin 
notice him. Therefore, in order to attract her attention, he behaves in foolish ways, 
which make him look even more insane. When the family realises his love, everybody 
tries to dissuade him. What Amir does to show off, hurts Shirin and when Monireh –
Amir’s sister pities and seeks to help Amir by talking to Shirin to convince her to marry 
Amir, we understand that Shirin really hates Amir.  
Afterwards, Amir develops some mental illness similar to Schizophrenia. He always has 
a delusion of Shirin who talks to him, while she is miserable because of what he is 
doing. Most parts of the narration are devoted to the mental conflicts of Amir. First, 
Amir falls in love and does foolish things to express his love, then, when he hears 
Shirin’s refusal, he breaks down and falls into madness, till the time he manages to 
forget his love and pay attention to more important matters such as his education. 
Narrating Amir’s love in the series is done in a way that contains elements of pure love 
without any expectation. Amir actually sacrifices his honour and pride in loving Shirin. 
Also he wants to sacrifice his life to prove his maturity to Shirin, by going to the front 
and becoming a martyr in the war. In a very effective scene when Amir is praying, he 
suddenly abandons the formal way of praying and starts talking to God in a very 
informal language. He addresses God and asks for help in order to overcome his love 
and stresses: “My dear God, I know I am going insane and I bother everyone, but I have 
no choice, I faced a condition that I haven’t faced before and I don’t how I can deal with 
this condition, everyone asks me to be wise and rational, I want to do so, but I simply 
can’t, you need to help me deal with this situation”.  
Amir’s love, madness, veracity, humility, altruism and honesty, alongside his brilliant 
characterisation by the writer and the director, arguably cause that Amir as the main 
character of the series, becomes the symbol of richness of meaning through the years 
that the show represents.  
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Ideological Excitation  
Although, the other characteristic of this decade, namely ideological excitation, is not 
much addressed in “Condition White”, but obviously it does not have a negative 
message against it. Since the aimed audience of the series is middle class who were 
the driving force of protest, addressing the ideological notions which historically have 
emerged in the 60s could have resulted in deepening the gap between this class and 
the IRdisc. Thus, to avoid addressing this gap, the series does not mention ideological 
notions much. The question of the series is the life style leading to social cohesion, 
therefore, to highlight cohesion and downplay the gap, ignores the ideological 
excitation, though there is no objection to the dominant ideology of the 60s.  
Conclusion 
Altogether, Condition White attempts to beautify the lifestyle of the 60s and to 
reconstruct the link between the audience and this decade in an aesthetic way by 
representing a myth of social cohesion and richness of meaning during the 60s. 
The preferred meanings the series is trying to articulate and make audience to identify 
with; are formed in relation to the signifier of the 60s and its lifestyle in order to create 
a social imagination and naturalise the current conditions of the IRdisc. It seems that 
notions elaborated by Fazeli (2012), except ideological excitation, are preferred 
meanings of the 60s represented in “Condition White” in order to build a myth 
regarding signifiers of the 60s. Undoubtedly, what IRdisc prefers, is a nostalgic and 
longing look to these meanings. If the subjects identify in such a way with these 
meanings, then, it helps the IRdisc to unite the subject in a historical though abstract 
point (myth), which prevents its discourse from experiencing legitimacy crisis. 
MUKHTAR NAMEH (THE BOOK OF MUKHTAR) TV SERIES 
Mukhtar Nameh was broadcast from October 2010 to July 2011, by Channel One or 
the “National Channel” (Shabake-ye Melli) in 40 episodes. 
Synopsis of “Mukhtar Nameh” TV Series 
Mukhtar Nameh is about a man named Mukhtar Al-Thaqafi, who sought to establish a 
Shiite and Alawi (in reference to Ali, the first Shiite Imam) state in order to avenge the 
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killing of Imam Hussein, the third Shiite Imam, killed by Yazid, the Umayyad Caliph, in 
the Ashura12 incident.  
The Narration begins when Hassan, the second Shiite Imam, accepts the peace 
agreement with Muawia, the first Umayyad Caliph and Yazid’s father. He travels to 
Iraq and resides in the governor of Iraq’s palace (who is Mukhtar’s uncle). Mukhtar 
who used to be a skilled warrior prior to his father’s death by the Iranian army, drops 
war and politics and instead works as a farmer. As Hassan enters Al-Mada’in, the 
capital of the Iraqi province, Mukhtar’s uncle asks Mukhtar to take on the duty of 
guarding Hassan. Hassan’s spouse poisons and kills Hassan, and thus Mukhtar goes 
back to farming.  
The narration cuts forward to “20 years later”, when Muawia is dead and Hussein 
seeks to establish a Shiite state. In order to do so, he decides to leave Madina (in 
current Saudi Arabia) for Kufa (in current Iraq) as the people of Kufa have sent him 
many letters inviting him there. To consider the situation, Hussein sends an 
ambassador to Kufa and when he approves the situation for a Shiite state, Hussein 
leaves Madina. While Hussein is on his way, the situation changes in Kufa. The new 
governor, Ibn-e Ziyad spreads fear in the city, kills Hussein’s ambassador and thus, 
ruins the setting for the Shiite state in Kufa. Then he sends Mukhtar, as one of the 
most important supporters of Hussein in Kufa to prison. 
Ibn-e Ziyad sends an enormous army to fight Hussein. They encircle Hussein on his way 
to Kufa and kill him and his supporters. Later, Mukhtar is released. He departs for 
Mecca, which is under the rule of Aal-e Zubayr (descendants of Zubayr). Abdullah Ibn-e 
Zubayr is a son to one of the prophet’s companions who claims a caliphate in Mecca 
and fights Yazid. Mukhtar joins him as he claims one of the reasons for his rebellion is 
the killing of Hussein. In the middle of this rebellion, Yazid dies and Mukhtar realises 
that Ibn-e Zubayr has no intention to avenge the killing of Hussein. He then decides to 
return to Kufa and establish a Shiite state there.                                                          12 According to Shiite Islam, Ashura is the day of the martyrdom of Hussein ibn Ali, the grandson 
of Muhammad at the Battle of Karbala on 10 Muharram in the year 61 AH (10 October 680 CE). Hussein 
refused to give an oath of allegiance to Yazid, the second Caliph of the Umayyad Caliphate and revolted 
against him. In Hussein’s view, Yazid was corrupt and his rule was against the spirit of Islam according to 
the Prophet. Hussein and his supporters (including his infant child) were killed in the Battle of Karbala on 
Ashura Day. Mourning for Hussein and his companions is one of the most significant Shiite traditions 
and it is commemorated every year.  
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Meanwhile a group of Shiite Muslims from Kufa who could not attend the battle of 
Karbala revolt in Kufa. Their names are the Tawwabeen (penitents) as they believed 
they committed the sin of inviting Hussein to Kufa and then leaving him on his own. 
Mukhtar does not accompany them as he thinks that they do not have a proper 
approach for revenge and what they do is sentimental. In Mukhtar’s opinion, the first 
step to avenge the killing of Hussein is to establish a well-found state and then to fight 
Hussein’s murderers. However, the Tawwabeen prepare a small army and go to fight. 
They are defeated and are all killed as Mukhtar predicted.  
In the interim, Mukhtar searches for allies among tribes and cities close to Kufa to 
assist him in establishing the new state. He succeeds in bringing many tribes of Kufa 
and its suburb together and gains their trust. At that moment, he declares the uprising. 
It should be mentioned that among people who support Mukhtar, there is an Iranian 
named Kian who accompanies him with an Iranian army. Kian is in fact the most 
trusted companion for Mukhtar and is his old friend. Finally, Mukhtar conquers Kufa 
and establishes the Shiite state. Then, he goes after Hussein’s murderers and kills them 
one by one.  
The important issue here is that according to Shiite beliefs, while a Shiite Imam is alive, 
he is the only one who has legitimacy to establish a state. As an Imam he comes to that 
position through inheritance. Thus, the descendants of Fatima, the Prophet’s 
daughter, and Ali, her husband and the first Imam, would be in the position to be 
Shiite Imams. During Mukhtar’s time there was a living child of this family. Thus, there 
are a lot of arguments about the legitimacy of establishing a Shiite state during the 
lifetime of a Shiite Imam. I will discuss this in the analysis part for this series.  
When Mukhtar conquered Kufa and killed the murderers of Hussein, he decided to 
extend his territory. Hence he enters a war with Aal-e Zubayr. Aal-e Zubayr has the 
same intention to extend their territory beyond Mecca and they invade Kufa as well. 
Mukhtar loses many of his supporters. Many die, such as Kian and his Iranian army and 
many are seduced by promises of fortune and power given to them by Aal-e Zubayr 
and desert Mukhtar. According to the series, one of the most important reasons for 
the fall of Mukhtar’s reign is the racial divisions between Persians and Arabs sown by 
Aal-e Zubayr in Mukhtar’s army. As a result of Aal-e Zubayr’s deception, Iranians who 
have a great army would be called as the inferior race and this leads to Mukhtar’s army 
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weakening from within. Finally, Aal-e Zubayr wins the war and seizes Kufa. The last 
episode of the series is the resistance of Mukhtar and his few remaining supporters 
and at the end, Mukhtar is killed in the Kufa Mosque, where Ali, the first Shiite Imam 
was martyred.  
In a nutshell, the story of Mukhtar Nameh is a narration of the life of a man who aims 
to avenge Hussein’s blood and establish a Shiite state. Although he manages to do the 
former, he is prevented by Aal-e Zubayr’s deception from achieving the latter. He is 
killed and his Shiite state is destroyed. 
Analysis of “Mukhtar Nameh” TV Series 
Mukhtar Nameh (The Book of Mukhtar) is one of the “Accomplished Collections” 
(Serial-e Faakher) of state TV productions. Though, there is not an exact description of 
“accomplished” and the way these series should be produced, by examining the series 
that have held this label, it can be understood that some characteristics are similar in 
these products. The main characteristic is budget. Products that have been labelled 
“accomplished” by state TV are all “Big Productions” that in comparison to other 
productions have used much more resources. This grand budget has usually been 
dedicated to creating huge scenes, with lots of actors and extras, long timing and 
numerous episodes, vast advertisements and so on. As there is no private channel in 
Iran and all productions of Iranian state television are financed by the public budget, it 
is obvious that the content of these big-ticket “accomplished” series is of vital 
importance. Thus, not only these products are approved by the state, but also the 
huge budget is allocated to articulate meanings important for the IRdisc. In other 
words, the meaning articulated should be close to the nodal point of the IRdisc.  
Accomplished productions, when compared to other productions of state television, 
determine that these series mostly contain ideological meanings and attempts to 
represent subject positions for a larger group of Iranians. For instance, while two other 
series examined in this research, “Shams-ol Emareh” and “Condition White”, were 
critically acclaimed by critics and the state television itself, they cannot be considered 
as “Accomplished Series”. The budget spent for the series is one of the most important 
factors. According to the state television website a budget of around US$15 million has 
been spent on Mukhtar Nameh, while the two other series studied here spent less 
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than US$1 million each. The second reason can be detected in the meanings these 
series are trying to promote. As I studied the two previous series, I concluded that the 
state television, consciously or unconsciously, is trying to make some meanings 
preferred among the Iranian middle class. In other words, I have attempted to describe 
the aim of these series to represent the subject positions for the structural position of 
middle class. That is not the case in Mukhtar Nameh. Unlike the two other series, I 
cannot say that Mukhtar Nameh is aimed at any specific group. Nor can I claim that 
this series is trying to make any meanings preferred among all subjects of the IRdisc. 
It seems that the series is about to give meaning to signifiers, which determine 
ideological borders of the IRdisc. It means that considering the legitimacy crisis that 
the IRdisc faced, the preferred meanings of this discourse regarding the existing 
signifiers in its field of discursivity have been dislocated. As mentioned, this discourse 
in confrontation with the legitimacy crisis tried to prefer some meanings and articulate 
its discourse in order to tighten its safety belt for its nodal point. Obviously, meanings 
that Mukhtar Nameh is trying to make preferred are the closest ones to the nodal 
point of the IRdisc. It does not mean that the IRdisc after experiencing the legitimacy 
crisis has tried to prefer a specific meaning related to its nodal signifier, but it means 
that this discourse is seeking to strengthen the mythical and ideological character of its 
nodal signifier. The mythical character would turn the nodal signifier into an empty 
signifier, which would be very hard to deconstruct. I will return to this point later and 
will express my point about giving a mythical character to the nodal signifier of the 
IRdisc.  
Nonetheless, before I start to analyse “Mukhtar Nameh” and discover the meanings 
this series is trying to highlight, it is necessary to find out about the accuracy and 
authenticity of the historical narration the series presents. There are many narrations 
of Mukhtar and his uprising in Shiite and Sunni history, though I would only approach 
Shiite narrations, which is dominant in Iran (Iran’s official religion being Twelver Shiite). 
Afterwards, I would discuss the state television narration of Mukhtar’s uprising and the 
reason this narration has been chosen.  
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Historical Narrations about Mukhtar’s Uprising 
There are four main narrations about Mukhtar in Shiite history which each has its own 
historical documents. Examining these documents would be irrelevant to this study; 
therefore, I would only go for a summary of different approaches to Mukhtar. 
Some Islamic Historians (Tarikh Al-Tabari, Volume 4, p441) believe Mukhtar to be a 
politician who takes the opportunity and use the turmoil caused by Hussein’s death to 
establish a state in Kufa. They assert that if we go back in Mukhtar’s life, it would be 
apparent that he had no claim of being Shiite and that is why his intention to institute 
the Shiite state was only to get Shiite Muslims to cooperate with him (Ansab Al-Ashraf, 
Volume 5, p214). Thus, according to this approach, he is a politician who succeeds in 
forming a new state.  
In the second group’s eyes, Mukhtar is a liar (Al Mosnaf, Volume 5, p330). As 
mentioned, according to Shiite beliefs, while a Shiite Imam is alive, he is the only 
legitimate person who has the right to reign (Sheikh Horr-e Ameli, Volume 15, p50 and 
Kolleini, volume 8, p264). Referring to this fact, they believe that Mukhtar had no right 
to revolt and form a state on behalf of a Shiite Imam of his time (Tarikh Al-Tabari, 
Volume 4, p518). In their view, Mukhtar did not have any permission given to him by 
Imam Sajjad (the fourth Shiite Imam and Hussein’s son), and the permission he claimed 
to own, was forged by him.  
The third group goes further and claims that not only he had no such permission, but 
also he has established a sect with a misconstrued understanding of Islam named 
Kaysanites (Ansab Al-Ashraf, Volume 5, pp233, 235, 236). According to this group, 
Mukhtar goes to Sajjad to get the permission, but the permission is denied. Therefore, 
Mukhtar goes to Hussein’s stepbrother and receives permission from him. Muhammad 
ibn-e Al-Hanafiah, the stepbrother, is no Imam for the mainstream Shiite, but Mukhtar 
introduces him as Imam and establish the false (in their view) sect of Kaysanites. They 
state that Mukhtar even claimed to be the messianic figure and consider himself as the 
saviour (Ibn-e Hazm Al-Andolosi, Volume 5, p35).  
The fourth narration, which is chosen by the Iranian state Television in this series, 
considers Mukhtar as a true Shiite, though he also has his faults (Al-Khoee, Mo’jam 
Rejal, Al-Hadis, Volume 19, pp105-110 and Allameh Amini, Alghadir, Volume2 p343). 
Still, the legitimacy of his uprising and the root of his intentions in Shiite beliefs is of no 
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question. While they also confirm that Mukhtar had no written permission letter from 
Imam Sajjad, but as Imam, they show he had no intention to establish an Islamic state, 
but instead had approved Mukhtar’s uprising and had even given prior confirmation 
and Muhammad ibn-e Al-Hanafiah is the one who has delivered this confirmation (Al-
Fotouh, Volume 5, pp91, 92, 93). In the Series, Mukhtar goes to Ibn-e Al-Hanafiah and 
he declares that not only avenging Hussein’s blood is favourable, but also Imam Sajjad 
has approved it, while there is no historical document of Imam Sajjad or Ibn-e Al-
Hanafiah interference in Mukhtar’s uprising. In the series, Mukhtar comes to Shiite 
Muslims of Kufa with the handwriting of Muhammad ibn-e Al-Hanafiah. One of the 
Shiite Muslims doubts the authenticity of this letter, and so he goes to Ibn-e Al-
Hanafiah to investigate the honesty of Mukhtar. While it is apparent in the series that 
Mukhtar has forged the letter, but Ibn-e Al-Hanafiah approves his support of himself 
and for Imam Sajjad of Mukhtar and his revolt.  
Obviously, the state television has reasons to choose this narration and it seems that 
the intention could be nothing but to make some meanings preferred in order to 
protect the hegemonic discourse of the Islamic Republic.  
Preferred Meanings and Ideal Subject Positions of the Mukhtar Nameh 
There are many aspects to criticise Mukhtar Nameh. The long timing of the series—40 
episodes each an hour long—and its numerous characters and sub-narrations give us a 
tool to examine the series from different aspects, for instance the series can be 
reviewed from a feminist or historical angle. Considering the aim of this study in 
examining the popular series of Iranian state television, it seems that three main 
meanings are articulated in this series. The understanding of these would help us reach 
the final aim of this study. I will discuss these three meanings and how they function in 
making the nodal signifier of the IRdisc secure from being dislocated. 
Sovereignty 
It seems that the most important meanings this series follows is about the signifier of 
“sovereignty”. According to Shiite belief, we are now in the era of occultation. This 
refers to the idea that Mahdi, the 12th Imam, is alive but hidden and it is not yet the 
right time for him to appear and constitute the ultimate Shiite/Islamic state. Shiite 
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Islam believes that Mahdi is going to be the saviour of the world and humanity. When 
he comes, the world will be full of justice and his sovereignty will be global.  
For the time being, the main question is sovereignty in the era of occultation. Some 
believe that establishing a state in the era of occultation is wrong and this is a right 
that belongs only to an Imam. It used to be the dominant idea among Shiite clergy 
before Ayatollah Khomeini, when he brought up the “supreme leadership” (velayat-e 
faghih) theory and stood against the traditional standpoint. According to this theory, a 
fully qualified jurist has the right to form an Islamic state in the era of occultation and 
an Islamic state would be meaningful only if a Shiite jurist is head of the state (Imam 
Khomeini, Hokoumat-e Eslami). I do not intend to study Ayatollah Khomeini’s theory, 
but to point out that forming a state in the era of occultation is a vital meaning 
targeted by the series. 
In Mukhtar Nameh, it is presented as Imam Sajjad and his uncle, Muhammad ibn-e Al-
Hanafiah have no confrontation with Mukhtar in establishing a state and find him 
deserving to do so, while it is a very controversial subject in Shiite history. Therefore, 
the position of Mukhtar Nameh regarding the signifier of sovereignty is about its 
legitimacy in the era of occultation.  
It is worth mentioning that in the first half of the series, namely before Mukhtar 
publicised his uprising, Mukhtar’s character has been represented as more realistic. It 
means that in the narration of the series before Mukhtar’s uprising, we can see that 
Mukhtar has made some mistakes in his decisions. Even at some points Mukhtar 
character has been represented as a hesitant or ambitious person. For instance, in the 
first half of the narration of the series, Mukhtar refuses to accompany Imam Hassan 
(the second Shiite Imam) to start a battle against Muawia. Additionally, Mukhtar also 
refuses to accompany the Tawwabeen in their battle, which was initiated by the 
Tawwabeen to avenge Imam Hussein’s death. Nonetheless, after Mukhtar publicised 
his uprising to establish his state, no mistakes or any sign of hesitancy or egoism has 
been represented regarding Mukhtar’s character. This could be taken to mean that the 
head of the Shiite authority in the era of occultation does not make any mistakes.  
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Insight 
The other preferred meaning of the Mukhtar Nameh TV series has also been 
articulated regarding the signifier of sovereignty. However, this preferred meaning has 
been articulated in a way to clarify the position of the TV series regarding others. In 
other words, as I have argued in the chapter of methodology, representing the subject 
position of others can be considered as one of the strategies of representations in 
order to avoid any identification of the subjects regarding to subject position of others. 
In the Mukhtar Nameh TV series, the fact that Mukhtar’s companions deserted him in 
his battle against Aal-e Zubayr has been represented as one of the main reasons of the 
collapse of Mukhtar’s state. Mukhtar’s companions, who were helping Mukhtar in his 
uprising and establishing the Shia state, refused to accompany Mukhtar in his battle 
against Aal-e Zubayr. This refusal was caused by the conspiracy of Aal-e Zubayr. 
Actually this TV series sees no defect in Mukhtar’s behaviours that caused dissidence 
amongst his former companions. However the main cause of this dissidence is 
represented as divisive acts by Aal-e Zubayr. It means that Aal-e Zubayr by giving 
Mukhtar’s companions the promise of wealth and authority after collapse of 
Mukhtar’s state, cause them to abandon Mukhtar in his battle against Aal-e Zubayr. 
The main reason of accepting these promises by Mukhtar’s companions in the series 
was known as Mukhtar’s justice. It means that referencing Mukhtar’s justice by Aal-e 
Zubayr, Mukhtar’s companions were convinced that in the state that was ruled by 
Mukhtar, they could not reach any authority or wealth. In this series, the conspiracy of 
the enemy is known as the main cause of enticement of Mukhtar’s companions and 
consequently collapse of Mukhtar’s reign. Mukhtar’s enemy by emphasising racial 
differentiation in Mukhtar’s army, which contained two races of Arabs and Persians, 
and by promoting the idea of racial superiority of Arabs among Mukhtar’s army caused 
a split in the army and consequently its defeat. The interesting point here is that the 
Aal-e Zubayr army killed all of Mukhtar’s companions that wishfully accepted the 
promises of Aal-e Zubayr.  
Therefore I can say that the other preferred meaning of this series has been articulated 
regarding the signifier of “insight”. The preferred meaning that this series is trying to 
articulate according to this signifier seems to be a privative meaning—you define what 
insight is by identifying those who lack insight. It means that anyone who doesn’t have 
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insight when confronting the enemy: firstly, has helped the enemy to reach its 
interests and secondly has destroyed itself. Now it seems crucial to look at what could 
be the preferred meaning of insight.  
In the aftermath of the 2009 presidential election in Iran, the term “insight” (basirat) 
entered into the political literature of the IRdisc. The Supreme Leader of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, Ayatollah Khamenei, was labelling some people as “blinkered elites” 
(khavas-e bi-basirat). By this he meant the elites who before this election were acting 
in the interest of the Islamic Republic’s aims and goals, but after the election they lost 
their insight and in his opinion, were serving the enemy who wants the collapse of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran. The simplest meaning of the signifier of insight could be 
grasped as not serving the enemy. Ayatollah Khamenei believed that blinkered elites, 
consciously or unconsciously are acting in the interests of the enemy and not only are 
they making trouble for the Islamic Republic, but also through so acting are destroying 
themselves. The official voices of IRdisc, by referring to the signifier of insight and by 
considering the privative meaning of this signifier have tried to represent some elites, 
which previously were active subjects in advancing previous articulations of this 
discourse, as “others”. Three elites should be identified here, namely Mir-Hussein 
Mousavi, Seyed Mohammad Khatami and Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. They were very 
high-level officials of the Islamic Republic for three eight-year periods.  
As argued in the theoretical chapter, mentioned figures in the history of the Islamic 
Republic, have been representative of different articulations of the IRdisc under 
different circumstances. These articulations mentioned as “Islamic Leftist”, “Economic 
Development” or “Reconstructionist” and “Reformist” in the theoretical chapter. 
Nonetheless in social conditions during and after the presidential campaigns of 2009, 
all these figures may be considered as supporters of the Reformist articulation, headed 
by Mousavi, since they were emphasising the republicanism face of the IRdisc against 
the Principlist articulation, which highlights the Islamism face of this discourse by the 
centrality of the Ayatollah Khamenei as the determinant of principles.   
Thus, the authority of Islamic Republic and especially the supreme leader, Ayatollah 
Khamenei, with labelling them as blinkered elites, makes them as “others” for the 
IRdisc. This is when former active forces within the IRdisc, have become antagonistic 
forces since the principlist articulation was recognised as the privileged articulation, 
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and reformist articulation eliminated as the articulation of “others”. Therefore it seems 
that those lacking insight and in the “blinkered” position are acting in the interests of 
the enemy who is aiming for the collapse of Islamic Republic. Nonetheless what these 
elites were doing in the aftermath of the 2009 Iranian presidential election were 
efforts to present a new articulation of political, cultural and financial meanings, which 
could make the discourse of Islamic Republic more hegemonic. However, this 
articulation was challenging the position of the forces that were beneficiaries of 
maintaining the existing form of discursive articulation, namely the Principlist 
articulation that the supreme leader has supported.  
Velayat Madari13 
Nonetheless, grasping the preferred meaning of notion of insight in the discourse of 
the Islamic Republic leads us to the importance of another notion. This notion also can 
be considered as the other signifier that the Mukhtar Nameh TV series has tried to 
present a preferred meaning on. This signifier is “velayat-madari”. “Velayat-madar” 
persons are people who are believed to be defending the legitimacy of Shiite 
sovereignty in the era of occultation even if this defence causes their death. The 
subject position of velayat-madar could be grasped as the position of Principlists in the 
political realm of the Islamic Republic since the main principle in their articulation, as 
argued in the theoretical chapter, is maintaining the Islamic face of the IRdisc by 
emphasising the centrality of the position of the supreme leader as determinative of 
principles. This TV series has sought to articulate the preferred meaning of “velayat-
madari” by representing the subject position of the Iranians in Mukhtar’s army, who 
stood by Mukhtar till Aal-e Zubayr killed them. The Iranians in Mukhtar’s army were 
standing behind Mukhtar from the beginning of his uprising till the collapse of 
Mukhtar’s authority. They were killed by Aal-e-Zubayr in an unequal battle, which was 
the result of highlighting racial differences among Persians and Arabs of Mukhtar’s 
army. After the death of some Iranians of Mukhtar’s army by Aal-e Zubayr, an Iranian 
                                                        13 Velayat literally means governance and it refers to the supreme leadership and protectorship of the 
Islamic jurists (velayat-e faghih), which is the Islamic governance of jurists. Velayat-madari is a term 
used by followers of the supreme leader in Iran, which can be described as making Velayat or supreme 
leadership the focus of one’s mind and actions. This term literally means adherence of Velayat and 
Velayat-madar persons are Velayat adherents. Since I couldn’t find a proper English equivalent for this 
concept, I will use its transliterated form in my thesis.  
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soldier raised a three-coloured (red, green and white) flag on their grave. This flag 
currently is the official flag of the Islamic Republic of Iran. In this section of the series 
we can hear the voice of this Iranian soldier during a narration that claims this flag is 
the symbol of “velayat-madari” and affection for Shiite Imams till the end of the world 
and the Day of Judgment. Here it is evident that taking a contrary position with the 
position of Velayat-madar has been recognised as if that is only done by “others” in 
the IRdisc. Thus if we consider the position of velayat-madar as position of the 
Principlists in the realm of politics, then consequently, the Reformists, who highlight 
the face of republicanism in articulation of the IRdisc, are recognised as “others” in the 
Principlist articulation of this discourse. As argued in the theoretical chapter, I 
acknowledge the Principlist articulation as the IRdisc in the current circumstances.  
In fact, it can be said that notions of “insight” and “velayat-madari” are strangely 
meaningful in association with Mukhtar. It means that Mukhtar is the symbol of insight 
and “velayat-madari” as the relation of others to these notions is meaningful through 
their relation to Mukhtar himself. In Mukhtar Nameh, salvation of people depends on 
their connection to Mukhtar. People who reach salvation are those who lose their life 
for Mukhtar. In contrast, those who confront him or betray him are far from such 
salvation. Thus, salvation is nothing but martyrdom and martyrdom is to die for 
velayat (Islamic governance).  
Purpose of Addressing the “Others” 
The Mukhtar position as the head of the state, which is assumed to have a 
metaphysical source of legitimacy or in other words, the head of an ideological state, 
determines the position of insiders and the “others”. That is, the positions of people 
who have insight versus those who are misguided. In fact his position is strangely 
similar to Ayatollah Khamenei’s in the Islamic Republic state, while people’s position is 
defined respecting their position to the supreme leader. 
Understanding the Laclau and Mouffe discourse analysis seems impossible without 
grasping the function of two concepts in this theory: “antagonism” and “otherness”. In 
the point of view of Laclau and Mouffe, principally discourses are formed in 
antagonism and difference with each other. The identification of a discourse merely 
becomes possible in conflict with other kinds of identification by other discourses. This 
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kind of identity and identification is conditional on the presence of others. It means 
that discourses are defining themselves mostly according to other discourses and 
identities.  
Torfing (1999) believes that what helps a discourse to be hegemonic is negating and 
eradicating the circumstances in which possibly subjects could gain other identities 
rather than what the hegemonic discourse intends. This negating is done by 
hegemonic discourse in two realms with use of force and suppression elements. The 
first step is negating meanings, which are not the preferred meanings of hegemonic 
discourse for specific signifiers. The second step is negating individuals and groups 
which identify themselves according to those alternative meanings that are not the 
preferred meanings by the hegemonic discourse. Torfing (1999) believes that this 
negating and eradicating of alternative meanings and subjects of other discourses will 
cause the emergence of “social antagonism” (p120). Discourses that remain 
hegemonic or become hegemonic always make and hold others against themselves. 
This otherness helps discourses in various situations in order to fix and reinforce 
subjectivities according to their desired articulation. Thus the hegemonic discourse 
uses others in order to identify its subjects. Therefore the existence of others for a 
discourse on the one hand causes the coordination of the identity of that discourse 
and on the other hand causes distinction between that discourse and its rivals (Laclau, 
1990, p17).  
Since, as we discussed, the closure of a discourse is impossible, the hegemonic 
discourse could not completely eliminate the others and the marginalised voices. 
Therefore, the possibility of their return in the realm of challenge and competition 
regarding their preferred meanings is considerable. Laclau and Mouffe know this 
possibility for return and reconstruction of marginalised voices as the possibility of 
“the return of the repressed”. Whenever the hegemonic discourse attempts more to 
prefer its own meaning regarding the floating signifiers and does this by repression and 
marginalisation of other voices, it is more at risk for losing its hegemony. The 
combination of satisfaction and repression elements causes hegemony for a discourse. 
Whatever the repression part becomes greater and the satisfaction part become less 
in this combination. At this point, the loss of the hegemony become more likely. 
Therefore, whatever the hegemonic discourse makes the others according to 
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alternative meanings, which are threatening the meaning of its nodal point, this would 
be helpful regarding identifying subjects of the hegemonic discourse. Nonetheless, 
whenever this making the others and marginalising of voices is done regarding the 
signifiers (whose alternative meanings do not threaten the meaning of the nodal 
point), the hegemonic discourse may be closer to losing its potential subjects. This will 
increase the possibility of dislocation for moments in the hegemonic articulation and 
consequently will expose the hegemonic discourse to collapse and at the same time 
increase the need for suppression forces. In other words, indulgence in discursive 
conflicts, either in rough suppression of other discourses or in excessive making of 
others, will cause the radicalisation of the discourses of the “others”. As Laclau argues: 
 
We must assert that a discourse, or a discursive formation, established its limits 
by means of excluding a radical otherness that has no common measure with 
the differential system from which it is excluded, and that therefore poses a 
constant threat to that very system” (Laclau, 1995, p151, cited in Torfing 1999, 
p124).  
 
As Laclau (1990) argues, the banished “others” in a hegemonic articulation, always 
remain threats for the hegemonic discourse. The elimination of the others is beneficial 
for a hegemonic discourse when the articulations of the discourses of others are 
considered as radical articulation by the hegemonic discourse. This means that they do 
not have any distribution within the differential system, which is tolerable in the field 
of discursivity of the hegemonic discourse. In this case we can call the others as a 
“constitutive outside” for the hegemonic discourse. Since the hegemonic discourse 
firstly emphasises on its ideal subject position which have been formed in 
contradiction with others and secondly convinces its subjects that they also will be 
eliminated as others if they accept preferred meanings that have formed the 
subjectivity of others. This making of “others” leads to the cohesion of subjects against 
those “others” either in terms of denying their preferred meanings or rejecting them. 
By rejecting them, it causes them to be repressed and eliminated by the hegemonic 
discourse (Laclau, 1990, p17). The hegemonic discourse in order to remain hegemonic 
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has to make others against itself and also has to marginalise voices, which don’t accept 
preferred meanings of hegemonic discourse articulation.  
Mukhtar Nameh was on air exactly 1 year and 3 months after the 2009 election, when 
opposition leaders, Mir Hussein Mousavi and Mahdi Karoubi, went under house arrest. 
At this point, the Green Movement had no objective stronghold and thus, in the view 
of the IRdisc, was exterminated. That is why the representation of ideal subject 
positions of the Islamic Republic regarding the mentioned signifiers and determining 
positions of others contrary to these subject positions, would help the Islamic Republic 
to be rescued from a crisis which made the preferred meanings of these signifiers get 
dislocated. In order to perform the rescue, the official media of this discourse claimed 
constantly that Mukhtar’s story is the story of our time. After each episode, there was 
a program named “Time to Ponder” (Hengaam-e Derang) which was designated for 
the analysis of that episode. In this program, a guest was attending as an analyst who 
was mostly trying to associate events of Mukhtar Nameh, which they claimed to be 
historically true, to the current situation of the Islamic Republic. In comparing these 
situations, they aimed to strengthen the legitimacy of the IRdisc under a crisis 
situation.  
It is worth mentioning that representation of these subject positions helps the nodal 
signifier of the IRdisc, which is the reading of Ayatollah Khomeini from Shiite Islam, to 
become mythical since deconstructing this nodal point by subjects leads to their 
suppression by the repressive forces of the IRdisc. Altogether, what the Islamic 
Republic conducted in the time of crisis for its dislocated preferred meanings was not 
to redefine the nodal signifier and its preferred meanings, but to strengthen this 
signifier. Insight, velayat-madari and the legitimacy of the Islamic Republic’s 
sovereignty in the era of occultation and the way these notions are represented are 
tightly dependant on the supreme leader, as there is an innate legitimacy that 
purportedly only can be found in him. As these notions and subject positions get used 
to making the nodal signifier of discourse more ideological and mythical, the problem 
is that there is no explanation for their legitimacy or an explanation of why they are 
legitimate. Instead, it is supposed to be only the connection to the supreme leader 
that stands as the single source of their legitimacy. To oppose these subject positions is 
to oppose the head of discourse and hence, question his legitimacy and then become 
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the “others”. On other hand, the acceptance of supreme leadership is accepting the 
legitimacy of these notions and placing in ideal subject positions the IRdisc. Actually, 
the IRdisc tries to represent its ideal subject positions and the position of “others” 
against these positions to make its nodal signifier more mythical and ideological by it 
being the subject of de-familiarisation or deconstruction.  
Conclusion 
Mukhtar Nameh attempts to represent three ideal subject positions for the subjects of 
the IRdisc in the form of a historical narration and defines the “others” as well as those 
who are placed in contrary subject positions in rival discourses. These three subject 
positions are:  
1) To accept the legitimacy of Islamic “sovereignty” in the era of occultation. 
2) To prefer the subject position of people with “insight”, showing that they resist 
the enemy and are not deceived by his tricks.  
3) The subject position of “velayat-madari” is to accept the dominant position of 
the Islamic governor as the ideological authority. 
Considering the legitimacy crisis, the Islamic Republic faced after the presidential 
election of 2009, both accepting such subject positions as ideal positions by subjects 
and also not identifying with others who are questioning the legitimacy of these 
subject positions would save the IRdisc from being collapsed and would form 
subjectivities according to desires of this discourse in recognition of others and 
insiders. It is of vital importance to know that as these notions, insight, Islamic 
sovereignty and velayat-madari and their legitimacy are ideological notions related 
directly to the Islamic Republic’s politics, the identification of Iranian subjects within 
these positions on the one hand and on the other hand not identifying with positions 
of others could be very useful for the state to survive its legitimacy crisis. In other 
words, if subjects do not identify with opposed positions, the discourse has reached its 
aim to represent its ideal subject positions. In this situation, subjects who neither 
identify themselves with these positions, nor with the opposed positions, are less 
political and less ideological subjects and it would help the IRdisc to remain hegemonic 
and dominant. After the next chapter and in conclusion, I would return to this issue 
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and the reason why not being political and ideological for subjects of the IRdisc would 
help this discourse remain hegemonic. 
In the next chapter, I am going to analyse perceptions of Tehranian middle class 
members in regard to obtaining preferred meanings and ideal subject positions of the 
IRdisc through analysis of the three TV series. I will examine if the subjectivity of this 
class has been constructed in regard to desired characteristics of this discourse which 
have been represented in the analysed TV series.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN: BODY OF THE RESEARCH, FINDINGS 2: 
ANALYSIS OF MIDDLE CLASS ATTITUDES 
The main aim of this research is to explore positions of the Tehranian middle class in 
relation to the represented preferred meanings of the IRIB by considering three 
popular TV series. In other words, the main concern of this research is to find out how 
dominant and hegemonic is the IRdisc for Tehranian middle class subjects, as the 
preferred meanings of this discourse have been represented in three TV series. 
Consequently, this analysis leads to exploring the characteristics of the subjectivities of 
middle class members and the hegemony of the IRdisc in constructing them. 
In analysing the middle class perception of ideals of the IRdisc, it is significant to 
consider when a discourse tries to interpellate subjects by representing its ideal 
subject positions. This interpellation of course is done in the context of other 
interpellations by other discourses. It means that subjects, based on their social 
positions, age, sex, education, etc. are subjects of interpellation by various discourses. 
Accordingly, the subjectivity of each individual is a formation of different and 
sometimes antithetical elements and meanings. Additionally, discourses are also 
articulations of different meanings around a “nodal point”. Therefore, the encounter 
of discourses and individuals in the process of interpellation is the encounter between 
two kinds of formations. The subjectivities of individuals need not be coherent and 
homogenous. In the same way, discourses need not be coherent or inherent 
phenomena. Rather, discourses are formations and articulations of different features 
and meanings, but in the encountering of discourses, preferred meanings and 
individual identity formations in the process of interpellation it is necessary to 
understand at what level preferred meanings of particular discourses are forming the 
identity of individuals. The answer this question will lead us to a good understanding of 
the hegemonic level of discourses in making subjects. Attempts of discourses in the 
process of interpellations are to naturalise and normalise their forms of articulations 
regarding how to be hegemonic. It means that discourses are trying to hide the fact 
that their preferred meanings are constructed meanings and are not essential and 
eternal meanings. Therefore as I have argued in the theoretical part, a discourse can 
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be hegemonic when it can temporary fix its preferred meanings regarding the specific 
signifiers. The main attempt of this research is to find out if the discourse of the Islamic 
Republic can be considered hegemonic in constructing subjectivities of the Tehranian 
middle class. I do this using three signifiers: “woman”, “the 60s” and “sovereignty”. In 
order to grasp the relationship between preferred meanings of the IRdisc and the 
hegemonic level of these preferred meanings among the Tehranian middle class, I have 
analysed three popular TV series in order to grasp what are the preferred meanings of 
the IRdisc regarding the mentioned signifiers and consequently I have conducted 
interviews from the Tehranian middle class to examine the hegemonic level of the 
IRdisc among the Tehranian middle class. 
In order to analyse the data from the interviews, this data has been transformed to 
some categories. These categories demonstrate how Tehranian middle class members 
are identifying themselves regarding signifiers such as “woman”, “the 60s” and 
“sovereignty”. Consequently in each part related to the specific signifier, I will examine 
if the preferred meanings of the IRdisc that has been articulated in the TV series and 
can be considered as the hegemonic meaning of that signifier among interviewees 
from the Tehranian middle class or otherwise. 
DATA ANALYSING IN REGARD TO SIGNIFIER OF “WOMAN” 
In analysing the “Shams-ol Emareh” TV series I have argued that the IRdisc was trying 
to establish its preferred meaning regarding the signifier of “woman”. This discourse 
was using its most powerful and most important “ideological state apparatus” (namely 
Iranian state television) and represented its ideal subject position. The state apparatus 
has tried to articulate the preferred meaning of “wife-mother” for the signifier of 
woman. Considering this preferred meaning and the ideal subject position of the IRdisc 
which has been represented in the “Shams-ol Emareh” TV series, I went to the 
Tehranian middle class to examine if this represented subject position is the actual 
preferred meaning of “woman” or not. The responses to questions about the signifier 
of “woman”, have formed four categories.  
First Category: Moments/Fixed Meanings  
This category represents the consistency of interviewee’s subjectivities regarding the 
signifier of “woman” with the preferred mother-wife meaning of the IRdisc. Other 
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potential meanings of this signifier have been marginalised and the preferred meaning 
of mother-wife has become hegemonic among subjects that made these statements. 
The A-1 table in the appendices shows statements by the 52.22% of interviewees that 
have been categorised under this category.  
Although it is possible that a number of interviewees and in general the Tehranian 
middle class subjects could be opposed to the obvious ideological or political ideas of 
the IRdisc, the fact is the identification processes are often subconscious. Thus, the 
middle class’s politics here is not as important as it may seem at first. It means that 
sometimes it is possible for subjects to disagree with some ideas of a discourse, but 
meanwhile the major parts of his/her subjectivity have been formed by that discourse 
within the subjectification processes. For instance Interviewee 16, at the beginning of 
the interview thought that I am coming from the Iranian authority and this interview is 
for one of the state’s institutions. At first she avoided answering my questions, but 
after I explained to her that this interview is for academic uses, she accepted to be 
interviewed. She started to complain about the political and cultural situation in Iran 
and she wished for the collapse of the Islamic Republic state. After I made a question 
about her ideal type of division between house chores and earning money, she stated: 
“it is the duty of woman to be at the house and be the ideal mother for her children, 
and provide a warm atmosphere at home for her husband”. Also Interviewee 19 at the 
beginning of the interview started to complain about the situation of women in Iran--
including about compulsory headscarves. Shortly after, I asked her opinion about 
women who work. She claimed: “a woman should be provided for in all aspects to be 
able to handle house chores.” Also she claimed, “women have some needs, financially 
and emotionally, and men must answer the needs of women”. Interviewee 15 stated 
that she is not a religious person at all and she believed that religion is the major 
problem of Iran’s current situation. I asked her about her opinion about earning money 
by women in a household and she stated: “I totally disagree with women earning 
money; it is the duty of men to earn money and be the provider for the household. The 
duty of women is spending this money properly”. Also, Interviewee 40 who was 
criticising the compulsory hijab law in Iran, believed: “it is the duty of men to earn 
money for households, because men are stronger than women, both biologically and 
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mentally”, and during the conversation she stated: “everything is better in its 
traditional form, women working outside home is against our traditions”.  
Interviewee 45 who disagreed with the political ideas of the Islamic Republic state and 
believed that we in Iran have major cultural problems, stated: “since women are less 
logical than men and their actions are more based on emotional feelings, it is the duty 
of men to guide the household, both in making major decisions and also I think earning 
money is the duty of men and women mustn’t work outside the home”. She believed: 
“the ideal duty division between women and men is the traditional form, namely 
women in home and men outside home”. Interviewee 62 presented some statements 
about the importance of femininity and she knew herself as a woman who tries to 
reach the height of femininity, she believed: “being a woman is joyful, someone who 
grasps the pleasure of being a woman, can be both a good mother and a good wife. If 
we say that women should work, it is against the femininity of a woman”. She 
continued: “women are inherently dependent lovers, and this is because of the 
affection that God has created women with. Women should be lovers and their 
beloved should be their husband and children”.  
Interviewee 70 who identified himself as a religious person and believed that 
compulsory hijab is beneficial for society, stated: “I come from a religious family. In this 
type of family, earning money is the duty of men and women should do house chores. 
House chores are so varied and a woman should spend all of her time to be successful 
in these chores”. Interviewee 75 also identified himself as a moderately religious 
person and believed: “If a woman has a job outside the home, she spends her time in 
vain, because the major duty of a woman is being in love. A woman should love her life 
and her husband in order to be an ideal woman”.  
In fact my aim by putting these kind of statements together is to elaborate this crucial 
point: although it is possible that, subjects of a discourse be different with each other 
in case of beliefs and lifestyle, but all of them with even consideration of these 
differences, could be known as subjects of a specific discourse. In fact this discourse, 
by consideration of logic of difference, could make its preferred meanings with regards 
to the signifiers which are more close to the nodal point of the discourse. As we see, 
interviewees with different and sometimes contradictory beliefs, are similar in their 
preferred meaning regarding the signifier of “woman”, namely they identify 
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themselves with the meaning of mother-wife, which is the preferred meaning of the 
IRdisc.  
Therefore making subjects by discourses does not mean the creation of a homogenous 
form. Rather, it means discourses by recognition of the logic of difference could make 
their desired meanings, preferred regarding to specific signifiers. When a signifier is 
closer to the nodal point of a discourse in discursive articulation, that discourse is 
trying to make its preferred meaning also the preferred meaning of subjects.  
In analysing this category, I am trying to explain that although it is possible subjects 
have identified themselves regarding the signifier of woman with other discourses 
rather than the IRdisc, I can claim that this is also the preferred meaning of the IRdisc. 
Hence, the IRdisc can take benefits of this kind of identification in its articulation.  
As I have elaborated in the theoretical part, each discourse is trying to represent its 
preferred meaning regarding the specific signifier as the true and inherent meaning of 
that signifier. Acceptance of preferred meanings of a discourse as inherent meanings 
of signs by subjects, could temporarily fix the meaning of a sign and can create 
satisfaction among subjects of their true identification against the false perception that 
belongs to “others”. In the end, this kind of satisfaction could lead to the approach of a 
discourse ready for temporary closure.  
The noticeable point in analysing statements under this category is that 88% of all 
statements under this category see being a mother as the inherent duty of a woman. It 
means that they reduce the role of women to the duty of being a mother, because 
women are inherent mothers. Then they, with reference to this inherent duty, 
believed that a woman should take care of her child rather than go out of the home to 
earn money.  
Interviewee 73 believed that: “women are inherent mothers and basically, women 
have been created to be mothers, so a woman must accept duties related to this 
inherent role, working outside the home and earning money, is incompatible with their 
inherent role as mothers”. Interviewee 72 believed that: “the perfection of a woman is 
accepting roles that nature has brought for her, and these roles are being a good 
mother for her children and being a good wife for her husband”. He also believed: 
“bringing up children in the safe and warm atmosphere of a household, is the duty that 
women have naturally”. Interviewee 68 stated: “always and in all societies throughout 
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history, women and men have had separate roles and duties according to their nature. 
The duty of men is providing money and safety for families and the duty of women is 
doing house chores and bringing up children”.  
Lots of interviewees believed that a man could never do what a woman could do for 
children in their upbringing. This is believed to be innate and thus part of what nature 
has given women. That is, they felt that the main duty for women is being mothers. 
Interviewee 54 stated: “Fathers are not mothers, so they never can do what mothers 
can do for children. According to the law of nature, women are inherent mothers and 
they have to act according to their inherent nature”. Interviewee 65 believed: “when a 
woman follows her interests and works outside the home, then it causes the incorrect 
upbringing of children, when a woman became a mother, if she works, she has 
betrayed her children and even herself”.  
Lots of statements by interviewees, which have been mentioned in the statements 
table, show the acceptance of the preferred meaning of mother-wife by interviewees. 
Some interviewees, when explaining their position regarding the signifier of woman, 
have negated meanings that may have been articulated in other discourses and 
presenting the alternative preferred meaning regarding the signifier of woman rather 
than the mother-wife meaning. Negating other possible meanings of a signifier, which 
has been articulated in other discourses, by subjects, will automatically lead to the 
acceptance of the preferred meaning of the hegemonic discourse. It means the 
negation of “other” as an undesirable kind of identification who has identified 
her/himself with the false meaning of a signifier. For instance Interviewee 46 has 
stated: “If a woman works outside the home, children become delinquent and even 
criminal. It is not good for children to even go to kindergarten, because it is the duty of 
mothers to train her children, not kindergarten teachers or mentors”. Interviewee 63 
believed that “Nowadays, our society does not deal properly with women and women 
have no security to work outside homes. Each woman who works outside the home, 
loses her knack for dealing with children. Since society is impatient in dealing with 
women and consequently women become impatient in dealing with children”. He 
continued: “These days in the West, people don’t believe that woman must be with 
her children and bring them up and this has led to deconstruction of family and 
household in the west”. Interviewee 67 believed: “people that believe women should 
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work outside the home, are under the influence of foreigner’s propaganda, the West 
wants to make us like itself, but you see the situation of women and family in the 
West, it is pathetic”.  
In general and among statements that have been categorised under this category, 
three major positions can be recognised. All these three kinds are in line with the 
preferred meaning of the IRdisc. The first kind considers the preferred meaning of 
mother-wife as the inherent meaning of the woman signifier. This kind of identification 
with a signifier is the most powerful form of relation between the subject’s identity 
formations and the preferred meaning of a discourse.  
In the second kind, subjects are identifying themselves with regards to a sign, by 
negation of other possible meanings that a sign could have. This kind of identification 
is the reason of making otherness by a discourse in order to be hegemonic. In this kind 
of identity formations, subjects have been convinced that accepting the other possible 
meaning of a sign in other discourses, could lead to their rejection from the society.  
The third kind is the functional form of identification with the preferred meaning of 
hegemonic discourse. It means that subjects are identifying themselves with the 
preferred meaning of the hegemonic discourse because this preferred meaning can 
bring them a better objective quality of life. For instance in this category, subjects have 
been convinced that the meaning of mother-wife regarding the signifier of woman, 
leads to the better function of society both in the upbringing of children and providing 
a better situation for men in order to earn money for the household. 
Second Category: Moments with Accepting the Logic of Difference  
Statements that have been categorised under this category are presenting 
subjectivities that are close to the preferred meaning of the IRdisc, but have some 
small deviation. In other words, interviewees believed that although the main role of a 
woman is the mother-wife role, however, women should have some other activities 
for themselves in order to be happy in doing their mother-wife roles. This kind of 
positioning by interviewees mostly has been formed in responding to this question: Do 
you believe that women should have activities outside the home, which could be 
unrelated to their role as mother-wife?  
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Although statements under this category are not presenting meanings against the 
preferred meaning of the IRdisc, but they are presenting some sort of identity 
formations that have accepted this preferred meaning as the best functional meaning 
rather than the inherent meaning. Therefore the idea here is that they are seeking to 
bring objective situations for women to be happy with accepting the role of mother-
wife and consequently this satisfaction brings a better function in social orders.  
Twenty-eight out of 180 statements by 14 persons, equalling 15.55%, have been 
categorised here. The A-2 table in the appendices is presenting statements by 
interviewees that have been categorised under this category. 
For instance interviewee 08 stated: “a woman mustn’t work outside the home and 
should deal with house chores efficiently, but women should have some activities like 
painting courses or etc. to be happy and joyful at home”. Interviewee 43 believed: “I 
think a woman should be active outside the home but these activities like artistic and 
exercise classes should never influence the main duty of a woman which is maintaining 
the home and children”. Interviewee 11 stated: “nowadays with existence of satellite 
TV and technological equipment, women never get bored at home, if they were bored 
they can go to swimming pools or shopping centres and etc. with their friends but 
these mustn’t cause failure in their duties in doing house chores”. She, who was an MA 
student, went on to say: “some women like me don’t like to have a job outside the 
home, but having outside activities is so important, for instance women should go 
shopping and have some fun with their friends”. Interviewee 84, who was also a 
female MA student, believed: “Today’s women don’t stay at home, these shopping 
centres and training classes have helped women to be more active in society and I 
think women should spend time on these activities as much as they can do on 
household chores that are their main duty”. Interviewee 25 believed: “it is true that 
women are inherent mothers but this doesn’t mean that women stay at home forever, 
women should go to exercise and computer classes, but they mustn’t forget their 
children and husbands when they are gathered with friends”.  
Meaningful positioning under this category is showing that subjects by accepting the 
preferred meaning of mother-wife regarding the signifier of woman, are seeking to 
avoid any dislocation in this preferred meaning. It means that all subjects under this 
category are subjects of interpellation of other discourses, but they accept a situation 
 206 
where subjects can act more freely in order to advance the mother-wife preferred 
meaning. It is necessary to note that in fact statements under this category have been 
presented in line with the preferred meaning of the IRdisc. However, the satisfaction 
of subjects was the consideration of this kind of statements apart from the inherent 
meaning of the signifier of “woman”, which has been represented by the IRdisc.  
The significant point in considering this category is the fact that interviewees, in 
considering activities that could make women more satisfied by their role of mother-
wife, never mentioned any serious social activity that could be effective. Most of the 
interviewees considered shopping, going out with friends and activities compatible to 
the nature of women like artistic classes, exercise programs and language classes, as 
activities that could make women more efficient in doing their main role. For instance 
Interviewee 76 believed: “I think there is no need for women to work outside the 
home but they need to go to shopping centres and training classes like painting or 
music to be happy with maintaining the household.” Or Interviewee 36 stated: 
“Women should be active outside the home, women should go to classes, restaurants 
and gather with their friends in order to be content at home.” In this line also 
Interviewee 33 stated: “Being a mother, I mean good mother is more important for 
women than anything else, but if a woman wants to be a good mother then she needs 
to have fun for herself like shopping and going to restaurants.” Or interviewee 28 
believed: “Women should be active in the society in order to avoid any depression; 
they should be entertained especially after children grew up. For instance they should 
go to shopping and gather with their friends.” These statements are demonstrating a 
kind of subjectivity that considers no effective role for women in the society, rather 
this subjectivity emphasises a need of women for society, rather than the need of 
society for women. Furthermore, the need for society in this sense is reduced to doing 
social activities like shopping. Therefore in the same line with the former category, the 
roles of women are reduced to the role of mother-wife, but also considers some 
privileges for women to take some advantages of social activities and then go back to 
their homes for doing their main roles. Women in this kind of subjectivity are just 
consumers of the society in doing social activities. The rapid increase of the number of 
shopping centres in Tehran and the increase of importing commodities are signs for 
reliance of the IRdisc on this kind of subjectivity for advancing its political economy. 
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This subjectivity not only is not questioning political meanings of the state but also 
advances its desire in being a consumer of its economic policies. Therefore this kind 
subjectivity has been constructed in the same direction with the ideals of the IRdisc 
with regard to women, and acknowledging the logic of difference here means 
considering various possibilities for women to be active in society, but according to 
their nature, which means it reduces social activities to just being consumers. 
Third Category: Floating Signifiers 
Statements that have been categorised under this category are presenting a kind of 
subjectivity that although assumes other preferred meanings rather than wife-mother 
regarding the signifier of woman, but these meaning have not been rejected by the 
IRdisc. This means that although the preferred meaning of the IRdisc regarding the 
signifier of woman is the mother-wife meaning, however, other possible meanings are 
existing within the system. In fact, statements that have been categorised under this 
category are presenting a kind of identification regarding the signifier of woman that 
are acceptable in the meaning system of the IRdisc, but are not the preferred meaning 
of this discourse. Forty-four out of 180 statements by 22 people have been categorised 
under this category, namely 24.44%. The A-3 table in appendices is presenting 
statements by interviewees that have been categorised under this category. 
For example Interviewee 01 believed: “women could work outside the home if they 
want, but this is not their duty. They can work for themselves in order to not be bored 
but they also have to do house chores, for this reason it is better for them to do some 
normal works, which is not time-consuming”. Interviewee 07 stated: “it is good for 
both man and woman to work outside the home, but woman should work much less 
than man, for instance have a part-time job or just one or two days per week”. Most of 
interviewees under this category believe that the traditional division of labour 
between men and women works well. They felt that some labour is in women’s nature 
and they believed that it is better for women to do a job that is related to their nature. 
For instance Interviewee 14 was a female teacher and believed: “women should work 
both inside and outside the home, but outside the home women should do womanish 
works like soliciting sales in retail areas or as a secretary in offices”. Interviewee 21, a 
61 year old female artist, stated: “a woman’s job should be compatible with her 
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maternal feelings. At the end of the day, women are more sensitive than men. If a 
woman wants to have a job outside the home, she needs to like that job a lot, for 
example working in kindergartens”.  
In fact this kind of identification regarding the signifier of “woman” have neither been 
formed with regards to the preferred meanings of rival discourses nor are they present 
in the IRdisc. This kind of positioning is not presenting identification of subjects in 
regard to rejected meanings by the IRdisc. Therefore statements under this category 
are not presenting the preferred meaning of “others.” However, they are also not the 
preferred meaning of the IRdisc. It means that the preferred meanings of interviewees 
exist in the meaning system and field of discursivity of the IRdisc, as acceptable 
meanings but not rejected meanings that belong to others. As I have mentioned in the 
explanation of the previous category, it is possible that subjects have obtained these 
kinds of meanings from other discourses instead of the IRdisc, because individuals are 
subjects to the interpellation of various and different discourses. Also identities are 
formations that have been formed during interpellations of these discourses.  
Nonetheless, apart from what discourses have formed this kind of positioning, it is 
important to know that these meanings are not inconsistent or in contrast with the 
preferred meaning of the IRdisc. Rather, the signifier of “woman” in this kind of 
positioning is a floating signifier that can get meanings other than just the wife-mother 
meaning. Meanwhile the wife-mother meaning is not altogether rejected either.  
In fact the signifier of woman as a floating signifier in this kind of positioning on the 
one hand causes the impression of freedom of choice and satisfaction among subjects 
and on the other hand eliminates the possibility of identification with rival discourses. 
It is worth mentioning that among all statements under this category, a form of 
subjectivity could be found where there exists a belief that women’s working is good if 
they can earn money in order to support the financial needs of households. However 
the idea still seems to exist that the women should work some feminine jobs and also 
that they should do house chores as well. Interviewee 22 believes: “working for 
women is an option, but if the financial situation of the family is bad, so women should 
work to help men”. Interviewee 27 stated: “considering today’s financial situation, 
both men and women must work outside the home, but women should have part-time 
jobs to be able to handle house chores”. Interviewee 35 believes: “it is men’s duty to 
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earn money for the family and women’s duty is the upbringing children and house 
chores, but women could help men if the financial situation is bad”.  
Some other interviewees believed that although it is good for women to work outside 
the home, the main duty of men is earning money for the family, so if women earn 
money, they should spend the money for themselves, not family. Interviewee 41, a 
female PhD student, stated: “men should not need women’s money. But if a woman 
wants to work it is good to earn some money to spend on her interests”. Interviewee 
47 stated: “women could have womanish jobs outside the home if they want, but they 
have to spend the money that they earned for themselves, since financing the family is 
the man’s duty”.  
As we can see this kind of positioning is presenting women’s works as not necessary 
activities and hobbies for women. I also asked the interviewees who should do the 
house chores if a woman does work outside the home. When I asked this, most of 
them were emphasising that doing house chores is the duty of women and if a working 
woman could not do the house chores or bring up the children properly, then it is 
better to not work outside the home. Interviewee 56 believes: “One must understand 
what she wants. If she wants to work, that is very good for her, but she should never 
marry. But when she is married and has children, then she has duties to do in the 
home and no one can help her in doing these duties--like raising her children”. 
Interviewee 17 stated: “a woman could have a job outside home just when she 
manages her time to do both, so I believe it is better for women to have part-time jobs 
if they want”.  
Some interviewees believed that if a woman wants to work, then house chores should 
be divided between wife and husband, but as women should work outside the home 
less than men, then men should work in the home less than women. Interviewee 07 
stated: “95% of financial needs of a family must be earned by men and 5% by women if 
they insist on having a job. On the other hand, 95% of house chores are the duty of 
women and men should do only 5%”. Interviewee 57 believed: “If even my spouse 
could finance the family properly, I would like to have a job. For instance, he is 
financing 80% of the family expenses and I am financing 20%, we should also divide the 
house chores by the same ratio but in reverse--80% me and 20% him”.  
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Finally, I can say that although statements under this category are not representing the 
total acceptance of the preferred meaning of the IRdisc regarding the signifier of 
woman by subjects, but they are also not representing the identification of subjects 
with rival discourses and counter-meanings of the IRdisc. 
Fourth Category: Alternative Preferred Meanings  
This category covers statements that present new kinds of identity formations 
regarding the signifier of woman that truly stand against the preferred meaning of the 
IRdisc. It means that interviewees that have stated these statements have identified 
themselves with “rival” discourses and “other” preferred meanings regarding the 
signifier of woman. The number of these statements was 14 by 7 persons among all 
180, namely 7.77%. The A-4 table in appendices is presenting statements that have 
been categorised under this category. 
For instance, Interviewee 18 believes: “Everything should be divided equally between 
men and women, house chores and earning money. Women have to work and be 
active outside home in society”. Interviewee 26 stated: “women must work, it is part 
of women's rights to be able to work outside the home like men and have financial 
independence in order to not be under men’s shadow”. Interviewee 48 believed: “It is 
totally nonsense if we believe that women should stay at home and be housekeepers, 
women need to be in society and the best form of being part of society is having a 
job”.  
Clearly these kinds of statements that are presenting positioning of interviewees 
regarding the signifier of woman, not only are against the preferred meaning of the 
IRdisc but also they have been formed to reject meanings of the IRdisc. Not believing in 
the nature of women as mothers and not knowing an inherent meaning for the 
signifier of woman as mother-wife, believes in a kind of independency for women 
apart from being a mother or wife. It means preferred meanings of these kind of 
identity formations, not defining woman as a role in relation with other roles and 
positions. If we accept that the preferred meaning of the IRdisc regarding the signifier 
of woman is defining a woman in relation and dependent with other roles like children 
and husband and consequently family, these statements are presenting belief in the 
independency of women. Even in some statements, interviewees by emphasising the 
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independency of women have rejected the preferred meaning of the IRdisc. For 
example Interviewee 26 believed: “a couple should not have children at all, children 
cause women to be a housewife, a couple should agree on not having children”. 
Interviewee 31 stated: “women have to work in order to feel beneficial for society, 
unless they sacrifice themselves for their children and husband, and have nothing for 
themselves at the end of the day”. These statements contain rejection of the meaning 
of mother-wife and don’t reduce the role of women to just being mother and wife.  
I asked about house chores from interviewees that have stated these kinds of 
statements, Interviewee 31 believed: “women must work outside the home and house 
chores must be divided equally between wife and husband. I think men and women 
are equal; and I see no reason that just women have to do house chores”. Interviewee 
48 believed: “it is not fair that women stay at home and do just household chores, they 
should have a job outside home and household chores should be divided equally”. 
These statements are presenting the rejection of meaning of wife as a person who has 
to do household chores.  
Therefore, statements that have been categorised under this category which are 8.71% 
of all statements, are presenting subject’s identification with marginalised and rejected 
meanings of the IRdisc regarding the signifier of woman. As a result, we can consider 
these meanings as the meanings of “others”, which have been formed in contradiction 
with the preferred meaning of the IRdisc.  
Conclusion 
The main concern of this part of my research was examining if the preferred meaning 
of the IRdisc regarding the signifier of woman is the hegemonic meaning among the 
Tehranian middle class or not. Four categories have been obtained from interviews 
that are demonstrating different positions by this middle class regarding the signifier 
of woman. I have named these categories so that they also demonstrate the position 
of this middle class regarding the preferred meaning of the IRdisc which is the mother-
wife meaning. The first category “Moments/Fixed meaning” demonstrates a total 
match between the interviewee’s positions and the meaning of mother-wife. The 
second category “Moments with accepting the logic of difference” also demonstrates 
the acceptance of meaning of mother-wife regarding the signifier of woman by 
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interviewees. Nonetheless this kind of position accepts the logic of difference and 
seeks for a way that makes subjects objectively satisfied by their identification with the 
meaning of mother-wife. Therefore, some social activities like training courses, artistic 
courses, shopping, etc. are considered as activities belonging to women in order to 
make them satisfied and not bored or exhausted in doing duties that belong to their 
main role as mothers and wives. The third category “Floating Signifier” demonstrates 
the subject’s identification with meanings rather than the preferred meaning of the 
IRdisc. Nonetheless these meanings, although are not the preferred meanings of the 
IRdisc, but also have not been rejected or represented as the meanings of “others” by 
this discourse. It means that the meanings in this category exist in the meaning system 
of the IRdisc but are not the preferred meanings. Identification with these meanings 
doesn’t make subjects “others” or rivals in the IRdisc, but rather shows a kind of 
identification, which is acceptable in its meaning system. The fourth category 
“Alternative preferred meaning” demonstrates identification of interviewees with 
alternative meanings that are not acceptable in the meaning system of the IRdisc. It 
means that the IRdisc has tried to marginalise and reject these meanings that are not 
considering the inherent role for women as mothers or wives. The below table shows 
the numbers of interviewees and the percentage of statements in each category:  
 
Category Number of interviewees 
Number of 
statements Percentage 
1 Moments/Fixed meaning 47 94 52.22% 
2 Moments/Logic of difference 14 28 15.55% 
3 Floating signifier 22 44 24.44% 
4 Alternative preferred meaning 7 14 7.77% 
Total 90 180 100% 
  
The numbers and percentages in the above table demonstrate that the desired 
meaning of the IRdisc regarding the signifier of woman is hegemonic among the 
 213 
middle class. If we say that categories 1, 2 and 3 are not presenting any alternative 
meaning regarding the signifier of woman, then we can say that almost 92% of 
interviewees have not identified themselves regarding any alternative meaning of the 
preferred meaning of the IRdisc. Meanwhile 52.22% of interviewees have identified 
themselves by the exact meaning that the IRdisc has desired. If we consider the second 
category also as the category that demonstrates the kind of identification that the 
IRdisc has preferred, we can say that the preferred meaning of mother-wife is 
hegemonic among almost 68% of interviewees. 
Therefore, I wish to make the argument that the preferred meaning of the IRdisc 
regarding the signifier of woman is the hegemonic meaning among the Tehranian 
middle class. This signifier, as I have elaborated, is among the signifiers that the IRdisc 
has tried to prefer in its desired meaning after experiencing its main legitimacy crisis in 
2009. When the meaning of mother-wife is hegemonic among Islamic Republic 
subjects, it means that this discourse can use this meaning in its ideal form of 
articulation. Namely if we say that discursive articulations are attempts to relate 
preferred meaning of a discourse in order to be hegemonic, the IRdisc can consider its 
preferred meaning regarding the signifier of woman as the hegemonic meaning and 
consequently can form other meanings in relation to this hegemonic meaning.  
I should point out here that although it is possible to consider that this stereotype 
regarding signifier of woman, was expanded among the middle class before the 
existence of the dislocation, but the issue here is that the hegemonic discourse needs 
to reproduce stereotypes in different contextual circumstances. Stereotypes need to 
be reproduced in order to be expanded among subjects of a discourse and 
reproduction of stereotypes is related to the contextual circumstances that a discourse 
is experiencing. Therefore I can say that maybe the role of mother-wife regarding 
women was accepted by the middle class subjects before the emergence of 
dislocation, but this discourse after experiencing dislocation needed to reproduce its 
stereotype and again define its meaning system. Moreover, in a contextual reading of 
conditions that caused legitimacy crisis for the IRdisc, the role of women was not 
considered as the just mother-wife role. For instance, Mousavi himself always was 
attending in his campaign with his wife Zahra Rahnavard, who is an academic figure 
and is a woman figure, more than a wife or a mother. During the history of the Islamic 
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Republic state and during all electoral campaigns for the presidency, this was the first 
time that a candidate of Iranian presidency was showing up in public during his 
campaign alongside his wife as an independent figure. This can be understood as the 
rejection of the mother-wife role within the campaign that questioned the preferred 
meanings of the Principlist articulation of the IRdisc. Moreover, after emergence of the 
Reformist articulation of the IRdisc, the issue of women’s rights was one the main 
concerns of this articulation. In contradiction, the Principlist articulation, has always 
emphasised the mother-wife role for women. Therefore this emphasis by the IRdisc on 
the mentioned stereotype and reproduction of this stereotype in the contextual 
circumstances after the emergence of the dislocation, could be interpreted as seeing 
gender equality and presence of women in public as active forces who are seeking to 
gain social influence, as a threat to the hegemony of the IRdisc. Therefore this 
discourse, after experiencing the dislocation, intended to reproduce its desired 
stereotype regarding women to form subjectivity that does not seek influence for 
women in society more than wives and mothers.  
Therefor I can say that reproducing the mentioned stereotype by the IRdisc not only is 
contextually related to the conditions of the dislocation, but also is an act of repetition 
in order to flatten the hegemony of the IRdisc by eliminating the demand of gender 
equality which is definitely a political demand since it questions the preferred 
meanings of the IRdisc.  
Therefore, considering reproduction of a stereotype, it can be said that the demand of 
gender equality has been suppressed in the subjectivities of the Tehranian middle class 
by accepting the role of mother-wife for women. Arguably this demand can be 
considered as the demand, which if becomes pervasive among the middle class, can 
cause deconstruction of articulation of the IRdisc and question the patriarchal nature 
of this discourse.   
Gramsci argued that hegemony is a combination of both elements of “suppression” 
and “satisfaction”. In regard to the signifier of woman, the IRdisc not only could gain 
people’s satisfaction but also possibilities for demanding gender equality by this 
middle class has been eradicated. As I have described before these people can be 
against the propaganda of the IRdisc and can disagree with political or ideological ideas 
of this discourse. Nonetheless, within processes of subjectification the preferred 
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meaning of the IRdisc regarding one of its main signifiers, which is close to the nodal 
point since it negates the demand of gender equality, is hegemonic among these 
people. It means that these people are subjects of the IRdisc regarding the signifier of 
woman since they don’t demand gender equality within their everyday life. 
Consequently, the IRdisc certainly is using this meaning in its articulation to relate its 
“other” desired meaning to this hegemonic meaning and make them hegemonic as 
well, in order to be the absolute hegemonic discourse.  
DATA ANALYSIS IN REGARD TO THE SIGNIFIER OF “THE 60S” 
In analysing the “Condition White” TV series in the previous part, I have argued that 
the preferred meaning of the IRdisc regarding “the 60s”, is highlighting “social 
cohesion” and “richness of meaning” during the 60s decade. The attempt of the IRIB in 
“Condition White” TV series was to prefer these meaning by romanticising the lifestyle 
of the 60s in order to reconstruct the link between the audience and this decade in an 
aesthetic way. The preferred meanings the series is trying to articulate are formed in 
relation to a signifier of the 60s and its lifestyle. Undoubtedly, what the IRdisc prefers 
is a nostalgic look to these meanings. 
In order to examine if these preferred meanings could be considered as hegemonic 
among the Tehranian middle class, during 90 interviews, I have highlighted 180 
statements by interviewees that make clear their position regarding the signifier of the 
60s. This meant gathering two basic statements from each interviewee.  
Responses to the interview questions about the 60s clarified the position of the 
interviewees regarding the 60s to see if they have nostalgia for the 60s or not. 
According to responses, two major categories have emerged. The first one 
demonstrates the existence of a kind of nostalgia among interviewees in remembering 
the 60s and the second category is about statements by interviewees that reject any 
kind of nostalgia in remembering that decade. After grasping if interviewees have 
nostalgia for the 60s or not, my questions were about clarifying why they have such a 
position. Actually my aim was to clarify the most significant features that interviewees 
think belong to that decade. During interviews, if I realised that interviewees have that 
kind of nostalgia for the 60s, I was trying to find out why they have this nostalgia and 
according to what features of the 60s they think living in that era was better. It is 
 216 
worth mentioning that many of the interviewees, namely 51 persons, have been born 
during or after the 60s, therefore they do not have clear memories of that time. 
However, during the interviews I found no one who had no comment on the 60s 
because he or she did not live in that decade. It means that the IRdisc or even rival 
discourses, could form a kind of perception regarding the 60s so that people are not 
remembering living in that era, but can still have clear positions about that era.  
Next, I am going to analyse this issue using the theoretical framework of the Laclau and 
Mouffe discourse analysis. 
First Category: Moments/Fixed Meaning 
The first category is named “Moment/fixed meaning” according to the Laclau and 
Mouffe’s discourse theory. Here statements demonstrate a kind of nostalgia and a 
total match between the preferred meaning of the interviewees and the preferred 
meaning of the IRdisc regarding the signifier of the 60s. The signifier of 60s has 
become a moment in their identity formations according to the preferred meanings of 
the IRdisc that have been represented in the IRIB. It is worth mentioning that the 
objective living situation during the 60s is not the subject of study here. Instead, the 
main issue is how the Tehranian middle class are remembering it. Or, if they have no 
memories of the 60s, then what types of positions regarding the lifestyle during the 
60s do they take? Therefore, my consideration is not examining if these kinds of 
memories are objectively true or false, but my consideration is examining the 
coordination of these kinds of taking position regarding the 60s with the preferred 
meaning of the IRdisc. This category demonstrates that the signifier of the 60s in the 
identification process of interviewees that stated these statements can be considered 
as “moments” in the IRdisc articulation. It means the total coordination between the 
interviewees’ identification and the preferred meaning of the IRdisc. As I have 
elaborated in the analysis of the “Condition White” TV series, “social cohesion” and 
“richness of meaning” during the 60s are the meanings that the IRdisc has desired its 
subjects to prefer regarding the 60s.  
Therefore I have divided this category into two sub-categories. These two sub-
categories make clear the position of interviewees according to significant features of 
the 60s in their opinions. In the first sub-category statements are demonstrating the 
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reason for having nostalgia as the existence of “richness of meaning” during the 60s 
and statements under the second sub-category are indicating the reason for nostalgia 
as the “social cohesion” of the 60s.  
Consequently two other sub-categories have emerged in the interviewees’ statements 
that are demonstrating the causes that make the 60s decade significant and different 
in comparison with today. It means that interviewees were expressing why the current 
social conditions of living are not the same as during the 60s. In forming these two sub-
categories I tried to understand who interviewees are blaming for the loss of the living 
conditions of the 60s which were so pleasant for them. Finding the answer to this 
question has helped me understand if subjects are blaming the state in losing those 
conditions or they see other causes. If interviewees who have nostalgia for the 60s 
blame the state for the loss of the pleasant living conditions of 60s, then preferring the 
meanings of “social cohesion” and “richness of meaning” during the 60s by the IRdisc 
would be against its interests. Nonetheless if subjects blame something else in losing 
that “richness of meaning” and “social cohesion”, then the IRdisc can claim that those 
meanings are its ideal and agree with subjects in blaming other conditions for the loss 
of the pleasant conditions of the 60s.  
It is worth mentioning that surprisingly, all statements by interviewees under this 
category which are making clear the position of interviewees in relation to the signifier 
of the 60s, could be categorised under one of the preferred meanings of the IRdisc 
regarding the 60s, namely, “social cohesion” or “richness of meaning”. 
Among all 90 interviewees, 77 persons, namely 85.55%, have admitted to having 
nostalgia for the 60s decade. Among these 77 interviewees, statements by 39 persons 
could be categorised under the preferred meaning of “richness of meanings” during 
the 60s decade and statements by 38 interviewees could be categorised under the 
preferred meaning of “social cohesion” during the 60s. I am going to analyse the first 
two sub-categories that make clear the reason of having nostalgia and afterward I will 
address the causes of having nostalgia for the 60s in analysing next two sub-categories.  
First Sub-Category: “Richness of Meaning” during the 60s 
Statements under the first sub-category are demonstrating the interviewee’s nostalgia 
for the 60s because of “richness of meanings” during the 60s decade. Statements by 39 
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interviewees among all 77 interviewees who admitted to having nostalgia for the 60s. 
This comes out to 50.64%. These statements are available in table B-1-1 of the 
appendices. 
Interviewees that have stated the statements under this category believed that the 
kind of morality that belonged to the 60s is one that these days we cannot recognise in 
society. For instance, Interviewee 07 stated: “Humanity and spirituality were much 
higher among people back then so I have nostalgia for that time.” Or Interviewee 89 
stated: “Love and friendships were more real in the 60s, people used to believe in 
morality. Jealousy did not exist, and people were all alike. These days they are all 
jealous of the lives of others.” Or Interviewee 73 believed: “Immorality has increased 
in society, if we had morality the way we had in the 60s, the situation would be much 
better.” The interesting point here is that interviewees that believed in the existence 
of morality during the 60s, have not related this morality to objective conditions of the 
60s, such as war or the Islamic revolution, but they believed that in general, morality 
existed during the 60s. And they also felt that this was a type of morality that does not 
exist today. It means that these subjects were having the kind of satisfaction in 
remembering the 60s and were satisfied with the meanings that they related to the 
60s in general. Not mentioning any objective situation that may cause the richness of 
meaning during the 60s, this meant that the subjects are not seeing that kind of 
morality related to the ideological propaganda of the IRdisc during wartime or shortly 
after the victory of the Islamic revolution. Nonetheless, they relate this morality to the 
way people were dealing with each other; not the conditions that made people deal 
with each other in moral ways. For instance, Interviewee 23 believed: “There is no 
mercy in people anymore. No one has mercy on others. The government and economy 
does not really matter, people have changed.” Or Interviewee 31 stated: “The most 
important thing we had and lost is honesty; no one would lie to others. There were 
important matters, which are dead now, such as humanity and honesty.” Or 
Interviewee 36 believed: “Personal advantages used to be of less importance, now 
brothers have no mercy on each other. The intimacy we had does not exist anymore.” 
Or Interviewee 61 stated: “What we used to have is morality. Values of that time are 
lost and people made it so. Values of that time were beyond humans; we used to have 
an ideal and perfect society.” 
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Consequently the war between Iran and Iraq as the most important feature of the 60s 
and also the condition of a country dealing with a war shortly after the victory of the 
revolution have been forgotten and some interviewees believed that the current 
situation of the society should be the same as 60s, neglecting wartime. For example 
Interviewee 02 stated: “The spiritual and cultural atmosphere of the society was better 
back then. The current demand of our society is to return to those circumstances of 
the 60s.” 
The war between Iran and Iraq in the meaning system of the IRdisc, worked as the 
constitutive outside that caused the emergence of a kind of morality during the 60s. 
Nonetheless, nowadays in the identification process of subjects of the IRdisc, that 
constitutive outside has been forgotten and the morality that was the result is 
remembered. For example, statements like: “People’s relationships were not based on 
taking and giving back then, people used to care about others for the sake of God. Pain 
and suffering used to be less, as people would be at each other’s sides.” (Interviewee 
77), or “People used to be at each other’s side. Nowadays, if someone has a stroke in 
the street, no one would take him to the hospital. People had forgiveness back then” 
(Interviewee 75). These are statements that clearly remember the 60s under the 
influence of war but not mentioning the war. Nonetheless the war as the most 
important element that caused the emergence of these kinds of moral values was 
forgotten and the morality apart from war has highlighted. In the meaning system of 
the IRdisc this means that this discourse could prefer its desired meanings regarding 
the 60s apart from indicating or accepting that this morality was the logical 
consequence of war in the society. Therefore this discourse by neglecting the role of 
war can interpellate its subjects and ask them why you don’t have such morality any 
more, and people in responding to this interpellation are blaming themselves (people) 
in losing that kind of morality. This causes the security of the IRdisc to be blamed as 
the factor of losing that morality and makes this discourse vulnerable to political 
criticisms. Obviously this demonstrates depoliticisation of subjects of the IRdisc, 
because they are not seeing political reasons for emergence and also for the losing of 
that kind of morality, but instead they think that people have morally changed. Namely 
they relate the richness of meaning during the 60s to what people understand about 
life, not to political matters, and also relate the losing of morality to people’s 
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understanding of life, not the current political situation of the IRdisc.  
In statements that have been categorised under this sub-category we can see 
satisfaction of subjects in identifying themselves with one of the preferred meanings of 
the IRdisc regarding the signifier of the 60s. All these statements are relating to the 
kind of morality of the 60s decade that nowadays has been forgotten. Therefore we 
can say that the preferred meaning of the IRdisc is hegemonic among interviewees 
that have made these statements. In the coming section I will address the second 
preferred meaning of the IRdisc regarding the signifier of the 60s, which is “social 
cohesion”. 
Second Sub-Category: “Social Cohesion” during the 60s  
Interviewees, who have nostalgia for the 60s because of “social cohesion” during the 
60s, have also made statements under this sub-category. Among all 77 interviewees 
their statements formed the category of “moment/fixed meaning”. Statements by 38 
persons could be categorised under this sub-category, which comes out to 49.36%. 
These statements are available in table B-1-2 of the appendices. 
Statements under this sub-category also present the acceptance of the preferred 
meaning of the IRdisc regarding the signifier of the 60s Nonetheless they see the most 
important feature of the 60s decade as the existence of social cohesion during the 60s. 
For instance Interviewee 28 stated: “The matters that have ruined our society now, 
they did not exist in the past. People were alike and homogenous”. Or Interviewee 68 
stated: “People’s relationships used to be more beautiful; people had a better 
understanding of their situation. I have nostalgia, as people used to stick together. 
Now, they are torn apart.”  
These statements are showing that interviewees believe that the kind of social 
cohesion existed during the 60s, does not exist anymore in the society. Therefore 
statements under this sub-category are all about society and concerns of people about 
losing social cohesion. Interviewees have mentioned different forms of social relations 
during the 60s that nowadays could not be found in the society. Some of them 
mentioned family relationships during the 60s and believed that families were closer 
together during the 60s. For example Interviewee 18 stated: “We used to gather with 
our family and friends a lot, now it is all gone”. Or Interviewee 30 believed: “Friends 
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and families used to spend more time together but today they neglect each other. 
Therefore I have nostalgia for the 60s, much better times indeed”. Or Interviewee 80 
stated: “Neighbours used to be like family back then; and now, family members are 
like strangers. Our society was consistent and homogenous. What about now?”  
Also some interviewees believed that values during the 60s were different from 
today’s values in society. They believe that today’s culture of society is not the same as 
the 60s. They blame the culture as the matter that has changed and because of this 
change, the social cohesion has been lost. For instance Interviewee 43 stated: “Our 
people are so attracted to lowbrow culture that all they can think about is themselves. 
Despite the progress we had, no one cares about others, when they see them in 
trouble.” Or Interviewee 24 believed: “Back then, people’s culture was the same. It 
was easy to be prosperous. Everybody was like-minded back then, but now there is 
distance among people.” The important thing in these kinds of statements is that 
interviewees are blaming the culture of the society and consequently they blame 
people for losing this culture. Also as I have mentioned in analysing the previous sub-
category, these statements are so depoliticised. Namely what is important for 
interviewees is the culture of the society and they don’t see this culture as the matter 
that is related to the contextual form of society. They also blame “people” for losing 
that culture and this is also securing the IRdisc as the matter of consideration. In all 
statements it seems that people are blaming themselves for losing that homogenous 
culture in the society. It is the exact form of identification that the IRdisc has desired in 
order to be hegemonic: the depoliticised vision by its subject in analysing the most 
politicised era after victory of the Islamic Revolution. 
The important thing that interviewees have mentioned was the aim of society during 
the 60s. They believed that during the 60s, the Iranian society had a common aim and 
this aim made it an ideal society. “The 60s was the climax of our nation’s idealism. 
Everyone had a common ideal. These days they all think of their own interests” 
(Interviewee 86). Or Interviewee 03 stated: “Those days, everyone was united and 
striving towards one aim. In the 60s, social solidarity was higher. I really miss those 
days.” Although we can say that this aim that was mentioned by interviewees is victory 
in the war between Iran and Iraq as Interviewee 01 has mentioned: “I have nostalgia 
for the 60s, since back then, in the time of war, everyone was appealing for one thing 
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and that was victory in the war”, but the way that interviewees have mentioned that 
goal is in the most depoliticised way, because the victory in the war here is mentioned 
as the element that caused the solidarity of the society and social cohesion in the 
society. Although it is obvious that during wartime the range of social cohesion in any 
participant society in the war is increasing, but here the war stands against people. 
Because war is known as an element that caused solidarity and people are known as 
elements that caused the losing of that social cohesion. Here war belongs to the 
Islamic Republic state and culture belongs to people. When people mention victory in 
the war as the common goal of society, and also blame “people” for losing that social 
cohesion, we can conclude that the IRdisc by preferring its desired meaning could 
make a kind of satisfaction among its subjects when they remember the wartime 
during the 60s. Even this discourse could make this kind of satisfaction among subjects 
that have no clear memories of the 60s. For example Interviewee 83 stated: “I do not 
remember much about that time, but I know that there was a war and people were 
united and coherent. Communications were honest and intimate, not like today full of 
false flattery and hypocrisy.” Or Interviewee 70 stated: “I do not remember much 
about that time, but I believe the situation was better. At least people were kinder. 
People used to have common feelings, we have lost this unity.”  
Interviewees under this sub-category have mentioned social cohesion as the one of 
the most important features of the 60s. As I have mentioned in analysing the previous 
sub-category, the concern of this research is not examining if the existence of social 
cohesion during 60s is true or false. Nonetheless the matter is that people are 
remembering the 60s as the era when the amount of social cohesion was higher than 
today and they blame people for losing this social cohesion. This means that not only 
the preferred meaning of the IRdisc is hegemonic among interviewees that stated 
these statements, but also the role of the Islamic Republic state has been neglected in 
seeing its responsibility for losing the social cohesion during the 60s.  
In the next part I will analyse the next two sub-categories that are stated by 
interviewees who have nostalgia for the 60s because of the “richness of meaning” or 
“social cohesion”. Statements that have been categorised under the next two sub-
categories are demonstrating the causes of losing that richness of meaning and social 
cohesion in the interviewees’ opinion. In the analysis of the next two sub-categories I 
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will elaborate more the depoliticised vision of interviewees in remembering the 60s 
and the causes of losing that pleasant living situation.  
Third Sub-Category: Absence of Technology during the 60s  
During interviews about the 60s, 77 interviewees among all 90 interviewees believed 
that because of the “richness of meaning” or “social cohesion” during the 60s decade, 
they have nostalgia for the 60s. After positions of interviewees became clear for me 
regarding the 60s, I tried to ask them why they think our society is not like the 60s and 
what has changed society? Interviewees’ responses to these questions could help me 
in order to understand if interviewees see a kind of defeat in Islamic Republic state 
ideals, or they see other causes for the loss of the richness of meaning and social 
cohesion of the 60s.  
Interviewees’ responses to these questions led to the emergence of two sub-
categories for the causes of the loss of the conditions of the 60s. The first sub-
category, which surprisingly came out of the responses, is about the “absence of 
technology” during 60s. Namely interviewees that have made statements under this 
sub-category, believed that the emergence of technology has caused the Iranian 
society to move away from the conditions of the 60s. 
27 interviewees out of 77 have mentioned technology as the cause of moving away 
from the ideal situation of the 60s, namely 35.6%. These statements are listed in the 
table B-1-3 of the appendices. 
For instance Interviewee 09 stated: “We had social solidarity back then. Technology 
and the Internet have ruined everything.” Or Interviewee 65 stated: “The progress of 
technology has made people to tear apart and do not care about others. Back then, as 
much as you cared about yourself, at least half that amount you would care about 
others.”  
Seeing technology as the cause of losing solidarity or intimacy of a society, looks like a 
projective point of view and this projective point of view has been desired by the 
IRdisc since it is extremely depoliticised. It means that interviewees by knowing 
technology as the matter that ruined the ideal society are not considering any possible 
political matter in this ruin. Therefore the Islamic Republic state in this point of view is 
acquitted from all possible action that could lead to the loss of the richness of meaning 
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or social cohesion.  
Here, in the subjectification processes of the IRdisc, technology also can be known, as 
the constitutive outside factor that will cause the defeat in forming the ideal form of 
society. People, who blame technology for the loss in social cohesion are subjects of 
the IRdisc, because they see no defeat in the Islamic Republic’s actions in losing the 
ideal form of society. What seems obvious here is the dissatisfaction of interviewees of 
their current living situation, nevertheless what has made them subjects of the IRdisc, 
is that they are not blaming the state or articulated meanings in the IRdisc for this 
dissatisfaction, but technology as the “other” is blamed. And in the more accurate 
look, we can see that people are blaming themselves in using technology. For instance 
Interviewee 90 stated: “These technologies like new cell-phones and tablets and 
especially internet, have caused the emergence of a new lifestyle. People spend no 
time together and even in family parties everyone just looks at their technological 
gadgets”. Or Interviewee 77 believed: “All the ladies are watching satellite TV channels 
or using internet now, which is why they do not care about each other”.  
Here again “people” are the subject of blame, since they use this technology. It means 
that not only the preferred meanings of the IRdisc are preferred meanings of people 
and they are subjects of this discourse, but also these subjects blame “people” in 
moving away from the ideal situation during the 60s. The IRdisc in preferring its 
desired meanings regarding the signifier of the 60s, could exonerate itself from 
articulating meanings that could lead to the loss of richness of meaning and social 
cohesion. Therefore, people see technology as the matter that caused this loss and 
blame people for using this technology.  
Fourth Sub-Category: Economic Welfare during the 60s 
The next sub-category more clearly depoliticised the subjectivity of the interviewees. 
Statements under this category are available in table B-1-4 of the appendices. 50 
interviewees among 77 (64.93%) believed that the current economic situation is the 
cause of moving away from the ideal form of society during the 60s, but only 7 
interviewees (9.09%) believed that this economic situation is caused by mediation of 
political decisions (first seven statements in the table B-1-4 in appendices).  
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The important point is, even these 7 interviewees have not mentioned any political 
decision or action by the state that caused the emergence of a bad economic situation, 
but in general they have stated that the economic situation was better during the 60s. 
For instance Interviewee 29 stated: “Back then, you were sure about your financial 
situation, I mean, you knew that at least you would have something to eat with your 
family and you would not go hungry.” Or Interviewee 52 believed: “Economic 
problems have reached a level that all principles and friendships have faded.” It seems 
that in all statements about the 60s and the loss of the ideal living situation during that 
decade, the state plays no role. This also demonstrates the hegemony of the IRdisc in 
preferring its desired meanings regarding the signifier of the 60s. 
Although the other 43 interviewees (90.91%), have economic concerns and believed 
that the economic situation during 60s was better, they also blame “people” for losing 
that welfare and lifestyle. Interviewees in expressing the causes of moving away from 
the conditions of the 60s have mentioned concepts like greed, luxury, money-based 
relationships, personal interests and selfishness. For example Interviewee 03 stated: 
“Everyone has turned into a wolf these days, they want to rob you and make money. 
Back then people cared about others.” Or Interviewee 28 stated: “Our financial 
situation might have been worse, but no one was greedy. Now, everyone is greedy for 
more money.” Or Interviewee 73 believed: “Humans when hungry, are worse than 
animals. I do not believe that our people are hungry, but greed has blinded them and 
made them obsessed with needs, which were not significant back then.”  
Again, here and among these statements people are subject to criticism. Interviewees 
believe that our society moved away from the 60s situation because of people and 
because they become more selfish and greedy for money. Again here the role of the 
Islamic Republic state in creating the current economic situation has been neglected. 
People are dissatisfied with the current economic situation and they blame the culture 
that “people” created for this dissatisfaction. For instance Interviewee 60 stated: 
“Money has become influential in a way that stealing is not immoral anymore. The one 
who steals more is wealthier and gets others to respect him, while it was humanity 
which used to command respect.” Or Interviewee 80 believed: “People would give up 
their lives for the sake of others. These days, they do not even give up their money.”  
Therefore the IRdisc could make its desired subjects in a way that these subjects blame 
 226 
themselves for not being the ideal subjects that they used to be. It means that in the 
identification process of these subjects, preferred meanings of the IRdisc regarding the 
signifier of the 60s, have been fixed in a way that if subjects objectively and based on 
their current situations move away from that preferred meanings, they blame 
themselves, because they know those meanings as the true meanings of life which 
brought for them a more pleasant living situation during the 60s. This is what I meant 
by a depoliticised point of view. The IRdisc could make that kind of subjectivity in 
regard to the 60s decade that acquits itself from being blamed for articulating 
meanings which leads to the current unpleasant living situation. Therefore, this 
discourse always stays in the minds of subjects as the saviour of values, which have 
emerged during the 60s and made the living situation better than what it is today. Also 
this kind of subjectivity does not recognise the IRdisc as the causes of failure, but 
blames “people” instead for the loss of the ideal social living situation during the 60s.  
Second Category: Alternative Preferred Meanings  
Statements that have formed this category are presenting different preferred 
meanings regarding the 60s from what the IRdisc has desired. Twenty-six statements 
by 13 interviewees have been categorised under this category which comes out to 
14.44%. These statements are presenting the kinds of identifications which stand 
against the preferred meaning of the IRdisc that has been presented in the “Condition 
White” TV series. The B-2 table in the appendices is showing statements by 
interviewees that are not having nostalgia for the 60s and have preferred other 
meanings.  
These alternative preferred meanings might be formed in regard to remembering the 
objective situation during the 60s. Some interviewees by referring to the living 
situation during the 60s believed that nothing beautiful existed then and everything 
was effected by war. For example, Interviewee 10 stated: “All I remember of the time 
is the hardship of war, the air raid sirens and fear. There was nothing beautiful.” Or 
Interviewee 76 believed: “What I know about 60s is war between Iran and Iraq, and I 
think having nostalgia about wartime is a kind of physiological illness.” In this kind of 
position, interviewees by referring to the actual living situation under effect of war 
during the 60s, see the war as an element that made the living situation difficult. It 
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means that the preferred meaning of the IRdisc has been deconstructed in this kind of 
position regarding the war. This deconstruction sees war as an element, which has 
caused nothing for the nation except fear and horror. Interviewee 64 believed that: 
“the 60s is the era of fear and horror, we experienced war at that era and the domestic 
policy was about eliminating political parties and social groups. Why should I have 
nostalgia about that dark decade?” This kind of remembering exactly stands against 
the preferred meaning of the IRdisc. Again I reiterate that the concern of this research 
is not seeking for the true or false position regarding the objective living situation 
during the 60s, but all I desire is examining if the preferred meaning of the IRdisc 
regarding this signifier can be considered as the hegemonic meaning or not. 
Deconstruction of the meaning of war leads to preferring other meanings regarding 
the signifier of the 60s, rather than what the IRdisc has desired. After all, in the 
previous parts I have argued that the preferred meaning of interviewees regarding the 
signifier of the 60s is related to how they see war. If interviewees don’t relate the war 
to ideological and transcendental meanings, then the objective situation of living 
during the 60s under the effect of war becomes meaningless for them. For instance 
Interviewee 26 stated: “All I can remember is misery and misfortune. If you wanted to 
criticise, they would shut you up, because there was a war and revolutionary forces 
would make life hell for you.” Or Interviewee 50 believed: “People who have 
experience living in the 60s have forgotten the breath-taking circumstances in that 
decade, everything was about war and defeat.” These kinds of statements are 
presenting the kinds of identifications regarding the signifier of the 60s, which can be 
considered as rival meanings of the preferred meanings of the IRdisc. In this kind of 
identification, the meaning of war and the living situation that this war caused has 
been understood differently. As I have argued in analysing the previous category, in 
the meaning system of the IRdisc the 60s and the war caused social cohesion and 
richness of meaning. The IRdisc within forms of interpellations asks its subjects to 
remember the 60s as the beautiful era that the living situation was in its ideal form. If 
some people don’t accept this romanticising and glamorising and believe that it is 
propaganda of the IRdisc, then they have definitely identified themselves with other 
meanings rather than what the IRdisc preferred. For example Interviewee 26 believed: 
“If we say that people used to be better, we are affected by the state’s propaganda, 
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which wants to cover its problems.” Therefore here the “people” are not subjects of 
criticism as we saw in the previous category, but the forces that have caused the war 
and now are taking benefits from war are to be blamed. For instance Interviewee 57 
stated: “60s is all about war and propaganda of the Islamic Republic about the war, 
which could have ended 4 years earlier. Wartime caused this Islamic Republic state to 
become more powerful by taking young lives.” 
Therefore, statements that have been categorised under this sub-category are 
presenting alternative preferred meaning which are not acceptable in the meaning 
system of the IRdisc. Interviewees that have stated these statements see nothing 
beautiful or outstanding during the 60s that causes the emergence of nostalgia in their 
mind. This kind of identification doesn’t blame people for losing the ideal form of living 
situation during the 60s and instead highlights other possible meanings. It is worth 
mentioning that the IRdisc can articulate its preferred meaning in antagonism with this 
kind of identification, which is not considering the 60s as the ideal era. This is because 
the amount of this kind of identification regarding the signifier of the 60s is simply 
much less than the amount of the IRdisc ideal form of identification. Also the IRdisc 
can marginalise this form of identification, since it stands against “people” because it is 
not recognising the ideal form of society and people being during the 60s decade.  
Conclusion 
My concern in this part was examining if the preferred meaning of the IRdisc regarding 
the signifier of the 60s which I obtained from the “Condition White” TV series can be 
considered as the hegemonic meaning among the Tehranian middle class or not. In 
analysing the data that I have obtained from 90 interviews, 2 major categories have 
been obtained. The first category is presenting the kind of identification that is 
consistent with the preferred meaning of the IRdisc. Namely interviewees that have 
made statements under this category, are having nostalgia for the 60s because they 
think the living conditions during this decade were in its ideal form. Statements under 
the second category are presenting alternative preferred meanings by interviewees in 
regards to the signifier of the 60s. It means that interviewees that have made these 
statements do not have nostalgia about the 60s decade since they don’t think living 
conditions during the 60s were better or outstanding. The table below shows the 
 229 
numbers of interviewees and statements and also the percentages of the two major 
categories.  
 
Category Number of interviewees 
Number of 
statements Percentage 
1 Moments/Fixed meaning 77 154 85.55% 
2 Alternative preferred meaning 13 26 14.44% 
Total 90 180 100% 
 
In an overall view I can conclude that the preferred meaning of the IRdisc regarding 
the 60s is hegemonic among Tehranian middle class. The majority of interviewees, 
namely 85.55% are having nostalgia about the 60s because of their belief in the 
“richness of meaning” or “social cohesion” of that decade. As I have elaborated in the 
analysis of the “Condition White” TV series, the preferred meaning of the IRdisc 
regarding the signifier of the 60s decade is nostalgia for this decade because of one or 
both of the mentioned reasons. Therefore these preferred meanings could be 
considered as the hegemonic meaning among the Tehranian middle class, since the 
majority of interviewees have admitted that they have nostalgia for the 60s decade 
and their statements demonstrated that the reason for this nostalgia is either the 
existence of “social cohesion” or the “richness of meaning” during the 60s.  
Therefore the first category has been divided into two sub-categories, those having 
nostalgia for the 60s because of “richness of meaning” or “social cohesion” --both of 
which can be considered as preferred meanings of the IRdisc. The table below 
demonstrates the number and percentages of interviewees in each sub-category.  
 
The approximate equality among statements about reasons for having nostalgia for 
Sub-Category about reasons 
of having nostalgia about 60s 
Number of 
interviewees 
Number of 
statements Percentage 
1-1 Richness of meanings 39 39 50.64 
1-2 Social cohesion 38 38 49.36 
Total 77 77 100% 
 230 
the 60s shows that the IRdisc has been successful in making its subjects prefer its 
desired meaning. In the process of making subjects prefer a specific meaning among all 
potential meanings, the IRdisc could gain the submission of the subjects in accepting 
the preferred meaning of social cohesion or richness of meaning during the 60s. It 
means that the interpellation of subjects by the ideological state apparatuses, and the 
state television is certainly among them, could successfully interpellate subjects 
regarding the signifier of the 60s and also could successfully make them prefer a 
specific meaning among all potential meanings. Therefore the meaning system of the 
IRdisc in facing the 60s signifier could make subjects satisfied in accepting its desired 
meaning and reach a temporary closure regarding the signifier of the 60s. 
The main concern of the IRdisc, here could be that if people (subjects) have nostalgia 
for the 60s, this could lead to their dissatisfaction with their current living conditions. 
Therefore, it is very important to find out what the subjects consider to be the causes 
of losing those pleasant living conditions of the 60s. If subjects blame the state or 
government for losing that ideal social living condition, then the IRdisc damages its 
current hegemony by preferring these meanings regarding the 60s, but if people 
(subjects) blame other matters rather than the state and government, then the IRdisc 
has protected itself from being blamed by its subjects, and remains as a force that has 
a potential for returning back the current conditions to what existed during the 60s. 
Therefore it is important to understand the matters that subjects know as causes of 
losing the ideal living conditions during the 60s. The table below shows major causes of 
losing the ideal living conditions that have been obtained from interviews.  
 
Sub-Categories about causes of 
losing ideal living conditions 
during the 60s 
Number of 
interviewees 
Number of 
statements Percentage 
1-3 Absence of technology during the 60s 27 27 35.67% 
1-4 Economic welfare during the 60s 50 50 64.93% 
Total 77 77 100% 
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During my analysis of the 1-3 sub-category, I have argued that none of the 
interviewees who made statements that have formed this sub-category, have blamed 
the state for losing the ideal living conditions of the 60s. They consider technology as a 
matter that works here as the constitutive outside force regardless of the IRdisc. 
Technology in this sub-category belongs to people, not the state, and people are eager 
to use technologies. Therefore, statements under this sub-category are blaming people 
for using technology and believe that the extreme use of technology is the cause of 
losing the ideal social living conditions of the 60s.  
The 1-4 sub-category demonstrate that people believe the current bad economic 
situation has caused the loss of the ideal living conditions during the 60s decade. 
Nonetheless as we can see in the table below, only 9.09% of interviewees consider 
economic matters as the cause of the loss of living conditions of the 60s believe that 
the state has caused the emergence of this bad economic situation.  
 
Point of view Number of interviewees 
Number of 
statements Percentage 
Political reasons 7 7 9.09% 
Non-political reasons 43 43 90.91% 
Total 50 50 100% 
 
The majority, namely 90.91%, mention concepts like greed, luxury, money-based 
relationships, personal interests, selfishness, etc. have blamed people for losing the 
ideal social living conditions of the 60s.  
Therefore I can conclude that not only the IRdisc could prefer its desired meaning 
regarding the signifier of the 60s among the Tehranian middle class, but also this 
discourse in the process of this preferring and articulating its preferred meaning has 
secured itself from being blamed in losing the ideal living conditions during the 60s and 
has made “people” to blame for this situation. Subjects are blaming people for losing 
the pleasant social living circumstances of the 60s. This blaming has two benefits for 
the IRdisc. Firstly people are not blaming the state and are blaming themselves for not 
remaining the ideal subjects that they used to be during the 60s for the IRdisc. 
Consequently this subjectivity that blames people, politically secures the IRdisc since it 
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contains depoliticised characteristic in facing current problems, which logically have 
accrued by the mediation of the IRdisc and government that supports this discourse. 
Secondly, by referring to the satisfying living conditions of the 60s, the IRdisc remains 
in the minds of the subjects as a potential that can return the conditions back to what 
existed during the 60s.  
Therefore, the preferred meaning of the IRdisc regarding the signifier of the 60s can be 
considered as the hegemonic meaning among the Tehranian middle class. The IRdisc 
by being successful in preferring its desired meaning regarding the 60s, which as I 
discussed, can be considered as the one of the important signifiers for this discourse, 
could secure itself from losing hegemony among its Tehranian middle class subjects. 
Representing a myth of social cohesion and richness of meaning during the 60s, could 
naturalise the current conditions of the IRdisc and this naturalisation logically leads to 
ignorance of social injustices that this discourse has caused.  
Representing a myth of existence of social cohesion and richness of meaning during 
the 60s, leads to emergence of a social imagination, according to Laclau and Mouffe. If 
a discourse can relate this social imagination to a historical spot and highlight its 
desired element related to that spot, consequently having nostalgia to that historical 
spot is securing the discourse from being dislocated. Since this discourse by 
representing a myth and making a social imagination, introduces itself as a matter that 
objectively caused the emergence of that imagination. Nostalgia here means accepting 
this social imagination by the subjects and imagining that this myth objectively existed 
during a historical period. Here apart from what really was happening during the 60s, 
the 60s can be considered as a historical period that subjects of the IRdisc accepted as 
a period that their imagination of the richness of meaning and social cohesion 
objectively existed. Therefore having nostalgia for the 60s, not only means accepting 
the social imagination of the hegemonic discourse, but also means seeing that 
discourse (which represented the social imagination according to its desired elements 
apart from what actually was happening during that decade) as the most important 
factor that caused conditions of actualisation of their imagination, since in the middle 
class’s subjectivity, this discourse has actualised richness of meaning and social 
cohesion once during the 60s. Therefor having nostalgia for the 60s is the demand of 
the IRdisc from its middle class subjects since it naturalises the current conditions of 
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this discourse. Arguably considering not seeing any political reason for losing the myth 
of social cohesion and richness of meaning by the subjects, making this nostalgia is an 
extremely political act by the IRdisc since it represses the demand of having social 
justice from the IRdisc since subjects see this discourse as the matter that caused 
social justice during the 60s, therefor they blame themselves for losing social cohesion 
and richness of meaning and this secures and naturalises the current conditions of the 
IRdisc.  
Within this naturalisation, the demand of social justice has been suppressed in 
subjectivities of members of the middle class. Since this middle class by having an 
extremely depoliticised vision, firstly not recognizing any marginalised or suppressed 
social agencies, and secondly, not questioning or even mentioning preferred meanings 
of the IRdisc, which may cause the emergence of social injustice within the everyday 
life, in comparison with what they perceive to be the pleasant life of the 60s. In the 
subjectivity of interviewees, the poor, marginalized social groups and suppressed 
political activists are ignored and neglected, and this would naturalise the articulation 
of the hegemonic discourse and eradicates the demand of social justice.   
Islamic Republic’s subjects seem currently satisfied in accepting the myth of this 
discourse in their identity formations and don’t feel forced in this acceptance.  
DATA ANALYSIS FOR SIGNIFIERS OF “SOVEREIGNTY”, “INSIGHT” AND 
“VELAYAT-MADARI” 
In the previous chapter, in the analysis of the “Mukhtar Nameh” TV series, I have 
argued that the IRdisc with the mediation of its main ideological state apparatus, 
namely the state television, has tried to represents its ideal subject positions and 
preferred meanings regarding to signifiers of “sovereignty”, “insight” and “velayat-
madari”. As I have argued in the analysis part, these signifiers are closer to the nodal 
point of the IRdisc because they are making clear the ideological red-lines of the IRdisc. 
Therefore, the preferred meanings regarding these signifiers by the IRdisc has been 
done in a different way from the other two signifiers that I have discussed before.  
The aim of the IRdisc and IRIB in articulating meanings regarding these signifiers was 
mostly in determining and clearing the ideal and the non-ideal subject positions, rather 
than preferring a specific meaning regarding these signifiers. Thus in analysing the 
 234 
interview data, it is of vital importance to grasp that the notion of “others” is very 
important in taking positions regarding the signifiers of “sovereignty”, “insight” and 
“velayat-madari”. It means that the IRdisc by representing its ideal subject positions 
also has determined the position of “others” in dissident with the ideal subjects’ 
positions. Consequently, although the acceptance of the preferred meaning of the 
IRdisc by subjects is the ideal of this discourse in order to be the hegemonic discourse, 
but in analysing interviews’ data in this part we need to understand that the concept 
of “other” plays a critical and determining role. Since, as discussed, the concept of 
“other” and clarifying the subject position of others in opposition to the ideal subject 
position has two major benefits for each discourse. Firstly, the elimination of others as 
those who stand against and oppose the ideal subject position, and secondly this 
elimination causes other people (because of fear of being eliminated and punished by 
repressive state apparatuses) to opt out of the “others” subject positions. It is worth 
mentioning that in considering the second benefit for each discourse in identifying 
“others”, actions by repressive state apparatuses are determinant. Since if repressive 
state apparatuses deal with “others” in a way that creates fear among people from 
being punished by these apparatuses, the discourse has reached the ideal in 
representing its ideal subject position against the “others” position. Thus if people 
don’t accept the ideal subject positions that have been represented and also don’t 
identify themselves with “others” positions, because they don’t want to be punished 
by repressive state apparatuses, the discourse remains hegemonic. This is because 
people, on the one hand are not accepting the preferred subject positions of 
discourse, and on the other hand are not identifying themselves with opponent 
positions. Therefore in analysing interview data in this part, it is important to notice 
the position of interviewees not adopting the position of “others”.  
In the aftermath of Iran’s 2009 presidential election, many were arrested and even 
killed during street protests. The “Revolutionary Court” gave prison sentences to many 
of the protesters that have been arrested. Those days a jail in southern Tehran named 
“Kahrizak” became notorious for its mistreatment of prisoners. A few protesters died 
in jail and whilst in detention. Some of them claimed that they were raped in 
“Kahrizak” prison. However, my concern here is not talking about what the Islamic 
Republic state has done in dealing with protesters. What I want to examine here is, if 
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the IRdisc by using its repressive state apparatuses, namely revolutionary court, anti-
riot forces, police and prisons, could prevent people from accepting the position that 
this discourse considers as the “others” position or not. 
As I have argued in the analysis of the “Mukhtar Nameh” TV series, the articulated 
meaning and represented subject positions in this series are related to the concept of 
“supreme leadership” in the IRdisc. All three signifiers that I mentioned above and the 
ideal subject positions in regard to them are defined by their closeness or distance 
with the position of the supreme leadership in the IRdisc. These subject positions have 
been defined in relation to the position of Mukhtar, which I have argued, is the same 
as the position of Ayatollah Khamenei in the IRdisc as the supreme leader. Hence in 
interviews, I have tried to grasp the position of interviewees regarding supreme 
leadership in the Islamic Republic state and the current supreme leader, Ayatollah 
Khamenei.  
As I did when analysing the other two TV series, in each interview in this part I have 
highlighted two major statements by each interviewee. These statements are the exact 
words of the interviewees and are clarifying the interviewee’s position regarding 
“sovereignty”, “insight” and “velayat-madari” and their positions regarding the notion 
of supreme leadership and the current supreme leader. After elimination of non-
related statements by interviewees, 4 major categories have been obtained from 
interviews. In the next part, I will name and analyse each category and will discuss if 
the IRdisc could reach hegemony by representing its ideal subject positions and 
defining positions of others in contradiction with these subject positions or not.  
First Category: Ideal Subjects’ Positions 
Statements that have been categorised under this category are demonstrating the 
acceptance of the concept of supreme leadership as the functional notion for ruling 
the country. Interviewees that made statements under this category believe that the 
current supreme leader has served the country properly. 36 statements by 18 
interviewees have been categorised under this category. It means that the ideal 
subject position of the IRdisc regarding the concept of supreme leadership is 
hegemonic among 20% of interviewees. These interviewees, by mentioning different 
reasons, believe that having a supreme leader is beneficial for the country. The C-1 
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table in appendices is showing statements that have been categorised under this 
category. 
Statements under this category are demonstrating reasons why interviewees are 
mentioning the supreme leader as beneficial for the country. These reasons could be 
grasped in relation to ideal subject positions that have been represented in the 
“Mukhtar Nameh” TV series. Some of these interviewees believe that the supreme 
leader is the person that can legitimise the sovereignty. For instance Interviewee 70 
believed: “I support the supreme leader one hundred percent, since society needs a 
leader. Our society is Islamic, the leader must be Muslim.” Or Interviewee 4 stated: “I 
believe in supreme leadership and I also believe the current supreme leader can prove 
that the Shia is right and fair”. These kinds of statements are related to the notion of 
sovereignty. Namely interviewees that made these statements believe that the 
country needs a leader and without the supreme leader the country will fall into chaos. 
For instance Interviewee 45 stated: “The supreme leader as a superior person has 
saved the country many times. Everyone should trust the captain at the helm of the 
ship”. Accepting the position of supreme leader by interviewees means that they are 
seeing the notion of sovereignty and supreme leadership related to each other and 
also they are considering the position of supreme leader as necessary for ruling the 
country. It means that the preferred meaning of the IRdisc is hegemonic among 
interviewees that made these statements. Indeed, I have argued in the part of the 
analysis of the “Mukhtar Nameh” TV series that the IRIB has tried to prefer this 
meaning: every Islamic state needs a supreme leader. Even some interviewees 
admitted that the current situation in the country is not in its ideal form, nonetheless 
they believed that it is not the fault of supreme leader. For example Interviewee 30 
stated: “The supreme leader is good. His subordinates are hurting us. He himself is 
fine”. Or Interviewee 55 believed: “I believe we have cultural, economic and political 
problems in this country, which has a good leader. We should support the supreme 
leader and we should also have qualified people to manage the country’s affairs”. 
Some other interviewees believed that any other alternative for ruling the country 
makes the situation worse; thus they assumed that the current supreme leader is 
proper for Iran. For instance Interviewee 49 stated: “I do not have any problem with 
the supreme leader or the Islamic state, because I know any alternative would have its 
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own problems.” This shows that the concept of sovereignty and supreme leadership 
complement each other in people’s minds.  
Some other interviewees, considering the current situation in the region, believed that 
the current supreme leader, by his actions, has brought security for the country. For 
example Interviewee 24 stated: “We need a leader. If we did not have the supreme 
leader our situation would be insecure like that of other countries in the region”. Or 
Interviewee 63 believed: “We have security in the Islamic Republic, which is the most 
important factor. So, political issues and such stuff are nonsense. We owe security in 
this country to the supreme leader”. Or Interviewee 82 stated: “We have security in 
the country, the security that no other country in the region has. It indicates that the 
Islamic Republic’s policies and actions by the supreme leader are right”. These kinds of 
statements and positions are related to the notion of “insight”. Indeed, interviewees 
that made these statements believe that security in the country is the outcome of 
good leadership. The notion of “insight” as we discussed before, is related to 
conspiracies of enemies. The person who has insight is not fooled by the enemy’s 
conspiracies. The IRdisc, considering the insecure situation in the region and 
neighbouring countries like Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan, could convince people that if 
we have security in the country, it is the consequence of good leadership of the 
current supreme leader. Therefore those speaking about Iran’s security and consider 
this security as the outcome of good leadership by the current supreme leader have 
insight and were not fool by the enemy’s conspiracies. At least that’s what the Islamic 
Republic wants people to think in this case.  
Therefore the preferred meaning of the IRdisc regarding the signifier of “sovereignty” 
and “insight” can be considered as the preferred meaning of the subjects that made 
the above statements. The position taken by the subjects is the Islamic Republic 
discourse’s ideal subject position.  
It is worth mentioning that none of interviewees considered the role of the supreme 
leader as the transcendental or metaphysical role which has been given to the 
supreme leader. All of them mentioned functions of supreme leadership. This means 
that the IRdisc after experiencing the legitimacy crisis after the presidential election in 
2009, hasn’t tried to prefer its desired meaning regarding the nodal point of the IRdisc. 
Nonetheless this discourse has tried to prefer its desired meaning regarding signifiers 
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that could keep the nodal point safe from being dislocated. The signifiers that the 
IRdisc has tried to prefer in its desired meaning regarding the “Mukhtar Nameh” TV 
series are more ideological than the other two signifiers in the “Shams-ol Emareh” and 
the “Condition White” TV series. Therefore, the IRdisc instead of preferring its desired 
meaning regarding these signifiers, has tried to demonstrate the function of accepting 
the subject positions that have been represented in “Mukhtar Nameh”. This action by 
the IRdisc makes sure the nodal point remains safe from being dislocated, because it 
stands in its mythical form by not being defined. The IRdisc has clarified its ideal 
subject positions and in contradiction, the position of “others” is illustrated by the 
Islamic Republic is very negative terms. Consequently this discourse has tried to 
determine what happens to people who accepted the position of “others”. Therefore 
even in this category, which is the category of acceptance of the preferred subject 
positions of the IRdisc, we see no ideological statements by the interviewees. That is, 
the interviewees just simply mention their acceptance of the desired subject positions 
of the IRdisc.  
Statements by interviewees that have been categorised under this category are 
demonstrating acceptance of the ideal subject positions of the IRdisc. In the analysis of 
the next categories I will examine if not accepting these subject positions by people 
could lead to the loss of hegemony for the IRdisc.  
Second Category: Floating Signifier 
Interviewees that have made statements under this category relate the issue of 
supreme leadership to the notion of politics. Accordingly these statements are 
demonstrating that interviewees have no clear position regarding the notion of 
politics. It means that they don’t believe that talking about politics would be beneficial 
in order to solve the country’s problems. Thus statements under this category are not 
clarifying the position of interviewees regarding the supreme leader. Although these 
statements contain no sign of any identification with rival and marginalised meanings 
to the preferred meanings of the IRdisc, but they do not accept the ideal subject 
positions of this discourse. It seems that interviewees under this category are 
indifferent to the notion of politics and also see the issue of supreme leadership in the 
Islamic Republic state as a different issue than politics. Statements under this category 
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are showing that interviewees have other priorities rather than politics to be 
concerned about.  
Fifty-eight statements by 29 interviewees have formed this category, which comes out 
to 32.22% of all 90 interviewees and 180 statements. Among the statements that have 
formed this category, two major positions stand out. The first one, by avoiding talking 
about supreme leadership and politics, believe that the main problem in Iran is not 
politics and the supreme leader, but the country’s bad financial condition. The C-2-1 
table in the appendices shows the statements that consider the economy as the main 
problem in the country and see talking about politics and the supreme leadership 
irrelevant.  
These statements are containing no signs of accepting the preferred meaning of the 
IRdisc regarding the signifiers of “sovereignty”, “insight” and “velayat-madari” by 
interviewees. Most of the interviewees avoid talking about these issues and believed 
that these are political issues that they have no comment on. Alternatively they 
believe that the economy matters instead of politics and if the financial conditions get 
better, then other political issues don’t matter. For instance Interviewee 34 stated: “I 
do not think about the supreme leader and the like. If you had money, you would have 
everything. The regime should be economically reformed. If the economy improves, 
then culture would get fixed”. Or Interviewee 73 believed: “Politics is not an issue right 
now, but our economy needs to be fixed. Comparing to other countries in the region, 
our political situation is very good. Our problem is the economy; political concerns are 
useless”. Or Interviewee 38 stated: “If you acquire money, politics and culture would 
get fixed. When financial issues get solved, political and cultural problems would drop. 
I have nothing to do with politics; our problem is the economy”.  
These statements are demonstrating that interviewees have no preferred meaning 
regarding to the signifier of politics in general. Although the preferred meaning of the 
IRdisc regarding the mentioned signifiers are not hegemonic among this kind of 
positioning by interviewees, what is important is that these kinds of positioning do not 
identify themselves with other or rival discourses regarding the signifier of politics. It 
means that in the identification process of these interviewees, the issue of supreme 
leadership and all signifiers related to this concept are floating signifiers, since specific 
preferred meanings haven’t been related to them. Thus the importance of this kind of 
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positioning for the IRdisc is that people are not identifying themselves with rival 
discourses in regard to this signifier of politics. This is beneficial for the IRdisc in order 
to remain the hegemonic discourse. Because on the one hand its subjects are not 
denying its preferred meanings and on the other hand they are not adopting the 
position of “others” either. 
Interviewees that have made statements under this category see the concept of 
politics apart from the economy and this means that they are depoliticised. For 
instance Interviewee 83 stated: “I work a lot and I need to have a comfortable life. I am 
not a man of politics; I do not care about it. All people including me, have financial 
problems, it has nothing to do with politics”. Or Interviewee 79 believed: “The issue is 
not politics; I have nothing to do with politics. My main concern is economy, I want to 
travel abroad once a year and I need something to do in order to do so”. Or 
Interviewee 01 stated: “I have no comment on supreme leadership; the economic 
situation has affected the culture and spirituality in this country. If the economy works, 
we would not have political problems”.  
As I have argued in the data analysis related to the signifier of the 60s, the IRdisc 
prefers its subjects to be depoliticised instead of disagreeing with Islamic Republic’s 
positions. Therefore the kind of positioning that belongs to this category is well-suited 
for keeping the IRdisc hegemonic. Because subjects are not blaming the Islamic 
republic state’s actions and decisions, rather they see other elements important in 
even having bad living conditions. And they don’t relate these elements to the politics 
and consequently the ideological meanings of the IRdisc remain safe from being 
deconstructed.  
The second kind of positioning is, similar to first, about being depoliticised. 
Interviewees that have made statements in the C-2-2 table in the appendices also 
don’t care about politics and see culture as the matter that needs reform and change. 
Also in statements under this category, interviewees see culture separate from politics 
and blame people for its shortcomings. For example Interviewee 03 stated: “These 
days, all people are hypocritical and deceptive. They change their mind, depending on 
where they stand. The problem of our country is not theocracy and supreme 
leadership. People make the problems”. Or Interviewee 07 believed: “Our people are 
all about pleasure and idleness, it has nothing to do with the regime and theocracy, 
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and they lack humanistic values. We used to see positive characteristics everywhere. 
People have become fools, a bunch of indifferent fools!” or Interviewee 52 stated: 
“We do not have political problems, I mean, we have but they are not important 
comparing to the fact that our people’s culture is a mess. In a culture where rich 
people are thieves, do you believe political protest works?”  
Again in these statements we can see that interviewees by mentioning concepts like 
robbery, greed, money worshiping, etc. are blaming people and they don’t recognise 
any link between what they call politics and culture. Again the Islamic Republic’s 
subjects here are so depoliticised, since not only do they have no intention to question 
the ideal subject positions of the IRdisc but also consider issues related to politics as 
irrelevant matters in constructing conditions of their social life.  
If we consider the situation of the IRdisc after the presidential election of 2009 and the 
legitimacy crisis which occurred because of political rather than economic issues, then 
the main question for the IRdisc is how to get out of this crisis. The IRdisc as I have 
argued in analysis of the first category, hasn’t tried to define the nodal point of the 
discourse in order to be the hegemonic discourse. Rather the efforts of this discourse 
were about depoliticising subjects. In analysing this category, we saw that the signifier 
of politics (as interviewees called it) could be considered as a floating signifier in the 
process of subject’s identification, which means no preferred meaning has been 
assigned to it. If the concept of politics becomes a floating signifier in the identification 
process of subjects, then the IRdisc has reached its aim in depoliticising subjects.  
In analysing this category, I have tried to emphasise how interviewees in facing the 
concept of supreme leadership and also the current supreme leader and in general in 
facing the concept of politics are indifferent and see other issues like economy and 
culture as more important and also consider these issues as separate from politics. 
Hence these subjects became depoliticised and this is ideal for the IRdisc to deal with 
its major legitimacy crisis, which was political. In the analysis of the next category I will 
mention the other way that the IRdisc could make its subjects depoliticised.  
Third Category: Rejecting the Position of “Others” 
Statements that have formed this category are showing the complete refusal of 
interviewees to make comments about politics. Interviewees that formed this category 
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see the concept of supreme leadership and consequently signifiers that the IRdisc has 
tried to prefer its desired meaning regarding them in the “Mukhtar Nameh” TV series, 
as political issues. They rejected the idea of making any comments about political 
issues. Thirty-four interviewees, namely 37.77% of all interviewees, rejected making 
any sort of political statements. The C-3 table in appendices shows statements that 
have been categorised under this third category.  
The phrase “I am not into politics” is the common phrase that has been repeated in 
most statements. The main question here is why interviewees don’t want to make 
comments about politics. The possible reasons are: they are satisfied with the current 
political situation in Iran, or they see other issues more important than politics, or they 
see consequences in speaking about politics and they want to avoid these 
consequences. Unlike the previous category, interviewees that made statements 
under this category did not believe that other issues are more important than politics 
and unlike the first category they were not satisfied with the current political situation. 
Nonetheless they avoided talking and making comments about politics, because most 
of them were thinking that getting into politics has consequences and a price to pay 
and they didn’t want to pay that price. For instance, Interviewee 14 stated: “I am not 
into politics, because I am not ready to pay its price. There is no use in objecting to this 
regime or to the supreme leadership. You only have to pay the price for your 
opposition”. Or Interviewee 25 believed: “I am not into politics, I follow the news but I 
am not ready to pay any price. Anyone, based on his capability should do as he can to 
reform the country. I have no capability”. Or Interviewee 50 said: “I am not into 
politics, in my opinion people do not want to get involved in politics, because there is a 
price to pay”.  
These kinds of statements demonstrate that interviewees have been convinced that 
talking about politics and having a position regarding political matters like the supreme 
leader, leads to paying a price. Nonetheless the question is why do they think so? 
We can seek the answer in the Islamic Republic’s actions in the construction of 
“others”. Interviewees that made the above statements had a fear of being punished 
and paying the price for being political. This fear has emerged in the interviewees’ 
minds because of the process of making “others” by the repressive state apparatuses 
of the IRdisc. As I have mentioned in the theoretical parts, Gramsci argued that 
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hegemony is a combination of the two elements of satisfaction and repression. The 
IRdisc after experiencing its legitimacy crisis during and after the presidential election 
of 2009, in order to remain hegemonic, needed to use both of these elements. In the 
analysis of the two other popular TV series, I have argued that the concern over the 
IRdisc was to make satisfaction among its subjects in accepting its preferred meanings. 
I concluded that this discourse was successful in making this satisfaction among the 
Tehranian middle class for the signifier of “woman” and “the 60s”.  
Nonetheless in facing the third signifier, the IRdisc has tried to create distance 
between its subjects and what they call politics. In this category we can see that this 
distance has been made because interviewees don’t want to make comments about 
politics. The position of “others” has worked here as a constitutive outside. It means 
that the actions of the IRdisc by the mediation of its repressive state apparatuses, has 
led people to avoid being “others” to avoid being punished by the repressive state 
apparatuses. Interviewees who have made statements under this category, see being 
political as the reason for the repression. During the aftermath of the events of the 
presidential election of 2009, they have seen what has happened to people who were 
political in the sense that they define politics. They have seen that political persons 
have been punished and eliminated. Therefore they were convinced that getting into 
politics (namely making comments about the supreme leader and sovereignty) is 
dangerous for them. So the IRdisc by using the element of repression could avoid its 
subjects from intending to deconstruct the preferred meanings of this discourse, which 
are close to the nodal point of this discourse and consequently make them 
depoliticised because of the fear of repression. For instance Interviewee 74 stated: “I 
am not into politics and do not think about this stuff, I want to earn a minimum 
income to live. This very supreme leader is a pure dictator, but who dare say it? They 
will catch you and send you to Kahrizak” (The notorious jail of 2009). Or Interviewee 
09 said: “I am not into politics at all. In 2009, I joined the protests till 15 June; then I 
got scared and quit.” Or Interviewee 14 believed: “Politics has no meaning in this 
country, since if you speak about politics, you will go to prison”. 
This fear of being repressed led to the emergence of two kinds of positioning regarding 
the notion of politics. Both of them are ideal for the IRdisc in making depoliticised 
subjects in antagonism with the “others” position. The first position sees the politics as 
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belonging to the politicians. For instance Interviewee 43 stated: “Politics is for 
politicians; I have another job. We should find a practical way to practice politics, 
because in this country political activism is impossible, it is better to stay silent”. Or 
Interviewee 76 said: “I am not into politics, but it is not possible for all to be 
indifferent; someone—I mean politicians—should do something”. And the other 
position defines politics by using concepts like “nasty” and “ugly” and sees politics as a 
matter that is not worth paying a price for. For instance Interviewee 31 stated: 
“Politics is ugly; I have nothing to do with it. I do not care about the supreme leader 
and such, because I am not ready to pay the price. Change in politics, do not change 
your life”. Or Interviewee 50 believed: “Politics is ugly and nasty. I have nothing to do 
with the supreme leader. Whoever he is, I do not care”. Or Interviewee 81 believed: 
“What is the use of politics? Politics is nasty, some pay the price and nothing changes 
at the end”.  
Therefor the IRdisc, by using the element of repression, could make a distance 
between its subjects and politics. This making of distance has made the preferred 
meanings of the IRdisc secure from dislocation and temporarily eliminated the 
emergence of the other potential meanings regarding the signifiers of “sovereignty”, 
“insight” and “velayat-madari” which were considered as political issues by 
interviewees.  
Therefore the positions of interviewees under this category are consistent with what 
the IRdisc desires. This category has been formed as a result of the repressive actions 
of the IRdisc in order to depoliticise its subjects in by punishing and eliminating people 
who were political.  
Fourth Category: The Positions of “Others” 
Statements under this category demonstrate the refusal of the preferred meaning of 
the IRdisc regarding the concept of supreme leadership. Eighteen statements by nine 
interviewees have been categorised under this category. Namely only 10% of all 
interviewees made statements that clearly demonstrate the acceptance of subject 
positions of “others” rather than the ideal subject position of the IRdisc. The C-4 table 
in the appendices shows these statements.  
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Interviewees that stated statements under this category have taken a position 
regarding the notion of supreme leadership, which is considered as the position of 
“others” by the IRdisc. Because they didn’t accept the position of supreme leader as 
represented in “Mukhtar Nameh” TV series and were not afraid to speak politics, 
despite fear of being repressed. They have a clear position regarding notions of 
supreme leadership and this position is not consistent with the ideals of IRdisc. For 
instance, Interviewee 10 stated: “If the state let people live as they desire and have 
their own lifestyle, everyone would be satisfied. The current supreme leader is a 
dictator and he forces people to accept his idea about everything”. Or Interviewee 57 
believed: “I personally believe the current supreme leader is the main factor that has 
caused insoluble problems in the country. He has to go and then people can decide 
freely how they want to live. The problem of this country is dictatorship”. Mentioning 
the concept of dictatorship and relating this concept to the current supreme leader of 
Iran, means that interviewees have chosen other potential meanings regarding the 
signifier of supreme leader, which the IRdisc has tried to marginalise. It means that 
signifiers of “sovereignty”, “insight” and “velayat-madari” haven’t been related to the 
concept of supreme leadership by these interviewees on the one hand and on the 
other hand they don’t see talking about these concepts and supreme leadership as 
irrelevant. Interviewees that have made the above statements by having different 
concerns believed that the current supreme leader is not doing well in serving the 
country. For instance Interviewee 10 by having the concern of freedom stated: “I am 
not into politics, but I believe we should have freedom of speech, freedom in clothing 
and freedom in the film industry and media”. Also Interviewee 19 by mentioning the 
same concept believed: “It would be great if we had freedom of speech alongside 
supreme leadership. We need to reform; another revolution has many dangers and 
casualties”. What seems obvious in these statements is that although the interviewees 
are opposing the current conditions of supreme leadership in Iran, but they don’t 
believe that the regime or the supreme leader should collapse. Nonetheless they 
believe in reform, even with the current supreme leader. For example Interviewee 16 
stated: “Whatever this regime is, it must be reformed. Because as soon as they go 
away, someone worse would come and rule”. Or Interviewee 44 believed: “At the end 
of the day, this society needs reform. If this regime collapses, foreigners would take its 
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place and they are worse. So, the current regime should be reformed”. The reason that 
these statements even have been made by interviewees, who opposed the current 
supreme leader, is that the IRdisc was successful in preferring its desired meaning 
regarding the signifier of insight even among people who are opposing the current 
supreme leader. As I argued the signifier of insight is related to not accepting the 
conspiracies of enemies. And enemy in this sense could be known as rival discourses, 
which aimed to deconstruct the preferred meanings of the IRdisc and collapse this 
discourse. During the interviews only two statements by Interviewees 26 and 64 called 
for the collapse of the Islamic Republic state: “I would like this regime and its supreme 
leader to collapse, but who can help? I am not ready to pay any price for this cause”. 
And Interviewee 64: “I totally disagree with supreme leadership and Islamic state, I 
think these are forms of dictatorship and have to go… the circumstance matters, if the 
circumstance is in a way that a protest does not lead to violence, you should protest 
then.” Nonetheless as it is obvious, again because of fear of being repressed and 
paying prices for the collapse, even these interviewees don’t want to pay any prices in 
order to make changes.  
Therefore, the IRdisc again is remaining secure from facing deconstruction regarding 
its ideological signifiers even from people who are clearly opposing the current 
supreme leader, since either they believe in reform or don’t want to pay any price for 
the collapse. Therefore, the IRdisc even with people, who don’t accept to be placed in 
the ideal subject positions of this discourse, is not facing any threat of collapse or 
deconstruction. Nonetheless this discourse was successful in marginalising rival 
discourses and rival preferred meanings in relation to the notion of supreme 
leadership and politics. Antagonist forces with the IRdisc are usually not strong enough 
to make any trouble for the hegemony of the IRdisc. Also, these forces, as we saw in 
analysing this and the previous category, are beneficial for the IRdisc in order to define 
ideological red-lines and create fear of repression among subjects of this discourse.  
Conclusion 
The concern of this research in this part was examining if preferred meanings of the 
IRdisc in regard to signifiers of “sovereignty”, “insight” and “velayat-madari” are 
hegemonic among the Tehranian middle class or not. The IRdisc through the “Mukhtar 
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Nameh” TV series has represented its ideal subject position in relation to the 
mentioned signifiers. As I have argued before, these subject positions are related to 
the supreme leader position more than they are related to the preferred meanings of 
the IRdisc. Therefore, during interviews in this part I have tried to grasp what is the 
position of the interviewee in relation to notions of supreme leadership and the 
current supreme leader. This could help me understand if the Tehranian middle class 
has been placed in the ideal subject position of the IRdisc or not. It is worth mentioning 
that in analysing this part, there was the consideration of the “others” position. 
Namely, if interviewees just have rejected the position of “others”, although they were 
not the ideal subjects of the IRdisc, but with consideration of the nature of hegemony 
that contains two elements of satisfaction and repression, not being placed in the 
position of “others” because of the fear of being repressed, makes the IRdisc 
hegemonic. During interviews and among 90 interviewees and 180 highlighted 
statements, four major categories have been obtained. The table below shows these 
categories and the numbers and percentages of interviewees that placed in each 
category.  
 
Category Numbers of interviewees 
Numbers of 
statements Percentage 
1 Ideal subject positions 18 36 20% 
2 Floating signifiers 29 58 32.22% 
3 Rejecting the position of “others” 34 68 37.77% 
4 The position of “others” 9 18 10% 
Total 90 180 100% 
 
The first category shows the consistency between interviewees’ positions and the ideal 
subjects positions of the IRdisc that have been represented in the “Mukhtar Nameh” 
TV series. The second category shows that interviewees have not made clear the 
position regarding the ideal subjects’ positions on the IRdisc. Statements that have 
been categorised under this category are not demonstrating any sign of accepting the 
position of “others”. Interviewees that have stated these statements believed that 
other issues are more important than politics in the current situation of Iran. They 
believed “economy” and “culture” are more important issues to talk about. 
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Nevertheless, these interviewees didn’t relate these issues to what they called politics 
(speaking about supreme leadership). Therefore, I have argued that because the 
position that these interviewees have taken in regard to the notion of supreme 
leadership and the current supreme leader, they have been not represented as the 
position of others, although these interviewees and their positions cannot be 
considered as the ideals of the IRdisc, but this discourse doesn’t see this kind of 
position as the positions of “others”. This kind of taking positions is beneficial for the 
IRdisc in order to be the hegemonic discourse because then it would have no 
possibility for deconstruction of the preferred meaning of this discourse.  
The third category demonstrates the rejection of the position of “others” by the 
interviewees. Here and in analysing this category the element of repression becomes 
very important. Interviewees that have made statements under the third category 
refused to make comments on what they called politics because they have been 
convinced that talking about politics could make them repressed. Here the repressive 
state apparatuses of the IRdisc made people convinced that talking about politics and 
being placed in the positions that are known as the position of “others” by the IRdisc 
could make them pay a price that they don’t want to pay. As I have argued, according 
to Gramsci, hegemony is a combination of “satisfaction” and “repression”. The IRdisc 
after experiencing the legitimacy crisis of 2009, has used its repressive state 
apparatuses to secure its ideological signifiers from dislocation and deconstruction. 
Although interviewees that made statements under this category didn’t identify 
themselves with the preferred meaning of the IRdisc regarding the mentioned 
signifiers and didn’t take the ideal subjects’ positions of the IRdisc, but they also didn’t 
identify themselves with rival discourses and other possible meanings regarding the 
notion of supreme leadership and the current supreme leader. Perhaps this was 
because of the fear repression. Therefore, the process of making “others” by the IRdisc 
has helped this discourse not lose its hegemony and has made people not accept or 
not identify themselves with the positions of “others” who have been repressed during 
the legitimacy crisis of the IRdisc.  
The fourth category demonstrates the rejection of the ideal subject position of the 
IRdisc in relation to the notion of supreme leadership. Interviewees that made 
statements under this category not only reject being placed in the ideal subjects’ 
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positions, but also have accepted the position of others regarding the notion of 
supreme leadership and the current supreme leader. Nonetheless, most of them 
believed in reform more than the collapse of the Islamic Republic state.  
In conclusion I can say that according to what I have argued in the analysis of each 
category, the first three categories demonstrate that interviewees have taken 
positions in relation to represented positions in the “Mukhtar Nameh” TV series, which 
are acceptable and ideal for the IRdisc. The first category is the ideal for the IRdisc and 
the other two categories are acceptable since they show the Islamic Republic subjects 
as depoliticised and this leads to safety for the Islamic Republic’s preferred meanings.  
It means that among interviewees only 10% have taken positions, which are not ideal 
or acceptable by the IRdisc, and 90% are consistent with the ideas of IRdisc. Thus the 
IRdisc is the hegemonic discourse among the Tehranian middle class, in preferring its 
desired meanings regarding the signifiers and subject positions that have been 
represented in the “Mukhtar Nameh” TV series. Accordingly, it can be concluded that 
the demand for political participation and political freedom have been suppressed 
within subjectivities of members of the Tehranian middle class. As mentioned in the 
chapter on the Tehranian middle class, these demands have always been significant in 
the subjectivity of the middle class and have caused various cultural and political 
transformations within Iranian society. Nonetheless, the IRdisc in order to be 
hegemonic, could eradicate this demand within the middle class subjectivities by 
making constitutive outsides (others) versus its ideal subject positions. This led to 
emergence of the depoliticized characteristic among subjectivities of the middle class 
and causes neglecting the significance of the notion of politics (as interviewees called 
it) and consequently having no intention in questioning meanings that belongs to this 
notion. Arguably, as I will mention in the conclusion chapter, the development of the 
depoliticized characteristic among the middle class subjectivities is beneficial for the 
IRdisc not only in overcoming the crisis, but also in advancing its articulation in various 
realms of the everyday life. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION
This study set out to explore to what extent the IRdisc can be considered the 
hegemonic discourse in fashioning its desired form of subjectivity among the 
Tehranian middle class. Two main questions thus had to be answered by this research. 
First, what is the desired form of subjectivity that the IRdisc aspires to, and what 
aspects are the most important for this discourse in forming the subjectivities that are 
related to them? Second, to what extent has the subjectivity of the Tehranian middle 
class been formed in relation to these preferred meanings and the ideal subject 
positions of the IRdisc?  
In order to answer these questions, I have tried to explore the desired form of 
subjectivity in the IRdisc, through the study of productions from Iranian state 
television. During a historical analysis of the emergence and evolution of the Iranian 
television discourse since the revolution of 1979, I have argued that this ideological 
state apparatus has always represented the preferred meanings and ideal subject 
positions of the IRdisc in different contextual circumstances. Studying the products of 
Iranian state television at different periods thus reveals the desired form of subjectivity 
that this discourse is seeking to form. I have focused on the three most popular TV 
series, which were broadcast by Iranian state television from 2009 until the end of 
2013, and I suggest that these TV series represent the ideal subject positions and 
preferred meanings of the IRdisc in the contextual circumstances that pertained after 
the emergence of the Green Movement in 2009.  
Additionally, the subjectivity of the Tehranian middle class was the subject of 
consideration in this research; since this modern middle class in Iran, which emerged 
under the influence of Reza Shah’s modernisation process, has always played a major 
role in forming social movements and establishing social changes and reforms during 
recent years. The role of this class is recognisable in the advancing of Reza Shah’s 
modernisation process, in the establishing of social changes and reforms during the 
rule of Mohammad Reza Shah, in forming the Iranian revolution of 1979, and also in 
the post-revolutionary changes of the Islamic Republic’s state like establishment of the 
IRdisc during the 60s, preceding the demands of the Reconstructionist Cabinet after 
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the war, electing a Reformist Cabinet in 1997, and also in the election of the Principlist 
Cabinet in 2005, by boycotting the 2005 presidential election. In contemporary Iranian 
history, the occurrences of major social changes and reforms have always become 
possible through the mediation of the middle class. As I have discussed in the section 
on the middle class, in this contemporary history, all of the regimes have also been 
faced with major defeats when this middle class stopped supporting them and started 
protesting against them for its demands.  
During this research, in three chapters, I have tried to present a narration of the 
transformations of the Islamic Republic’s discursive articulations and the relation of 
the subjectivity of the modern middle class with the different articulations of this 
discourse. In the theoretical chapter, following the framework of Laclau and Mouffe’s 
discourse theory, four forms of the IRdisc articulations have been mentioned regarding 
different contextual circumstances since the revolution of 1979. Islamist Leftist, 
Economic Development, Reformist and Principlist articulations, are the four major 
forms of the IRdisc articulations. During chapter three, I tried first to relate these 
dominant articulations in each period to the represented preferred meanings and ideal 
subject positions of the IRdisc on Iranian state television. Consequently, in the chapter 
on the Tehranian Middle Class, the role of this middle class in advancing each 
articulation has been discussed. In this chapter, these articulations have been 
discussed with the mediation of governments and cabinets of each period as 
representatives of each articulation. The cabinet during the war-time, as the 
representative of the Islamic-leftist articulation, took an anti-capitalist and anti-
Western position, The Constructionist Cabinet, as the representatives of the Economic 
Development articulation that transformed the political economy of the IRdisc, the 
Reformist Cabinet as the representative of the Reformist or Political Development 
articulation that transformed the cultural structure of the society, and the Principlist 
Cabinet as the representative of the Principlist articulation, which is currently the 
dominant articulation, were discussed. Consequently, the relations of the middle class 
with these cabinets and articulations have been elaborated upon. Moreover, the 
political economy of each cabinet, according to their significant signifiers, has been 
discussed.  
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Nonetheless, as I have argued, during the Reformist Cabinet period, a serious split 
emerged among the politically active forces of the Islamic Republic’s state. This break 
emerged in consequence of the highlighting of the Republican face, or Islamist face, of 
the IRdisc. Principlists stood on the side of Islamism and Reformists on the side of 
Republicanism. As a result of the intensification of the struggle between these two 
forces, after the presidential election of 2009, the reformists were eliminated from the 
realm of politics, and the Principlist articulation became the dominant articulation of 
the IRdisc, the Reformist articulation thus becoming the rival discourse. The main 
principle of this articulation is the recognition of principles according to the demands 
and desires of the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei.  
In addition, this break was detected in the Iranian television discourse and it is argued 
that this ideological state apparatus has always supported the Principlist articulation 
since the unfolding of the split during the Reformist Cabinet period.  
As a result of what has been discussed, I can conclude that since the 1979 revolution, 
the IRdisc, first took an anti-capitalist position, as a rival to Marxism, by emphasising 
the nature of Islam as the ideology of resistance against both capitalism and the West, 
especially the US. After the end of the war, many revolutionaries, who constituted the 
Constructionist Cabinet, highlighted economic development and distanced themselves 
from the so called anti-capitalist position in their economic policies; yet they 
emphasised Islamic ideological values. Here, the point is that the Islamism within the 
IRdisc has been transformed from an ideology of resistance to an ideology of the state. 
Due to this, the Reformist cabinet, since it emphasised liberal values, like civil society, 
democracy, public sphere, etc., which were not tolerated by the Principlists and the 
Supreme Leader, as the representative of the Islamic ideology within the IRdisc. 
Nonetheless, as argued in the section on the middle class, the IRdisc, after the 
elimination of the Reformists, by emphasising privatisation and by taking advantage of 
the increase in oil revenues, was articulated in such a way that, on one hand, it 
highlighted ideological values, and, on the other hand, it was expanding a kind of 
consumerist culture in relation to the increase in the semi-private sectors, which were 
supported by the government.  The Principlist government spent the state budget 
from oil revenue to construct shopping centres and import commodities with the 
mediation of the semi-private sectors. This meant that an Islamic capitalism, or Islamic 
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bourgeoisie, with a particular interpretation of sharia as its ideology emerged. 
However, the question is, what could conjoin the Islamic ideology to the capitalist 
consumerism that was based on oil revenue? The answer is the new middle class. This 
discourse therefore needs this middle class as the mediator to conjoin Islamism to 
consumerism within the IRdisc. The characteristics of a subjectivity that this discourse 
demands is expanded among the middle class is significant for the IRdisc in two ways; 
first, by overcoming the dislocation, and, second, by advancing its political economy.  
In 2009, after the presidential election, the Islamic Republic’s state faced the 
emergence of the “Green Movement”. This movement claimed there was fraud in the 
election results and demanded a return of their votes—their main slogan being 
“Where is my vote?” As is obvious, this demand is a very political demand and seeks 
enhanced political participation. One of the main demands of the middle class in 
criticising and also protesting against political regimes has always been their desire for 
more political participation. This demand has always caused serious costs to political 
regimes, for instance, during the Islamic Republic era, this class caused the main 
political transformation, namely, the emergence and empowerment of the Reformist 
articulation, which is no longer tolerated by the IRdisc.  
The IRdisc, in facing the Green Movement which targeted its legitimacy, had no other 
choice than to either take action in order to establish serious changes and reforms in 
its articulation according to demands of the protesters, or to repress the movement 
and then form a kind of subjectivity among this middle class that may lead to the 
security of the IRdisc through facing more dislocations, aimed at deconstructing its 
preferred meanings. 
Adapting the first choice required the acceptance of the claims of the protesters about 
fraud in the election and, obviously, the state, did not choose this way since none of its 
officials ever admitted the possibility of fraud in the 2009 election. The Islamic 
Republic’s state therefore adopted the second choice. 
The IRdisc, in order to frustrate these demands forever and to secure itself from facing 
dislocation through the mediation of the middle class, which might lead to losing the 
discursive hegemony, tried to expand its desired form of subjectivity among this class.  
This subjectivity had to be formed in order to meet two purposes, first, to be 
consistent with the political economy of the Principlist articulation, and, second, not to 
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question the legitimacy of this discourse, which was more ideological than ever 
through the domination of the Principlist articulation and the centrality of the 
Supreme Leader.  
Accordingly, this discourse needed, first, to alter the demands of the middle class from 
political to non-political demands that did not question the hegemony of the IRdisc, 
and, second, to benefit from this subjectivity by advancing its economy, which is, more 
than ever, based on consumerism.   
During this research, I have tried to understand what aspects in the everyday life of the 
Tehranian middle class are the most significant for the IRdisc in order that its desired 
meanings are preferred by them and form a kind of subjectivity for this class, which 
meets the mentioned purposes. I have explored and found these aspects and their 
significant signifiers in the Iranian state television’s products. In fact, I have studied 
three of the most popular TV series from this apparatus in the four years after the 
2009 presidential election, to explore what the preferred meanings and desired 
subject positions of the Islamic Republic’ discourse are after they faced this dislocation, 
and relating the signifiers that these meanings and subject positions have represented. 
In analysing the three most popular TV series from summer 2009 to winter 2013, I 
have inferred that the IRdisc aimed to promote its meanings and represent its ideal 
subject positions regarding three signifiers of: “women”, “the 60s” and “sovereignty”.  
During the analysis of each TV series, according to Hall’s thoughts in considering 
strategies of representation, I have realised that a preference for the desired meanings 
of the IRdisc and the interpellation of subjects regarding the represented subject 
positions in each TV series, have different functions for the IRdisc so that it can remain 
the hegemonic discourse.  
Regarding the signifier of woman, through the “Shams-ol Emareh” TV series, the IRdisc 
was seeking to make a stereotype, which represented and gave preference to the 
meaning of “mother-wife”. Regarding the signifier of “the 60s”, this discourse, in the 
“Condition White” TV series, tried to form the social imagination by representing a 
myth of the emergence of social cohesion and a richness of meanings during this 
decade. Regarding the signifiers for “sovereignty”, “insight” and “velayat-madari”, in 
the “Mukhtar Nameh” TV series, this discourse, by representing the subject position of 
“others”, has tried to make clear what its ideal subject positions are, and what the 
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positions of others are, and also what will happen if people are placed in the subject 
positions of others. The “other-making” in this series is mostly done in relation to the 
position of the Supreme Leader. The mentioned signifiers can thus be considered as 
the most significant signifiers in the IRdisc, since this discourse has represented its 
preferred meanings and ideal subject position relating to them when it was 
experiencing a dislocation.  
Through conducting interviews with members of the Tehranian middle class, I have 
tried to understand whether these preferred meanings form the subjectivity of this 
class, or is this done by discourses other than the IRdisc, which thus become 
hegemonic in forming their subjectivity. During data analysis of the interviews 
conducted, according to categories that were obtained from the interviews, I have 
concluded that all of the preferred meanings and desired subject positions of the 
IRdisc regarding the mentioned signifiers and aspects of everyday life, can be 
considered as part of the hegemonic meanings among this middle class. This means 
that the desired form of subjectivity in the IRdisc, is the hegemonic one among the 
Tehranian middle class.  
In regard to the signifier of women, the subjectivity of this class indicates the 
acceptance of the role of “mother-wife” for women more than any of the other roles 
that women can take in society. This preferred meaning reduces the role of women to 
just being mothers or wives, and it ignores other potential meanings that could define 
the roles of women. Making this stereotype in regard to the signifier of woman, on one 
hand, causes the elimination of this group from serious social activities, and, on the 
other hand, it makes the subjects of the IRdisc homogenous in accepting this cliché. 
The elimination of women from being determinant in social and political matters, by 
reducing their role to being mothers and wives, leads to the elimination of a group that 
potentially could have political demands for gender justice and political participation. 
Constructing subjectivities according to this ideal subject position for woman, in the 
articulation of the IRdisc, will cause the depoliticising of half of Iranian society, since 
their ideal role is defined, as being mothers and wives, and this meaning is arguably 
hegemonic among this class. When the role of women is defined by their being 
mothers and wives, consequently, as we saw in the interview data, the role of men will 
be as the providers for their families. Men’s acceptance of this role also leads to more 
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effort from this gender group in order to gain more money and to provide for the 
family, since the contribution of women in this provision is not considered to be one of 
the duties of women. This also may cause the assiduity of men in making more 
financial efforts to provide for the family, rather than their attention to political 
concerns. Stereotype making by discourses make a society homogenous and leads to 
an ignorance of matters that cause gender injustice and inequality. 
Regarding the signifier of the 60s, the Tehranian middle class has accepted the myth 
that the IRdisc has represented through this signifier. Representing this myth has led to 
the establishment of a social imagination in the minds of this middle class, which sees 
the IRdisc as being what has constructed the pleasant living situation during the 60s. In 
considering todays’ situation, losing the social cohesion and richness of meanings 
during the 60s, members of the middle class are not blaming the state, rather, they 
blame themselves, since they have become greedy or demand a luxurious lifestyle, or 
they blame technology for losing such social cohesion and richness of meaning. The 
main concern of this class, in their current situation, is financial, according to the 
interview data, but they do not see the state as being the reason for their 
dissatisfaction with their financial condition. Rather, according to the constructed 
social imagination of the IRdisc, they blame people for losing the ideal conditions of 
the 60s. Accepting this social imagination through the representation of a myth of 
social cohesion and a richness of meanings has naturalised the current articulation of 
the IRdisc, and the subjects of this discourse see no defect in the current articulation of 
it in losing the conditions of the 60s. Again, the Islamic Republic discourse might prefer 
its desired meaning regarding the signifier of the 60s by making depoliticised subjects, 
who accept this social imagination. Since accepting this imagination naturalises the 
current situation and consequently the current social injustice and inequality, and 
considers the IRdisc as the sole source that could bring back the situation related to 
what was experienced during the 60s.  
According to the ideal subject positions and preferred meanings of the IRdisc, 
represented in the “Mukhtar Nameh” TV series, the Tehranian middle class can also be 
considered as subjects of this discourse, since they do not identify themselves with any 
positions that have been considered to be the position of others. The ideal subject 
positions of the IRdisc in regard to the signifiers of “sovereignty”, “insight” and 
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“velayat-madari” are recognisable in the “Mukhtar Nameh” TV series. Although, the 
ultimate goal of the IRdisc is to form subjectivities according to these ideal subject 
positions, subjects who identify themselves with these represented subject positions 
ideologically support the IRdisc. In other words, represented subject positions in the 
mentioned TV series, as I have argued, are ideological and are related to the 
ideological values of this discourse and, consequently, to the position of the Supreme 
Leader. Moreover, the emphasis of this TV series, on demonstrating the position of 
others, indicates that not identifying with the positions of others is also a desired form 
of subjectivity for the IRdisc. Again, the Tehranian middle class members have taken 
the desired position of the IRdisc, since the position of others has been clarified for 
them, and they have been convinced that accepting the preferred meanings of others 
regarding the mentioned signifiers leads to their elimination and suppression by 
suppressive state apparatuses. In taking positions in regard to the ideal subject 
positions of the IRdisc, and the preferred meanings of this discourse, this middle class 
mostly rejects being placed in the position of others determined for them. This means 
that members of this middle class mostly rejected speaking about the issues that they 
thought were related to what they call ‘politics’. Again, the Tehranian middle class 
members are very depoliticised, since they are not willing to place themselves in the 
position of others by taking positions in political matters. The strategy of making a 
constitutive outside, or others, has worked for the IRdisc to distance its subjects from 
becoming others and so questioning its legitimacy and demanding political freedom.  
I can thus conclude that the IRdisc is the hegemonic discourse in forming the 
subjectivity of the Tehranian middle class regarding the signifiers that are most 
significant for this discourse since they could carry meanings for concepts of gender 
equality, social justice and political freedom. As a result of this hegemony in 
constructing the subjectivity of the middle class, this subjectivity contains reliable 
characteristics for the IRdisc so as to expand its articulation into other realms of 
everyday life. The main characteristic of this subjectivity, as obtained from analysis of 
the interview data, is a depoliticised characteristic.  
In addition to the fact that the Tehranian middle class members, in the interviews, 
rarely took a position in regard to the notion of politics, or what they called politics, 
the represented preferred meanings of the IRdisc, have constituted the perceptions of 
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the interviewees in regard to the mentioned signifiers. This means that the IRdisc can 
eliminate other potential meanings in regard to signifiers, and so become the 
hegemonic discourse in constructing the subjectivities of the middle class. 
Consequently, members of the middle class rarely have the intention to question these 
meanings by highlighting other potential meanings in regard to the considered 
signifiers. If we consider politics as the principles for organising the institutions of a 
society, then the political challenges the preferred meanings of the hegemonic 
discourse to highlight the marginalised meanings of a signifier. Namely, attempts to re-
articulate the hegemonic discourse and get rid of the pre-determined subject 
positions. Although, as mentioned, many interviewees were taking positions against 
the policies of the state, yet politics, in this sense, means the attempts of subjects to 
deconstruct the preferred meanings of the hegemonic discourse and to highlight the 
other potential meanings of a signifier. Nonetheless, the subjectivity of the Tehranian 
middle class has been constructed so that there is no intention to re-articulate the 
meanings that have constructed their subjectivity, since either they accept these 
meanings as being inherent meanings, or as being affected by a myth, or as being 
afraid of their elimination and suppression.  
The IRdisc could overcome the crisis by expanding this depoliticised form of 
subjectivity among the Tehranian middle class. The mentioned preferred meanings can 
be considered to be moments in the discursive articulation of the IRdisc, and this 
discourse can articulate its other preferred meanings in relation to these moments, by 
relying on the depoliticised characteristic of middle class subjectivity.  
This research was an attempt to explore the desired form of subjectivity of the IRdisc, 
almost four years after the experiencing of the crisis, and to examine whether this 
form of subjectivity is hegemonic among the group that has caused this dislocation. 
The findings of this research, according to the interview data, demonstrate that the 
desired forms of subjectivity of the IRdisc, and the preferred meanings of this 
discourse regarding the signifiers that have been considered in this research, are 
hegemonic in constructing the subjectivity of the Tehranian middle class. Obviously, 
the IRdisc, apart from overcoming the dislocation, is seeking to take other benefits 
through making this kind of depoliticised subjectivity. This discourse is demanding to 
 259 
seize the realm of everyday life by preferring its desired meanings regarding the 
different aspects of everyday life.  
The findings of this research demonstrate that, in studying Iranian everyday life and 
examining the lifestyle in relation to the ideological values of the Islamic Republic’s 
state, we need to consider that the IRdisc is more than an ideology, rather, it is a 
discourse that, according to the nature of discourses, is transforming its preferred 
meanings and representing different articulations of its preferred meanings in 
different contexts. Reaching the closure in the discourse’s articulations is impossible 
and the fixed meanings of signifiers can be dislocated. As a result of this, discourses 
change their articulations according to contextual circumstances, and different 
signifiers, in facing different contextual circumstances, become significant in discursive 
articulations. Considering ideological values as meanings that construct the articulation 
of a discourse, means the lack of understanding about how the IRdisc forms its desired 
subjectivities. 
Considering the IRdisc as more than an ideological formation, leads to highlighting the 
fact that the IRdisc may not demand the acceptance of its ideological values by the 
middle class, rather, this discourse desires to construct a kind of subjectivity among 
this class so as to be secure from meaning dislocation and also to take benefit, rather 
than being ideologically dominant. 
What I am trying to say relates to the significance of going beyond the propaganda in 
the IRdisc, which highlights ideological values, in order to examine the lifestyle and the 
everyday life of the middle class. Thus, in considering different aspects of everyday life 
and lifestyle, for instance, fashion, consumption, cultural products, we should be able 
to track and map the articulatory practices of the IRdisc in order to reveal its desired 
form of subjectivity, instead of its propaganda in emphasising ideological values. If the 
propagandas of this discourse is considered without highlighting the articulatory 
practices and exploring the desired for subjectivity, then a fantasy of resistance against 
ideological values will be concluded within the lifestyle of the middle class, since this 
lifestyle has obviously been formed that is not consistent with the ideological codes of 
the IRdisc. This is the fantasy of resistance, which is also beneficial for the IRdisc in 
order that it should be hegemonic, since a kind of satisfaction accrues in the 
subjectivity of its subjects in resisting the ideological codes. However, their 
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subjectivities have been formed consistently with the desires of the IRdisc, since they 
do not question the preferred meanings in its articulatory practices, which may have 
been formed regardless of ideological values. The lifestyle of the middle class cannot 
therefore be considered as effective resistance, since it has been formed consistently 
to the subjectification of the IRdisc in order to construct depoliticised subjectivities.  
Moreover, expanding this subjectivity could not only secure this discourse from 
collapsing and so reinforce its hegemony, but could also bring other benefits for this 
discourse through making depoliticised subjects. Everyday life, which has been 
depoliticised, is the proper realm for the emergence of profit seeking systems, which 
mostly seek financial interests, and the IRdisc, on one hand, needs these systems to 
expand the depoliticisation within the society, and, on the other hand, these systems 
are serving the political economy of the Islamic Republic’s state. 
A kind of collaboration has thus emerged between these systems and the IRdisc in 
depoliticising the realm of everyday life. Consequently, forms of lifestyles have 
emerged within everyday life, which may objectively be against the ideological values 
of the Islamic Republic’s state, but work in the interest of the IRdisc by depoliticising 
the realm of everyday life. The number of shopping centres and malls in Tehran in 
2009 was less than 25, however, by the end of 2012, 34 other shopping centres were 
under construction in this city. This dramatic increase is a sign of the recognition of a 
lifestyle by the IRdisc, which is not associated with its ideological values since it has 
consequences, which lead to the trivialisation of these values. Moreover, the amount 
of the state budget, mainly from oil revenues, which is spent on importing 
commodities, has been discussed in the section on the Tehranian middle class.   
Furthermore, the expansion of fashion styles in the everyday life of the Tehranian 
middle class, or the emergence of a secular lifestyle among this class, does not mean 
that this class is resisting the hegemony of the IRdisc, rather, the potentials of this 
lifestyle should be explored, as this is revealing in order to disarticulate the preferred 
meanings of the hegemonic discourse. Although, this lifestyle does not match the 
ideological values of the IRdisc; the question is: has the desired form of subjectivity in 
this discourse, which it wishes to expand among the middle class, been formed in 
association with its ideological values? The answer seems to be no, according to the 
findings of this research.  
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It is true that the findings of this research are not comprehensive, since this research 
has not examined the hegemony of the IRdisc in relation to various, different aspects 
of everyday life. This examination definitely requires the study of the other ideological 
configurations that this discourse has generated, in order to ascertain the ideal subject 
positions of the IRdisc. Nonetheless, I have tried to narrow down the research’s 
findings in regard to significant aspects of this everyday life. I believe that, in other 
forms of interpellation of the IRdisc, the desires of this discourse in constructing these 
depoliticised subjectivities are detectable through its articulatory practices, for 
instance, in apparatuses such as the educational and religious ones. 
The present study is just a preliminary step in gaining a better knowledge of the 
multifaceted aspects of the discourse of the Islamic Republic and the subjectivities 
formed in relation to it. A broader understanding of different subjectivities formed in 
relation to the IRdisc requires further study of various subjectivities that are formed 
within the Islamic Republic and in relation to its discourse, such as the religious and 
non-religious intellectuals, political opposition movements such as the student 
movement, supporters of the Islamic Republic including the Basij, to name just a few. 
An assessment of the future of the Islamic Republic’s state and its ability to overcome 
the future crises would necessitate a study of the IRdisc and also the discourse of these 
groups to see how these groups comply with the ideal subject positions and preferred 
meanings assigned to articulatory practices of the IRdisc. 
In this research, the theoretical framework of discourse analysis by Laclau and Mouffe 
has been applied. This theoretical framework enables the researcher to study the 
dynamic relationship between power and discourse and also delineate the hegemonic 
relationship that exists between constituted and constitutive subjects. Application of 
this framework made it possible for me to examine the hegemony of the IRdisc by 
finding its preferred meanings from its forms of interpellation and representation. This 
examination has been carried out under the influence of the cultural studies approach, 
which considers the process of meaning construction in the realm of everyday life by 
mapping the articulatory practices of discourses, mostly through their cultural forms of 
representations, and examining the hegemony of this articulation by reference to the 
subjectivity of persons who could potentially be the subjects of different discourses.  
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The main attempt of this study was to argue that the desired form of subjectivity for 
the Tehranian middle class, in the IRdisc regarding the main signifiers of the studied TV 
series, is a hegemonic one among this class, and the main characteristic of this 
subjectivity is that the middle class are being depoliticised. Additionally, as I have 
argued, the Tehranian middle class’s members are the subjects of the IRdisc, and 
therefore, subjectively, they are expanding the power of this discourse in the realm of 
everyday life through the mediation of other cultural products, such as music, film, 
novels, social networks, etc., which are not as much under the control of the state as 
the Iranian state television. I also believe that the discourse analysis of these media 
reveals that the middle class subjectively expands the depoliticised subjectivity, since, 
in most of them, there is no significant, recognisable attempt to deconstruct the 
preferred meanings of the IRdisc and to form an alternative subjectivity.   
Thus, understanding how, and in relation to what signifiers, the IRdisc’s preferred form 
of subjectivities is fashioned, brings the possibility for further research on this basis to 
explore what other benefits this discourse is gaining by expanding this kind of 
depoliticised subjectivity among the middle class, rather than just securing itself from 
dislocations. I believe that the expansion of this form of subjectivity is related to the 
transformations in the articulations of this discourse regarding the meanings that 
construct its approach to the notion of political economy and the emergence of the 
new petit-bourgeoisie and bourgeoisie. Accordingly, in this transformation, the IRdisc 
needs to motivate the middle class to become subjects of expanding its power. In fact, 
I believe the actuality of transformations within the articulations of IRdisc, were 
nothing other than a struggle over the formation and subjectification of the middle 
class. However, the proof of this claim requires additional research that may be 
undertaken on the basis of the present findings.  
My intention in doing this research and in exploring the meanings that construct the 
everyday life of the Tehranian middle class, was to understand the condition of this 
everyday life “as it is”, and this understanding would be the first step to bring out the 
hidden potentials of everyday life in order to reach the situation “as it should be”. It 
seems impossible to highlight the other marginalised meanings of signifiers, which are 
the hidden potentials of everyday life to resist the domination, unless we explore 
which of the preferred meanings of the signifiers in the realm of everyday life are 
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hegemonic, and what kind of subjectivity, in favour of which discourse, these meanings 
are creating. This exploration is the first step in attempting to construct more just 
living conditions by being the subjects of a discourse, in which its preferred meanings 
might be articulated around the nodal point of justice and equality. Arguably, if the 
middle class could get rid of the depoliticised subjectivity, it could play a significant 
role in questioning the preferred meanings of the hegemonic discourse and in trying to 
re-articulate this discourse according to meanings that could empower civil society 
over the challenge to reach gender equality, social justice and political freedom. 
Currently, this middle class, unlike its historical role in advancing social changes and 
political reforms, is an apathetic class, since they have no intention to be political 
subjects in order to re-articulate the meanings that have constructed its subjectivity.  
What has been argued during this study is that the hegemony of the IRdisc constructs 
everyday life according to its preferred meanings and subjectification. However, this 
study, by revealing these preferred meanings and their functions for the IRdisc, and 
also by examining the hegemonic extent of these meanings, has tried to clarify the 
current conditions of this discourse. This revelation may bring the possibility of a 
beneficial and essential critique of the IRdisc according to its current articulation and 
problematic. Consequently, this critique brings the possibility to overcome the 
depoliticised subjectivities and to construct subjectivities that have concerns relating 
to equality justice and freedom. 
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APPENDICES 
 
INTERVIEWEES’ STATEMENTS 
Section A  
Interviewees’ statements, which formed obtained categories in data analysing in 
regard to signifier of “Woman” in “Shams-ol Emareh” TV series. 
Table: A-1  
First Category: Fixed meanings/moments. 
Num Phrase 
02 When a couple have children, then, the main duty of wife is upbringing children and she never should work outside the home. 
02 Having a job for women, keeps them away from their main duty, which is being a mother. 
03 Women are inherent mothers and they should act according to this feeling that god gave it to them. 
03 All women have motherhood instinct and they cannot reject this feeling by working. 
04 Based on motherhood feeling and motherly love, when a woman becomes a mother, she has to stay with her children. 
04 
The main duty of women is raising children and this will build the future of a 
society. 
05 
If a woman works outside the home, then she will be so exhausted that she 
cannot perform her duties in the home properly. Anyway, women have some 
duties in the home. 
05 
The maternal feeling is inherent in women and this feeling brings duties for 
them that no one can do. A mother has to stay with children all time and I 
think working outside the home is against this maternal feeling. 
06 For the goodness of children and women, it is better for women to stay at home and not having a job outside the home. 
06 
A duty of woman is warming up the household atmosphere by doing 
household chores and well upbringing children. 
09 
If women spend all of their energy in the home, then the family foundation 
becomes stronger and this would be beneficial for women to avoid any failure 
in marriage or children upbringing. 
09 The inherent motherhood instinct would cause women to want to stay at home when they have children. 
10 I might think traditionally, but I believe a woman should spend all of her time in the home in order to nurture children very well. 
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10 A woman should manage her household chores of her own, maidservant or nannies never could do what a mother could do. 
12 The maternal feeling is undeniable and working outside the home is against this feeling. 
12 
Maternal feeling is the best feeling in the world and it follows with duties that 
keep women away from working outside the home. 
15 
I am totally against the idea of women earning money, this is duty of men to 
earn money and be the providers for the household, and duty of women is to 
spend this money properly. 
15 A woman must not work outside the home and should deal with house chores efficiently. 
16 It is the duty of woman to be at home and be an ideal mother for her children, and provide a warm atmosphere at home for her husband. 
16 A woman should be provided from all aspects to be able to handle household chores. 
19 Women have some needs, financially and emotionally, and men must answer to those needs of women. 
19 Women have needs that men have supply, both emotionally and financially. 
23 Normally, women must do household chores and men must provide for the family. 
23 
Motherhood feeling is an inherent feeling which causes the emergence of 
duties for women, and working is not among these duties.  
24 
The motherhood feeling is very important and I think it was the base of 
women creation by god, so women should appreciate this feeling by doing 
duties that a mother has and surely earning money in not among these 
duties. 
24 
Upbringing children and maintaining the home is duties of women in families, 
because these are not consonant with men’s nature. Men should provide and 
women should maintain the family. 
29 
There is no need for women to work outside the home, if they have been well 
provided financially by men. Women and men have different demands 
according to their nature and the most important demand of women is being 
good mothers for their children.   
29 Housekeeping is a fulltime job for women. I think if they can properly do this job, then there is no need for them to work outside the home. 
30 If a woman marries with true love, then she should spend her time to be a good wife and a good mother. 
30 Women’s duty is upbringing children and nothing else. Working keeps them away from their main duty. 
34 The inherent feeling of motherhood that belongs to women, makes them to be comfortable with upbringing children. 
34 If a man is honest with his wife about his income, the wife would manage his earnings and there would be no need for her to work outside the home. 
37 I disagree with women working outside the home, working is not compatible 
with women’s emotions.  
37 In all societies, women must do household chores and men must provide for 
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the family, it is the nature. 
38 
When a woman became a mother, then she should spend her time to nurture 
her children properly, working outside the home would lead the major failure 
in this duty. 
38 The traditional role of women is raising children and this is good because this role is compatible with the nature of women. 
39 Motherhood feeling is the most beautiful feeling in every woman and women should appreciate this feeling with spending all of their time with children. 
39 Based on women’s nature, they should spend all their time raising children and doing household chores. 
40 It is duty of men to earn money for households, because men are stronger than women, both biologically and mentally. 
40 
Everything is better in its traditional form, women working outside the home, 
is against our traditions. 
42 
The inherent feeling of being a mother should be found in women’s hearts, 
and when a woman has found it, then she does not want to have a career for 
her own sake. 
42 I have just one word -and believe me- , experiences have proven this: women never should have a career outside the home. 
44 
It is the responsibility of women to satisfy emotional needs of a family and 
men should guide the family, therefore, I think it is better for both men and 
women to do their traditional and natural duties. 
44 Based on the nature of women, automatically they desire to do the household chores and nurture the children. 
45 
Since women are less logical than men and their actions are more based on 
emotions, it is men’s duty to guide the household, both making major 
decisions and also I think bringing money are duties of men. Women must not 
work outside the home. 
45 The ideal role division between women and men is the traditional form, namely women in home and men outside the home. 
46 
If a woman works outside the home, her children are abandoned by 
themselves and they may become criminals. Even it is not appropriate for 
children to go to kindergarten, because it is the duty of a mother to train her 
children, not kindergarten teachers or mentors. 
46 
Everything is more beautiful in its traditional form, men work outside the 
home in order to provide for the family and women stay in the home to raise 
children and do household chores. 
49 The history has proven that the role of women is housekeeping and mothering. 
49 
The ideal division is for both women and men to perform their traditional 
roles. Man should work outside the home and woman should do her 
maternal duties and housekeeping, this is better for both. 
51 
If a woman works outside the home then who should do household chores? I 
think families with working mothers have loads of problems and the home 
atmosphere would never be in its ideal form, because the woman is working 
and have no time to maintain the home. 
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51 
Men should provide properly for the family in case of financial needs and this 
would keep women away from working and cause them to engage with their 
main duties in the home. 
52 If men can support the family financially, then I am sure no woman desires to have a career. 
52 A woman has to be at home in order to maintain children and household chores. 
54 It is the law of the nature that mothers have to stay in home and do what they can for their children. 
54 
Fathers are not mothers, so they can never do what mothers can do for 
children. According to the law of the nature, women are inherent mothers 
and they have to act according to their natural instinct. 
55 The main duty of men is providing for the family, when men provide properly, then women can do their duties like upbringing children properly as well. 
55 
I basically disagree with the idea of women working outside the home. 
Women have more important duties to do rather than working. 
58 Women’s work causes children to feel deficiencies and I think women should avoid this by not working. 
58 The ideal form of role division is a division according to women and men’s nature. Women should stay at home and maintain the children. 
62 
Being a woman is joyful, someone who grasps the pleasure of being a 
woman, can be both a good mother and a good wife. If we say that women 
should work, is against femininity of women. 
62 
Women are inherently dependent lovers, and this is because of the affection 
that god has created women with. Women should be lovers and their beloved 
should be their husbands and children. 
63 
Nowadays, our society does not deal properly with women and women have 
no security to work outside the home. Each woman who has a career, loses 
her abilities in dealing with children, since the society is impatient in dealing 
with women and consequently, women become impatient in dealing with 
children. 
63 
These days, in west, people do not believe that women must be with their 
children and look after them and this has led to deconstruction of the family 
and the household in the west. 
65 When a woman follows her interests and works outside the home, then it leads to the inappropriate upbringing of children. 
65 When a woman became a mother, if she works, she has betrayed her children and even herself. 
67 Working outside the home is against the nature of women and also, doing household chores and upbringing children is against the nature of men. 
67 
People who believe women should work outside the home, are under the 
influence of foreigner’s propaganda. The west wants to make us like itself, 
but you see the situation of women and families in the west, it is pathetic. 
68 
In all times and in all societies, women and men had separate roles and duties 
according to their nature. The duty of men is providing money and safety for 
families and the duty of women is doing house chores and bringing up 
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children. 
68 
The inherent feeling of motherhood causes mothers to want to be with their 
children all the time and not to have a career outside the home, because men 
cannot cope with children and house chores. 
70 I am coming from a religious family, in this type of family, earning money is the duty of men and women should do house chores.  
70 Household chores are so varied and a woman should spend all of her time to be successful in these chores. 
71 
I -as a woman- never wants to have job if my husband can provide me 
financially. 
71 
I think it is clear that the duty of a woman is not earning money, men should 
finance and lead the family and women should maintain the household with 
nurturing children and doing household chores. 
72 
The perfection of a woman is accepting the roles that the nature has brought 
for her, and these roles are being a good mother for her children and being a 
good wife for her husband. 
72 Taking care of children in the safe and warm atmosphere of a household is the duty that women have naturally. 
73 Women are inherent mothers and basically, women have been created to be mothers. 
73 A woman must accept duties related to her inherent role, working outside the home and earning money, is incompatible with her inherent role as a mother. 
75 If a woman has a job outside the home, she spends her time in vain. 
75 The major duty of a woman is being in love. A woman should love her life and her husband in order to be an ideal woman. 
77 
I -as a woman- love my life and because of this, I even do not think about 
working outside the home, It is duty of men to earn money for households, 
because men are stronger than women, both biologically and mentally. 
77 Traditions work for the best, women working outside the home, is against our traditions. 
78 If we say that women should work, it is against femininity. 
78 The duty of women is to forming the life emotionally, not to work or earn money. 
81 
Something belong to the nature and do not lose their importance, being a 
mother is one of them. Women have to respect the nature by accepting 
duties of being a mother. 
81 Women have to do household chores and men have to provide for the family, this is the nature. 
82 When a woman works outside the home, it may causes the failure in 
children’s upbringing, I think women should stay at home. 
82 
The feeling of motherhood has been given to women by god and women 
have to respect this feeling by not working outside the home just for some 
more money. 
85 It is obvious that families with working mothers are so corrupted. 
85 Like old days, I think it is the duty of women to do household chores properly and the duty of men is the financial support of the family. 
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89 I -as a woman- prefer not to work outside the home, my priority as a woman is to maintain my house to be a pleasant place for my husband and children. 
89 
The duty of a woman is not having a job and earning money, a woman needs 
to be supported by her man to be able to maintain house chores and the 
financial supports is the most important one. 
90 
I think working cannot be joyful for women, the best recreation that a woman 
can have is being with her children and husband in a warm environment that 
she provides in home 
90 
Women that believe they need to have jobs outside the home have forgotten 
their main duty in the life, which is providing a pleasant atmosphere in the 
home by their femininity.  
Table: A-2 
Second Category: Moments with accepting the logic of difference.  
Num  Phrase  
08 
A woman must not work outside the home and should deal with house 
chores efficiently, but women should also have some extra activities like 
painting courses or etc. to be happy and succulent in the home. 
08 
When the husband and children are not at home, women can do their 
desired works like watching satellite TVs, doing sport courses, shopping and 
etc. in order to be succulent at home. 
11 
Nowadays, with existence of satellite TVs and technological equipment, 
women never get bored in homes, If they are bored, they can go to 
swimming pools or shopping centres and such places with their friends, 
though this must not cause failure in their duties in doing house chores. 
11 
Some women like me, do not like to have a job outside the home, but to have 
other activities outside the home is so important. For instance, women 
should go shopping and have some fun with their friends. 
13 Based on life conditions and the income of the husband, a wife should have her own life style, for example, she can take language courses or go to gym. 
13 Men should earn money, but women should have the authority to spend this money for the children and the household. 
20 
If women stay at home all the time, she would get exhausted and 
despondent, she should travel and take training courses and should have fun 
with her friends. 
20 
Women should keep the home in its ideal condition, but she also needs to be 
active outside the home, for instance, going to the movies and shopping with 
her friends. 
25 
It is true that women are inherent mothers, but this does not mean that 
women should stay in homes forever, women should go to gym and take 
computer classes, but they must not forget their children and husbands when 
they are with friends. 
25 If a woman stay at home, she becomes depressed and exhausted, she needs to go out and entertain herself, but as much as she could maintain the home 
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and the children. 
28 
Women should be active in the society in order to avoid any depression; they 
should be entertained, especially when children are grown up. For instance, 
they should go shopping and gather with their friends. 
28 
Some women like me, do not like to have a career outside the home, but 
having other activities outside the home is so important; for instance, women 
should go shopping and have some fun with friends. 
33 
Being a mother, I mean a good mother, is more important for women than 
anything else, but if a woman wants to be a good mother, then she needs to 
have some fun for herself, for example shopping or going to restaurants. 
33 
Maternal feeling is the most important feeling in the nature of every woman, 
but it depends on how we see it, I think a good mother should be a happy 
mother and a woman can be happy if she have activities such as taking 
exercise classes and artistic courses outside the home. 
36 
Women should be active outside the home, women should go to classes, 
restaurants and gather with their friends in order to be succulent in the 
home. 
36 
If a woman put all her energy in doing house chores and children upbringing, 
then she would become so exhausted and depressed. Besides these duties 
that a woman has, she needs to take music and exercise courses, and do 
shopping which is the most important one. 
43 
I think a woman should be active outside the home, but these activities like 
taking artistic and exercise courses should never affect the main duty of a 
woman which is maintaining homes and children. 
43 The first priority of women is doing household chores and raising children, but besides these duties, she can have fun in her spare time. 
50 Women need to be active outside the home, activities like artistic classes which is compatible with their nature.  
50 
I think it is better for women to be housekeepers but they should not be 
excluded from society, therefore, they need to go to pools or painting classes 
to be active in the society. 
53 Today’s women never become exhausted and bored at homes because of satellite TVs and TV series. 
53 Women should take training courses and continue their education, but there is no need to have jobs and earn money. 
76 
I think there is no need for women to work outside the home, but they need 
to go to shopping centres and training classes like painting or music to be 
happy with maintaining the household. 
76 Women should be active outside the home, but working and earning money is not kinds of activities that match with the nature of women. 
79 
A woman needs to be in the society, but being active does not necessarily 
mean to have a job, if a man provides, then his wife can do shopping and lots 
of other activities. 
79 
Being active in the society does not mean just working and earning money, 
women can be active in the society while they do not have a career, and they 
can go to gym or have artistic activities. 
84 Maternal feeling in women is a gift from god, so women should respect this 
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God-given gift; I say, women can have activities outside the home but their 
main priority should be child raising and this is their main job. 
84 
Today’s women do not stay at homes, these shopping centres and training 
classes have helped women to be more active in the society and I think 
women should spend time on these activities as long as they can do 
household chores that are their main duty.  
 
Table: A-3 
Third Category: Floating signifier. 
Num Phrase 
01 Women could work outside the home if they want, but this is not their duty.  
01 
Women can work for themselves in order to not be bored, but they also have 
to do house chores; That is why it is better for them to do some normal works, 
which is not time-consuming. 
07 
It is good for both man and woman to work outside the home, but woman 
should work much less than man; for instance, she could have a part-time job 
or work just one or two days per week. If a woman wants to have a job, it is 
fine, but she needs to know that basically she has to do house chores as well. 
07 
95 percent of financial needs of a family must be earned by men and 5 
percent by women, if they consist on having a job; on the other hand, 95 
percent of house chores are duties of women and men should do only 5 
percent. 
14 The main responsibility of women is maintaining home; if she wants to work, then she needs to have a part-time job to be able to do house chores as well. 
14 
Women should work both inside and outside the home, but outside the home 
women should do feminine works like solicitorship or working in retails or 
being a secretory in offices. 
17 Women can work if they want, but they need to spend the money that they have earned for themselves, since financing the family is the duty of men.  
17 
A woman could have job outside the home, just when she manages her time 
to do both, so I believe it is better for women to have part-time jobs if they 
insist on working. 
21 Women’s careers have to be compatible with their maternal feelings; in the end, women are more sensitive than men. 
21 If a woman wants to have a job outside the home, she needs to like the job a lot, for example working in kindergartens is an appropriate job for women. 
22 Working is an option for women, but if the financial situation of the family is bad, then women should work to help men. 
22 Most of the time, fathers cannot do what a mother can do for children, so if a woman wants to work, her priority should be her children. 
27 The main duty of women is nurturing children, when their children grew up, they can work, but feminine jobs I prefer.  
27 Considering todays financial situation, both men and women must work outside the home, but women should have part-time jobs to be able to handle 
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house chores. 
35 A family should never be in need of wife’s money. Women can work if they want, but the priority is the family. 
35 
It is men’s duty to earn money for the family and women’s duty is raising 
children and doing household chores, but women could help men if the 
financial situation was bad. 
41 Men should not demand women’s money, but if a woman wants to work, it is good to earn some money to spend on her favourites. 
41 
The maternal feeling in the nature of each woman causes the emergence of 
duties, a woman can work, but after she raised her children properly. Women 
should not work in any places, if a woman wants to work, she needs to do 
feminine jobs like hairdressing. 
47 
Women could have feminine jobs outside the home if they want, but they 
should spend the money that they have earned for themselves, since financing 
the family is man’s duty. 
47 Women cannot tolerate work conditions, unless they have a feminine job compatible with their nature. 
56 
Both husband and wife should help each other in a bad situation, but we 
should not forget that the main duty of men is financial providing and 
women’s is nurturing children. 
56 
One must understand what she wants, if she wants to work, it is very good, 
but she should never marry. When she is married and has children, then she 
has duties to do in the home and no one can help her in doing duties such as 
children upbringing. 
57 
Perhaps women who work outside the home and have jobs compatible with 
their emotions, are more successful in nurturing children, because they have 
been in the society. Even if my spouse could finance the family properly, I 
would still like to have a job. 
57 
Men should finance 80 percent of the family’s income and women could help 
in the other 20 percent, in doing household chores the same token can be 
applied but vice versa. 
59 If women want to work, they should do feminine works in feminine environments, because not all working environments are secure for women. 
59 A woman could work, when she does not have a child, but after having a baby, she needs to look after the baby. 
61 I -as a woman- prefer to have a job, if the financial situation of the family is bad, but in general, I prefer to take care of children and be a housekeeper. 
61 
A mother should be with her children and if she wants to work, she should 
have a part-time job in order to maintain children and home as well, the ideal 
is for women is to work 2 or 3 days a week in order not to get depressed on 
one hand and on the other hand, be able to maintain household. 
64 Women should never have full-time jobs, because they need to be at home with children and do household chores. 
64 
Men should provide at least 70 percent of household livelihood and if women 
want to work, she could provide the other 30 percent, but in household 
chores, men can only do 10 percent of the job and 90 percent is women’s 
duty. 
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66 When a woman turned into a mother, she should not work at least for three years, after that if she favours, she can have a part-time job. 
66 Proper jobs for women are part-time jobs in retails or offices, since they need to do household chores as well. 
74 Working is beneficial for women, but they need to do at least 70 percent of household chores, then it is better for them to have part-time jobs. 
74 Women can work just in case of financial needs, unless, I think they have more important duties to do like warming up the family environment. 
80 
If I did not have to work, then I would never work and spend more time with 
my children. Working is an option for women, if they want to work, they have 
to do some feminine jobs like being a secretory.  
80 Earning money is not duty of women, but they can work if they want not to be depressed and exhausted. 
83 Working is good for women, but after they raised children. The main duty of a woman is nurturing children and after that, she can work if she wants. 
83 Nowadays, in our society, lots of women are working and I think this is good as long as they also do their duties at home, like cooking, cleaning and etc. 
86 Housekeeping is the main duty of every woman, if she maintains this duty very well, then it is fine to work in her spare time. 
86 The best option for women is to find a career while she can be at home, like translating. This would help them to maintain home and also earn money. 
87 Feminine jobs like hairdressing or tailoring are careers that a woman can have, not all jobs are compatible with women’s emotions. 
87 
Women can work if they want, no one should force them to work, it is very 
important for a woman to do what she truly loves, because women are 
inherent lovers, they love their children, their husband and also they need to 
love their job. 
88 
I believe workingwomen are better mothers, because they are more aware 
about society and its problems, but women should work as long as they can 
spend enough time with their children in order to take care of them very well. 
88 The best job for women is working in kindergartens, because they can bring their children there and be around them. 
 
Table: A-4 
Fourth Category: Alternative preferred meaning. 
Num Phrase 
18 Everything should be divided equally between men and women, household chores and earning money.  
18 Women have to work and be active outside the home in the society. 
26 
Women must work outside the home in order to have financial 
independence; not working outside the home would exclude women from 
the society. 
26 A couple should not have children at all, children cause women to turn into housewives, a couple should agree on not having children. 
31 Women have to work in order to feel beneficial for the society, otherwise 
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they sacrifice themselves for the children and the husband, and they would 
have nothing for themselves at the end of the day. 
31 
Women must work outside the home and house chores must be divided 
equally between wife and husband. I think, men and women are equal and I 
see no reason that justify women have to do all the house chores. 
32 Both wife and husband are responsible for the household chores equally. 
32 
Women must work, it is part of women’s rights to be able to work outside the 
home like men and have financial independence in order not to be under 
men’s shadow. 
48 
It is not fair that women must stay at home and do just household chores, 
they should have a job outside the home and household chores should be 
divided equally. There is no difference between women and men in working, 
both of them should work to have a better financial situation and both of 
them must work equally in the home, I believe. 
48 
It is totally nonsense if we believe that women should stay at home and be 
housekeepers, women need to be in the society and the best form of being 
part of the society is having a career. 
60 Women are demanding equal rights with men and if we say women should stay at home and do not work, then we disrespect this equality. 
60 I think a couple should be equal in all aspects of life, I mean, in earning money and doing household chores and also nurturing children. 
69 I identify myself as a feminist; therefore, I believe in equality in rights between women and men. A couple needs to divide duties of life equally.  
69 
A good mother is not a mother that sacrifices herself for children, but a 
woman is a good mother, when she teaches her children about equality of 
women and men in all aspects of life.   
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Section B 
Interviewees’ statements, which formed obtained categories in data analysing in 
regard to signifier of the “60s” in “Condition White” TV series. 
Table B-1-1 
First Category: Moments/fixed meanings: First sub-category: Richness of meaning in 
the 60s. 
Num Phrase  
02 The spiritual and cultural atmosphere of the society was better back then. The current demand of our society is to return to those circumstances of the 60s.  
04 Those who have experienced those times are different from others.  
07 Humanity and spirituality were much higher among people back then. I have nostalgia for that time.  
11 False cultures have entered freely. At that time, everyone was the same. Now, they all want to keep up to the Joneses. 
12 The 60s life style was much better, there were impurities, but it was much better than the present in general. 
13 Everything got ruined after the 60s, because tenderness has lessened. 
17 Family was the most important thing back then, but now people do not care about their relatives. 
23 There is no mercy in people anymore. No one has mercy on others. The government and economy does not really matter, people have changed. 
25 If someone had a problem, everybody would help him. Now, everyone thinks of his own business. 
29 Feeling absurd and empty, which is common nowadays, did not exist back 
then, since every person’s place was defined. 
31 
The most important thing we had and lost, is honesty, no one would lie to 
others. There were important matters, which are dead now, such as humanity 
and honesty. 
32 Stuff like family and honesty had a meaning back then. The society has lost discipline. In the 60s, it had discipline and stability. 
34 Youth do not respect elderly anymore; these things had meanings in the 60s for all.  Manhood and bravery used to be the most important characteristics. 
35 We would not even look at the girls of our neighbourhood, But today a boy has a girlfriend and even so, he uses sexual slurs towards other girls. 
36 Personal advantages used to be of less importance, now brothers have no mercy on each other. The intimacy we had, does not exist anymore. 
38 Individuals are important now; it used to be communities. Nowadays, everyone is selfish, it was not like this before. 
39 All people became carefree and extravagant. It has nothing to do with the government; the culture has changed. 
40 Nowadays, no one gives a damn about the humanistic values, which were important at that time. 
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45 People’s characters used to be positive, now everybody has turned into fools with no positive character. 
48 
The most important thing we have lost is peace. Despite all deficiencies, we 
had peace. Time has passed and that is made us to forget how our society was 
better at that time. 
51 Back then neighbours were brothers, now everybody turned into wolves. 
52 Despite the 60s, personal advantage is what matters to all now. Men used to be gentlemen, now they do not know how to be a real man. 
53 Just look at the films or loves of that time, they used to be the same. It is not the same anymore. 
59 Friendships we had, you can never ever find in any time and place. It is the rule of time to pass the good days. 
61 
What we used to have is morality. Values of that time are lost and people 
made it so. Values of that time were beyond humans; we used to have an ideal 
and perfect society. 
62 The 60s had many flaws, but there was one advantage, which is lost now: people were not selfish. 
65 I have nostalgia for the 60s, since we had spirituality back then and I myself am a spiritual person. 
67 The culture has changed and it is mainly because spirituality is lost, people do not love each other anymore, but they see others as enemies. 
69 I do not remember much of that time, but of what I heard, I think we had a beautiful society. 
71 Our nation was in love; it is not the same anymore, not in love with someone or something but in love with himself or herself. 
73 Immorality has increased in the society, if we had morality the way we had in the 60s, the situation would be much better. 
74 People of that time, especially the veterans were all about bravery and sacrifice. It is not like this anymore. 
75 
People used to be at each other’s side. Nowadays, if someone has a stroke in 
the street, no one would take him to the hospital. People had forgiveness back 
then. 
77 
People’s relationships were not based on taking and giving back then, people 
used to care about others for the sake of god. Pain and suffering used to be 
less, as people would be at each other’s’ sides. 
79 These days, no one is looking for spirituality. Back then it was people’s main priority. All our values in the 60s are lost, both humanistic and social values. 
82 Forgiveness and mercy used to be valued. People would care about your heart not appearances. 
84 Hypocrisy did not exist back then, all were honest. I do not know why, but kindness was way more than today among people. 
88 Lying was less; therefore, people would trust others easily. Today, everybody tries to deceive others. 
89 
Loves and friendships were more real in the 60s, people used to believe in 
morality, Jealousy did not exist and people were all alike. These days, they are 
all jealous of others’ life. 
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Table: B-1-2 
First Category: Moments/fixed meanings: Second sub-category: Social cohesion in the 
60s. 
Num Phrase  
01 I have nostalgia for the 60s, since back then, in the time of war, everyone was appealing for one thing and that was victory in the war. 
03 Those days, everyone was united and was appealing for one aim. In the 60s, social solidarity was higher. I really miss those days. 
05 I have nostalgia for that time. There were fewer difficulties and people would get along better. They would support others. 
08 
Yeah, I have nostalgia for that time, as there are compulsions now, which did 
not exist back then. Though, the situation might be better now, but people 
were all together in those days. 
09 People would not snitch on others. They would support others. People related better to others back then. 
14 Nowadays, everybody looks for his or her own benefit. Those days, the benefit of majority was important. 
15 
Though, there were war and difficulty, but people were more comfortable with 
others. Family members had a close relation back then. They were getting 
along well. 
18 We used to gather with our family and friends a lot, now it has all been gone. 
20 Back then, people’s feelings and perceptions were closer to each other. 
21 If there was a shortage, it was for everyone, all the same. Now, some have everything and some suffer. 
22 At that time, everybody was like-minded. Now, dissension has increased. 
24 
Back then, people’s culture was the same. It was easy to be prosperous. 
Everybody was like-minded back then, but now there is a distance among 
people. 
28 The matters that have ruined our society now, they did not exist in the past. People were alike and homogenous. 
27 Back then we were a community. Benefit of the society used to be the most important thing. 
30 Friends and families used to spend more time together, but today they neglect each other. Therefore, I have nostalgia for the 60s, much better times indeed. 
33 People used to be happy about visiting and gathering, but now they run away from each other. 
37 There was such intimacy among people that no one would be unaware of how is going to friends and acquaintances. 
41 Look at the children born in the 70s. They have nothing; at least, we have good memories. 
42 Our people are attracted to lowbrow culture, they act based on their personal advantages. At that time they cared about others. 
43 Our people are so attracted to lowbrow culture that all they can think is themselves. Despite the progress we had, no one cares about others, when 
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they see them in trouble. 
46 People were more intimate back then, they were aware of each other’s situation. Somehow, solidary was higher among people back then. 
47 People are busier today, there used to be enough time to serve family and friends. 
49 
Obviously, I have nostalgia for the time and that is because of economic and 
cultural situation we have now. Back then, economic problems were much less 
and people’s culture was homogenous. 
54 People are nowadays selfish, that is what did not exist in the 60s. 
55 I have a very good feeling towards the 60s, since there were no class in the society and everyone was kind to others. 
56 Now, people do not see many things and do not care about others, but they did not used to prefer themselves to others. 
58 There used to be common advantages, but the benefit today is to harm others. 
60 The society was consistent back then, everyone would understand others. 
These days’ differences are too much that no one even can notice others. 
63 Back then, everyone wanted the benefit of the society rather than their personal advantage. 
66 
People used to be brothers and sisters; today, real brothers have no mercy on 
each other. Pain and suffering used to be less, as people would be at each 
other’s sides. 
68 
People’s relationships used to be more beautiful; people had a better 
understanding of their situation. I have nostalgia, as people used to stick 
together. Now, they are tearing apart. 
70 
I do not remember much about that time, but I believe the situation was 
better. At least people were kinder. People used to have common feelings, we 
have lost this unity. 
78 People used to care about others and put their efforts to help others. Now, they would steal from others. 
80 Neighbours used to be like family back then; and now, family members are like strangers. Our society was consistent and homogenous. What about now? 
83 
I do not remember much about that time, but I know that it was a war and 
people were united and coherent. Communications were honest and intimate, 
not like today full of flattery and hypocrisy. 
85 
It is true that the situation was not good, there was a war, the economic 
situation was bad, but people were friends and brothers and overcame 
hardships. 
86 The 60s was the climax of our nation’s idealism. All had a common ideal. These days they all think about their own interests. 
90 The way people used to be is gone now. They used to care about others. Solidarity among people and their beliefs is gone now. 
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Table: B-1-3 
First Category: Moments/fixed meanings: Third sub-category: Absence of technology 
during the 60s. 
Num Phrase  
08 Technology has torn people apart and has made these days different. 
09 We had social solidarity back then, Technology and Internet have ruined everything,  
14 Technology and Internet caused people to tear apart.  
15 The situation was much better, when there was not Internet and such technologies.  
17 There was love among people back then, technology has ruined it.  
21 These mobile phones have spoiled the bond people used to have.  
23 Technology and luxury has spoiled people’s beliefs. Their beliefs used to be beautiful. 
24 Technology has torn people apart. When this stuff did not exist, people were intimate.  
30 People’s thoughts were close back then, technology has ruined everything. 
33 All the good things are screwed now and that is all because of satellite TV channels.  
39 Satellite TV channels and Internet has screwed everything up. 
43 Technology has changed everything and ruined the beautiful human relations. It was all more beautiful, when there was no technology.  
45 We are like machines now, like robots, feelings are lost among people.  
48 Satellite TV channels and Interne have changed our culture; people were not ready for such technology.  
55 Technology is an issue now. Everyone cares about worthless stuff.  
56 People used to socialise more and be kind to everyone in the streets. Now everyone is busy with their mobile phones.  
58 People used to be at others’ side, now they are apart, as culture has changed because of internet and satellite TV channels.  
63 
People used to support each other, now there is a distance among them. As 
long as these technologies did not exit, they would socialise with others even 
with people in the streets.  
65 
The progress of technology has made people to tear apart and do not care 
about others. Back then, as much as you cared about yourself, at least half that 
amount you would care about others.  
68 Everything was more beautiful back then and technology took away this beauty.  
71 Since we had not such technology and luxury back then, there were no jealousy among people and they used to be kind to others.  
74 Technology was not widespread and entertaining back then; it is tearing people apart now. 
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77 All the ladies are watching satellite TV channels or using internet now, which is why they do not care about each other. 
82 Satellites, internet and these technologies have made people apart.  
85 
TV programs of the time were great; they all had a message to give to the 
audience. Nowadays, what Internet and satellite TV programs try to teach is to 
care only about you. 
86 People used to have faith and belief. There was no satellite to take away 
people’s faith.  
90 
These technologies like new mobile phones and tablets and especially internet, 
have caused the emergence of a new life style. People spend no time together 
and even in family parties everyone just look at their technological things. 
 
Table: B-1-4 
First Category: Moments/fixed meanings: Fourth sub-category: Economic welfare 
during the 60s. 
Num Phrase  
01 
Economic situation made everything different. During the 60s, there were no 
such gap in the society, because the economic situation was more stable than 
todays.  
29 
Back then, you were sure about your financial situation, I mean, you knew that 
at least you would have something to eat with your family and you would not 
be hungry. 
38 Bad economy and the fact that everyone wants to keep up to the joneses are the reasons we had distanced the good old days. 
47 To find a job is a problem now, everybody had a job in the 60s. 
52 
Economic problems have reached a level that all principles and friendships 
have faded. 
53 
Economic and cultural situation make people to believe that the 60s were a 
better time. We have nothing of our own, while we used to have friendship 
and principles. 
75 
When income is low and poverty is widespread, conflict would emerge.  We 
used to have a good life with our income, whatever it was. 
02 Nostalgia we have, since everything was much better, we had welfare.  
03 Everyone has turned to be a wolf now, they want to rob you and make money. Back then, people cared about others.  
04 It was like this back then: everyone making any income would help those in need.  
05 Pennilessness is now the reason of all devastation. There were difficulties before, but all people were the same and no one had to keep up with others,  
07 When greed emerges, things go bad. Those days no one had greed.  
11 There were no luxury back then, therefore, expenses were less.   
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12 
Now, people just follow others to see what they buy, It was not like this at that 
time. 
13 Relationships were based on love those days, but today, it is based on money. 
18 I have nostalgic feelings towards those days, because I think that everything was better then. Money was not all people think of.  
20 I really like to return to those days, everything was better and money did not matter the way it does now.  
22 Now, people just want to keep up to the joneses. Back then, everyone was satisfied with what they had.  
25 At that time, people would not think of gathering a fortune. Now, everyone just think about money.  
27 Greed was less back then. 
28 Our financial situation might have been worse, but no one was greedy. Now, everyone is greedy for more money.  
31 Capitalist way of thinking is common now; everybody reaches for his own advantage.  
32 There is class gap today. Everybody tries to deceive others. 
34 The culture has changed. Everybody is going after money, cars, villas and etc. Back then, everybody was looking for spirituality.  
35 Now people do not know what to work for. That is why everybody is a money-worshiper. They used to care about others.  
36 People used to be intimate, if someone had a piece of bread; he would share it with others. Now, people look to see what they can take from others.  
37 
No one would steal from you, I mean, you could not point at someone and tell: 
he is gathering a fortune by robbing people. But now, everybody wants to rob 
you.  
40 Nowadays; one hundred percent of those who have a fortune, have robbed people. Who would rob people like this in the 60s? 
41 Life was easier back then indeed, the costs were less, you did not have to work your arse off to make a living.   
42 Back then, friendship and devotion were all people wanted; now they all look for money. 
46 Something that did not exist in the 60s was calculation to reach your own advantage.  
49 Nowadays everyone is greedy for money. At that time if you had something, you did not need to hide it from others, since there was no greed.  
51 Luxury and show off did not exist in the 60s, but now people show off about what they do not even have.  
54 People used to be pure, now everyone is thinking about financial issues. 
59 Now the culture has changed; people value things, which did not used to be valuable, people -these days- only care about money.   
60 
Money has become influential in a way that stealing is not immoral anymore. 
One, who steals more, is wealthier and gets others to respect him. While, it 
was humanity which used to be influential.  
61 I would love to live in the 60s. These days, everything is measured with money. 
 282 
If you are rich, you have value.  
62 There were not any economic problems back then. People would rather to be with their family and friends.  
66 Economic problems and the need to keep up with the joneses have made people to lose their kindness and communicate less.  
67 People were artists at that time; they knew the art of living. These days, everybody is following money.  
69 
All men would go to war back then; they did not care about financial issues. 
They only cared about their homeland. These days, they only care about 
themselves.  
70 The 60s was a time when people support others and work for others. Now, they all have a financial point of view.  
73 
Human, when hungry, is worse than an animal. I do not believe that our 
people are hungry, but greed has blinded them and made them to be obsessed 
with needs, which were not significant back then.  
78 In the 60s, it was hideous to eat out. These days, it is luxurious.  
79 People used to live more comfortable, since they were not envious of other’s life.  
80 People would give up their lives for the sake of others. These days, they do not even give up their money.  
83 Expectations used to be lower, you would be happy with a minimum income. Now, nothing can fulfil people.  
84 Life standards were based on morality. These days, they are based on financial measures.  
88 Our lives were blessed; I would work and feed a family. Now, I work ten times harder and it is not yet enough.   
89 People yet were not wolves who want steal other’s fortune.  
 
Table: B-2 
Second Category: Alternative preferred meanings. 
Num Phrase  
06 People of the 60s are the burnt generation. Everything has been experienced in this decade, but after the war, things got better.  
06 I do not understand why people stick to this nostalgia. New things are always better.  
10 In my opinion, there is not any difference between the 60s and other decades. Anyway, any time has its own characteristics.  
10 All I remember of the time is the hardship of war, the air raid sirens and fear. It was nothing beautiful. 
16 The 60s feels like sadness and deficiency for me, I am glad we have passed it.  
16 I have no special feeling towards the 60s. 
19 It has not changed that much, the situation used to bad and it is still the same. 
19 It is a cliché to say that people have changed during the time. Everyone -using his mind- can be a better person in order to live better.  
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26 If we say that people used to be better, we are affected by the state’s propaganda, which wants to cover its problems.  
26 
All I can remember is misery and misfortune. If you wanted to criticise, they 
would shut you up, because there was a war and revolutionary forces would 
make life a hell for you.  
44 I will not forget the bitter memories of that time, though our people passed it with unity.  
44 All bitterness and misery it was. All would lie to each other and no one would dare to tell how he truly thinks.  
50 Our people get carried away easily; the time was all about war, martyrdom and devotion. People would get carried away with this stuff. 
50 People who have experienced living in the 60s have forgotten the breath-taking circumstances in that decade; everything was about war and defeat.  
57 Not only I have no nostalgia about that decade, but also I even do not want to remember that decade because of difficulties that we had. 
57 The time has passed and the 60s has gone and I see no reason to remember that time.  
64 I do not even want to speak about that era. The 60s was the era of blood.  
64 
The decade was the era of fear and horror, we experienced war at that era and 
the domestic policy was about eliminating political parties and social groups. 
Why should I have nostalgia about that dark decade? 
57 
The 60s is all about war and propaganda of Islamic Republic about that war 
which could end 4 years earlier. Wartime caused that this Islamic Republic 
state became more powerful with taking youth’s life.   
57 
I do not remember that decade very well and I do not want to hear about the 
60s. Every problem and defeat that we face today is the product of that 
decade.  
72 I have no nostalgia about the 60s and I do not understand why remembering that era is so important. 
72 We passed an era and I think it would be better for our society to look forward, not remembering what has passed and never come back.  
76 I do not remember that decade; therefore, I have no nostalgia about the 60s. 
76 What I know about the 60s is war between Iran and Iraq, and I think having nostalgia about wartime is kind of psychological illness.   
87 
I have been born in that decade and I do not remember that decade very well, 
but I think passing the war era is good and personally I am so glad that we 
passed the 60s. 
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Section C  
Interviewees’ statements, which formed obtained categories in data analysing in 
regard to signifiers of “Sovereignty”, “Insight” and “Velayat Madari” in “Mukhtar 
Nameh” TV series. 
Table: C-1 
First Category: Ideal subjects’ positions. 
Num Phrase  
04 I believe in supreme leadership and I also believe the current supreme leader could prove the Shia is right and fair.  
04 Our people, I mean, most of them want the Islamic Republic, in the same way people of Syria want Bashar Al-Assad. 
12 I believe in supreme leadership, because at the end of the day, country needs a leader. 
12 Capitalists are the only group who are opposing the Islamic Republic; others support the regime.  
15 The country should be reformed, but through the means of supreme leadership.  
15 
I do not have an ideological approach, if there is an Islamic Republic and it 
works, then it is fine. The regime is great, if they do not pick on people and 
give them freedom. 
23 
We are the most secure country in the region. It must be because of a good 
government and supreme leader, isn’t it?  
23 
Everyone, everywhere, has his own problems, we have to trust the 
government in order to make the situation better. 
24 
We need a leader. If we did not have the supreme leader, our situation would 
be unsecure, as other countries in the region. 
24 
I am against anything that questions our security, whether it is an objection or 
an uprising or anything else. 
30 The supreme leader is good. His subordinates are hurting us. He, himself, is fine. 
30 
I love this country; I do not have any problem with the supreme leadership and 
I think this government is doing well in keeping the country in peace and 
safety.  
37 
You have to pay the price, if you want to substitute this regime. In this case, 
the current regime works for me and I am satisfied with the supreme 
leadership.  
37 We should maintain the supreme leader; we need a leader, unless the situation gets worse. 
39 I care about politics. I dissent the events of 2009, because we were about to lose our political independence. 
39 I agree with the concept of “insight”. Aqa (the supreme leader), himself has 
mentioned that anyone who has not acquired “insight” is helping the enemy.  
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45 The supreme leader as a superior person has saved the country many times. Everyone should trust the captain and the head of the ship. 
45 
We live from hand to mouth, everyone is unsure about the future. Anyway, we 
have security and that is because of this regime and the supreme leader. There 
are difficulties for sure, but they would be resolved.  
49 I do not have any problem with the supreme leader or the Islamic state, because I know any alternative would have its own damages and losses. 
49 Supreme leadership is not a problem, every state should work for the good of its people and we have security.  
55 
I believe we have cultural, economic and political problems in this country, 
which has a good leader. We should support the supreme leader and we 
should also have qualified people to manage. 
55 Most people in our society are religious that is why you cannot imagine a republic, which is not Islamic. 
58 
No one likes chaos here, as there is in Iraq, Egypt or Syria. At least, with this 
supreme leader, we have security.  
58 
The only way to change is an armed revolt, but it will cause casualties as it 
happened in Iraq and Syria against ISIS. We do not want Iran to be like this and 
pay such price 
63 
Every society, in any time, needs a leader to help people reach what they 
want; considering current situation in Iran and in the region, I think the 
supreme leader did well in maintaining the country. 
63 
We have security in the Islamic Republic, which is the most important factor. 
So, political issues and such stuff are nonsense. We owe security in this 
country to the supreme leader. 
65 
I basically agree with the concept of supreme leadership, but the supreme 
leader must be someone who supports all people. 
65 
Theocratic regime and supreme leadership are fine concepts, if only they work 
right, and I think the current supreme leader is doing well in serving country 
and keeping it in peace and security. 
67 Most of our people are Muslims and to be honest, they do not have capacity for a non-Islamic state; that is why this supreme leader is very fine. 
67 The supreme leader or any other kind of leader needs to bring welfare to people. Anyway, at least this supreme leader has brought us security. 
70 I support the supreme leader one hundred percent, since society needs a leader. Our society is Islamic, the leader must be a Muslim.  
70 
Theocratic regime is the best, because religion is a determining frame of life 
and when you do not have religion, it leads to chaos. A leader above all people 
also prevents chaos. 
82 
We have security in the country, the security that no other country in the 
region has. It indicates that Islamic Republic’s policies and actions by the 
supreme leader are right. 
82 I have been to other countries; I am familiar with their situation. Our country has the most desirable environment. 
90 If we did not have the supreme leader, we would have the same situation as Iraq and Syria.  
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90 Foreign countries have always wanted to control our country, but the supreme leader and Islamic Republic have always stopped them.  
 
Table: C-2-1  
Second Category: Floating signifiers: The economy is important. 
Num Phrase  
01 
I have no comment on supreme leadership; economic situation has affected 
the culture and spirituality in this country. If economy works, we would not 
have political problems.  
01 
I would not struggle for reform in Iran; the situation is not that bad and there 
are only economic concerns.  
02 
I have no comment on supreme leadership, if economy improves, even this 
government would work. People’s financial situation is catastrophic; wealth 
inequality among people has increased. 
02 If economic problems get solved, the situation gets better and people would reach peace.  
11 
The main problem of all people is economic issues; talking about the supreme 
leader is useless, no one is in the mood to oppose any other issue and pay any 
price for any objection.  
11 The main problem today is economy, financial situation of ordinary people is bad, and that is why they do not care about politics.  
20 I am not into politics, economy is the main priority, if it improves; everything gets better.  
20 
We do not have political problems; it is about economy. Iranian Rial’s value has 
dropped and we cannot travel abroad anymore. I have no opinion about 
supreme leadership, but I know people should be satisfied and if economy 
improves, they would be. 
27 
The supreme leader or anyone else, it has no difference as long as they work 
to make economic situation better. Our main problem is economy. It is not 
related to the supreme leadership. The westerners made us miserable by the 
sanctions. 
27 
The first demand of men is money, we have economic issues and this should 
get fixed. We need respect. The economic situation has made us miserable and 
degraded. 
29 
I am not into politics and I have nothing to do with supreme leadership, only if 
financial situation gets better.   
29 
Everybody has financial problems; we cannot travel abroad anymore to buy 
cloths and such stuff. The main problem is economy, who is in the mood for 
political protests? 
32 The issue is not the supreme leader, freedom and such. The main issue is economy. Some make easy money and they have a monopoly on economy. 
32 Wealthy people are getting wealthier and poor get poorer. I am not into politics; my financial situation is awful. 
 287 
34 
I do not think about the supreme leader and alike. If you had money, you 
would have everything. The regime should be economically reformed. If 
economy improves, culture would get fixed then. 
34 
When economy gets fixed and inflation gets to be controlled, then you can 
think of other issues. 
35 
I am not into politics and I do not even think about the theocratic state. 
Objective condition of life matters to me, and it is the fact that economic 
condition is down. 
35 
The whole world demands freedom, happiness, laughter, amusement parks, 
traveling and so on. Any regime that can provide these demands is fine with 
me. 
38 I am not into politics and I would not pay any price for any change. If only economic situation get better, we would reach peace.  
38 
If you acquire money, politics and culture would get fixed. When financial 
issues get solved, political and cultural problems would drop. I have nothing to 
do with politics; our problem is economy. 
40 
I do not have any problem with supreme leadership; our issue is not politics 
but economy. We need an economic reform. 
40 
When you have freedom, but you do not have a job, it is unimportant. I am not 
into politics; I only want my job status to improve. 
41 
Everything is wrong nowadays, it has nothing to do with the supreme 
leadership or such stuff; the main issue is economy. Economy is determinant. 
How can we affect politics? 
41 Politics is not important; it is not our concern. People are concerned about economic situation. 
46 
I do not have any problem with the theocratic state and the supreme leader. If 
they do their job and fix the economic issues, no one would have any problem 
with them. 
46 I believe we have issues to fix, such as economic issues. But it is our problems and they have nothing to do with foreigners.  
47 
I do not have any political issue with the supreme leader, If he can maintain 
people’s livelihoods. But the problem is that if he is gone, our situation gets 
worse. 
47 The main issue is economy, because in cultural aspect, our people do not have capacity for freedom. 
53 
People have economic problems. In this case, it is no one’s business to know if 
the supreme leader is good or bad. People should work hard, though they do 
not.  
53 The theocratic regime should remain, but our people need economic welfare and it is the most important demand. 
54 
Everybody is in search of money and easy ways to earn it, which is why politics 
is only a concern for people who live abroad. I do not have a problem with the 
supreme leader, if only he can fix economic problems. 
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54 
In order to be wealthy in this country, you have to be close to the sources of 
power. I used to live morally, I had not accepted a bribe, and then, I realised I 
have lost my opportunities. Now I accept it and I am like others. 
62 There are priorities. Our problem is not supreme leadership now, it is economic policies, which has made people miserable and has created inflation. 
62 
Our economy is sick. Informal dealers are close to the Revolutionary Guards 
and top officials, they get wealthier and ordinary people get poorer. If you 
oppose, they would shut you up. 
73 
Politics is not an issue right now, but our economy needs to be fixed. 
Comparing to other countries in the region, our political situation is very good. 
Our problem is economy; political concerns are useless. 
73 
Economic problems made people to believe that our problem is caused by an 
Islamic state, but if this very state works based on true Islam, every problem 
should be solved. 
75 Politics is not the main factor, but economy is. We should work harder and corruption should be controlled. 
75 People’s problem is economy. No one follows political and cultural issues as long as we have economic problems.  
79 If Islamic Republic and supreme leader find a way to resolve these economic problems, we do not have any problem with the Islamic Republic. 
79 
The issue is not politics; I have nothing to do with politics. My main concern is 
economy, I want to travel abroad once a year and I need something to be done 
in order to do so.  
83 I am not into politics and I do not comment on political issues. I believe that if our economy improves. Our country improves as well.  
83 
I work a lot and I need to have a comfortable life. I am not a man of politics; I 
do not care about it. All people including me, have financial problems, it has 
nothing to do with politics. 
 
Table C-2-2 
Second Category: Floating signifiers: People’s culture is bad. 
Num Phrase  
03 
These days, all people are hypocritical and deceptive. They change their mind, 
depending on where they stand. The problem of our country is not theocracy 
and supreme leader. People make up the problems. 
03 Our nation has problems, even if this theocratic regime change – which is unlikely-, people would not change.  
07 
Our people are all about pleasure and idleness, it has nothing to do with the 
regime and theocracy, they lack humanistic values. We used to see positive 
characteristics everywhere. People have become fool, a bunch of indifferent 
fools! 
07 History has taught us that our people are not honourable. They are all for self. They have no honour.  
13 Everybody is nagging about his or her status, but no one is going to do 
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something. They are all chasing money. Our people are opportunists; no one 
really cares about reforming the situation. 
13 We face many problems in culture, industry, economy and welfare. Some of 
these issues are related to the state, but most of them are people’s faults.  
22 If society changes and people do the right things, political issues would get fixed. The problem is not the supreme leader, but people.  
22 No group effort has ever worked in this country. Everyone should try to reform oneself individually; team work has nothing but damage. 
36 Our current issue is not politics and the supreme leader, because we have many thieves who are connected to power and they rob people.  
36 
Money is the axis of everything; some had connections to the sources of power 
and became rich. They had the ability. Those who do not have the ability nag 
about the situation. In this country, if you neglect the principles, you would get 
rich. 
42 This country needs a reform, no one knows how? Our people have turned into fools who worship money.  
42 Our culture has a problem, people are immoral and it has ruined everything. While, in an Islamic Republic, Islamic principles should be observed.  
52 
We do not have political problems, I mean, we have but they are not 
important comparing to the fact that our people’s culture is a mess. In a 
culture that rich people are thieves, do you believe political protest works? 
52 
When everyone worships money and when all wealthy people are thieves, you 
should obviously shut politics down. Our politics is ruined, the same as our 
culture, but we can do nothing! 
89 
Our problem is that people have lost faith in god; they have turned into liars 
and thieves. The supreme leader is good and he is dealing very well with 
problems that have occurred in the region.  
89 Our main problem is that people have lost Islamic culture and become corrupted. 
 
Table: C-3 
Third Category: Rejecting the position of “others”. 
Num Phrase  
05 
I am not into politics; I just follow the news. I prefer to withdraw the issue, 
since there is nothing I can do about it.  
05 I have no opinion about supreme leadership. I do not want to be into politics. I am not ready to pay its price. 
06 I am not into politics and I have no political comment, I only know that everything is wrong here. 
06 I do not even think about this stuff. If politicians could do something, that is great. It has nothing to do with me to pay any price for. 
08 I have nothing to do with politics, what is the use of distressing me? People would be more satisfied, if these political struggles were less. 
08 I have nothing to do with supreme leadership. Why would I think about it? 
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09 I am not into politics at all. In 2009, I joined the protests till June the 15
th; then 
I got scared and quit.  
09 We have lots of political satellite TV channels. If something could be done, they would do it. If they cannot, why would we make the situation worse? 
14 
I am not into politics, because I am not ready to pay its price. There is no use in 
objecting this regime or supreme leadership. You only have to pay the price for 
your opposition. 
14 Politics has no meaning in this country, since as you speak about politics, you would go to prison. 
17 
I am not into politics. I used to attend official rallies of Islamic Republic when I 
was a teenager, then I realised that they are taking advantage of us. Politics is 
not our job to do; it is biting more than we can chew.   
17 I am not into politics and I do not answer such questions. I cannot comment on supreme leadership. 
18 I do not have any problem with the supreme leader, but I believe men of god should handle religion and let politicians do politics.  
18 
We need reform, but I am not ready to pay any price, because we have built 
our lives by now.  
21 I am not into politics and have no comment about the issue. 
21 I essentially dissent a theocratic state. But I would not pay any price to put it down; because we have some kind of peace now.  
25 
I am not into politics, I follow the news but I am not ready to pay any price. 
Anyone, based on his capability should do as he can to reform the country. I 
have no capability.  
25 If the Islamic state reforms, that is wonderful. If it did not, we wait for it to collapse, because a revolt has no function. 
28 I am not into politics. I did not go out to protest in 2009. I mean, I was afraid to get arrested. 
28 The regime should be reformed, everything should be reformed, but it is not our job. Politicians should do that.  
31 I am not into politics and have no opinion about these issues. 
31 
Politics is ugly; I have nothing to do with it. I do not care about the supreme 
leader and such, because I am not ready to pay the price. Change in politics; do 
not change your life. 
33 I am not into politics and have nothing to do with it. Everyone who cares about politics should be ready to pay the price. 
33 The state is so powerful that they do not let people say any word in objection. 
43 I am not into politics; these struggles make me sick. 
43 
Politics is for politicians; I have another job. We should find a practical way to 
practice politics, because in this country political activism is impossible, it is 
better to stay silent. 
48 I am not involved in politics; I believe the problem is inside people’s hearts, if we all change our hearts, the situation gets better. 
48 To pay any price for any political activity is the most useless work in the world. Men should not ruin their lives for nothing. 
 291 
50 I am not into politics, in my opinion people do not want to get involved in politics, because it has a price to pay. 
50 Politics is ugly and nasty. I have nothing to do with the supreme leader. Anyone he is, I do not care. 
56 
I am not interested in politics and have no comment. Politics is ugly. I have 
nothing to do with it and I believe it is insignificant. 
56 
For instance, protests in 2009 were useless. Its only function was for people to 
understand how ugly politics is. 
59 I am not into politics; I do not even follow the news. I try not to involve in political debates, because I have no interest and I do not like to pay its price. 
59 When one you are confronting is strong and your political thoughts may cause you to pay a price, why would you do that? 
60 I have no opinion about political issues. 
60 Politics and political activity is useless even when you have strong objections to the situation, because you have to risk many things. 
61 I am not into politics, but I believe all issues are coming from forcing Islam on people. People should be free to be Muslims or not to be Muslims. 
61 If I knew that objection and political activity has no price to pay, I would do that, but I know it causes damage; therefore, I prefer to be silent. 
66 I am not into politics and I do not go along with the crowd.   
66 I have no idea about supreme leadership; it is dangerous to comment on such issues. 
68 I am not into politics and have no opinion. Politics is dangerous. I follow the news and I feel sorry, because nothing can be done. 
68 Political activity and objection is useless, I am not ready to pay its price. 
69 I am not into politics at all and have no opinion. 
69 I have nothing to do with supreme leadership, I believe in morality. The only approach, which can help us, is morality, not politics and protests.  
71 I am not into politics, but I follow the news and I believe our problems are beyond political struggles.  
71 
If I were against the current political situation and the supreme leader, I would 
say nothing because I do not want to pay any price or get hurt over these 
issues. 
72 I hate politics and have nothing to do with it. 
72 The situation is in a way that if you have any objection you would not speak out because of fear. 
74 
I am not into politics and do not think about this stuff, I want to earn a 
minimum income to live.  
74 
This very supreme leader is a pure dictator, but who dare to say it? They will 
catch you and send you to Kahrizak (The notorious jail in 2009). 
76 
I am not into politics, but it is not possible for all to be indifferent; someone -I 
mean politicians- should do something.  
76 There is not any appropriate idea worth fighting, which is why I have nothing to do with politics. 
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77 
Nowadays, politics plays a vital role in people’s lives and everybody knows how 
important politics is. However, people try to neglect this fact, because they are 
afraid to pay any price.  
77 
Not only me but also no one is satisfied with the current situation, though, no 
one wants to pay any price, nor me and neither others. 
78 I am not into politics; I mean I try not to be. Since it is useless and has nothing but distress.  
78 Some got very rich during these years, because they were connected to power. Now, if you say something against it, they will send you to Kahrizak! 
80 I have no opinion about politics; I cannot earn a minimum income to live, to hell with politics! 
80 Politics and protests, for example the incidents of 2009, belong to some useless people who have no real problem. 
81 I am not into politics at all and have no opinion. 
81 What is the use of a politics? Politics is nasty, some pay the price and nothing changes at the end.  
84 I am not into politics, because to enter this world, you have to pay the price and I am not the man to pay any price. 
84 I do not think about the supreme leader. I mean, it has nothing to do with me. 
86 I am not into politics. I believe you should not follow politics, because it is cruel. 
86 Political objection such as protests and such, are ridiculous. They only eradicate the security we have. 
87 I do not comment on political issues, I do not even dare to tell my spouse my political opinions.  
87 I have nothing to do with supreme leadership; it has nothing to do with the way I live. As long as we have security, I do not care about other stuff.  
88 I am not into politics; however, I am not unaware of political issues. 
88 Political objection only leads to damage and any wise man will not do that.  
 
Table: C-4 
Fourth Category: The positions of “others”. 
Num Phrase  
10 
If the state let people to live as they desire and have their own life style, 
everyone would be satisfied. The current supreme leader is a dictator and he 
forces people to accept his idea about everything. 
10 I am not into politics, but I believe we should have freedom of speech, freedom in clothing and freedom in film industry and media. 
16 We have to have a proper vision to politics. The current supreme leader has caused major problems in this country. 
16 Anything this regime is, it must be reformed. Because as soon as they go away, worse than it would come and rule.  
19 It would be great if we had freedom of speech alongside supreme leadership. We need to reform; another revolution has many damages and casualties. 
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19 I am really into politics, everything we have, depends on politics.  
26 I would like this regime and it’s supreme leader to collapse, but who can help it? I am not ready to pay any price for this cause.  
26 I care about politics and I have a problem with the theocratic state, people 
should have freedom. Their religion is not other’s business.  
44 
This theocratic regime and the supreme leader interfere in every aspect of 
people’s life. It is not right. It was not like this in the Islamic Republic; we have 
to revive the Ideals of Islamic Revolution.  
44 
At the end of the day, this society needs a reform. If this regime collapses, 
foreigners would take its place and they are worse. So, the current regime 
should be reformed. 
51 This supreme leader is not ideal, because he only pretends to be an Islamic person. If he were truly Islamist, that would be wonderful.  
51 
Everything in this country needs a serious reform, politics and culture and 
economy and the current government cannot do anything because they do not 
know anything about true Islam.  
57 
I, personally, believe the current supreme leader is the main factor that has 
caused insoluble problems in the country. He has to go away and then people 
can decide freely how they want to live.  
57 The problem of this country is dictatorship. 
64 I am totally disagreeing with supreme leadership and the Islamic state, I think these are forms of dictatorship and have to be gone.  
64 The circumstance matters, if the circumstance is in a way that a protest does not lead to violence, you should protest then.  
85 
The current regime is forcing people to do what the supreme leader demands. 
The state needs to deal well with people and not neglects their demands and 
needs.  
85 
Everyone should be able to do as s/he decides; for instance, about veiling. We 
do not have fundamental problems and the ones we face now, are going to be 
solved eventually. 
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TABLE OF INTERVIEWEES 
Code 
S
e
x 
Age Education 
Household 
Income per 
month 
Million IIR 
Married 
/ 
Children 
Occupation 
Car 
Owner
ship 
Religious 
Affiliation 
Satelli
te 
User 
Inter
net 
User 
Housin
g 
01 M 23 MA Student 3.5 N Student N 0 N Y 
Owner 
 
02 M 25 BA 4 Y/0 Soldier Y 3 Y Y Owner 
03 M 24 BA 7 N Self-employed N 3 Y Y Owner 
04 M 28 Diploma 4 Y/1 Mechanic Y 3 Y Y Tenant 
05 F 19 BA Student 3.5 N Student N 2 Y Y Owner 
06 M 30 BA 7.5 Y/0 Self-employed Y 3 Y Y Owner 
07 F 29 Diploma 4 Y/0 Secretary Y 1 Y Y Owner 
08 F 24 BA 3.5 N Unemployed N 2 Y Y Tenant 
09 F 52 Diploma 2.5 Y/3 Housekeeper Y 2 Y N Owner 
10 M 29 MA 4.5 N Vendor N 3 Y Y Owner 
11 F 23 MA Student 4.5 N Student N 1 N Y Owner 
12 M 31 BA 4.5 Y/1 Employee Y 1 Y Y Tenant 
13 M 33 Diploma 2 Y/1 
Governme
nt 
employee 
Y 0 Y Y Owner 
14 F 55 MA 5 Y/2 Teacher Y 3.5 Y Y Owner 
15 F 53 BA 7 Y/3 Housekeeper Y 1 Y Y Owner 
16 F 42 Diploma 2.5 Y/2 Housekeeper Y 0 Y Y Owner 
17 M 60 BA 3 Y/4 Flight engineer Y 1 Y Y Tenant 
18 M 38 Diploma 3 N Accountant N 2 Y Y Owner 
19 F 25 BA 4 N Unemployed N 3 N Y Owner 
20 M 23 BA 3.5 N Driver N 2.5 N Y Owner 
21 F 61 MA 3 Y/2 Artist Y 1 Y Y Owner 
22 F 44 MA 3 Y/2 Art teacher Y 0 Y Y Owner 
23 M 67 MA 3 Y/4 Film maker Y 0 Y Y Owner 
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24 M 62 MA 3.5 Y/3 Self-employed Y 4 Y Y Owner 
25 M 27 BA 2.5 Y/0 
Governme
nt 
employee 
Y 1 Y N Tenant 
26 F 35 PhD 3.5 Y/O University tutor Y 1 N Y Owner 
27 M 25 BA 4 N Structural engineer N 3 Y Y Owner 
28 F 33 MA 5 Y/1 Housekeeper Y 1.5 Y Y Owner 
29 M 47 MA 3 Y/0 Manager N 2 N Y Owner 
30 F 37 BA 5.5 Y/1 Housekeeper Y 2 N Y Owner 
31 F 27 BA 2.5 N 
Governme
nt 
employee 
Y 0 Y Y Owner 
32 F 26 MA Student 2.5 Y/0 Student Y 3 Y Y Owner 
33 M 48 MA 3.5 Y/2 
Governme
nt 
employee 
Y 3 N Y Tenant 
34 F 35 MA 3 Y/2 Housekeeper Y 3 Y Y Owner 
35 M 28 BA 3 Y/0 Self-employed Y 3 Y Y Tenant 
36 F 25 BA 2.5 N Unemployed Y 3 Y Y Owner 
37 M 27 MA 2.5 N Employee Y 3 N Y Tenant 
38 F 35 MA 2.5 Y/1 Housekeeper Y 3 N Y Tenant 
39 F 49 MA 3.5 Y/3 Housekeeper Y 4 N Y Owner 
40 F 33 BA 8 Y/1 Housekeeper Y 2.5 Y Y Tenant 
41 F 28 PhD Student 7 N Student Y 5 Y Y Owner 
42 M 36 MA Student 2.5 Y/0 Student Y 4 N Y Tenant 
43 M 36 BA 2 N Seller Y 3 N Y Owner 
44 F 34 BA 3 Y/1 Housekeeper Y 1 Y Y Owner 
45 F 57 BA 6 Y/3 Housekeeper Y 3 Y Y Owner 
46 M 24 Diploma 2.5 N Mobile repairman N 0 Y Y Owner 
47 M 28 BA 3 N Accountant Y 2 Y Y Owner 
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48 F 45 Diploma 7 Y/2 Self-employed Y 1 Y Y Tenant 
49 M 37 BA 4.5 Y/1 
Governme
nt 
employee 
Y 4 Y Y Owner 
50 F 33 MA Student 3.5 Y/0 Student Y 3 Y Y Owner 
51 M 26 BA 2.5 N Employee N 2 Y Y Owner 
52 M 26 BA 2.5 N Employee N 1 Y Y Owner 
53 F 25 BA 2.5 N Unemployed N 0 Y Y Owner 
54 F 38 Diploma 4.5 Y/2 Housekeeper Y 0 Y Y Tenant 
55 M 49 Diploma 6 Y/2 Self-employed Y 2 N Y Owner 
56 M 51 MA 5 Y/1 
Governme
nt 
employee 
Y 3 Y Y Owner 
57 F 34 BA 3.5 Y/0 Translator Y 2 Y Y Owner 
58 M 31 BA 5 N Mechanic engineer Y 2 N Y Tenant 
59 F 26 BA 5.5 N Model Y 1 Y Y Tenant 
60 M 24 BA Student 3.5 N Student N 1 Y Y Tenant 
61 F 25 BA 3 Y/0 Writer Y 2 Y Y Owner 
62 F 39 Diploma 2.5 Y/2 Housekeeper Y 3 N Y Owner 
63 M 42 MA 5 Y/2 Trader Y 2 N Y Owner 
64 M 58 MA 6 Y/2 Self-employed Y 2 Y Y Owner 
65 M 61 BA 5.5 Y/3 
Governme
nt 
employee 
Y 1 Y N Owner 
66 F 24 BA 4.5 N Unemployed N 0 Y Y Owner 
67 M 35 BA 4.5 N Self-employed Y 1 Y Y Tenant 
68 F 67 Diploma 4 Y/2 Housekeeper Y 3 Y N Tenant 
69 F 44 PhD 8 Y/1 Doctor Y 1 Y Y Owner 
70 M 23 BA Student 3 N Student N 3.5 Y Y Owner 
71 F 51 BA 3.5 Y/2 Housekeeper Y 0 Y Y Owner 
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72 M 26 BA 2.5 N Unemployed N 2 Y Y Tenant 
73 F 34 MA Student 4 Y/0 Student Y 2 Y Y Owner 
74 F 39 MA 4.5 Y/0 Seller Y 1 N Y Owner 
75 M 27 BA 3 N Self-employed Y 2 N Y Owner 
76 F 25 BA 2 Y/0 Housekeeper Y 0 Y Y Tenant 
77 F 40 MA 2 Y/2 Housekeeper Y 0 Y Y Owner 
78 F 19 BA Student 4.5 N Student N 0 N Y Owner 
79 M 35 BA 2 Y/0 
Governme
nt 
employee 
Y 2 Y Y Tenant 
80 F 26 BA 1.5 Y/0 Editor N 1 Y Y Owner 
81 M 48 MA 3.5 Y/2 Housekeeper Y 2 Y Y Owner 
82 F 53 MA 2.5 Y/3 Housekeeper Y 2 Y Y Tenant 
83 M 27 BA 2 N Journalist Y 1 Y Y Tenant 
84 F 30 MA Student 4 N Student Y 0 N Y Tenant 
85 F 41 BA 4 Y/1 Housekeeper Y 2 Y Y Owner 
86 M 56 Diploma 5.5 Y/2 Self-employed Y 3 Y Y Owner 
87 M 28 BA 1.5 Y/0 IT manager Y 0 Y Y Owner 
88 F 26 BA 3 Y/0 Employee N 0 Y Y Owner 
89 F 33 MA 2.5 Y/1 Housekeeper N 0 Y Y Owner 
90 F 39 MA 3 Y/2 Housekeeper Y 1 Y Y Owner 
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